The development of a multidimensional scale to measure irrational beliefs regarding frustration intolerance by Harrington, Neil
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALE














THE CONCEPT OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE 14
1.1 INTRODUCTION 14
1.2 OVERVIEW OF RATIONAL EMOTIVE BEHAVIOUR
THERAPY 14





1.3.5 Psychodynamic perspectives 23
1.3.6 Summary 25
1.4 BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH 26
1.4.1 Early research and Amsel's theory 26
1.4.2 Radical behaviourism 30
1.4.3 Summary 31
1.5 SOCIAL COGNITION AND SELF-REGULATION 32
1.5.1 Delay of gratification 32
1.5.2 Negative affect 33
1.5.3 Self-worth 35
1.5.4 Willpower and ego-depletion 36
1.5.5 Personality traits 38
1.5.6 Summary 39
1.6 COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL MODELS 40
1.7 THE REBT CONCEPT OF LOW FRUSTRATION
TOLERANCE 42
1.7.1 Structure of irrational beliefs 42
1.7.2 Self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs 45
1.7.3 Content of frustration intolerance beliefs 47
2
1.7.4 The definition of irrationality 50
1.7.5 Levels of frustration tolerance 53
1.7.6 Pleasure versus pain: approach and avoidance 54
1.7.7 Trait or state 56
1.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 57
CHAPTER TWO
THE ASSESSMENT OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS 60
2.1 INTRODUCTION 60
2.2 EARLY SCALES 60
2.2.1 Methodological issues 60
2.2.2 Theoretical issues 62
2.3 EXPLORING BELIEF PROCESSES 64
2.4 EXPLORING BELIEF CONTENT 68
2.5 DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN FRUSTRATION 73
INTOLERANCE AND EGO DISTURBANCE
2.6 ITEM WORDING 74
2.7 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 75
2.8 GENERAL ASSESSMENT ISSUES 78
2.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 85
2.10 RESEARCH AIMS 89
CHAPTER THREE






3.3.4 Preliminary scale: Clinical group 93
3.3.5 Changes in measures for revised scale 96
3.3.6 Additional measures for student group 96
3.3 PRELIMINARY SCALE CONSTRUCTION 96
3.4 ITEM WORDING AND STRUCTURE 96
3.4.1 Differentiating the two categories ofbelief 96
3.4.2 Rational versus irrational beliefs 98
3.4.3 Scaling method 99
3.4.4 Item reversal and valance 100
3.4.5 Item selection and generation 103
3.5 PILOT STUDY 105
3.5.1 Procedure 105
3.5.2 Frequency analysis 105
3.5.3 Item revision 107
3.6 ANALYSIS OF THE FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE 110
3.6.1 Response rates 110
3.6.2 Missing data 111
3.6.3 Outlier identification 111
3.6.4 Scoring method and analysis 111
3.7 RESULTS 112
3.7.1 Descriptive statistics 112
3.7.2 Preliminary analyses 115
3.7.3 Frequency analysis 115
3.7.4 Reliability analysis 116
3.7.5 'MAP' analysis 120
3.7.6 Interaction with ego-disturbance 128
3.7.7 Comparison of clinical and student groups 129
3.8 ITEM SELECTION 131
3.9 DISCUSSION 132
CHAPTER FOUR
FACTOR ANALYTIC STUDY 135
4.1 INTRODUCTION 135
4.2 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 135
4.2.1 Sample size and composition 135
4.2.2 Screening for normality and non-linearity 136
4.2.3 Factorability of the correlation matrix 137
4.3 METHOD 137
4.3.1 Rotation 137
4.3.2 Factor determination 138
4.3.3 Factor loading criteria 140
4.4 RESULTS 141
4.4.1 Four-factor solution 141
4.4.2 Five and six-factor solutions 148
4.4.3 Oblique rotation 149
4.5 FACTOR INTERPRETATION AND DESCRIPTIONS 153
4.5.1 Factor I (Emotional discomfort) 154
4.5.2 Factor II (Entitlement) 157
4.5.3 Factor III (Comfort) 161
4.5.4 Factor IV (Achievement) 163
4.6 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 165
4.7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 169




FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE AND EGO-DISTURBANCE 111
5.1 INTRODUCTION 111
5.2 METHOD 182
5.2.1 Participants and procedure 182
5.3 RESULTS 183
5.3.1 Adequacy of the self-esteem measure: Preliminary analysis 183
5.3.2 Rosenberg Scale: Descriptive analysis 186
5.3.3 Frustration intolerance and self-esteem 188
5.3.4 High and low self-esteem and frustration intolerance 190
5.3.5 Relationship ofRosenberg Scale and emotional disturbance 192
5.3.6 Relationship of the difference score to other measures 193
3.7.7 Confirmatory factor analysis 197
5.4 DISCUSSION 211
CHAPTER SIX








6.6.1 Preliminary data analysis 219
6.6.2 Descriptive and correlational analysis 220
6.6.3 Regression analysis 223
6.6.4 Relationship between anger and difference score 224
6.7 RELATIONSHIP OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE WITH
DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY 226
6.7.1 Preliminary data analysis 226
6.7.2 Descriptive and correlational analysis 226
6.8 ANXIETY 228
6.8.1 Discriminative analysis 228
6.8.2 Regression analysis 229
6.9 DEPRESSION 233
6.9.1 Preliminary analysis 233
6.9.2 Descriptive and correlational analysis 234
6.9.3 Regression analysis 235
6.10 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS 238
5
6.11 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CLINICAL AND STUDENT
POPULATIONS 241
6.11.1 Descriptive analysis 241
6.11.2 Logistic analysis 242
6.11.3 Regression diagnostics 243
6.12 DIVERGENT AND CONVERGENT VALIDITY 244
6.13 DISCUSSION 247
CHAPTER SEVEN
PROBLEMS OF SELF-CONTROL 251
7.1 INTRODUCTION 251
7.2 METHOD 256
7.2.1 Procedure and measures 256
7.2.2 Participants 257
7.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE DYSFUNCTIONAL COPING
INVENTORY 257
7.3.1 Introduction 257
7.3.2 Dysfunctional Coping Inventory: Preliminary analysis 258
7.4 RESULTS 260
7.4.1 Relationship between self-control items 260
7.4.2 Relationship between self-control items and frustration
intolerance 262
7.5 ANALYSIS OF SELF-HARM 266
7.5.1 Preliminary analysis 266
7.5.2 Correlational analysis 266
7.5.3 Logistic regression analysis 269
7.5.4 Discriminant item analysis 271
7.6 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 272
7.6.1 Introduction 272
7.6.2 Model specification 274











8.4 PROCRASTINATION FREQUENCY AND PROBLEM
SUB-SCALES 296
8.4.1 Preliminary analysis 296
8.5 PROCRASTINATION REASONS SUB-SCALE 298
8.5.1 Preliminary analysis 298
8.5.2 Factor analysis 299
8.5.3 Relationship between PASS procrastination scales 304
8.6 RELATIONSHIP OF PROCRASTINATION TO FRUSTRATION
INTOLERANCE 306
8.6.1 Preliminary Frustration-Discomfort scale 306
8.6.2 Fear of failure and frustration intolerance interaction 308
8.6.3 Revised Frustration-Discomfort scale 313
8.6.4 Analysis of individual academic tasks 315
8.6.5 Interaction between frustration intolerance and self-esteem 316
8.7 DISCUSSION 318
CHAPTER NINE







9.3.1 Descriptive data: background questionnaire 327
9.4 OUTCOME DATA 329
9.4.1 Therapy attendance 329
9.4.2 Therapy dropout 331
9.4.3 Therapy outcome 333
9.4.4 Analysis of questionnaire non-replies 333
9.5 DISCUSSION 334
CHAPTER TEN
THE REVISED FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE 337
10.1 INTRODUCTION 337
PART I: SCALE REDESIGN AND CONFIRMATORY ANALYSIS 337
10.2 SCALE REDESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
10.2.1 Question structure







10.2.5 Statistical approach: Structural equation modeling 340
10.3 RESULTS 342
10.3.1 Missing data 342
10.3.2 Descriptive statistics 342
10.3.3 Frequency analysis 344
10.3.4 Full scale: Reliability and'MAP'analysis 346
10.3.5 Short scale: Item selection 347
10.3.6 Descriptive statistics 349
10.4 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 351
10.4.1 Model specification 351
10.4.2 Results: Full scale 353
10.4.3 Results: Short scale 357
10.4.4 Normative data 360
PART II: VALIDATION ANALYSIS 361
10.5 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CLINICAL AND STUDENT
POPULATIONS 361
10.6 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN SELF-ESTEEM AND
FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT 364
10.6.1 Preliminary analysis 364
10.6.2 Relationship to frustration-discomfort 365
10.7 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL MEASURES 367
10.7.1 HAD scale: Preliminary analysis 367
10.7.2 Anxiety 368
10.7.3 Regression analysis 369
10.7.4 Depression 370
10.7.5 Regression analysis 371
10.7.6 Anger 372
10.7.7 Regression analysis 373
10.7.8 Relationship between frustration intolerance,
self-esteem and anger 375
10.7.9 Differentiation between anger and depression 376






11.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS 383
11.2.1 Scale development 383
11.2.2 Validation study: Self-esteem 384
11.2.3 Validation study: Emotional disturbance 385
11.2.4 Validation study: Self-control 385
11.2.5 Validation study: Procrastination 385
11.2.6 Validation study: Therapy engagement 386
11.2.7 Analysis of revised scale 386
11.3 THE STRUCTURE OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE 387
11.4 EGO DISTURBANCE AND FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE 392
11.5 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 396
11.6 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 398
11.7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 400




1 Frustration-Discomfort Scale (Revised scale complete items) 454
2 Frustration-Discomfort Scale (Preliminary scale) 455
3 Pilot questionnaire 456
4 Frustration-Discomfort Scale (Revised short version) 457
5 Patient information/Consent form 458
6 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 459
7 Dysfunctional Coping Scale 460
8 Schema questionnaire (Impaired limits sub-scales) 461
9 Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) 462
10 Trait Anger Scale 463
11 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAD) 464
12 Background Information Questionnaire 465





Skewness and kurtosis analysis (Preliminary scale)
Item frequency distributions (Preliminary scale)




























Four-factor rotated component matrix: Complete item loadings
(Preliminary scale)
Five-factor rotated component matrix (Preliminary scale)
Six-factor rotated component matrix (Preliminary scale)
Item frequency distributions (Revised Scale)
Full-scale reliability analysis/Rosenberg correlations (Revised scale)
'MAP' analysis: Four factors (Revised scale)
'MAP' analysis: Five factors (Revised scale)
Descriptive statistics: Clinical group by gender (Revised scale)
Normative statistics: Four-factor clinical (Revised scale)
Normative statistics: Five-factor clinical (Revised scale)
Normative statistics: Four-factor non-clinical (Revised scale)
Normative statistics: Five-factor non-clinical (Revised scale)
10
DECLARATION
I, Neil Harrington, declare that I am the author of this thesis. The research, of which this
thesis is a record, has been conducted by myself and has not previously been submitted
for any other degree or professional qualification.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
11
I wish to thank Professor Mick Power for his careful attention and helpful supervision
throughout the study. Thanks are also due to Professor Windy Dryden for his
encouragement and help, as well as to Ray DiGiuseppe for his comments and
suggestions. This work could also have not been completed without the support of Hugh
Toner and my colleagues in the Fife Department of Clinical Psychology. I am also
grateful to the many patients who participated in the research, and to Sandra Prentice
and the secretarial staff for their assistance in organising the questionnaires. On a
personal note, thanks go to my friends and family. In particular my son Carl who has,
with great patience and tolerance of frustration, often accepted that his father was
unavailable for combat on his Playstation.
ABSTRACT
12
This research examines the construct of frustration intolerance. Although this is a central
concept in Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), its structure and definition are
unclear. The irrational beliefs that comprise frustration intolerance are hypothesised to
form one of two major categories of psychological disturbance. However, the empirical
evidence is sparse regarding the relationship of these beliefs with disturbance and with
the other category of beliefs, those referring to self-worth. The concept of frustration
intolerance and existing methods of assessment are discussed. A multidimensional
measure, the Frustration-Discomfort Scale, was developed based on descriptions of
beliefs in the literature and REBT theory. An exploratory factor analysis, using both a
clinical and student population, was conducted and indicated a four-factor structure.
These dimensions were labelled: (I) Comfort, involving intolerance of difficulties and
hassles; (II) Emotional discomfort, involving intolerance of emotional distress; (III)
Entitlement, involving intolerance of unfairness and frustrated gratification; and (IV)
Achievement, involving intolerance of frustrated perfectionistic goals. A series of
validation studies established that this measure had good reliability and validity. From
these results, a simplified scale was developed and a confirmatory factor analysis
conducted to test the hypothesised factor structure. This supported the four-factor
solution and, along with further validation studies, strengthened the argument regarding
the usefulness of a multidimensional measure. The results showed that the dimensions
differed in their relationship with emotional disturbance: Using multiple regression
analyses, entitlement was uniquely associated with anger, comfort with depression, and
emotional discomfort with anxiety. These relationships remained significant when
controlling for negative affect and self-esteem. Whilst self-esteem was correlated with
depression and anxiety it had no significant association with anger. Similar differential
relationships were found with a range of self-control problems. The relationship between
frustration intolerance and student procrastination was examined, and indicated that
comfort was a unique predictor of academic procrastination problems. Self-harming
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behaviour was investigated using a structural equation modelling approach. This
suggested that emotional discomfort and entitlement beliefs were important features of
this problem in addition to the influence of low self-worth. Therapy engagement was
also explored using clinical outcome data. Comfort was significantly correlated with
increased therapy sessions and entitlement with increased therapy dropout. The
implications for theory and clinical practice are discussed. Overall, the findings




THE CONCEPT OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE
'It is tempting for me to overestimate the significance of discomfort anxiety and relate
all forms of emotional disturbance to this problem. When... mustmbatory views are not
affirmed by reality...which is often the case in this frustrating world...(individuals) then
usually conclude that they can't stand their own, others or the world's imperfections...
In some respects, they seem to have low frustration tolerance as an aspect of virtually all
their emotional disturbances...their self-downing, their hostility, and their self-pity.'
Albert Ellis (1979a)
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The ability to tolerate frustration and discomfort has been said to underlie many
emotional and behavioural problems. It concerns the puzzle as to why people do things
they wish to avoid, yet often fail to do things they profess to desire. It spans the range of
human difficulty from the failure of everyday resolutions to severe psychological
disturbance. The effects are often not dramatic but may well have longer-term
consequences by undermining commitment and satisfaction with life. This research aims
to investigate the Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) model of frustration-
discomfort intolerance, and to measure and validate this concept.
1.2 OVERVIEW OF RATIONAL EMOTIVE BEHAVIOUR THERAPY
Whilst many therapeutic approaches refer to problems of self-control REBT is probably
unique in distinguishing between two categories of psychological disturbance. The first
is termed 'discomfort disturbance' and is based on beliefs regarding comfort, with
psychological problems arising from a philosophy of low frustration tolerance (LFT).
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The second is termed 'ego disturbance' and is based on beliefs that refer to the self, or
more specifically global rating of the self as opposed to the acceptance of personal
fallibility. Similar to many psychotherapeutic approaches, REBT initially placed most
emphasis on the issues of self-worth. However, low frustration tolerance has developed
into a central concept in REBT theory and become one of REBT's distinguishing
features (Ellis, 1979b; 1980b). Indeed, it has been said that in fifty years Albert Ellis
may be remembered more for the concept of low frustration tolerance than for REBT
itself (DiGiuseppe, 1991a).
REBT is a member of the cognitive behavioural family of psychotherapies and was
developed in the late 1950's by Albert Ellis (Ellis, 1994a). As with other cognitive
approaches, it focuses on beliefs as being central in psychological disturbance (e.g.
Yankura & Dryden, 1994 for review). REBT proposes that when personal goals are
frustrated two types of beliefs may be activated, termed rational and irrational beliefs.
These beliefs represent basic evaluative philosophies of the world rather than
'inferences', or interpretations of events. In this respect, they are similar to the
distinction in Cognitive Therapy between core Schema and automatic thoughts (Beck,
1976; DiGiuseppe, 1996). The central features of irrational beliefs are that they are rigid,
illogical, and block goal achievement. Essentially, irrational beliefs are based on rigid
demands ('musts'), as opposed to rational beliefs based on flexible preferences or
desires. Deriving from this central demanding belief are three other derivative irrational
beliefs: Awfulising, low frustration tolerance, and self-rating.
REBT is also unique in distinguishing between 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' emotions
(Dryden, 1995c), although the empirical evidence for this is disputed (Cramer, 1985;
Cramer & Ellis, 1988). This proposes that for each unhealthy emotion there is a parallel
healthy emotion, respectively: Anger-annoyance, depression-sadness, guilt-remorse,
anxiety-concern, and shame-regret. It is normal for people to react to negative events
with negative emotions, but whether these negative emotions are healthy (in promoting
coping) or unhealthy (in blocking goals) depends on the beliefs involved. They differ in
16
that unhealthy emotions derive from demands and healthy emotions from preferences,
rather than in the intensity of the emotion.
Frustration intolerance has a complex overlapping relationship with ego disturbance
with disturbing events often activating both types of belief. The two types of belief also
interact, since self-worth difficulties may lead to secondary problems of frustration
intolerance, and vise versa. However, Ellis (1979a) points out that, for maximum
explanatory usefulness, frustration intolerance requires to be separated from ego
disturbance. However, frustration intolerance lacks adequate conceptualisation and
definition and, as with ego disturbance, the cognitive content of frustration intolerance
remains undetermined (Neenan & Dryden, 1999). This has meant that rather all
encompassing terms are used, leading to a lack of differentiation between different
facets of these concepts. This severely limits the usefulness of these concepts in
explaining interactions between psychological disorders. For instance, there is evidence
that some types of 'impulsive' problems, such as bulimia, self-harm, substance abuse,
and compulsive shopping, are associated (Lacey & Evans, 1986). However, to describe
the underlying process under the umbrella term Tow frustration tolerance' is to overlook
the complexity of beliefs that may be involved.
The REBT concept of low frustration tolerance draws on pre-existing psychological and
philosophical theories. As such, Ellis makes no claim as to the originality ofREBT ideas
and has been quite explicit in detailing philosophical and psychological influences
(Yankura & Dryden, 1994). Therefore, to understand the concept of frustration
intolerance it is important to explore its philosophical and historical background. Indeed,
the failure to place psychological models and concepts within such context has been
lamented (Power & Dalgleish, 1997).
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1.3 PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHODYNAMIC BACKGROUND
1.3.1 STOICISM
Many of the basic principles of REBT were adapted from ancient Greek and Roman
philosophy (Ellis, 1994a). The three major philosophical schools of the Hellenistic
period, Epicureans, Sceptics and Stoics, all agreed that the primary goal of life was
peace of mind (Passmore, 1970). The later Stoics: Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius, were particularly concerned with how in practice a person might achieve this
state of mind and live the 'good life'. They argued that this depended on living in
'accordance with nature'. Nature was conceived as having the likeness of God and, since
God was rational, the wise man would aim to rationally accept the world as it is, rather
than how he commands it to be. Seneca presents numerous examples to illustrate the
idea that whilst life consists of many unavoidable frustrations, our reactions to such
frustrations are open to choice, and are therefore our responsibility. This choice depends
on rationally accepting the aspects of reality that cannot be changed - 'the one
alleviation for overwhelming evils is to endure and bow to necessity'.1 Thus, emotional
disturbance derives from the attempt to shoehorn reality into our own demands and it is
this 'collision of a wish with unyielding reality' that is central to the Stoic conception of
frustration intolerance (De Botton, 2000). In other words, passions such as anger are not
'irrational', in that they can be understood as resulting from a conflict of a desire with
reality, but are irrational in the belief that reality will inevitably fulfil this desire. In
contrast, the ability to endure frustration comes from the realisation that every wish
cannot be gratified. That is, we should accept that people are imperfect and the world
one of change and uncertainty; an attitude summarised by Epictetus's aphorism ' it is not
things that upset people but rather ideas about things'.2 Like REBT, Stoicism assumes
1
Seneca, De Ira, 16, 1
2 Encheiridon, trans. Mason, 16, 7
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that these beliefs can be expressed in propositional statements, with which the person
has to agree before they can lead to action.
As such, this appears to advocate a hair shirt philosophy, and passive endurance of
suffering, with which stoicism is sometimes mistakenly associated. However, there is
another important side to the stoic approach to frustration. Since man is also part of
nature and thus rational, he has a choice between what can, and what cannot, be
changed. Such a choice may be guided by reason and knowledge regarding the world.
Although ultimately, Epictetus argues, we can only control our 'own doings', which are
our beliefs, perceptions and actions, and not the external world or other people.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should avoid trying to influence events, but
rather that we should not allow the success or failure of these attempts to affect our
peace of mind. Thus, Zeno recognised that it would be sensible to prefer wealth rather
than poverty, but happiness should not be dependent on either condition. Indeed, Seneca
argues that it is as irrational to passively accept frustrations that can be avoided as the
refusal to accept harsh reality.3
Incorrectly, it is also sometimes thought that Stoicism aimed to eliminate emotions and
desire. This is due to a confusion regarding the Greek word for 'freedom from passion',
apatheia. Pathos is not the same as the English word emotion, for which there is no
ancient Greek equivalent. Rather, Pathos signifies emotional disturbance/disease
resulting from the aberration of reason. Thus, the aim of Stoicism is not freedom from
emotion but from emotional disturbance, and only the latter is viewed as irrational.
Indeed there are, in addition to desire, other 'good emotions' such as 'well-reasoned
avoidance' and joy. Nevertheless, it is true that the Stoic ideal was the elimination of
'passion', not simply one of rational control and reduced intensity as Plato had proposed.
However, the observation that 'passion' can sometimes outweigh reason led Zeno to
3 Seneca, De Ira, 16, 7
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suggest that both rational and irrational beliefs continue to coexist even when
intellectual understanding had been achieved.
Peace of mind did not mean the avoidance of frustration or discomfort. Indeed some
Stoics, such as Posidonius, argued that toleration of frustration was required in order to
strengthen and habituate the mind against the passions. Others emphasised that to gain
philosophical wisdom it was necessary to change behaviour, which often required
discomfort and deprivation. For example, Seneca gives the example that by enduring
hardship for a few days one realises a situation is not as awful as feared. Similarly,
Epictetus argues that such training requires constant hard work and practice in going
against habitual patterns of thought and behaviour. This is in contrast with the
Epicureans who equated happiness with freedom from suffering, fear, and discomfort.
Likewise, Aristotle proposed that man should seek eudaemonia, which translates more
accurately as 'freedom from troubles' rather than 'happiness'. Nevertheless, whilst Stoic
philosophers did not advocated the renunciation of earthly pleasures and desires such
pursuits were not viewed as of central importance. This follows from the Stoic belief
that external events were a function of fate and providence. Thus, while man has a
choice in his reaction to events, the wise attitude to the slings and arrows of life was that
of 'indifference' and enabling 'the mind to adapt itself to whatever comes to pass'. In
general a simple life was encouraged, and rather than pursing worldly goals the rule was
'not to lead events, but to follow them'.4 Similarities between Stoicism and Eastern
thinking, such as Buddhism, are not coincidental since these ideas did influence Asia
Minor during this period.
1.3.2 NIETZSCHE
Stoicism has echoes down to the present time but, of modern philosophers, perhaps




relevant to the concept of frustration tolerance. To some extent, Nietzsche viewed
himself as a Stoic and indeed one of his central ideas, that of the eternal recurrence,
derives partly from stoicism. '.... My formula for greatness in a human being is amor
fati: that one wants nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in
all eternity 5. As encapsulated by this quotation, this idea is an affirmation and
acceptance of life, including suffering. Whilst Nietzsche does not extol suffering he does
recognise that hardship is essential to those who desire fulfilment. Initially however, he
had been much influenced by the work of Schopenhauer. In 'The World as Will and
Representation' Schopenhauer described the world, 'the worst of all possible worlds', as
a blind struggle for survival leading to conflict, suffering, boredom and procreation in an
endless cycle. Desires, since they could never be fully satisfied, inevitably resulted in
only fleeting pleasure. Fulfilment was like 'the alms thrown to a beggar, that keeps him
alive today in order that his misery may be prolonged tomorrow....' He argues for
withdrawal from the world into one of compassion, aesthetic detachment, the avoidance
of conflict and strife, and an acceptance of the futility of change. Above all, he
recommends a renunciation of desire and the self, following which 'the peace which we
were always seeking, but always fled from us on the former path of the desires, comes to
us....It is the painless state which Epicurus prized as the highest good....'6
Thus, for Schopenhauer the pursuit of pleasure is not worth the frustration and distress
that it brings. However, Nietzsche eventually considered that this philosophy was
symptomatic of neurosis, or what he termed decadence. He argued the primary
psychological motivation was power, not pleasure or peace of mind dependent on the
absence of frustration and discomfort. Nietzsche uses the term 'will to power' to
describe this psychological concept, which he contrasts with the pursuit of pleasure. This
motivation is instrumental in the process of 'self-overcoming', which enables an
individual to become the master of experience, not its victim. Although Nietzsche was
5 Ecco Homo, trans. Hollingdale, 10
6 The Will and Representation, Vol. I
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not a proponent of hedonism, since he conceived happiness as necessarily involving
suffering and hardship, 'self-overcoming' did require a Dionysian embracing of life.
Indeed, Nietzsche urges a seeking out difficulty and discomfort, '....live dangerously!
Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send out your ships to unexplored seas'.7
Pleasure and pain are 'so intertwined that whoever wants as much as possible of the one
must have as much as possible of the other.. ..At least the stoics believed that this is how
things are, and were consistent when they also desired as little pleasure as possible in
order to derive as little pain as possible from life...'.
Therefore, although Nietzsche is reinstating Stoic philosophy there is a distinctly
different focus. As noted above, there are two approaches to frustration: the endurance
of unavoidable events and the attempt to change events that may be changed. Compared
to the Stoics, Nietzsche emphasises the second of these options. However, both options
involve the toleration of frustration and discomfort, since changing frustrating events
will involve effort, discomfort, and often result in further difficulties. Above all, the
motivation to overcome obstacles usually requires some emotional commitment, and the
need to harness and tolerate feelings without allowing them to lead to disturbance. This
relates to some apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's work. For example, he condemns
attempts to control the instincts, "to have to combat one's instincts - that is the formula
for decadence..., happiness and instinct are one'.9 On the other hand, he also argues that
one should 'not react immediately to a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-taking
instincts in one's control'.10 Thus, 'for Nietzsche the good man is the passionate man
who is the master ofhis passions' (Kaufmann, 1974).
7 The Gay Science, trans. Nauckhoff, 23
8 The Gay Science, trans. Nauckhoff, 12
9
Twilight of the Idols, trans. Hollingdale, 2, 11
10
Twilight of the Idols, trans. Hollingdale, 9, 6
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However, Nietzsche points out that 'the overcoming of [passion] itself is only a means,
not a goal', 11 and he was particularly concerned with how to give meaning to life in a
world in which religious values have been lost. He often answers this by referring to
individuals who have given purpose to existence by 'sublimating' the will to power
towards a creative involvement in life. These qualities include courage, truthfulness, and
loyalty. Nietzsche is clear that such creativity does not come cheap, but requires
hardship and suffering - 'let us remain hard, we last of the Stoics'.12 He emphasises the
importance of having a purpose and persisting towards this, ' the secret ofmy happiness:
a yes, a no, a straight line, a goal...'.13 Also that growth is bound up with the toleration
of the frustration and discomfort involved; encapsulated by his well known aphorism,
'what does not kill me makes me stronger'.14 Whilst, Nietzsche is particularly scathing
towards the idea of contented happiness, describing it as the 'contemptible sort of well-
being dreamed of by shopkeepers...'.15, he also recognises how frustration can lead to
destructive emotions and beliefs as well as to creativity. In this regard, he particularly
singles out resentment (ressentiment) and pity. For example, he argues that for the
underdog in a position of frustrated subservience one method of gaining power is to
encourage a reversal of values, so that weakness becomes strength. In opposition to the
desire to overcome adversity and exercise the will that he associated with fulfilment, he
suggests this encourages self-pity and undermines self-determination.
1.3.4 UTILITARIANISM
Bentham's idea of hedonistic calculus is a component of REBT's general
recommendations for psychological health and the concept of frustration intolerance16.
This is based on the Utilitarian philosophical principle that people are motivated to
"
Human, All Too Human, trans. Hollingdale, The Wanderer and His Shadow, 53
12
Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Hollingdale, 227
13
Twilight of the Idols, trans. Hollingdale, 1, 14
14
Twilight of the Idols, trans. Hollingdale, 1, 8
15 Twilight of the Idols, trans. Hollingdale, 9, 38
16 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
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increase pleasure and avoid pain, and goals can be evaluated on the balance of these
outcomes. Thus, reason does not control desire but rather chooses which desires are best
pursued. There are a number of problems with this, in particular it is debatable whether
people are motivated by pleasure or, at least, just pleasure. Although, the narrow model
of rational choice attempts to overcome these objections by stipulating that preferences
should be those based on well-informed and rational choice under ideal conditions, there
are other difficulties. Thus, people often do have conflicting goals, and may prefer to
satisfy short-term pleasures rather than a long-term reward. Thus, Ellis (1979a) argues
that although smoking is unhealthy it is a personal preference and therefore not,
necessarily, irrational. The difficulty with this view is that preferences may be based on
false information. For example, a person may mistakenly believe that cigarettes reduce
stress. Furthermore, since is a criterion for wellbeing is defined as satisfying preferences
this tends to emphasise short term and easily achievable goals. As Nietzsche pointed out,
few great achievements could have been based on such simple hedonistic calculus. The
wide model of rational resolves this by proposing that satisfaction consists in the person
pursuing what they want, which may include short-term pleasure and a range of possible
desires. Therefore, it assumes that rational decisions are 'bounded', in that individuals
lack information and may not use detailed cost-benefit calculations. However, whilst
such decisions are 'rational' in the sense of reflecting functional choices longer-term
consequences may be very maladaptive. Thus, an explanation is required for the failure
of self-control when individuals are aware of negative consequences and desire to avoid
these.
1.3.5 PSYCHODYNAM1C PERSPECTIVES
Frustration is a central developmental concept in Freudian theory, whereby the blocking
of a child's need for immediate gratification transforms the pleasure principle into the
reality principle. Later, frustration can lead to regression to earlier developmental stages
and the deployment of psychological defences, generally termed repression. The
capacity to tolerate frustration and associated affect is included in the overall concept of
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'ego strength'. However, it was the Neo-Freudian theories of Horney (1950) and Adler
(1927) that most influenced Ellis's ideas. Horney viewed the discrepancy between the
'real' and the 'ideal' self as being at the root of neurosis. This resulted in a 'central inner
conflict' between 'pride', based on an idealised image, and the persons actual self.
According to Horney, the drive to actualise this ideal self led to neurotic demands, or
'claims'. The difference between these 'compulsive' claims and normal self-
actualisation she summarised as 'I want' compared to 'I must'. The greater the
importance of the striving the more intense the claim, and stronger the reaction when the
claim is frustrated. Horney characterises neurotic claims as being rigid, denying reality
and having absolute and perfectionistic goals. She notes that whilst wishes are
reasonable, 'claims are irrational because they assume a right, a title, which in reality
does not exist', and thus it 'seems advisable to speak simply of irrational or neurotic
claims'.17 Horney identified the essential characteristics of claims as being unrealistic,
rigid, and absolute, relative to their social adaptiveness. This description closely
corresponds to the definition of irrational beliefs in REBT.
This 'tyranny of the shoulds' is directed both towards the self and towards the outside
world. Horney's examples of externally directed claims closely match many beliefs that
REBT considers characteristic of low frustration tolerance. She suggests that these often
involve beliefs 'of life being easy and without suffering', and that 'things are coming to
him without his making adequate efforts'. Horney's discussion of these beliefs suggests
how they may interlock and overlap with one another. In particular, she describes the
interaction between egocentric entitlement, vindictiveness and inertia, summarised in the
belief 'the world should be at my service and I should not be bothered'. Thus,
unwillingness to make any effort can follow from entitlement beliefs - since life should
be so arranged to remove effort and trouble. Homey uses the analogy of an individual
who, in expectation of a handsome inheritance, puts all his energy into pursuing this and
consequently invests little interest or effort into everyday life. Furthermore, if
17 This and subsequent quotations from Neurosis and Human Growth (1952)
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entitlements are frustrated then this implies unfairness and injustice. Therefore
hardships, because they are perceived to be unfair, become more difficult to tolerate and
result in resentment and anger.
Horney proposed three methods by which individuals attempt to cope with the central
inner conflict. First, a 'self-effacing solution' whereby the real self is devalued, and is
associated with self-condemnation, needs for affection, support and safety. Secondly, an
'expansive solution' whereby the individual overvalues the ideal self and attempts to
master the outside world and other people. This solution is sub-divided into three: a
grandiose narcissistic group with illusionary high self-esteem, a perfectionistic group,
and an arrogant vindictive group. Lastly, there is a 'resigned solution' where the person
seeks freedom from conflict and inner tension by restricting and withdrawing from life.
This solution is associated with claims that 'life should be easy, painless, and effortless'.
It is also related to lack of engagement in therapy due to both a lack of personal goals,
aversion to change, and the expectation that overcoming problems should be easy and
undertaken by the therapist. Thus, whilst aiming to protect the ideal self, this elaborate
system of avoidance eventually blocks self-actualisation. Freud had argued that such
compulsive neurotic rigidity related back to an infantile intolerance of frustration based
on the pleasure principle. However, Homey moves from this biological based concept to
a socially determined neurotic drive for mastery and superiority. As with Alfred Adler,
Homey's work has clear antecedents in the philosophy of Nietzsche who described the
consequences of frustrated mastery as resentment and bitterness. Similarly, Homey
describes the vindictiveness, anger and dissatisfaction with the world that results from
self-hatred and the percieved unfairness ofpast frustration and suffering.
1.3.6 SUMMARY
Many key REBT concepts forming the basis of frustration intolerance can be discerned
in this brief review: The Stoic philosophical tradition describes the failure to tolerate the
discrepancy between the ideal and reality as central to disturbance. It defines
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'irrationality' as failing to accept this discrepancy. Nietzsche argues, like REBT, that
strong emotions are not necessarily disturbed emotions and may serve an important role
in the pursuit of goals. A similar distinction between the real and the ideal is central to
Horney's psychodynamic theory and she highlights how the frustration of 'shoulds' and
entitlement beliefs can result in resentment, withdrawal, and disturbance. However,
whilst departing from classical Freudian theory in some respects, she is still very much
within the psychodynamic tradition. Behavioural change is dismissed as superficial and
inconsequential to the real task of fostering insight regarding inner conflicts. The cause
of disorders resides in disturbed child-parent relationships, with a failure of genuine
affection leading to 'basic anxiety' and a distortion of the self-image. The associated
'painful and unbearable feelings' are defended against because they are incompatible
with the self-image. Thus, Horney conceptualises emotional problems as deriving from
the self, with frustrating events causing disturbance because they conflict with self-
beliefs. The next section considers behavioral approaches to frustration intolerance that
emerged from these psychodynamic foundations.
1.4 BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH
1.4.1 EARLY RESEARCH AND AMSEL'S THEORY
Whilst the term frustration tolerance had been employed both in everyday use and in
Freudian theory Rosenzweig (1938) was one of the first to specifically explore this
concept. He classified reactions to frustration as extrapunitive (against others),
intrapunitive (against oneself), or impunitive (frustration ignored). These reactions were
aimed at defending the ego or satisfying a frustrated need. Frustration itself was defined
as an obstacle preventing satisfaction of a need, and frustration tolerance as the ability to
withstand a frustrating situation without 'distorting reality'. He considered frustration
tolerance to be a global personality trait, with its influence varying between situations
and increasing with age. Rosenzweig speculated that 'insufficient frustration tolerance'
('immaturity') would develop from spoiling, and Tow frustration tolerance'
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('complexes') from overwhelming frustration in childhood. Like William James (1890),
who wrote that the faculty of using effort to overcome difficulty required continual
exercise, he suggests that such problems might be treated by gradual exposure to
tolerable doses of frustration.
At the same time, Dollard and his associates in the Yale group (1939) were exploring the
association between aggression and frustration. Defining frustration as external events
blocking goal achievement, rather than the emotional reaction to such events, they
proposed that 'frustration always leads to some form of aggression'. The obvious
objection to early theories of frustration was that this frequently does not result in
aggression, and that attributions of unfairness, deprivation, or intent are additionally
required (Averill, 1983). Another criticism of these early theories of frustration tolerance
was the lack of detailed behavioural analysis (Lawson, 1965). However, Maier (1949)
used experimental methods, investigating the behaviour of rats using the Lashley
jumping stand. When these rats, trained under frustrating reinforcement schedules, were
tested using changed response conditions Maier found that they were less adaptable and
continued with stereotyped 'fixated' responses. These results have parallels with the
'experimental neurosis' reported by Pavlov (1927) in which the behaviour of animals
was disrupted with difficult response discriminations.
Dollard and Miller (1950) attempted a more general analysis by combining
psychodynamic theory with Hull's learning theory, drawing a parallel between neurotic
conflicts and the approach-avoidance behaviour observed in animal experiments (Miller,
1944). Likewise, Brown and Farber (1951) also explored the concept of frustration using
Hull's learning theory, defining frustration as a 'hypothetical construct' functioning as a
drive state. They suggested that conflict between opposing responses tended to increase
drive and to produce internal 'affective' stimuli. Amsel's research (1958) extended this
by proposing that the failure to receive a reward after having previously been rewarded
('frustrative non-reward') led to an innate aversive state. This emotional response
disrupted goal performance and led to avoidance, but also acted as a stimulus that could
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be conditioned to further responding ('fractional anticipatory frustration'). With
continued behaviour under conditions of frustration, this emotional response becomes a
conditioned stimulus for an 'anticipatory goal reaction'. Since this goal reaction is in
opposition to the aversive frustration stimuli it therefore, by a process of
counterconditioning, reduces the aversiveness of the frustration and its disruptive
effects. Furthermore, the frustration stimuli gradually elicit continued responding,
explaining why responses following partial reinforcement are more resistant to
extinction compared to continuous reinforcement (Mackintosh, 1974). That is, the
feelings of frustration act as cues to remind the animal to keep responding. However, the
aversiveness of the anticipatory frustration eventually increases until the tolerance
threshold is passed, leading to avoidance and reduction in frustration (Amsel, 1967).
This theory was elaborated by Wong who suggested that the tolerance threshold partly
depended on prior reinforcement of trial and error goal orientation or 'try strategy'
(Wong & Amsel, 1976).
Amsel's general theory of persistence (see Amsel, 1990 for review) proposes that
impulsiveness can be attributed to a history of inconsistent rewards and punishments.
This inconsistency leads to an increased sensitivity to the disruptive arousal resulting
from frustration or conflict and a failure to 'tolerate', or countercondition, to these
stimuli. His general theory predicts that training to respond under one frustration will
transfer to other types of frustration and increase self-control by reducing the
aversiveness of effort and frustration (Amsel, 1967). Many studies support the
acquisition of generalised frustration tolerance. Thus, raising the required number of
responses, strength of response, or reward delay has been found to increase subsequent
persistence in later extinction trials (Wong et al., 1974). Response persistence also
transferred to different behaviours, for instance in rats from speed of running to lever
pressing (McCuller, Wong, & Amsel, 1976). These, and other studies suggest that
frustrative non-reward has similar characteristics to punishment (Wagner, 1966). Indeed,
Gray (1987) has theorised that resistance to extinction after partial response schedules is
based on the process of tolerance to aversive events. He equates the effects of frustration
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with that of fear, or more precisely, that frustrative non-reward is functionally equivalent
to punishment and that relief from punishment is equivalent to reward. Gray suggests
that avoidance behaviour is maintained by the secondary stimuli, 'safety signals', that
are associated with successful non-punishment.
An alternative explanation of these results is the secondary reward theory of
Eisenberger, which proposes the sensation of response effort is conditioned to secondary
reward (see Eisenberger, 1992 for review). Eisenberger argues from his series of studies
that this instrumental theory is more able to account for differences in transfer effects
and stimulus control than habituation to frustration. Rather he suggests that all forms of
effort, physical, mental, as well as that required to adapt to aversive situations, are
discomforting and that self-control involves a choice to 'tolerate one or more costs
(delay, effort, punishment) to obtain reinforcement' (Eisenberger et al., 1989). However,
both theories agree that rewarded high effort increases persistence in the presence of
frustration and this is dependent on active responding rather than just waiting for
rewards. This is consistent with findings such as Adelman and Maatsch (1956) that
indicated resistance to extinction is strongest when the animal can make a response to
the frustration rather than just remaining in the situation.
There is also strong evidence that people differ in their industriousness (Eisenberger,
1992) and that this behaviour exhibits moderate stability between situations and over
time (Eisenberger & Shank, 1985). Eisenberger argues that enduring differences in
industriousness are related to the degree that past effort has been reinforced. For
example, Eisenberger et al. (1985) found in children that if high effort was rewarded this
increased the choice of high effort large rewards over low effort small rewards in a
variety of other tasks. For students, effort training increased the quality and length of
essays (Eisenberger, Masterson, & McDermitt, 1982). It also increased working time on
frustrating tasks such as unsolvable anagrams, and reduced the temptation to take the
easier option by cheating on mathematical problems (Eisenberger & Masterson, 1983).
Learned industriousness was initially conceived as being on a dimension with learned
30
helplessness (Eisenberger, Park, & Frank, 1976). Learned helplessness theory derives
from the work of Maier using inescapable shook (Seligman & Maier, 1967), which
proposed that uncontrollable non-contingent aversive stimulation led to passivity and
emotional disturbance, analogous to human depressed behaviour (Seligman, 1975).
1.4.2 RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM
The radical behavioural literature has eschewed hypothetical concepts such as cognitions
or internal stimuli and has focused on a comparatively narrow aspect of frustration
tolerance. That is, self-control as the choice of a larger more delayed reinforcer over a
smaller less delayed reinforcer, with impulsiveness defined as the opposite (Ainslie,
1975: Rachlin & Green, 1972). Certainly, by this criteria pigeons and rats can be said to
be impulsive, and choose the immediate reinforcer even when overall frequencies are
balanced (Logue & Pena-Correal, 1984). In contrast, humans tend towards self-control
choosing the pattern of reinforcement that maximises the reinforcement outcome (Flora
& Pavlik, 1992). Consistent impulsive responding has only been found with the
termination of strong aversive noise (Navarick, 1982). There also seems to be a marked
difference between positive and negative reinforcers, with significantly less self-control
shown with negative compared to positive reinforcers (Takahashi & Fujihara, 1995).
Time is also an important variable, and a consistent finding is that of preference reversal.
That is the tendency to reverse the choice the nearer to the smaller reinforcer the choice
is made (Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981). However, there are often large individual
differences depending on the type of reinforcer, for instance food can lead to more
impulsiveness and extreme variation in control (Forzano & Corry, 1998).
Rachlin (1974) and Ainslie (1975) proposed that the choice between rewards could be
described by a mathematical utility function, the hyperbolic decay curve. As in
economic theory, behavioural outcomes can be determined by the examining the decay
of rewards over time. Nevertheless, given this the question remains, how do humans
choose self-control. Rachlin's (1995) updated theory, termed 'ideological
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behaviourism', argues that self-control results from commitment to external constraints.
Thereby, the cost of deviating from self-control is increased, for example by leaving
cigarettes somewhere difficult to access. However, since much self-control is achieved
without such obvious external commitment Rachlin proposes that it is the increased
patterning of reinforcement that constitutes the main constraint. In other words, as we
become committed to a wider pattern of behaviour it becomes more costly to interrupt.
Lack of self-control is therefore the choice of individual acts over complex patterns,
whereas self-control lies in the development of such patterns. For example, eating a jam
cake compared to commitment to a healthy life style. There are a number of problems
with this theory of self-control. First, whilst patterns may help to maintain self-control
they initially still need to develop from single acts. Second, it is unclear how acts are
distinguished from patterns, for example an alcoholic lifestyle could be said to be a
complex pattern and abstaining from a drink a single event. Lastly, a frequent self-
control problem is the failure to persist with complex patterns such as long-term dieting.
1.4.3 SUMMARY
Behavioural research has described enduring patterns of response to frustration, and
Amsel suggested that the mechanism of frustrative non-reward was a 'candidate for the
learning theory counterpart of "frustration tolerance" (Amsel, 1962). Nevertheless,
simply equating frustration with disturbance was clearly mistaken, and evidence
indicated that helplessness in both animals and humans was not consistently related to
non-contingency of reinforcement, and equating depression with low effort
reinforcement or non-contingency was simplistic. In addition, helplessness theory failed
to explain the association of low self-esteem with depressed mood. Overall, it became
clear that people do not merely respond to environmental contingencies, but self-
regulate by setting goals and following rules. Whilst behavioural strategies are involved
in self-control these are underpinned by beliefs regarding personal goals or self-worth. It
is these aspects that will be considered next.
1.5 SOCIAL COGNITION AND SELF-REGULATION
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1.5.1 DELAY OF GRATIFICATION
Mischel's research with children used an experimental paradigm, a 'self-imposed delay
of gratification', which mirrored the behavioral work on animals (see Mischel, 1996 for
review). Results indicated that uncertainty of delayed rewards increased preference for
immediate rewards, and larger values of delayed rewards reduced this preference
(Mischel & Mettzer, 1962). Initial expectations, based on psychoanalytic theory, were
that being able to see and anticipate the delayed but larger reward would enable children
to postpone gratification. However, the opposite was found (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970).
Indeed, it was observed that the more the child could distract themselves from future
desires the higher the resistance to temptation (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972).
Mischel theorised that exposure to the desired reward increased frustration and that
'willpower' in this situation is maintained by strategies that reduce frustrative arousal
and make waiting less aversive. This could be achieved by other cognitive strategies
apart from distraction, and it was found that abstract representations of the reward, such
as mental pictures or slides, also enabled greater resistance to temptation (Mischel &
Baker, 1975; Moore, Mischel & Zeiss, 1976). He argues that willpower, rather than
reflecting 'Stoic' endurance, is the attentional ability to convert aversive delay to a
situation that is more tolerable. Thus, there is a balance between using images to guide
intention towards long-term goals and avoiding these images becoming too arousing and
intolerably frustrating.
Mischel's studies also indicated large individual differences between children in the
ability to delay gratification. Longitudinal studies showed that the children who had
difficulty in delaying gratification as pre-schoolers were rated as having less ability to
tolerate frustration, delay gratification, cope with stress, or use methods of self-control
when adolescents. There was also a significant correlation between later Scholastic Test
33
Aptitude scores and pre-school delay of gratification. Furthermore, the experimental
condition diagnostic of later problems was the most frustrating situation, where the
rewards were exposed and no coping strategies suggested (Shoda, Mischel, & Peake,
1990). In addition, children with poor delay times tended to have higher levels of
physical and verbal aggression, suggesting a link between different types of frustration
tolerance (Rodriguez et al., 1998).
Self-control and persistence has also been related to self-efficacy, that is expectations
regarding successful performance (Bandura, 1997). For instance, Mischel and Staub
(1965) found that children with high scores on a measure of generalised self-efficacy
were more likely to choose a difficult problem and large reward, rather than an
immediate small reward. The ability to disengage or persist at goals has also been linked
with differences in self-efficacy (Carver & Scheier, 2000). From this theoretical
perspective failures in self-regulation result from ineffective techniques and planning
which depend on self-efficacy beliefs.
1.5.2 NEGATIVE AFFECT
The relationship between affect and self-control is an important component of a number
of theories. Thus, Mishel's (1974) theory proposes a two-stage process for the delay of
gratification. First, the choice between preferred options, dependent on the value of
rewards and likelihood of success. Secondly, perseverance with this choice dependent on
coping with the aversiveness of frustration. Indeed, Berkowitz (1962) in his criticism of
Dollard's study had previously noted the importance of affect in frustration tolerance.
He suggested that affective states mediated frustration and, in his reformulation of the
frustration-aggression hypothesis, argued that frustrations only produced aggression 'to
the degree that they arouse negative affect' (Berkowitz, 1989). He notes that both
physical and psychological discomfort can increase aggression and hostile beliefs, and
suggests that anger is associated with depression due to the unpleasantness of the mood.
Likewise, failures to achieve expected goals, or opposition from other people, also
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arouse anger in relation to their affective discomfort. Affective discomfort may effect
other aspects of self-control and, for example, exposure to unpredictable noise reduces
subsequent ability to tolerate the frustration of persisting with insoluble puzzles (Glass,
Singer, & Friedman, 1969). Studies also indicate that various areas of self-control, such
as smoking cessation, dieting and gambling are more likely to fail under emotional
distress. Furthermore, emotional distress increases the likelihood of choosing small
immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards (Mishel, Ebbensen, & Zeiss, 1972).
Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister (2001) in a series of experimental studies placed
individuals in situations requiring self-control, however one group were informed that
their mood was 'fixed' and unable to be changed. The results indicated that when people
believed mood was unchangeable the tendency to engage in a snacking, immediate
gratification or procrastination was not increased. Indeed, there was a trend for
individuals in this condition to procrastinate less and spend more time on the boring
task, compared to when mood was believed to be controllable. From this, they argue that
self-regulation failure is not related to low self-efficacy, since confidence would be the
same in both experimental conditions. Likewise, there was no evidence that being
emotionally distressed reduced the desire of individuals to attain long-term rewards or
reduced their confidence that they could attain these. Rather they argue that failures of
self-control were due to a shift of priority from distant goals to immediate affect
regulation. That is, emotionally distressed individuals make a strategic decision to
reduce negative affect and this overrides impulse control. They also add that there was
little evidence that the methods used to improve mood made any difference to this state,
although they may have resulted in temporary pleasurable distraction.
Schwartz and Pollack (1977) have suggested that negative affect increases the value of
immediate gratification by acting as a compensation to the discomfort, thus driving
short-term goal orientation (Isen, 1984). There is also evidence that the percieved
effectiveness of an activity to alleviate distress is more important than its actual
effectiveness. For example, Bushman, Baumeister and Phillips, (2001) found that if an
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individual believed that expressing anger reduced negative affect they increased this
behaviour. Similarly, in the addictive behaviours, the belief that substance use is helpful
in reducing stress and increasing relaxation is frequently cited as a reason for continued
use. Whilst evidence regarding tension reduction as an explanation of general alcohol
abuse (Conger, 1956) has been contradictory (Sayette, 1999) drinking to alleviate
negative affect may apply to a sub-set of individuals (Cooper et al., 1995). For instance,
although positive affect does not predict adult drinking, anxiety sensitivity scores are
related to alcohol dependency and to increased drinking with negative emotion (Cooper
et al., 1995; Stewart & Phil, 1994).
The generation of negative affect has been linked to goal frustration and positive affect
to goal fulfilment (Scrull & Wyer, 1986; Frijda, 1987). From the prospective of goal
formation it has been suggested that negative affect is the most powerful determinant of
self-control. For instance, Carver and Scheier (2000) propose a feedback model of goal
process with negative affect signalling negative discrepancies in goal attainment. They
point out that this implies this system would aim to minimise pain and discomfort, not
maximise pleasure. This is because pleasure would indicate a positive discrepancy and
lead the system to ease off or move onto another goal. It also suggest that the pleasure
resulting from single goals is likely to be fleeting, consistent with the REBT position
that 'happiness' comes from involvement with long term meaningful goals (DiGiuseppe,
1991a; Emmons, 1996).
1.5.3 SELF-WORTH
Several theories have focused on the relationship between self-worth and self-regulation
(see Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Clearly some failures of self-regulation are associated
with problems of self-worth, and individuals may fail to exercise self-control such as
giving up smoking because of fears regarding appearance and self-esteem. Baumeister
(1996) describes a number of 'avoidant defences' that maintain self-esteem, for instance
ignoring the threat by shifting attention or changing the threat by reinterpretation. This
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latter strategy of 'rationalisation' is particularly characteristic of those classed as
'repressors' (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). Interestingly, other studies have indicated that
repressors do not avoid aversive stimuli because of low tolerance of negative arousal,
indeed their pain threshold have been found to be high (Jamner & Schwartz, 1986),
suggesting they are more concerned with protection of self-esteem.
Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) propose that binge eating is motivated by the need to
escape from aversive self-awareness. Thus, the failure to attain goals leads to lower self-
worth and emotional distress and focusing on eating enables attention to be narrowed
and distressing thoughts avoided. They argue this is consistent with evidence that, for
instance, dieters with low self-esteem eat more after breaking a diet than those with high
self-esteem (Polivy, Heatherton, & Herman, 1988). They also suggest that a similar
process underlies other types of impulsive behaviour, such as self-harm (Baumeister,
1990), and substance abuse. However, evidence indicates these behaviours can also
serve to regulate mood and discomfort separately from problems with self-esteem (e.g.
Fairburn & Cooper, 1987). This is also consistent with research showing that individuals
high in rejection sensitivity also have low pre-school levels of gratification delay
(Ayduket al. 2000). However, the association between self-esteem and other aspects of
self-control is complex and likely to be interactive (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice,
1994).
1.5.4 WILLPOWER AND EGO-DEPLETION
Baumeister and his colleagues, as well as Mischel (1996), have suggested that the
concept of 'willpower' or ego-strength is required in any model of self-control
(Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). In a series of studies, individuals undertook a
number of consecutive self-control tasks. They found that using self-control on
subsequent tasks was consistently impaired by previous acts of self-regulation. Thus,
trying not to think about a white bear reduces persistence on anagram problems
(Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). This impairment was also found to transfer across
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different types of self-control, for instance trying to control emotion reduced anagram
performance, and resisting temptation to chocolates reduced persistence on frustrating
puzzles (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Greater awareness of fatigue
was also associated with lower self-control, suggesting that tiredness effects self-control
by depleting the capacity for self-exertion (Muraven et al., 1998). Therefore, they
propose that active self-control uses up a limited ego-resource analogous to willpower
and similar to Funder and Block's (1989) trait of ego-control. They draw the parallel
with a muscle in that, after recovery from bouts of self-control, exercise of self-control
should improve further capacity. In comparison to a no-exercise group, a group of
students who had performed self-control tasks showed significant improvement on tasks
that were unrelated to the original task (Muraven et al., 1999).
Muraven et al., (1999) argue that these studies support an energy depletion model, rather
than a schema or skills based model This is because if self-control were a skill no
depletion would be seen on repeated use. Similarly, if it was based on a cognitive or
knowledge schema repeated use would increase self-control since the schema had been
already primed. However, alternative explanations are certainly possible. Thus, REBT
would argue that both helpful and unhelpful schema related to frustration tolerance are
activated by such situations. An aspect of these cognitions may involve beliefs regarding
degrees of frustration. That is, that so much discomfort is acceptable but more than this
is 'too much', and a rest is deserved. Another criticism is, whether the term employed is
ego-strength or willpower, it remains unclear exactly what is being depleted. REBT also
employs a strength concept, but in terms of the comparative strength of irrational and
rational beliefs. Thus, the strengthening of these rational beliefs could also explain the
improvement following longer-term self-control practice, and indeed a therapeutic
method for improving frustration intolerance is that of purposely coping with frustrating
situations, such waiting in long supermarket queues (Walen et al., 1992). It would also
explain why in the short term repeated frustration would be likely, by activating low
frustration tolerance beliefs, to increase resistance to further self-control.
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1.5.5 PERSONALITY TRAITS
Drawing on rational choice theory, as well as behavioural theory, Gottfredson and
Hirschi (1990) have proposed that individual differences in criminality reflect a broad
disposition to self-control. They describe this as the absence of characteristics that
enable a person to take a long-range view, a disposition that is shaped by childhood
experiences. However, they emphasise that this should not be considered an enduring
trait that compels criminal acts (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1993). However, they do suggest
this entails stable characteristics including an orientation to immediate gratification, lack
of persistence, and being self-centered. They point to the evidence that offenders often
commit a wide range of different types of criminal acts, and that this is often associated
with other non-criminal activities such as drug taking, gambling, drinking, having in
common a short-term orientation. They also note that a characteristic of many criminal
acts is that they are opportunistic, immediately gratifying, represent the easiest option,
and require little effort or planning. However, as to what lack of self-control consists of
is not clarified. Measures of self-control have also been circular (e.g. Gibbs, Giever, &
Martin, 1998) in that they have comprised items which describe the very behaviours
used to define the concept.
One such broad disposition is the concept of impulsiveness, however definition of this
concept varies considerably. Impulsiveness measures contain widely differing content
and lack a consistent theoretical framework, including for example, adventure seeking
and boredom susceptibility. The core features have been summarised as a reduced ability
to delay immediate gratification and the tendency to respond without reflection (Lorr &
Wunderlich, 1985). However, research suggests many individuals with self-control
problems are aware of the long-term risks, desire to stop, but do not act on this.
'Impulsiveness' also implies that such problems are due to overwhelming impulse and
the desire for immediate gratification. Nevertheless, it is debatable how far 'impulsive'
acts can be ascribed to overwhelming desires. Indeed, analysis of the behaviour of
shoplifters or self-harmers often reveals considerable planning (Baumeister &
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Heatherton, 1994). Furthermore, thinking without reflection can be functional in some
situations (Dickman, 1990). The concept has also been stretched to include a wide range
of behaviours and traits. It has been argued that being so all encompassing it lacks
explanatory meaning and is difficult to distinguish from a range of other personality
traits (Blackburn, 1993). This is perhaps reflected in the wide range of existing
impulsiveness measures, and evidence of poor intercorrelations between these measures
(Parker & Badby, 1997).
A number of personality classification systems include an impulsiveness dimension but
what this constitutes also varies considerably. For instance, in Eysenck's personality
system, it is weakly related to both Extroversion and Psychoticism, although the
meaning of Psychoticism is itself unclear (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991). Zuckerman
(1991) arguing that this is a mixture of impulsive-sensation seeking and hostility. For
Zuckerman's own 'alternative five' model, the impulsive sensation-seeking dimension is
a central component characterised by a lack of behavioural restraint. Gray (1987)
suggests that introverts are more sensitive to punishment and frustrative non-reward, and
extroverts to reward and non-punishment. Thus, Eysenck's personality dimensions are
said to reflect an interaction between impulsivity and anxiety. The dimensions of Costa
and McCrae's (1990) 'Big Five' model of personality have also been linked to a variety
of beliefs. Aspects of low self-control, such as procrastination and illegal behaviours, are
related to low Conscientiousness (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995). Likewise,
Agreeableness has been associated with revenge, interpersonal hostility, and the ability
to control affect in frustrating situations (Graziano et ah, 1996). However, doubts have
been raised as to the interpretation and meaningfulness of these factors, with Eysenck
(1992) suggesting that Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are facets of Psychoticism,
and Block (1995) arguing the factors may merely reflect clusters ofprestructured items.
1.5.6 SUMMARY
Consistent with behavioral studies, the social cognition literature suggests there are
enduring individual differences in self-control. However, the research also suggests this
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process is mediated by cognitive variables. The regulation of affect, possibly resulting
from issues of self-worth, has been proposed as central in this process. Negative affect
has been particularly highlighted as important and, as Teasdale (1991) notes, for humans
aversive events usually consist of frustrated goals rather than physical pain. It may also
be added that some behaviour may mislead in appearing to pursue pleasure, whereas the
prime motivation is relief from emotional discomfort (Thayer, Newman, & McClain,
1994). For example, many superficially enjoyable activities, such as shopping, eating
binges and exercise may serve as distraction from distress (Tice, Muraven, &
Baumeister, 1993: Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991).
However, the mechanism whereby negative affect is tolerated remains unclear.
Attentional strategies and self-efficacy have been suggested but are unlikely to fully
explain resistance to gratification. For example, self-control often is required over
lengthy periods of uncertainty where exposure to temptation is likely and distraction
difficult to sustain. Personality traits such as impulsiveness have also been associated
with self-control, as have concepts such as ego-depletion, however the meaning and
nature of these traits is unclear. In the last part of this chapter, models that propose that
specific types of cognition mediate self-regulation will be considered.
1.6 COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL MODELS
Seligman's learnt helplessness theory of depression was reformulated, or replaced, by a
cognitive model (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). This proposed that stable,
internal, and global causal attributions for bad events were more likely to be made by
depressives. This suggests that different sub-types of depression exist depending on the
pattern of attributions. Thus, internal attributions leads to low self-esteem, and global
and stable attributions to more chronic motivational deficits without lowered self-
esteem. A later revision moved away from attributions regarding lack of control and
'helplessness' to those of 'hopelessness' and negativity, with low self-esteem deriving
from a general negative style and stability and globality adding chronicity (Abramson,
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Metalsky, & Alloy, 1988). This model is closely associated with Beck's Cognitive
Therapy approach.
Ellis (1979a) originally drew a parallel between his concept of discomfort anxiety (or
frustration intolerance) and that of learned helplessness and experimental neurosis. That
is, individuals when faced by unpredictable or uncontrollable situations are led to
conclude they are 'too uncomfortable'. However, he points out (Ellis, 1987b) that REBT
differs very importantly from behavioural models in that it proposes that frustrating or
negative events alone will not necessarily lead to depression, but are mediated by beliefs
regarding these events. Ellis also argues that REBT differs from Beck's (1967)
Cognitive Therapy Model as regards the type of cognition that are considered central to
emotional disturbance. REBT proposes that, on their own, negative attributions
regarding frustration or loss will lead to 'healthy negative emotions', such as sadness.
The additional dysfunctional belief that needs to be associated with these attributions to
produce 'unhealthy negative emotion', such as depression, is the absolute demand that
the frustration or loss 'must not exist'. However, evolving changes in both Cognitive
Therapy and REBT theory have made this distinction less pronounced. Thus, Cognitive
Therapy has emphasised underlying dysfunctional cognitive schema described, as are
irrational beliefs, as rigid, absolutistic, and global (Beck, A. T., Freeman, & Associates,
1990). Likewise, recent REBT theoretical debate has suggested that global negative self-
worth beliefs may operate separately from those of demands (DiGuiseppe, 1996).
Nevertheless, differences remain both in emphasis and formulation between these two
cognitive-behavioural approaches. Regarding Cognitive Therapy, Safran et al. (1986)
have suggested that meaningful therapeutic change is more likely to involve higher level
cognitions. Similar to other theorists (Guidano and Liotti, 1983) they propose that these
higher level belief are fundamentally related to the self-concept, and that therapeutic
improvement depends on changes in the rules on which self-worth is based. Beliefs
unconnected to the self are assign to a peripheral role, and they suggest that these should
'ultimately be evaluated in terms of their impact upon self-perception'. However, they
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note that it can be argued that irrational beliefs represent just such higher level beliefs,
and that REBT is primarily focused on changing these beliefs in preference to more
peripheral distorted thinking. They qualify this by adding that irrational beliefs are not
explored in terms of their idiosyncratic meaning for each patient, and indeed REBT does
avoid undue examination of personal meaning, emphasising instead the belief processes
involved in disturbance (Yankura & Dryden, 1994). Safran et.al. (1986) also point to the
importance of common themes related to the self, such as sociotropy and autonomy
(Beck, 1983). In contrast, REBT theory has proposed the existence of two broad
categories of higher level belief: those involving the intolerance of life conditions as
well as those pertaining to the self.
1.7 THE REBT CONCEPT OF LOW FRUSTRATION TOLERANCE
1.7.1 STRUCTURE OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS
The general concept of low frustration tolerance is found in rudimentary form in the
original list of irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1962). Indeed, the belief that unfair or frustrating
events are awful, and that difficulties are easier avoided, are discussed at length in the
early self-help books (Ellis & Harper, 1975). However, there is no specific definition of
low frustration tolerance and examples of low frustration tolerance vary considerably in
their content. Furthermore, the terms low frustration tolerance and discomfort
disturbance are sometimes used interchangeably (Neenan & Dryden, 1999). Ellis
(1979a, 1980b) initially used the term 'discomfort anxiety' and distinguished this from
'ego-anxiety'. He defined discomfort anxiety as the emotional tension resulting from
irrational beliefs regarding a threat to personal comfort and the belief that one must get
what they want (or must not get what they don't want). In comparison, ego-discomfort is
the emotional tension resulting from irrational beliefs associated with a threat to self-
worth and the belief that one must perform well and be approved of by others. However,
it became apparent that a range of other emotions could be similarly classified, including
discomfort depression and discomfort anger. Furthermore, these types of belief were
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also involved a range of dysfunctional behaviours, such as therapeutic resistance (Ellis,
1985a), procrastination (Ellis & Knaus, 1977), and addiction (Ellis, Mclnerney,
DiGiuseppe, & Yeager, 1988). Thus, the general term discomfort disturbance was
eventually used to describe the range of emotions and behaviours resulting from these
irrational beliefs.
In summary, REBT classifies human disturbance into two categories, ego disturbance
and discomfort disturbance. Broadly speaking, the irrational beliefs in ego-disturbance
refer to self-worth, whereas in discomfort disturbance they refer to the intolerance of
discomfort (Ellis, 1979a). Low frustration tolerance has been most commonly used to
refer to the beliefs or philosophy that underlies the area of discomfort disturbance. That
is, the belief that it is absolutely impossible to tolerate a discomfort or frustration. In
contrast, ego disturbance involves beliefs regarding the self, specifically that the self is
only acceptable if certain standards are met (Ellis & Dryden, 1987). Apart from being
the defining belief within the discomfort disturbance category of disturbance, low
frustration tolerance also one of the four types of irrational belief. Ellis has argued that
demandingness is the central belief and the other three belief processes, self-worth,
awfulising, and low frustration tolerance, derive from demand beliefs like spokes
emerging from the hub of a wheel (Ellis, 1989). These can be summarised as follows:
1 Demandingness
Demandingness involves an absolute imperative that oneself, other people, or the world
'must' be a certain way. The corresponding rational belief is a preference or desire that
things are a certain way, but an acceptance that they may not be.
2 Self-Downing
Self-downing involves global negative evaluations of the self. The corresponding
rational belief is based on acceptance of the self and human fallibility.
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3 Awfulising
Awfulising refers to the belief that something is absolutely bad rather than just
unfortunate. The corresponding rational belief is the evaluation of events on a continuum
of badness rather than as an absolute.
4 Low frustration tolerance
Low frustration tolerance is usually expressed in terms such as "It's too much, I can't
bear it, I can't stand it, I can't tolerate it." Such beliefs imply that a person would believe
the situation impossible to cope with: It would be too overwhelming, too hard, or too
uncomfortable. The corresponding rational belief is acceptance that frustrations and
discomforts exist but they can be tolerated and it is constructive to do so in order to
reach one's goals. In REBT the term frustration is used to describe the failure to achieve
a goal not the associated emotional reaction (Trexler, 1976).
Frustration intolerance is sometimes discussed in terms of an additional underlying
meaning. That is, the person will disintegrate, or will never experience any happiness
again. However, it is arguable whether these additional meanings are required or are
definitive of this belief. Several theorists suggest that the essential irrationality involved
in both demands and frustration intolerance is the refusal to accept the distinction
between the ideal and the reality (DiGiuseppe, 1996). In which case, intolerance of
something that can be tolerated is sufficient definition of 'irrationality' in itself. It is also
unlikely that an individual refusing to tolerate an uncomfortable task or frustration
believes they will disintegrate or be continually miserable. It may be true in some
problems such as panic disorder that catastrophic beliefs may occur regarding death, and
in depression that the future is hopeless. However, it is debatable that these beliefs are
more descriptive of awfulising rather than frustration intolerance. Indeed, hopelessness
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may be said to represent a generalised negative inference regarding the future, rather
than being a true irrational belief.
1.7.2 SELF-WORTH AND FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE BELIEFS
The interrelation of the four types of irrational belief has been the focus of considerable
debate. Ellis (1994a) has argued that demandingness beliefs are central and from these
beliefs radiate the other three derivative beliefs. However, other researchers have placed
the derivative beliefs, particularly those of self-worth and frustration intolerance, in a
more central position. Wessler and Wessler (1980) suggest the essence of irrational
thinking is that it 'ignores reality in favor of what the individual says should exist'.
Rorer (1989) proposed a similar definition of irrationality and sub-divide irrational
beliefs into two further groups. Firstly, that of grandiose beliefs, for example, 'the world
should treat me fairly.' These beliefs represent demands that one self, other people, or
the world must be different from the way it actually is, simply because the person wants
it that way. Secondly, beliefs that confuse evaluations with objective evaluation, for
example definitions of self-worth based on arbitrary standards.
Indeed, clinical experience suggests that people distinguish between schema regarding
the self and those referring to the world and other people (DiGiuseppe, 1996).
Furthermore, DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner, and Robin (1988) found that demandingness,
frustration intolerance, and awfulizing, all loaded on one factor whilst self-rating loaded
on a separate factor. A confirmatory factor analysis also supported a two factors
(DiGiuseppe, 1998), as did Bernard's (1998) study in which self-rating emerged as
being separate from 'absolutistic thinking'. Therefore, DiGiuseppe's (1996) argues that
the distinction is not simply related to the content of the beliefs. More importantly, he
proposes that these two categories involve different underlying cognitive processes:
'both involve musts but are different types of thought'. That is irrational beliefs referring
to the outside world and beliefs involving self-worth are different types of belief.
Frustration intolerance reflects a demand that reality be different. It is a failure to
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distinguish between a preference and empirical reality, and this mismatch between
desire and reality attempts to shoehorn one into the other. In comparison, ego-
disturbance is based on conditional statements of self-worth based on arbitrary self-
definition.
DiGiuseppe (1996) discusses three models that could represent the interconnection of
irrational belief processes with emotional disturbance. In the first model, demandingness
creates the other three irrational beliefs, including self-worth, which then lead on to
emotional disturbance. The second model has demandingness directly related to
emotional disturbance as well as via the derivative beliefs. In the third model, self-rating
leads to emotional disturbance independently from demandingness, with demandingness
leading directly to emotional disturbance as well as through awfulising and frustration
intolerance. In reply, Ellis (1996b) has agreed that demandingness, awfulising, and
frustration intolerance can be separate from self-rating. However, he emphases that both
sets of beliefs are created by demandingness, suggesting the term 'general
demandingness' to refer to absolute demands regarding the self and the term 'specific
demandingness' to refer to demands on others and the world but excluding the self. This
model suggested by Ellis is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1 Model of the interaction between irrational belief (Ellis, 1996b)
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Following Wessler and Wessler (1980) and Muran (1991), DiGiuseppe (1996) suggests
that beliefs are expressed as compound sentences. Thus, a frustration intolerance belief
involves a 'must' combined with awfulising or frustration intolerance statements, "I
must not be criticised and if I am, I can't stand it." Whereas, a self-worth belief would
involve a demand regarding arbitrary definitions of self-worth, "I must not be criticised
and if I am that would make me a worthless person." If this model is correct then
demandingness beliefs on their own are insufficient to determine whether a person is
experiencing ego or discomfort disturbance (Dryden, 1996). For instance, "I must not
feel anxious" could refer to intolerance of emotional discomfort, or to a fear of
appearing inadequate, or both. Likewise, Dryden also argues that awfulizing beliefs do
not define whether the disturbance primarily involves ego and frustration intolerance
beliefs, since both types of problem could be 'awful'. The assessment of these two
categories of belief is further complicated in that each type of belief can be operational
in the other domain (Neenan & Dryden, 1999). For example, an individual might
perceive emotional discomfort as evidence of personal weakness (ego disturbance).
1.7.3 CONTENT OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE BELIEFS
Opinions have been divided as to whether irrational beliefs were best conceptualised in
terms of processes or content and how belief process and content might interact (Sutton-
Simon, 1981). Campbell (1985, 1988) suggested that the four belief processes might be
most usefully viewed as interacting with a specific set of content themes, that is
approval, achievement, and comfort. This was supported by Davidson's (1985) research
that indicated that irrational beliefs could be described both in terms of the belief process
and content. Ellis and Dryden (1987) proposed a matrix incorporating four belief content
themes, approval, achievement, comfort, and fairness, with the four irrational belief
processes (figure 2). It has been further suggested that the content categories could
include that of 'control' (Walen, DiGiuseppe, & Dryden, 1992), and positive
gratification (Dryden & Yankura, 1993).
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Many of the examples of frustration intolerance beliefs in the literature (e. g. Dryden &
Gordon, 1993) fit into the categories described in this matrix Thus, a central group of
beliefs is the intolerance of hard work and demands for ease and comfort. This belief
implies that a situation is too overwhelming, hard, uncomfortable, and unbearable.
Intolerance of negative feelings concerns problems such as anxiety about anxiety,
characteristic of discomfort anxiety. In addition to discomfort intolerance, there is also
frustration intolerance regarding being blocked in ones goals. Thus, Ellis (1994a)
describes the essence of low frustration tolerance as 'other people must give me exactly
what I desire and conditions must be nicely arranged to cater to my wishes'. These
beliefs, reflecting Horney's work, often refer to unfairness both in relation to treatment
from other people and from life in general. Associated with this theme is the demand for
immediate gratification and the intolerance of delay or deprivation of pleasure.
Frustration intolerance in the area of achievement is also of particular interest. Research
on the Type-A behaviour pattern indicates a strong relationship between excessive
achievement striving and a 'relative stable tendency to react to a broad range of
frustration-inducing events' with anger and resentment (Dembrowski & Czajkowski,
1989). However, these beliefs would seem to contrast with other forms of discomfort
intolerance such as for ease and gratification. Often associated with perfectionism are
demands for certainty and control, and Dryden and Gordon (1993) have described the
need for control as the 'mainspring' of discomfort anxiety.
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Table 1 Model of the interaction between irrational belief processes and content (Walen,

















However, Neenan and Dryden (1999) have argued that low frustration tolerance
involves a wider range of difficulties than just tolerance of frustration or discomfort and
therefore should be replaced by reference to a wider category of 'non-ego disturbance'.
They outline a 'preliminary taxonomy' listing the forty-two sub-categories of belief that
non ego-disturbance may take. However, the definition of frustration in REBT is broad
and refers to all situations in which a person's goals are blocked. Taking this broader
perspective, frustration intolerance may be defined as not getting what you want, as soon
as you want it, or getting what you don't want, and being unable to be free of it as
quickly one would like (Ellis, 1979a). From this, it is arguable that many of the
situations described within non-ego disturbance could also be covered by the term
frustration-discomfort disturbance. To avoid the ambiguity of the terms low frustration
50
tolerance and discomfort it was decided in this study to use the term frustration
intolerance to refer to this category of irrational beliefs.
1.7.4 THE DEFINITION OF IRRATIONALITY
The term 'irrational' has also been the cause of confusion regarding its meaning and
criticised for lacking theoretical precision. For example, REBT has been wrongly
associated with rationalism, the philosophical theory that places reason above emotion
and as the arbiter of knowledge (Mahoney, Lyddon, & Alford, 1989). However, Ellis
changed the name to Rational Emotive Therapy in 1962 to underline the interconnection
of emotion and cognition. Recent philosophical critiques of rationality in REBT have
also focused on its failure as a logical concept (Erwin, 1997; O'Donohue & Vass, 1996).
However, Dryden and Still (1998) in reply, argue that 'rationality' should be placed in
context with the philosophical, and specifically Stoic, framework from which it derives.
They, like Haaga and Davidson (1993), conclude that there is 'no essential and eternal
entity to which the word "rationality" applies'.
However, some descriptions of irrational beliefs have remained central and Maultsby
(1984) defined irrational beliefs as being illogical, at odds with empirical reality, and
interfering with achievement of personal goals. Additionally, the rigidity and dogmatism
of irrational beliefs has also been emphasised. DiGiuseppe (1996) notes that Maultsby
did not clarify whether irrational beliefs needed to meet all or just one of these criteria,
although REBT texts have usually assumed that all three are required (Ellis & Dryden,
1987). Indeed, the separate use of these criteria may result in beliefs being wrongly
classified as 'irrational'.
That illogical inferences are not by themselves irrational can be understood by reference
to the cornerstone of REBT theory, the A-B-C model of emotional disturbance. As
originally proposed, the A stood for an activating event and the B for the beliefs about
this event leading at C to emotional and behavioural consequences. Included as beliefs
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within B were both 'inferences' and 'evaluations' about the event (Ellis, 1984).
However, Wessler and Wessler (1980) expanded this relatively simple model splitting
the two types of belief and placing inferences in A, with B reserved for evaluative
beliefs, which were defined as the meaning attached to events. They proposed that it was
these exaggerated and rigidly held negative evaluations that were definitive of irrational
beliefs, not distorted inferences regarding the event. Thus, REBT argues that whilst
illogical or unrealistic inferences may contribute to psychological disturbance they are
not definitive of irrational beliefs.
Nevertheless, that irrational beliefs are partly defined by being illogical is problematic. It
implies that thinking in non-disturbed individuals is logical and realistic, although
evidence indicates that this is not the case (Power & Dalgleish, 1997 for review). For
example, there appears to be no consistent association between empirically unfounded
religious beliefs and emotional dysfunction (Gartner, Larson, & Allen, 1991). On the
contrary, some studies have found significant correlations between measures of
religiosity, such as personal prayer, and psychological well being (Maltby, Lewis, &
Day, 1999). In respect to frustration tolerance, Dudley (1999) found that subjects
holding superstitious beliefs showed greater persistence with solving anagrams
following unsolvable puzzles. This is of particular interest to REBT given that Ellis
(1971) originally suggested that religiosity actually created emotional disturbance. In
response, Ellis argues for a distinction between absolute dogmatism and religious
affiliation itself. He also has made it clear that, although self-defeating actions are highly
correlated with irrational beliefs, people are sometimes productive in spite of such
beliefs (Ellis, 1989).
REBT has also defined rational beliefs as enabling people to live longer, happier, and
more fulfilling lives (Ellis & Bernard, 1985). Rational in REBT therefore means "that
which helps people to achieve their basic goals and purposes, whereas irrational means
that which prevents them from achieving these goals and purposes" (Dryden, 1994a).
However, the evidence above suggests that some beliefs considered inflexible and
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dogmatic may sometimes promote happiness. In addition, the circularity of the definition
in terms of undesired outcomes or goals has caused concern (Haaga & Davidson, 1993;
Rorer, 1989). Wessler (1996) has also pointed out that beliefs could only be defined as
irrational when the outcome of goals has become known, in which case can beliefs be
classified a priori without reference to goals or outcomes.
DiGiuseppe (1996) suggests the cognitions defined as irrational beliefs are a 'type of
schema that merges what is with what is desirable, moral or correct.' He accepts the
term 'irrational' can be misleading and he suggests the use of alternatives such as
dysfunctional belief. Ellis (1996b) agrees that the implication that irrational beliefs are
only unrealistic and/or illogical rather than also being self-defeating is also mistaken.
Irrational beliefs could be seen as an aspect of a 'quick and dirty' system that enables
rapid but less flexible decisions to be made (Epstein, 1990). It may therefore be more
constructive to consider beliefs in regard to their functions, rather than in terms of logic
or realism. Mischel's model of self-regulatory failure incorporates such ideas and is
based on two cognitive systems (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999): a 'cool' system that is
flexible and concerned with complex reflection but slow, and a 'hot' system that is
emotional, impulsive, and simple but fast. However, the REBT model, whilst also
proposing flexible and inflexible processing systems, is significantly different in that it
does not assume that negative emotions are only associated with inflexibility and
impulsivity. Rather, REBT suggests that 'healthy' negative emotions are generated by
the 'rational' system and that these motivate and direct goals. This is consistent with
cognitive models that suggest a function of emotions may be to prioritise goals and to
move out of unproductive patterns (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987).
In this regard, it may also be noted that Ellis (1979a) initially suggested that discomfort
anxiety was particularly associated with phobias. However, it can be argued that many
phobias and other emotions such as anger may well be triggered by automatic,
conditioned associations (Salzinger, 1995). This highlights the danger, noted in regard to
many cognitive models, of ignoring automatic processes in preference to higher level
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cognition (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Nevertheless, it is true that even if problems
involve automatic processes the patients has to decide to work at problems in spite of
emotional distress and discomfort (Power, 1991). Although Power (1991) relates this to
strengthening the self-concept, REBT would argue that it applies equally to the concept
of frustration intolerance. Indeed, O'Gorman and Baxter's (2002) research, using the
Gibbs et al. (1998) self-control measure, supported a model incorporating two self-
control processes: A conditioned inhibitory process involving associative learning, and a
cognitive control process.
1.7.5 LEVELS OF FRUSTRATION TOLERANCE
The use of the term Tow' frustration tolerance to refer to both minor and major
frustrations is problematic. Several theorists have suggested alternatives, for instance
Neenan and Dryden (1999) suggest the use of different terms depending on the degree
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and type of frustration, and Joyce (2001) proposes using the term 'inadequate
frustration tolerance'. By referring to frustration intolerance preventing goal
achievement this avoids comparisons between levels of frustration and is consistent with
recent definitions of irrationality. There are also other problems with the term Tow' and
'high' since this may, for example, imply that toleration of high levels of frustration is
necessarily good. However, too 'high frustration tolerance' such as in persisting with
hopeless goals, is often as unadaptive as easily giving up (Ellis, 1976a). Certainly, the
passive acceptance of frustration is not recommended by REBT but rather flexible
attempts to overcome frustrations (Ellis, 2000). Indeed, REBT considers frustration as a
motivator, which is consistent with the finding that successful life changes were more




Both engaging and disengaging from tasks is clearly important, and the ability to
disengage from failing goals has been theorised as important in depression (Nesse, 1998,
Klinger, 1975). Whether or not persistence was dysfunctional would depend on the
beliefs involved, with different types of frustration intolerance beliefs leading to quite
opposite behaviours. Thus, counterproductive persistence may reflect other forms of
intolerance of change. Brockner, Shaw and Rubin (1979) found that counterproductive
persistence was more likely when active effort was required, suggesting that people
continued because it was too much hassle to change. On the other hand, persistence may
derive from inflexible achievement demands, and the inability to tolerate less than
perfect performance.
1.7.6 PLEASURE VERSUS PAIN: APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE
Clearly, situations involving self-control can be described both in terms of negative
consequences and positive gratification. However, the question of valence, the relative
importance of pleasure versus pain, has not received much attention in REBT. Thus, it is
unclear to what extent low frustration tolerance refers to the reduction of discomfort or
the pursuit of pleasure. Dryden and Yankura (1993) have suggested a further aspect of
frustration intolerance is that of attaining positive gratification. Certainly, short-term
hedonism and immediate gratification are considered central to frustration intolerance
but often refer to reductions in discomfort as well as the pursuit of pleasure. Thus, long-
range hedonism has been defined as pursuing long-term goals whilst tolerating the
discomfort of short-term deprivations (Dryden, 1994a). Still and Dryden (1999) suggest
that Ellis is unconcerned with the distinction between positive and negative states
considering them endpoints of a utilitarian dimension. Nevertheless, evidence suggests
that positive and negative affect are not on a continuum but distinct states (Frijda, 1986).
Reflecting this, Neenan and Dryden (1999) suggest that non-ego disturbance involves
maintaining, reducing or increasing both positive and negative states and events.
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As noted above, a number of theoretical models are linked to the concept of
approach/avoidance behaviour (Carver & Scheier, 1996; Higgins, 1996; Grey, 1987).
Ryan and Deci (1999) argue that self-regulation cannot be reduced to a simple approach
/avoidance equation, and is likely to involve a mixture of both systems. However, the
definition of avoidance behaviour is important, and is best understood in terms of the
goals. Avoidance/approach refers to stimulus reduction/enhancement, not simply going
away/ towards a situation (McClelland et al., 1953). Thus, responses such as aggression
or the use of alcohol, whilst involving 'approach' behaviour, may functionally be aimed
at avoidance in terms of removing an unwanted situation or emotion. Thus, individuals
may seek 'positive gratification', not for its own sake, but believing this will help reduce
negative affect often created by the behaviour itself (Clark & Isen, 1982). As noted
above, the importance of tolerating negative states is a central feature of several different
theoretical approaches to self-control (Baumeister et al., 1994; Eisenberger, 1992;
Amsel, 1962; Mischel, 1996).
There is evidence that avoidance behaviour resulting from aversiveness is more rigid, in
contrast with the more flexible responses based on positive reward (Gray, 1987).
Similarly, evidence suggests that aversive events provoke more intense responses,
leading to narrowing of attention and more extreme attributions. On the other hand,
positive affect is associated with greater flexibility of thought and creativity (Isen,
1984), attributes assumed characteristic of rational beliefs. Although positive affect
leads to a desire to maintain this state (Isen, 1984), the evidence does not suggest that it
reduces the ability to resist temptation (Frey, 1975) or delay gratification (Schwartz &
Pollack, 1977). Whilst there is considerable evidence that positive states do lead to the
choice of pleasant activities over unpleasant activity, this appears to be a strategic
decision based on the desire to maintain a positive state (Wegener & Petty, 1994).
Research also suggest that positive affect increases heuristic problem solving (Isen,
1993), although when necessary individuals can choose a more elaborate cognitive
approach (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Similarly, in positive states the
avoidance of discomfort appears to be a choice that can be reversed when required
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(Power & Dalgleish, 1997). This is also consistent with Gottfredson and Hirschi's
(1990) view that criminals have no particular gratification needs. From this, it could be
argued that positive states are more likely to involve preferential 'rational' beliefs and
negative states irrational beliefs.
Nevertheless, immediate gratification has been considered, both in REBT and more
widely, an important feature low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Dryden &
Neenan, 1995). Certainly, immediate gratification is likely to be a prominent feature of
frustration intolerance if for no other reason than it takes less effort to indulge immediate
self-interest and desires. However, some qualification is still required. For instance,
Logue (1996) notes that impulsiveness as a strategy is sometimes effective in
maximising rewards, for example in conditions of uncertainty, and cautions against
value judgements regarding immediate gratification. Similarly, the pursuit of risk,
excitement, and gratification are insufficient by themselves to indicate frustration
intolerance. Thus, a distinction needs to be made between immediate gratification that is
a preferred choice, and therefore not irrational even if associated with future costs, and
immediate gratification resulting from frustration or discomfort intolerance. In other
words, frustration intolerance implies acting in spite of negative longer-term
consequences that are best avoided. However, the pursuit of immediate gratification by
itself does not necessarily imply frustration intolerance.
1.7.7 TRAIT OR STATE
Opinions are divided as to whether low frustration tolerance beliefs represent a trait or
state, with irrational beliefs having been described in terms of both. Ellis suggests that
frustration tolerance involves both learnt as well as a large innate component (Ellis &
Knaus, 1977). However, Bond and Dryden (1996c) argue that 'demandingness' is best
characterised as a state since within the ABC model specific beliefs are associated with
specific 'activating events'. However, the simplified ABC framework does not
adequately describe the complex interaction between emotions, behaviour and
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cognitions (Ellis, 1991). ABC sequences very rarely exist by themselves and usually
involve a network of irrational beliefs, behaviours, and affect. Thus, irrational beliefs are
not simply isolated propositions but involve a more complex framework of meaning
(Ellis, 1976b) compared to automatic thoughts or inferences, cognitions that have
traditionally been described in terms of states (Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983).
Irrational beliefs have been likened to the concept to 'schema' in Cognitive Therapy,
which have been described as ' inflexible, imperative, and resistant to change' (Beck,
Freeman, & associates, 1990; Ellis, 1996b). Similarly, irrational beliefs are described as
core philosophies involving 'rigidly held schema that are resistant to change'
(DiGiuseppe (1996). Beck et al. (1990) suggests that personality 'traits', being more
continually operative, less easy to modify, and triggered by wider situations, are an
expression of dysfunctional schema. This suggests that for some individuals irrational
beliefs operate like traits, with combinations of related beliefs associated with a wide
range of potential activating situations. Such clusters of beliefs may also become
chronically activated and constitute a form of enduring vulnerability and disturbance. It
is likely that irrational beliefs will reflect both situations and traits, with most theorists
accepting that an interaction between these influences is the best model (Matthews &
Deary, 1998). Certainly, the evidence discussed above strongly suggests people differ in
their industriousness and ability to delay gratification, and that these differences are
stable over time and across situations.
1.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This first chapter has attempted to place the concept of frustration intolerance into a
broader context and to arrive at a definition of this concept. The idea that the tolerance
of adversity is central to understanding psychological disturbance has strong
philosophical and psychological roots. Stoic philosophy described the underlying cause
of frustration and discomfort intolerance as essentially the attempt to shoehorn reality
into our own demands. Likewise, the work of Karen Horney emphasised the relationship
between 'claims' on the world with resentment and withdrawal. The REBT concept of
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frustration intolerance has derived from these and other historical sources. This may be
summarised as confusing wants/desires with demands/needs and believing that when
these are not forthcoming it is intolerable. In other words, it is not frustrating events that
cause emotional disturbance but the belief frustrations should not exist and cannot be
tolerated.
Therefore, it is not the desire for positive gratification that leads to dysfunction, and
indeed REBT has 'always encouraged people to strive for the pleasure of the moment...
and of the future' (Ellis, 1996b). Indeed, this review has suggested that frustration
intolerance may be best phrased largely in terms of negative consequences, that is not
getting something one wants or getting something one doesn't want. As a working
definition, frustration intolerance is the belief that frustration/discomfort is (absolutely)
intolerable in spite of the awareness of significant negative consequences that the
individual wishes to avoid. In other words, frustration intolerance involves being aware
of longer-term goals and costs but lacking the tolerance to achieve these: It is the
unwillingness to tolerate discomfort or frustration in spite of greater long-range negative
consequences to personal goals.
As such, the pursuit of gratification is not synonymous with frustration intolerance,
although this may be the case if gratification is indulged in spite of significant negative
consequences. Indeed, animal behavioural research indicates that immediate rewards are
more tempting than delayed rewards (Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981). Similarly, humans
have a marked preference for comfort across a number of areas, such as in avoiding
change or making difficult decisions (Anderson, 2003). Thus, Gottfredson & Hirschi
(1990) and others have argued that the pursuit of immediate gratification and self-
interest requires no special theory since behaviour naturally follows the easiest and most
tempting option unless restrained. An explanation of psychological disturbance therefore
requires to answer why short-range rewards are not indulged more often and what is the
nature of this restraint. The notion of individuals being overwhelmed by impulse is
arguably mistaken, in that whilst individuals do not choose to have impulses they can
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decide whether to act on these (Baumeister et al., 1994). As theories of rational choice
have argued, actions appearing 'impulsive' often involve deliberate choices, although
choices have costs regarding longer-range goals.
Cognitive-behavioural models propose that cognitions are central to the process of self-
control. However, the types of beliefs involved have not been clearly identified. Many
theorists propose self-worth as the most important aspect, either directly (Baumeister,
Heatherton, & Tice 1993) or indirectly through other types of belief such as
perfectionism (Hewitt & Flett, 1989; Frost et al., 1990). Uniquely, REBT has
distinguished between two categories of belief involved in psychological disturbance.
That is, frustration intolerance involving demands that reality be different and ego
disturbance representing conditional definitions of self-worth (DiGiuseppe (1996). Many
cognitive approaches, such as Schema Focused Therapy and Cognitive Therapy, have
primarily focused on the relationship of the self to emotional disturbance. For example,
it has been noted that Beck's cognitive triad, describing types of depressive belief, refers
largely to the self rather than general world conditions (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991).
The next chapter will explore the literature regarding the assessment of irrational beliefs,
and specifically those relating to frustration intolerance as opposed to self-worth.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ASSESSMENT OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The development of reliable and valid measures for the assessment of irrational beliefs is
essential if the basic tenets of REBT are to be studied. Unfortunately, a number of
difficulties have hindered this goal. Smith (1989), in reviewing the problems of
obtaining empirical support for REBT, argued that 'issues of assessment lie at the heart
of these limitations.' This he thought was related to the insufficient attention given to
methodological issues. Ten years later Burgess (1990) complained that the inadequate
validation of basic REBT assumptions was due to a lack of 'formal rigor and precise
specification' in REBT theory. These issues, regarding methodology and theory, will be
examined in this chapter and research aims outlined.
2.2 EARLY SCALES
2.2.1 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Many early tests paid scant attention to the requirements of test construction or
psychometric theory. For example, scales such as the Self-Rating Scale for Rationality
(Bard, 1973) and the Common Belief Scale (Maultsby, 1974), displayed a range of
inadequacies including lack of validity, reliability, and normative data (Sutton-Simon,
1981). The most commonly used early test was the Jones (1968) Irrational Beliefs Test
(IBT). Whilst this had improved psychometric properties, there was considerable doubt
as to the factor structure. This consisted of ten factors but many of the items had poor
factor loadings. Forty-one items were not placed on the scale with which they loaded
highest, and nine items were placed on scales on which they had one of their bottom five
loadings (Lane, Bessai, & Bard, 1977). The sub-scales were:
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Other questionnaires using the older irrational belief list were the Idea Inventory
(Kassinove, Crisci & Tiegerman, 1977) and the Rational Behaviour Inventory (Shorkey
& Whiteman, 1977). The Common Belief Survey III (CBS III), also used the early belief
list but separated rational and irrational beliefs (Bessai, 1977).
Numerous studies using these early scales have showed significant correlations with a
wide range of psychological difficulties including anxiety (Sutton-Simon & Goldfried,
1979), anger (Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill, & Sloan, 1986), and depression
(LaPoint & Crandell, 1980). However, Smith (1989) argued that positive correlations are
invariably found between measures of dysfunctional beliefs and emotional problems due
to a shared association with negative affect and problems regarding item wording. Thus,
correlations with measures of the same construct need to be higher than cross-construct
correlations or they may merely reflect similar wording across questionnaires. Such
similar wordings will artificially increase the association between the separate measures.
Whilst measures of irrational belief would be expected to strongly correlate with
measures of distress, they should not correlate to the point they were indistinguishable.
In fact, the convergent correlation between the RBI and the IBT was found to be very
high, but these scales were equally highly correlated with measures of anger, depression,
and anxiety (Smith & Zurawski, 1983).
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Smith therefore argued that the evidence for discriminative validity was lacking, and the
probable cause of this poor discrimination was the cross contamination of item content,
a common problem throughout personality research (Costello, 1992). This is because in
order to examine the relationship between cognitive and emotional variables it is
necessary that the measure of each is independent from the other. Thus, many of the
items on the IBT refer to dysfunctional emotions or behaviour as well as cognitions, for
instance: 'When people don't do what I want I feel upset". This is compounded by the
use of inadequate descriptive terms for emotions such as 'upset'. Therefore, the poor
discrimination and high correlations with measures of distress may be a result of similar
wording of questions on these separate measures. Smith points out that all of the twenty
or more scales prior to 1982 contained items designed to assess emotions as well as
beliefs. For example, 33% per cent of the IBT items involve wording related to affective
states. A similar number of items refer to behaviour. Only 50% of the items on the RBI
and the IBT where in the form of belief statements (Ramanaiah, Heerboth, & Schill,
1987). The questionnaires were therefore assessing the very emotions and behaviours
that they were meant to predict, a criticism that had also been made by Lane et al. (1977)
in their review of irrational belief assessment ten years earlier.
2.2.2 THEORETICAL ISSUES
Whilst Smith's review weakened the validity of these early scales there was nevertheless
some evidence supporting the relationship between irrational beliefs and emotional
disturbance. For example, Zurawski and Smith (1987) found a significant relationship
between irrational beliefs and measures of emotional disturbance even when controlling
for negative affect. Smith concluded that, 'improved assessment devices may produce
more compelling evidence of correlations between beliefs and emotions'. However,
there were also theoretical, as well as methodological weaknesses.
Theoretically, the major problem with earlier measures was that they were based on
outdated definitions and descriptions of irrational beliefs. In particular, they relied on the
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original list of eleven irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1962; Ellis & Harper, 1975). This list was
meant to do little more than illustrate the types of 'self-defeating ideas' that lead to
emotional disturbance and to describe broad categories of belief rather than serve as a
definitive classification (Walen et al., 1992). Indeed, Ellis (1994a) notes that such beliefs
might have been classified in many different ways. Although a new generation of belief
scales were developed following the methodological criticisms, they continued to use
the outdated model of beliefs. For example, the Malouff and Schutte Belief Scale
(Malouff & Schutte, 1986) showed improved validity and avoided item wording
referring to emotions (Warren & Zgourides (1989); Malouff, Valdenegro, & Schutte,
1987). Typical items are 'Life should be easier than it is,' and 'To be a worthwhile
person I must be thoroughly competent in everything I do'. Yet the ten sub-scales reflect
the outdated belief list and, as each sub-scale contains only two items, the scale is
limited to a global measure of irrationality.
In the years following the original descriptions of irrational beliefs, two major
theoretical developments took place. The first was the categorisation of beliefs into ego-
disturbance and discomfort disturbance (Ellis, 1979a). The second was the
conceptualisation of irrational belief from descriptions of content to four underlying
process categories: Demandingness, need statements, self-worth, awfulising, and low
frustration tolerance, with demandingness conceived as the core irrational belief. The
distinction between rational or irrational beliefs was also made in terms of whether it
involved a demand or a preference, rather than in terms of content. Furthermore, a
distinction was more clearly made between absolute evaluative beliefs and those of
inferential beliefs and distorted thinking, with Ellis (1977) arguing that inferences had a
more minor role in the production of emotional disturbance. Wessler and Wessler (1980)
suggested that beliefs may be described in the form of a syllogism, with a premise, 'I
must pass my exams', and a conclusion, 'If I don't pass my exams it would mean I was a
failure', that derives from this premise. Irrational beliefs were therefore represented by a
combination of at least two beliefs processes. Muran (1991) has also argued that schema
are expressed in the form of compound or conditional sentences. Thus, the structure of
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an irrational belief consists of two parts: A primary demand ('I must succeed'), and a
derivative belief, often termed a secondary belief (e.g. 'I can't stand it if I don't
succeed'). Similarly, a rational belief consists of a primary preference ('I would like to
succeed') and a secondary functional belief ('but I could tolerate not succeeding').
In relation to these theoretical changes, the Malouff and Schutte Belief Scale items are
therefore a mix of different types of cognition. Only half of the items represent primary
demands or derivative forms of irrational thinking. Some items are negative inferences
and others are essentially preferences, for example 'I dislike having any uncertainty
about my future', or refer to 'healthy' negative emotions, such as 'when it looks as if
something might go wrong, it is reasonable to be quite concerned.' The earlier
inventories had similar difficulties, for instance the IBT item 'I want everyone to like
me' represents a preference and not an irrational demand. In summary, these scales
confound the assessment of irrational beliefs by including items that measure rational
beliefs and healthy emotions as well as other types of distorted but not irrational
thinking.
2.3 EXPLORING BELIEF PROCESSES
One of the first inventories to focus on irrational processes and take into account
changes in REBT theory was the Personal Beliefs Test (Kassinove, 1986). The Personal
Beliefs Test avoided references to emotions and the items were grouped into six
categories, one reflecting basic principles ofREBT and others assessing irrational belief
processes. Demandingness was divided into two categories depending whether this was
self or other directed. The six sub-scales are:
1 Awfulizing ('The way some children behave is just awful')
2 Self-Directed shoulds ('When I make a mistake I usually tell myself, 'I shouldn't have
done that')
3 Other directed shoulds ('My family should understand the pressure I'm under')
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4 Low frustration tolerance ('I can't stand some of the things I see around me')
5 Self-Worth ('Being inadequate at a party would reduce my self worth')
6 Basic principles ('My feelings are largely determined by the actions of people around
me')
Like the Common Belief Survey III, this scale attempted to reduce the effects of
response bias by using reverse scoring methods. Thus, seven items in each category
were stated in a negative direction (that is disagreement was scored as being rational)
and three were reversed (agreement was scored as rational). However, this scoring
method raises a number of theoretical issues regarding the relationship of rational and
irrational beliefs. It assumes that disagreement with an irrational belief item indicates
that the person holds a rational belief and vice versa. It also assumes that the greater the
disagreement the stronger the alternative rational belief. However, disagreement with an
irrational belief does not necessarily indicate that a person holds a rational belief, or its
degree of strength. In addition, the use of reversed items has been generally criticised as
leading to reduced reliability and careless responding (Schriesheim, Eisenbach, & Hill,
1991).
Research using this scale showed that the irrational beliefs score was moderately
correlated with frequency of self-reported 'unhealthy' negative emotions, such as
anxiety and depression (Kassinove, 1986). Unfortunately, irrational beliefs also
correlated with 'healthy' negative emotions such as sadness and concern. Whilst, this
supplies further evidence of the association of irrational beliefs with emotional distress
these results do not support the REBT theory of separate healthy and unhealthy
emotions.
The Personal Beliefs Test was later revised to form the Survey of Personal Beliefs
(Demaria, Kassinove, & Dill, 1989). Analysis showed that almost all of the variance
when relating the five irrational sub-scales with neuroticism could be explained by two
predictors. These were self-directed shoulds and low frustration tolerance, supporting
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the distinction between ego and discomfort disturbance. 'Other-directed shoulds', in
contrast to the other sub-scales, was not significantly correlated with emotional
disturbance, and this finding was replicated by Nottingham (1992). From these results,
Kassinove (1986) argued that low frustration tolerance (LFT) and self-worth were the
most important irrational beliefs to focus on. This conclusion was supported by further
research by Kassinove and Eckhard (1993) who studied the relationship of self-reported
negative and positive emotions and irrational beliefs on a sample of Russian and
American students. The correlation of 'self directed shoulds' and all negative emotions
was negligible (-0.18) and there was no significant relationship with 'other directed
shoulds'. In contrast, LFT was the strongest sub-scale for the American sample (-0.48),
with awfulising second strongest (-0.35). In addition, LFT had the highest sub-scale
correlation with anger and depression, with awfulising the highest correlation with
anxiety. Global self-rating had significant correlation with anxiety (-0.34) but no
significant relationship with depression. On both awfulising and LFT, males scored
higher than females. Kassinove and Eckhard conclude that 'we would be wise to
consider the possibly greater importance of awfulising and LFT' in the cause and
maintenance of emotional disturbance, rather than demandingness.
The importance of low frustration tolerance was further underlined by Chang and
D'Zurilla (1996), who investigated the predictive discriminative validity of the five sub-
scales in relation to depression and anxiety. Controlling for covariation among the sub-
scales, two of these - self-worth and low frustration tolerance - were found to
significantly predict psychological symptoms. The 'other directed shoulds' sub-scale
was not significantly related to depression and, although correlated with anxiety, this
was in the opposite direction to that predicted, with higher scores associated with less
anxiety. Also against predictions, the self-directed shoulds sub-scale failed to correlate
with emotional disturbance even before controlling for covariation. As the authors note,
this raises two possibilities. The first is that the construct validity of the 'shoulds' scales
is poor. Thus, although Ellis and his associates vetted the test items, Chang and
D'Zurilla do not think that the items reflected the rigid and dogmatic quality emphasised
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by REBT as characteristic of irrational beliefs. In particular, the word 'should' is open to
a number of possible meanings (Vertes, 1971). In addition to the irrational 'absolutistic'
use, 'should' can also be used as a preference, or conditionally, or as a recommendation
or prediction. These other uses are rational and do not lead to emotional disturbance
(Dryden, 1995c). Thus, the statement 'when I make a mistake I usually tell myself, 'I
shouldn't have done that', used in the Survey of Personal Beliefs, could reflect either a
rational preference or an irrational demand.
Due to this ambiguity, Chang and D'Zurilla (1996) suggest that the endorsement of the
shoulds sub-scale items reflected commitment, rather than an absolute and rigid
adherence to values. However, such a commitment may be adaptive, similar to the
personality concept of 'hardiness' which incorporates elements of challenge, control,
and commitment (Kobasa & Puccetti, 1983). Since this concept has been associated with
reduced emotional stress it might explain the lack of association between some Survey
of Personal Beliefs sub-scales and anxiety and depression scores. Alternatively,
Kassinove (1986) suggests that demands on other people may often be complied with
and therefore lead to little frustration for the person making those demands. A further
explanation suggested by Chang and D'Zurilla is that demandingness is not central to all
forms of emotional disturbance. Certainly, the separate belief processes do not correlate
equally with measures of disturbance, possibly indicating that 'derivative' beliefs, such
as low frustration tolerance, may be equally important.
These results also raise another important issue. That is, distinguishing between
irrational and rational beliefs just based on the word 'should' is problematic. In therapy,
distinguishing between irrational shoulds from strong preferences is often achieved by
careful assessment of the context and the associations with other beliefs and emotional
consequences (Neenan & Dryden, 1999). However, this is clearly not possible when
using self-report questionnaires, and leaves open the possibility that endorsement of
'shoulds' may reflect rational preferences as well as irrational demands. To overcome
this potential ambiguity, Robb and Warren (1990) suggested that test developers use the
68
term 'ABSOLUTELY MUST' to emphasis the absolutistic quality that defines irrational
beliefs.
2.4 EXPLORING BELIEF CONTENT
Campbell (1988) had suggested a model whereby the four belief processes might be
most usefully viewed as interacting with a specific set of content themes: Approval,
achievement, and comfort. Burgess (1986), examined this interaction using an inventory
that was composed of items representing both content and belief processes. That is,
twelve statements combining the four processes with the three content categories. In
addition, he studied the influence of self-referential versus non-self-referential
statements, and specific versus generalised beliefs, on item endorsement. Each statement
was then worded rationally or irrationally, self versus non self-referential, and focused
versus overgeneralized. The resulting inventory, the Attitudes and Beliefs Inventory,
was composed of ninety-six statements.
The inventory was given to eighty outpatients fulfilling DSM III criteria for generalised
anxiety disorder, agoraphobia/panic, or dysthymic disorder (Burgess, 1990). Results
indicated that patients were more likely to endorse irrational beliefs and could be
differentiated from the non-clinical group. However, the clinical group also scored
significantly higher than the normal group on rational beliefs. Burgess suggests that this
could result from patients suffering more goal frustration than that of non-patients which
would activate higher levels of both rational and irrational beliefs in the clinical group.
Alternatively, the clinical group may be responding to both rational and irrational
statements as having similar meaning in terms of demandingness. Although Burgess
(1990) concluded from his results that 'the demand is the superordinate irrational belief,
demandingness did not in fact distinguish between depressed or anxiety groups and a
non-clinical group. However, the awfulising and LFT sub-scales did separate the clinical
from the control group. Similarly, comfort statements were significantly higher in the
agoraphobic group compared to the anxiety group, whereas approval and success items
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did not distinguish between these groups. Self-worth was significantly lower in the
anxiety and depressive groups. These findings suggest that, rather than demandingness
being the central belief, that the other derivative beliefs may have important and specific
interactions with measures of disturbance. As in Kassinove's research, beliefs relating to
frustration intolerance were particularly salient.
In a further study using Burgess's scale DiGiuseppe and Leaf (1990) found that
'focused' items were more likely to be endorsed than 'overgeneralized' items, and 'self-
referential' than 'non-self-referentiaT items. As Burgess had noted, overgeneralisation is
also not a definitive feature of irrational beliefs. They suggested that 'over-generalized '
and 'non-self-referential' items are therefore best avoided in future studies. Rational
beliefs were also best at distinguishing clinical from non-clinical groups. Therefore,
DiGiuseppe suggests that rational beliefs are separate from irrational beliefs, rather than
simply being on a continuum, and require to be assessed independently. Consistent with
Burgess' study, patients endorsed rational more frequently than irrational items.
DiGiuseppe and Leaf suggest that it was the 'rational' statement wording that lead to the
increased endorsement of these items. They note that the so-called 'rational' statements
are more accurately described as 'preferential' statements. Dryden (1995c) has
described this type of 'rational' belief as partial preferential statements ('I prefer that
people who are important to me like me') and distinguishes this from full preferential
statements ('If people who are important to me reject me, I realise they don't have to
like me, even though I want them to'). He argues that part-preferential statements can
have an unvoiced demand and therefore can be endorsed as having an irrational
meaning. DiGiuseppe and Leaf therefore argue that rational belief statements, in order to
convey the correct meaning, should include both the preferential as well as 'anti-
irrational' parts, and recommend that part preferential statements are best avoided in
future scales because they are artificially inflate the correlations with emotional
disturbance.
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The General Attitude and Belief Scale (GABS II) was redesigned with seventy-two
items with each representing a belief process, a content area, and with either rational or
irrational wording (DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner, & Robin, 1988). In order to obtain
conceptually distinct belief process sub-scales, definitions were written for each of the
four types of irrational belief, and the inclusion of items vetted by experienced REBT
practitioners. Examples of irrational LFT items for each content area are:
"Its unbearable being uncomfortable, tense or nervous and I can't stand it when I
am." (LFT/comfort)
"I can't stand being disliked by certain people, and I can't bear the possibility
their disliking me." (LFT/approval)
"I can't stand not doing well at tasks that are important to me."
(LFT/achievement)
It will be noted that frustration intolerance is used both as process and as content. Thus,
LFT is the process category and 'comfort' used as the discomfort disturbance content
category. The twenty-four items that relate to 'comfort' describe various combinations
of feeling 'tense, nervous, and uncomfortable', having 'hassles and frustrations' or
having a 'tough, and difficult life'. The criteria on which comfort items were included in
the sub-scale were stated as beliefs reflecting 'the quality or unpleasantness of one's life,
emotional states or hassles'. The GABS II was given to groups of students, outpatients,
and drug rehabilitation inpatients (DiGiuseppe et al., 1988; DiGiuseppe, Robin, Leaf, &
Gormon, 1989). Whilst these three groups significantly differed in terms of awfulising
and self-rating they did not differ as regards frustration tolerance or demandingness.
Whilst all sub-scales were significantly associated with measures of emotional
disturbance and emotional well being the other sub-scales had stronger correlations
compared to demandingness.
Theoretical, opinions are divided as to the best way of categorising irrational beliefs
(Sutton-Simon, 1981). Whether they are best described by content or by the processes of
awfulising, frustration intolerance, self-worth, and demandingness. A factor analytic
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study of the attitude and belief scale had yielded one factor of irrationality accounting
for 83% of the variance (DiGiuseppe & Leaf, 1990). However, due to the relatively
small number of subjects the sub-scale scores themselves were used as items in the
analysis, which can be argued as describing a second order factor. Shaw (1989), using
the GABS with a student sample, obtained a four-factor oblique solution, with factors
labelled: achievement, approval, comfort, and rationality. In a further analysis, Bernard
(1998) modified the General Attitude and Belief Scale by the addition of items related to
'fairness', and differentiated this sub-scale from 'other downing'. Fairness had been one
of the irrational beliefs on the original list ('the world should be fair and just'). However,
Ellis (Ellis & Bernard, 1985) has argued that these two types of belief (demands for
'consideration' and 'other blaming') are facets of the same scale. Bernard describes the
results of a oblique rotation as indicating a seven factor solution:
Factor 1 Rationality ('It is frustrating to be hassled but I can stand the frustration of
being hassled')
Factor 2 Self-downing ('I believe that I would be a worthless person if I achieved
poorly at tasks that are important to me')
Factor 3 Need for achievement ('I cannot stand not doing well at important tasks and it
is unbearable to fail')
Factor 4 Need for approval (' I must be liked by important people, and I will not accept
not being disliked by them')
Factor 5 Need for comfort ('I must have a pleasant life and I will not accept hassles
when I don't want them')
Factor 6 Demands for fairness ('I must be treated fairly by people, and will not accept
unfairness')
Factor 7 Other-downing ('I believe that if a person treats me very unfairly they are bad
and worthless')
Thus, there were four factors corresponding to the content areas, two factors relating to
self/other downing, and one factor related to rational beliefs. Again, it should be noted
that the content areas include a mixture of belief processes items. For instance,
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achievement has three items referring separately to awfulising, demandingness, and
frustration intolerance. Most of the variance was accounted for by the rationality factor
(34%), with all the other factors having less than 8%. However, factor extraction was
based on eigenvalues greater than one, a method that is very likely to result in too many
factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). More importantly, with the oblique rotation used in
this analysis it is not possible to interpret the rotated sums-of-squared loadings in terms
of proportion of variance, since the variance is shared between the correlated factors.
Thus, the variance explained by rationality is an arbitrary general factor (Kline, 1994).
In addition to these methodological errors, the number of items on the other downing
scale is very small, and with only three items is at the lower limit of factor definition
(Comrey and Lee, 1992). These weaknesses raise considerable doubts as to the factor
solution and to Bernard's conclusion that consideration (fairness) and other-blame are
separate factors. Unfortunately, individual factor loadings are not reported.
DiGiuseppe (1996) reports unpublished data using confirmatory factor analysis
indicating that demandingness, LFT, and awfulising all loaded together on one factor
whereas self-rating loaded as a separate factor. This is also consistent with Bernard's
(1998) results in which self-rating emerged as being separate from 'absolutistic
thinking'. These, and other studies, do not lend support to the hypothesis that
demandingness is the primary belief. DiGiuseppe's study did not yield a separate factor
of demandingness, and Joyce (1995) found demandingness was less strongly correlated
to a measure of parental stress than the other irrational beliefs processes. Furthermore,
she found that whilst the total irrationality score was significantly related to changes in
trait anxiety, guilt, and self-downing the demandingness score was not. Greaves (1996)
using multiple regression also reported that demandingness was a weak predictor of a
measure of parental stress, with demandingness accounting for less than 9% of the
variance compared to 40% of the variance accounted for by low frustration tolerance.
Likewise, the research on the Child and Adolescent Scale of Irrationality also showed
self-downing as distinct from demandingness (Bernard & Cronan, 1999).
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2.5 DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE AND
EGO DISTURBANCE
The separation of frustration intolerance from ego disturbance is strongly supported both
on conceptual and empirical grounds. However, these two categories of belief interact
and overlap in terms of content (Ellis, 1979a). Frequently both ego and frustration
tolerance themes are involved in primary psychological difficulties and in the inter-play
of primary and secondary problems. For example, a fear of appearing foolish may
primarily relate to low self-esteem and secondarily to intolerance of the associated
anxiety symptoms. Furthermore, a person may have ego-disturbance beliefs regarding a
discomfort theme. For example, 'I can't stand anxiety since it proves I'm such a weak
person'. Alternatively, they may hold discomfort intolerance beliefs about an ego-related
theme. For example, 'I can't bear to fail at tasks because it is so frustrating'. Dryden
(1996) has pointed out that, because of this interaction, it is not possible to determine if a
demand, by itself, refers to ego or discomfort disturbance. For instance, "I must not be
rejected" could refer to intolerance of the frustration associated with rejection, or to a
fear of appearing inadequate, or indeed both.
If this model is correct, then demand beliefs are insufficient in determining ego or
discomfort disturbance. To do so, it is necessary to assess the contributions of both
frustration intolerance and self-rating beliefs. As a rule of thumb, Dryden (1996) has
suggested that if a self-worth belief is present and is relatively stronger than any
frustration intolerance belief then the problem is one of ego-disturbance, and vice versa.
Therefore, to separate these two categories of belief both self-worth and frustration
intolerance beliefs need to be assessed for each irrational demand and their comparative
strengths compared. Dryden also argues that awfulising beliefs do not help in
determining if emotional disturbance is related to ego disturbance or frustration
intolerance. Thus, an event could be evaluated as awful since it 'proves' personal
inadequacy, or because the discomfort/frustration involved is deemed unbearable. The
presence of an awfulising belief still requires frustration intolerance or ego beliefs to be
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assessed. On the other hand others have suggested that awfulising beliefs are essentially
interchangeable with frustration intolerance beliefs, and have equivalent meanings
(DiGiuseppe, 1996). Existing irrational belief scales have not attempted to differentiate
between the two categories of belief by comparative ratings.
2.6 ITEM WORDING
The importance of question design and wording is recognised as central to the creation
of reliable and valid self-statement measures (Oppenheim, 1992). Guidelines in the
literature emphasis that wording is ideally kept simple and the terms exact. Ambiguous,
vague or biased words, such as double-barrelled questions and double negatives, are to
be avoided (Conner & Waterman, 1996). It is also recommended that questions are kept
relatively short, containing sentences of twenty words or less. Unfortunately,
examination of current irrational belief inventories will show that many of these
recommendations are lacking. An example of this can be taken from a recent
questionnaire, the Ellis Emotional Efficiency Inventory (Ellis, 1999):
'I don't like depriving or harming others but if I had to do so to help or keep from
harming myself, I would feel uncomfortable but not very guilty about depriving or
harming them'.
Clearly, this statement has problems in terms of readability, ambiguity, and that it refers
to several different aspects confusing the interpretation of responses. Similar problems
occur in other scales, for instance, the Survey of Personal Beliefs (Kassinove & Berger,
1996):
'I can easily tolerate very unpleasant situations and uncomfortable, awkward interactions
with friends'.
This statement refers to two areas of discomfort: Generalised 'very unpleasant
situations' that might include a range of difficulties, and a more specific 'uncomfortable'
social interaction. Furthermore, the reference to 'easily' tolerating discomfort
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substantially modifies the statement and raises issues regarding the concept of frustration
intolerance. The definition of high frustration tolerance refers to being able to withstand
difficulty without becoming disturbed, rather than the ease of doing so.
REBT theory places considerable emphasis on language in determining disturbance and
this clearly increases the difficulty in item wording. However, it is important to obtain a
balance between the accurate representation of irrational belief process and
comprehension. This is particularly the case regarding the content of beliefs, since with
complex wording it becomes difficult to determine the important elements of the belief.
Many existing scales display difficulties with readability and in using complex clauses
and referring to different content areas in the one statement. For instance, the General
Attitude and belief Scale has been criticised by participants as being too long and
repetitive leading too difficulties with incomplete responding (Lindner, Kirkby,
Wertheim & Birch, 1999).
2.7 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
A number of studies have used an experimental paradigm rather than traditional
inventory assessment to investigate the interrelationship of irrational beliefs. Dryden and
his colleagues (Dryden, Ferguson, & Clark, 1989; Dryden, Ferguson, & Hylton, 1989;
Dryden, Ferguson, & McTeague, 1989) studied whether irrational beliefs, compared to
rational beliefs, led to more dysfunctional inferences. Consistent with REBT theory,
results indicated that inferences were more dysfunctional following rehearsal of
irrational beliefs.
Bond and Dryden (1996a) extended this research to explore whether the content of
beliefs, in addition to their irrationality (that is whether they reflected a demand or a
preference), affected the functionality of inferences. They focused on the themes of
control and certainty and examined how this content interacted with the two major
categories of belief, that of discomfort disturbance and ego disturbance. In four separate
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experiments, students were asked to imagine themselves role playing scripted scenarios,
involving either a social or personal situation. During the role-play, the students were
asked to hold different types of belief that represented the independent variables. These
variables were (a) rational versus irrational beliefs, (b) discomfort disturbance versus
ego disturbance beliefs, (c) control versus certainty beliefs. The dependent measure was
the students rating of their agreement with fourteen inferences (e.g. ' To what extent will
other people in the bar think that you are pathetic?').
The findings from these four studies supported the early experiments, in that students
who held irrational, as opposed to rational beliefs, endorsed more dysfunctional
inferences. Ego and discomfort categories did not interact with the rationality of beliefs
to affect inferences. Whilst this was consistent with REBT theory, other results indicated
that certainty beliefs had a greater influence on the functionality of inference than
control beliefs (Bond & Dryden, 1996b; 1997). Control and certainty beliefs also
interacted with the rational and irrational conditions. Thus, students who held certainty
beliefs tended to show higher endorsement of functional inferences if this belief was
rational, rather than irrational. However, there was no difference between these
conditions with control beliefs. In other words, the inferences of students with control
beliefs were as dysfunctional whether or not such beliefs were rational or irrational. In
three of the studies, rational certainty beliefs produced more functional inferences than
rational control beliefs. The authors conclude that beliefs regarding certainty have a
greater effect on anxiety compared to those regarding control. They argue that these
results run counter to REBT theory which emphases that belief processes, rather than
content, are central in the generation of emotional disturbance.
Taking this further, Bond, Dryden, and Briscoe (1999) examined whether
demandingness beliefs were sufficient in themselves to affect the functionality of
inferences. Using the same imaginary role format students were asked to imagine
holding one of four different beliefs. Two of these beliefs were rational/irrational
primary beliefs (e.g. 'I must be certain of other people's opinion of me'). The other two
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were rational/irrational derivative beliefs combined with the corresponding primary
belief (e.g. 'I must be absolutely certain of other people's opinions of me; not having
such certainty would make me an inadequate person'). This study therefore aimed to test
whether demandingness needed to be combined with a derivative belief to result in
dysfunctional inferences. As in previous studies, it was found that holding an irrational
belief was more likely to result in dysfunctional inferences. However, results did not
support the hypothesis that demandingness was by itself sufficient to affect the
functionality of inferences. Rather, it seemed that a combination of secondary and
primary belief was required. A further study was carried out to test whether the
secondary belief by itself could affect inferences (Bond & Dryden, 2000). The rational
and irrational secondary beliefs were either in combination with a demand, as in the
previous study, or were reworded to stand alone. The results indicated that rational and
irrational secondary beliefs affected the functionality of inferences to the same degree as
the combined primary and secondary beliefs. In other words, it was not necessary for
beliefs to refer to demands or preferences to affect the functionality of inferences.
Bond and Dryden (2000) conclude from these results that it is the 'secondary belief
contents that constitute the primary mechanism through which rational and irrational
REBT beliefs affect the functionality of inferences', rather than primary demands.
However, another explanation is that secondary beliefs are more salient because their
simplified wording is easier to understand compared to the full combined statements
(Bond & Dryden, 1996a). For example, 'I must be absolutely certain of people's opinion
of me; not having such certainty would make me an inadequate individual' may be
compared to the straightforward secondary belief statement: 'If I am not certain of
people's opinion of me, then I am an inadequate individual'. However, they note that
even if this is true, it still leads to the same conclusion: that secondary belief statements
are to be preferred both therapeutically and in assessment. Therefore, they suggest that
irrational beliefs are best phrased in terms of secondary beliefs 'without mention of
musts and preferences'. Bond and Dryden (2000) argue that these findings are more
consistent with Cognitive Therapy which emphasises the role of belief content in
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causing emotional disturbance, than with REBT theory that places demandingness in
this primary position. However, one possible limitation to the studies was that the
wording of belief statements involved 'must', rather than 'absolutely must' which may
be confounded with preferences (Bond & Dryden, 1997).
2.8 GENERAL ASSESSMENT ISSUES
Similar methodological and conceptual problems have played a role in the failure of
assessment of the Cognitive Therapy model (Coyne & Gotlib, 1986), and three basic
problems have been noted (Weishaar, 1993). Firstly, the definition of schematic beliefs
has been vaguely and inconsistently used. Secondly, the practical difficulty of measuring
underlying beliefs has been underestimated. Thirdly, it is possible that the very nature of
basic beliefs precludes assessment by self-statement questionnaires. Thus, Ellis (1994a)
has emphasised that irrational beliefs are often 'preconscious' and require work in
therapy to bring these to awareness. Bond and Dryden (1996a) have also noted, that
clients may not be able to correctly identify their irrational beliefs without help, and
once that help is given the reports will be biased by knowledge about the 'correct'
response. Research regarding unconscious processing also suggests that often
individuals have limited access to their higher-order cognitions and motivations (Nisbett
& Wilson, 1977). In addition, both Ellis and Beck view the schemata operative during
emotional episodes as latent structures activated by salient events. This implies that the
assessment of beliefs outside this period, and therefore the investigation of underlying
vulnerability, may be severely limited. However, Power and Champion (1986) have
argued against the idea that schemata remain latent outside of activating situations. They
suggest that dysfunctional beliefs, rather than being inoperative, continue to exert an
influence outside of disturbed episodes, although the output from the schemata may be
automatic and unconscious. These, processes may be resistant to introspection without
some form ofpriming method (Power, 1990).
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Three main areas have been examined in the Cognitive Therapy literature: That specific
beliefs correspond to particular disorders, that underlying beliefs are associated with
depression, and that these beliefs are not merely symptoms of depressed mood but
represent enduring schemas constituting continued vulnerability. The Dysfunctional
Attitude Scale (DAS) has been the most widely used instrument to assess these issues
(Weissman & Beck, 1978). However, it has proved unsuccessful in providing evidence
for vulnerability to depression, with recovered depressed patients and control group
scores often found to be 'virtually identical' (Power, 1990). It is suggested that one
reason for this failure is the use of the DAS as a global measure of disturbance. Apart
from overlooking changes in specific areas of belief, global measures are likely to reflect
both state effects as well as enduring traits and may therefore simply act as symptom
indicators. This is related to 'mood congruity' effects, that is the tendency for people to
selectively recall negative information when low in mood, leading to higher scores on
'global hedonistic' worded items (Clark & Teasdale, 1985). Similar, difficulties can be
observed in REBT research regarding depression vulnerability. Thus, Solomon et al.
(1998) found no difference between recovered and never depressed groups on irrational
beliefs. However, they used the Malouff and Schutte (1986) Belief Scale, which only
gives a global measure of irrationality and uses the older definitions of irrational belief.
These difficulties prompted the investigation of multidimensional versions of the DAS.
Factor analysis of the original 100 item version has produced various factor models,
including nine factors (Beck, Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991) and six factor solutions
(Dyck, 1992). Calhoon (1996) using confirmatory factor analysis found that these
models were not supported and proposed instead a three-factor model, with sub-scales
labelled 'performance evaluation', 'need for approval', and 'imperatives'. She notes that
the most robust factor seems to be that of 'imperatives', which would be consistent with
REBT theory since the 'imperatives' sub-scale is conceptually similar to
demandingness. Power et al. (1994) in comparing the factor structure of the two forms
suggested a three-factor solution although there were differences between the two scales.
The DAS-A factors were 'achievement', and 'dependency', the latter being primarily
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concerned with approval. The third factor was more difficult to interpret but appear to
represent a mixture of both approval and self-control statements. The DAS-B yielded an
achievement factor, one concerning control over events and feelings, and a third factor
possibly related to dependency. Achievement was the most robust factor to appear in
both scales, with dependency and self-control only clearly represented in one or the
other scale. From these results, a more rationally scaled version, the DAS-24, was
developed. This was based on theoretically derived sub-scales and reflected content
themes already highlighted in the literature. Thus, beliefs related to vulnerability to
depression have been grouped into two main classes: 'self-critical' and 'dependent'
(Blatt et al., 1982). Beck (1983) has also proposed the 'autonomous' and 'sociotrophic'
personality types, referring to a person's investment in personal independence and
achievement or in interpersonal acceptance. Power et al. (1994), in their revision of the
DAS, included two factors related to domains of achievement and acceptance, as well as
one related to self-control.
The finding of inconsistent results regarding the relationship between belief scales and
emotional disturbance applies to other belief scales in addition to the DAS. For instance,
using the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale (Beck et al., 1983), a significant relationship has
been shown between negative interpersonal events and sociotropy but no significant
interaction between negative achievement events and autonomy (Nietzel & Harris,
1990). Likewise, evidence regarding the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scales (Hewitt
& Flett, 1989; Frost et al., 1990) indicates that not all of the dimensions of perfectionism
are implicated in emotional disturbance, with some sub-scales, such as 'Personal
Standards' and 'Organisation', showing an association with positive coping. Two major
scales have been developed to measure perfectionism both entitled the Multidimensional
Perfectionism Scale. The Frost, Marten, Lahart, and Rosenblate (1990) scale has six sub-
scales, that have been found fall into two further groupings (Frost, Heimberg, Holt,
Mattia, & Neubauer, 1993). In the first group, concern over mistakes, doubts, parental
expectations, and parental criticism, and in the second personal standards and
organisation, although the latter was only weakly related to the other scales. Likewise,
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Hewitt and Flett's (1989) scale has three sub-scales that fall into the same two groups:
other-orientated and socially prescribed perfectionism in the first group and self-
orientated perfectionism in the second. Research using these scales may be summarised
as showing the first group of sub-scales to be consistently associated with a wide range
of psychological disturbance (e.g. Hewitt & Flett, 1991). In contrast, the second group
has often shown no association with disturbance or even a positive relationship with
adaptive coping (e.g. Enns & Cox, 1999; Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, & O'Brian, 1991).
This has led several theorists to propose that the items on these scales represent a
mixture of functional and dysfunctional beliefs (e.g. Frost et al., 1993). In other words,
the first group represents dysfunctional perfectionism and the second group, reflecting
high standards, functional perfectionism. Thus, Frost et al. (1993) in a factor analysis of
the sub-scales in both perfectionism scales labelled these groups 'maladaptive evaluative
concerns' and 'positive achievement strivings'. There are several explanations as to why
these sub-scales might differ in functionality. Firstly, Alden, Ryder, and Mellings (2002)
have suggested that there are two elements to perfectionism: Demands for high
standards and maladaptive self-appraisal. They argue that high standards by themselves
are adaptive and it is only when these high standards are combined with fears of
negative evaluation that dysfunctional perfectionism occurs. Certainly, examination of
Frost's perfectionism dimensions indicates that for the 'concern over mistakes' sub-scale
all the items, bar one, refer to self-evaluation. In contrast, none of the items, bar one, on
the personal standards sub-scale refer to self-evaluation. The situation is more complex
for Hewitt and Flett's scale since they suggest that, although self-evaluation is an
essential aspect of perfectionism, the percieved ability to meet standards should be
seperated from the desire for high standards (Hewitt et al., 2003). However, whilst not
directly referring to self-evaluation it may be argued that the socially prescribed
perfectionism sub-scale items strongly imply an underlying relationship with self-worth.
Research findings support the conclusion that, compared to self-orientated
perfectionism, socially prescribed perfectionism primarily reflects self-evaluation. For
instance, fear of negative evaluation and poor self-esteem are found to be associated
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with socially prescribed but not self-orientated perfectionism (Flett, Hewitt, & DeRosa,
1996). Likewise, concern over mistakes and doubts are correlated with social anxiety
involving perceived weakness and personal inadequacy, but personal standards was not
(Saboonchi & Lundh, 1997).
This is consistent with REBT theory that has emphasised the relationship between
perfectionism, psychological problems, and global negative self-evaluation beliefs (Ellis,
2002). At face value, this could suggest that high standards, when not linked to negative
self-evaluation, are adaptive. However, REBT theory also hypothesises that
dysfunctional perfectionism can relate both to frustration intolerance beliefs as well as to
self-worth beliefs. For instance, an individual can become angry at failing to achieve
their best without necessarily believing that they are a failure. Given that both Hewitt
and Flett's self and other orientated sub-scales, and Frost's personal standards subscale,
refer to broader aspects of perfectionism it might be expected that these sub-scales
would also assess frustration intolerance perfectionism. However, as noted above, the
relationship of these two scales with emotional disturbance is inconsistent. Thus, self-
orientated depression is most strongly associated with positive motivation and adaptive
coping (Blankstein & Dunkley, 2002), although some evidence suggests this sub-scale
may have specific relationships with disturbance, for instance, in mediating achievement
stress and depression (Hewitt & Flett, 1993).
REBT would argue that one explanation for this inconsistency is that perfectionism is
only dysfunctional when associated with demands that standards be met, not merely the
desire for such standards. The latter represents an adaptive and flexible preference for
high standards. Thus, only some items on the self-orientated perfectionism items are
phrased in terms of demands, with other items phrased more neutrally ('It makes me
uneasy to see an error in my work'). This is more apparent in Frost's personal standards
sub-scale in which most of the items use positive or neutral wording ('I have extremely
high goals'). Furthermore, as previously discussed, it has been argued that the use of
'musts' without additional qualification may also be construed as referring to a
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preference (Robb & Warren, 1990). Therefore, the lack of item clarity in terms of
preferences and demands may lead to adaptive and dysfunctional beliefs being
confounded and the association with disturbance attenuated.
An additional explanation may be that demandingness when separated from self-
evaluation is unrelated to emotional disturbance. In this respect, recent research has
suggested that beliefs related to self-worth and frustration intolerance may be more
important in determining dysfiinctionality than demandingness (Bond & Dryden, 2000).
This would mean that, to adequately assess each type of perfectionism, items need to be
defined in terms of the consequences of failing to meet high standards, either by
referring to self-evaluation or frustration intolerance. Indeed, Shafran, Cooper, and
Fairburn (2002) argue that dysfunctional perfectionism is best defined as the pursuit of
high standards despite adverse consequences. Similarly from a behavioural perspective,
Terry-Short et al. (1995) have suggested that dysfunctional perfectionism involves the
avoidance of negative consequences, whereas adaptive perfectionism involves the
pursuit of positive outcomes. This has similarities to the definition of irrational beliefs, a
central characteristic of which is the blocking of long-term goal attainment (Dryden,
1994a). Thus, Frustration intolerance might be defined as the intolerance of discomfort
or frustration in spite of the awareness of negative consequences the individual wishes to
avoid. In this regard, perfectionistic frustration intolerance relates to the belief that
achievement failure cannot be tolerated, irrespective of beliefs regarding self-worth. It is
important to note that some frustration intolerance beliefs may well refer to the self but
not self-worth per se. For example, 'I must pass my exam' may refer to self-worth
(...'because I would feel a failure') or to frustration intolerance (...'because I would
have to resit the exam over the holiday, which would be an absolute pain'). Thus the
second belief, whilst focusing on the self, is not globally self-condemning but rather
involves intolerance of the discomfort of the additional work resulting from failure.
Clearly, both types of beliefmay operate separately or in combination (Dryden, 1996).
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Thus, the inconsistent evidence may reflect differences in the definition of dysfunctional
beliefs, as well as in the failure to separate self-worth from frustration intolerance
processes. This criticism may also apply to the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale. Indeed,
Ellis (1987) has suggested the Cognitive Therapy model fails to distinguish between
demands and preferences and therefore does not adequately separate healthy negative
from unhealthy negative emotions and behaviour. In reply, it has been argued that this
represents an oversimplification of Beck's theory (Marzillier, 1987), and clearly
Cognitive Therapy does emphasise the importance of absolute beliefs within core
schema. However, it is also true that the role of demandingness is not viewed as central
to disturbance in Cognitive Therapy. For example, the item on the DAS-A 'what other
people think about me is very important ' would be argued by REBT to describe a
preference regarding important goals, and likely to result in adaptive concern rather than
dysfunctional anxiety. Thus, although Beck et al. (1991) describe DAS items as aiming
to reflect 'absolute language' including categorical imperatives, less than 10% directly
refer to demands, and these are not phrased as 'absolute must' statements. Furthermore,
although generalised wording (all, always, never) is classed as absolutistic on the DAS it
is not regarded as definitive of irrational beliefs in REBT theory. Thus, many belief
inventories, such as the DAS and perfectionism scales contain not only items that refer
to demands but also to other types of cognition, such as overgeneralizations, inferences,
and preferences. In this regard, it may be noted that Bieling et al. (2000) have
distinguished two factors on the autonomy sub-scale described in terms of 'preferences'
and 'control', with only the later related to emotional disturbance, where as both
sociotropy factors were associated with disturbance.
Also important in relation to the present research is the lack of clear distinction between
self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs. Thus, on the DAS (Beck et al., 1991) the
majority of items refer to self-worth, for instance with 85% of the DAS-A achievement
items referring to self-worth. Power et al. (1994) note that the area of self-control has
received relatively less attention compared to achievement and socially orientated
beliefs. Thus, Brown and Beck's (1989) finding that the 'shoulds' sub-scale on the DAS
85
did not distinguish between anxious, depressed and general psychiatric disturbance is
perhaps not surprising, given that the sub-scale includes beliefs referring to both self-
worth and frustration intolerance, and to different types of belief within those categories.
Likewise, Gilbert (1992) has argued that approval needs are closely involved with both
achievement striving and interpersonal dependency and therefore these dimensions are
not separate, as proposed by Beck (1983).
In summary, this present model suggests that a central requirement for investigating
emotional vulnerability and cognitive specificity is the clear separation of frustration
intolerance from self-worth beliefs and between the specific dimensions within these
categories. This, and the lack of a clear distinction between preferences and demands in
the wording of items, may explain the inconsistent research findings using the DAS and
perfectionism scales.
2.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Whilst some researchers have complained that changes in definitions and models of
irrational processes has made research difficult (Wessler, 1996; O'Kelly, Joyce, &
Greaves, 1998), these studies do enable some conclusions and guidelines to be drawn.
First, there is considerable evidence that irrational beliefs are multidimensional, and that
global measures of beliefs are insufficient (DiGiuseppe et al. 1988; Power, 1991).
Secondly, research suggests that both content and processes are important. Although
REBT has focused on belief processes the interaction with the content of irrational
beliefs may be important in determining psychological disturbance (Bond & Dryden,
2000). Whilst opinions still differ as to the interrelation of belief processes, there is a
consensus of agreement that self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs are separate
categories of belief. However, several studies have raised doubts whether
demandingness is the central irrational beliefs. Evidence suggests that the derivative
beliefs may be more salient and more closely related to emotional disturbance.
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Certainly, demandingness has proved to be poor at discriminating between clinical and
non-clinical groups, and in predicting outcome measures.
The re-emergence of interest in belief content follows the suggestion that irrational
belief processes may not be specific to different psychological problems. DiGiuseppe
(1996) suggests that demandingness could be associated with general negative affect
whereas secondary beliefs determine the specific emotions and behaviours. This echoes
the conclusion of Kassinove and Eckhard (1993) that further research might gain more
from focusing on secondary irrational beliefs. However, the structure of these content
dimensions remains elusive, with both self-worth and low frustration tolerance lacking
any detailed analysis of their belief content. Thus, Neenan & Dryden (1999) have noted
that descriptions of self-worth often seem to be subsumed in one 'scatological
category... shithood', and similarly frustration intolerance often refers to a range of
beliefs without coherent classification. They concluded that there is a need for the
development of a non-ego disturbance scale and identification of the factor structure of
this area of disturbance.
Several existing irrational belief inventories measure frustration intolerance along with
other belief processes. Nevertheless, these scales are relatively poor at measuring self-
control problems, such as anger, in comparison to anxiety and depression (DiGiuseppe,
1998). Outside of REBT, scales have often focused on issues relating to self-worth and
do not adequately differentiate between ego disturbance and frustration intolerance.
Overall, no belief scale exists that specifically aims to assess beliefs unique to frustration
intolerance and scales that do incorporate frustration intolerance beliefs frequently treat
this as a single dimension. Both the Survey of Personal Beliefs and the GAB II Scale
contain frustration intolerance scales, but these include a mixture of beliefs regarding
'the quality or unpleasantness of one's life, emotional states or hassles' (DiGiuseppe et
al., 1988). Whilst the GAB II does have separate frustration intolerance items for each of
the content areas, (achievement, approval, and comfort) these only contain a small
number of items. To adequately assess the range of beliefs contained within the
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frustration intolerance domain requires a single questionnaire dedicated to this belief
category. Power (1991), writing from a Cognitive Therapy approach has argued that
individuals have circumscribed overvalued goals. For instance, depressed individuals
will not necessarily endorse all types of dysfunctional belief, and therefore there is a
need to assess specific content areas. A global rating scale is therefore too broad to
capture these areas of vulnerability, and a multidimensional scale is likely to be the best
means of investigating emotional vulnerability and beliefs (Power et al., 1994).
However, they recommended that content areas should be based on theoretical rather
than just statistical grounds. Clearly, this also applies to other types of disturbance and,
in this respect, beliefs related to anger and self-control may be poorly represented in
existing inventories. This review suggests that distinguishing between frustration
intolerance and self-worth beliefs, and determining the content structure of these
categories of belief, is central in clarifying the relationship with psychological
disturbance.
This review also points to the importance of questionnaire design and structure. Item
wording needs to closely reflect current REBT theory. In particular, the importance of
specifying 'absolute musts' was highlighted, to prevent confounding with 'preferential
shoulds.' Further, the contamination of belief measures with measurement of symptoms
and emotion, and the use 'over-generalised ' and 'non-self-referential' items, are best
avoided. Recent reviews of cognitive assessment have highlighted the methodological
problems involved with simple self-statement endorsement methods (Clark, 1997). In
particular, the ability of endorsement scales to measure underlying schematic beliefs has
been questioned. Nevertheless, Glass and Arnoff (1997) conclude that endorsement
questionnaires often remain the method of choice, having ease of administration, and
good validity and reliability.
With regard to unconscious processes, DiGiuseppe (1996) has argued that
demandingness might represent a more 'subtle, tacit irrational belief that drives the
secondary beliefs but not as open to conscious awareness. Therefore, secondary beliefs
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may be more readily accessible compared to the underlying absolutistic beliefs. That is,
demandingness may be expressed in everyday language by means of secondary beliefs.
This suggests that irrational beliefs need to be described in terms of a compound
sentence involving both the primary and secondary beliefs (DiGiuseppe, 1996). It also
implies that that tests employing single sentence items are unlikely to provide an
accurate measure of irrationality (O'Kelly et al., 1998). This was the approach adopted
in the design of the preliminary Frustration-Discomfort questionnaire, with a compound
sentence involving both a demand and intolerance belief. However, Bond and Dryden's
(2000) more recent research suggests that secondary belief statements are to be preferred
in assessment, and that irrational beliefs are best phrased in terms of secondary beliefs
'without mention of musts and preferences'. Based on this and the results of the
preliminary scale research the revision of the Frustration-Discomfort questionnaire,
described in chapter ten, used frustration intolerance beliefs without the demand.
Kendall and his colleagues, in reviewing the current status ofREBT, outlined what they
consider the most important future research priorities (Kendall et al., 1995). Foremost
amongst these is the need to investigate whether specific irrational beliefs are associated
with particular disorders. Whilst there are frequent reference to the central role that
frustration intolerance beliefs play in a wide range of disorders, empirical evidence to
support these theoretical claims is sparse. Existing scales, in treating these beliefs as
unidimensional, do not allow the investigation of specific types of frustration
intolerance. For instance, anger has been hypothesised as being associated with demands
for fairness (Walen et al., 1992) and procrastination with intolerance of discomfort (Ellis
& Knaus, 1977). Investigation of the relationship between diagnostic groups and
irrational beliefs has also been limited by the use non-clinical samples. In this regard,
Kendall et al. also emphasise the importance of obtaining discriminative validity, and in
particular determining the contribution of irrational beliefs independent from general
negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984).
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2.10 RESEARCH AIMS
1 The development of a multidimensional measure of frustration intolerance
beliefs.
2 To provide preliminary evidence regarding the reliability and validation of this
scale.
3 To investigate the specific relationship of frustration intolerance and its sub-
scales to measures of emotional behavioural disturbance.
4 To differentiate the relationship between emotional disturbance and irrational
beliefs from general negative affect.
5 To explore the relationship between the two proposed categories of belief: Ego
disturbance and frustration intolerance.
6 To distinguish between ego disturbance and frustration intolerance in their
relation to measures of disturbance.
7 To revise the Frustration-Discomfort Scale on the basis of these results and to
test the factor structure, using confirmatory factor analysis.
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CHAPTER THREE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
3.1 OVERVIEW
The previous chapters have discussed the theoretical concept of frustration tolerance and
the assessment of irrational beliefs. What follows is the construction of an instrument to
measure frustration intolerance beliefs and its empirical validation. One of the central
requirements in developing a psychological measure is determining the validity of the
measure. That is, whether it measures what it says it aims to measure, and not something
else. Traditionally, this consisted of the investigation of content, construct, predictive,
and concurrent validity. More recently, these strategies have been recognised as different
aspects of the primary question of construct validity. Thus, various types of evidence are
gathered to test whether the construct under examination is actually the construct being
measured, with a cyclical process of validation involving model building, testing, and
revision (John & Benet-Martinez, 2000). The present research follows this approach.
Convergent and divergent validity, the evidence the scale is related to conceptually
similar measures and unrelated to dissimilar measures, is examined by evaluating the
Frustration-Discomfort Scale in relation to other constructs similar to frustration
intolerance. In this regard, it is of primary importance that frustration tolerance beliefs
are differentiated from those relating to ego disturbance. Discriminative validity was
also evaluated in terms of clinical and non-clinical groups and between different types of
psychological disturbance.
The research comprises two separate studies. The first reports the development of a
preliminary Frustration-Discomfort Scale and the analysis of the factor structure using
exploratory factor analysis. Following this, a series of validation studies were carried out
investigating the relationship of the preliminary Frustration-Discomfort Scale with
emotional disturbance, self-esteem, self-control problems, and therapy engagement.
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Based on this evidence, the Frustration-Discomfort Scale was revised and, using two
further population samples, a confirmatory factor analysis conducted and the validity of
a shortened scale investigated. The development and analysis of the revised scale is
reported in chapter ten. Both the preliminary and revised scales were also compared in a
joint study on student procrastination. In order to preserve continuity, these results are
reported in chapter eight prior to the description of the revised scale. A summary of the




In the preliminary and revised scale studies both clinical and student groups were
employed. For the preliminary scale research, the clinical group comprised respondents
from 587 consecutive referrals to the adult psychology department from North East Fife
and Kirkcaldy districts. The clients were predominately outpatients with a small number
of in-patients and day-patients. The non-clinical sample comprised 88 undergraduate
psychology students taking final year honours courses in abnormal psychology.
Following preliminary data analysis, 242 cases were included in the patient group and
87 in the student group. The response rate for the clinical group was 44% The mean age
of the clinical group was 39.0 (range 18-74), with 39% men and 61% women. Gender of
students was 30% male and 70% female.
The participants and procedure in the revised scale research followed that of the
preliminary Frustration-Discomfort study. The clinical sample consisted of 573
consecutive patients referred to the adult psychology department. Of these 260 were
returned, a response rate of45.4%.
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The non-clinical population came from four samples of psychology students. Three of
these were final year undergraduates, two from St Andrews and one Edinburgh
University (n = 79). These groups were included with the clinical group in the
confirmatory analysis. A further group of first year students (n = 49), sampled as part of
the procrastination study, were included in the normative data and the discriminative
analysis but, due to time constraints, not in the confirmatory analysis. Patient age and
gender distribution was essentialy similar to the preliminary study, with 42% male and
58% female and mean age 37.2 (range 17-74). Student gender distribution was 17%
male and 83% female.
3.2.2 PROCEDURE
Cross sectional data were gathered from the clinical groups using a questionnaire packet.
For both clinical groups, the packet of questionnaires was included with notification of
first appointment and stamped addressed envelope for reply. Ethical approval was
obtained from Fife primary care NHS Trust prior to the research. A consent and
information form was included in the package of questionnaires and is reproduced in
appendix 5. For the student group, questionnaires were completed during classes as part
of a course in abnormal psychology.
3.2.3 MEASURES
3.2.4 PRELIMINARY SCALE: CLINICAL GROUP
Given the length and complexity of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale an important
consideration in selecting additional tests was brevity and reliability. In addition to the
Frustration-Discomfort Scale, the following questionnaires were included in the packet
given to patients. Where appropriate, specific measures are also described in more detail
in the relevant chapter.
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TRAIT ANGER SCALE (TAS): The Trait Anger Scale is a 10-item self-report
scale that includes two sub-scales angry temperament and angry reaction (Spielberger et
al., 1983). Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale reflecting how angry individuals
generally felt. It was developed to assess components of anger in the normal and clinical
population. Trait anger is defined as the 'disposition to perceive a wide range of
situations as annoying or frustrating, and the tendency to respond to such situations with
more frequent elevations in state anger more often and with greater intensity... Such
persons are also likely to experience a great deal of frustration'. The angry temperament
sub-scale has 4-items and measures 'a general propensity to experience and express
anger without specific provocation'. The angry reaction sub-scale likewise has 4-items
and measures the predisposition to 'express anger when criticised or treated unfairly'.
The scale has good normative and reliability data, with a reported coefficient alpha of
.87 and internal reliability from .81 to .91. A cut-point above the 75th percentile,
equivalent to > 21 for males and > 22 for females, is suggested as indicative of anger
likely to interfere with functioning, and was used in the present study to classify clinical
anger.
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE: The wide use of this self-esteem scale
(Rosenberg, 1965), its reliability, the lack of adequately researched alternatives, and its
brevity made this scale and obvious choice. The 10-item scale is scored as a likert-type
instrument. To enable easier comparisons with existing research (e.g. Marsh, 1996) high
scores represented high self-esteem. Rosenberg reports satisfactory internal reliability
(.87) and temporal stability (.86).
HOSPITAL ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION SCALE (HAD): The HAD is a 14
item scale used to measure anxiety and depression on two separate sub-scales, each
containing 7 items (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Normative data suggests a cut-point of 11
or more for each sub-scale to obtain the best separation of cases from non-cases
(Crawford, Henry, Crombie, & Taylor, 2001). It has been found a valid and reliable
method for measuring the severity of emotional distress (Herrmann, 1997).
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SCHEMA QUESTIONNAIRE (IMPAIRED LIMITS SUB-SCALES); The schema
questionnaire was developed by Young (1990) to measure common maladaptive schema
that he proposed formed the basis for emotional and personality disorder. It is a self-
report inventory with each item rated on a six-point scale. Validation studies have found
sixteen primary factors two of which, 'Entitlement' and 'Insufficient self-control',
seemed relevant to the present study (Schmidt, Joiner, Young, & Telch, 1995). High
scores on these factors indicate problems with 'making commitments, setting and
meeting personal goals, and tolerating unpleasant emotional experiences' (Lee, Taylor,
& Dunn, 1999). The self-control sub-scale in particular is viewed as reflecting
difficulties with frustration tolerance and an 'exaggerated emphasis on discomfort-
avoidance'. Nineteen items (5 for 'Entitlement' and 14 for 'Insufficient self-control')
were taken from the 160 item revised version of the test.
DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE (DAS-24): The 'self-control' sub-scale
from the short form developed by Power et al. (1994) was used. This has good
reliability, validity, and a close relationship with full-scale DAS. The items on this sub-
scale reflect the concept of demandingness and include beliefs assumed important in low
frustration tolerance. For example, items refer to avoidance of risk, emotional control
and being able to solve problems without effort. The eight items making up the sub-scale
are rated on a 1 to 7 scale.
COPING METHODS SCALE: This is a self-report inventory developed for the
present study to assess a range of dysfunctional behaviours. It is described in detail in
chapter six.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE: This self-report
questionnaire was developed for the present study to measure a variety of relevant
clinical background data and is described in chapter nine.
3.2.5 CHANGES IN MEASURES FOR THE REVISED SCALE
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The clinical group received the revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale, Trait Anger Scale,
the HAD inventory, and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. As in the preliminary study,
the student group received the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and the PASS inventory,
but additionally completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.
3.2.6 ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR STUDENT GROUPS
PROCRASTINATION ASSESSMENT SCALE-STUDENTS (PASS).-In addition to
the Preliminary Frustration-Discomfort Scale, students completed the Procrastination
Assessment Scale-Students (PASS; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), the most commonly
used measure of academic procrastination. This is described in more detail in chapter
eight.
3.3 PRELIMINARY SCALE CONSTRUCTION
The preliminary Frustration-Discomfort Scale was developed over a nine-month period,
with pilot work enabling modification of the questionnaire design, item wording, and
item selection (appendix 2). The review of irrational belief assessment had highlighted a
number of recommendations that were included in scale construction. General guidelines
for questionnaire design, particularly regarding structure and wording of statements,
were also followed.
3.4 ITEM WORDING AND STRUCTURE
3.4.1 DIFFERENTIATING THE TWO CATEGORIES OF BELIEF
The statement structure design aimed to reflect REBT theory. In particular that an
irrational belief consists of two parts, a primary demand and a derivative belief (Ellis,
1989), and this is best expressed in the form of a compound or conditional sentence
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(Muran, 1991; Wessler & Wessler, 1980; DiGiuseppe, 1996). Thus, the Frustration-
Discomfort Scale statements consist of a demand (T absolutely must not waste time')
associated with one of two derivative beliefs: A frustration intolerance belief ('I couldn't
bear to waste time') or a self-worth belief ('It would totally lower my self-esteem'). For
example:
24.1 absolutely must not be kept waiting
Because I can't tolerate waiting 0 12 3 4
It would totally lower my self-esteem 0 12 3 4
The complex interaction between ego and discomfort disturbance presented the most
difficult obstacle in the assessment of low frustration tolerance. If Dryden's (1996)
model is correct, then demand beliefs are by themselves insufficient in determining
whether a person is experiencing ego or discomfort disturbance and it is necessary to
assess the contributions of both frustration intolerance and self-worth beliefs. As a rule
of thumb, Dryden (1996) suggests that if a self-worth belief is present and is relatively
stronger than any frustration intolerance belief then the problem is one of ego-
disturbance, and vice versa. Therefore, to separate these two belief categories requires
that both self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs need to be rated for each irrational
demand statement.
This was incorporated into the scale by asking respondents to rate both frustration
intolerance and self-worth sub-statements connected with the demand. The use of
'because' to connect the sentences may suggest the derivative belief, rather than the
demand, is primary. There were two reasons for using this structure. First, it was the best
practical way of presenting the two types of disturbance in a questionnaire format.
Secondly, it follows suggestions that derivative irrational beliefs, whilst not theoretically
the primary belief, may nevertheless be most salient in everyday expressions of
irrational thinking (Bond & Dryden, 1996; DiGiuseppe, 1996). Lastly, opinions are
divided over the primacy of demands with suggestions that these may interact rather
than be hierarchically ordered.
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Item wording was constrained by the need to balance comprehension with REBT theory
and the attempt to differentiate frustration intolerance from ego disturbance beliefs. As
far possible the frustration intolerance wording was closely matched to that of the
demand. Frustration intolerance phrases used were: 'I can't stand it' (59%), 'I can't bear
it' (31%), 'I can't tolerate it' (5%), 'I can't go on' (1%), and 'I can't accept it' (1%).
Clearly, accurately representing REBT theory, and in particular distinguishing between
the two categories of disturbance, inevitably complicated the scale structure. Given this
complexity, and the importance of respondents understanding the distinction between
self-esteem and frustration/discomfort intolerance, the scale had detailed instructions
that included examples. These instructions emphasised that responses to the two parts of
the question may be quite different, and the distinction between being 'frustrated' and
lowered self-esteem.
3.4.2 RATIONAL VERSUS IRRATIONAL BELIEFS
The simple model of therapy change suggests that irrational beliefs are displaced by
rational beliefs during the process of disputation. However, more sophisticated models
propose that conviction is transferred from an irrational belief to a rational alternative
(Yapp & Dryden, 1995). Thus, existing beliefs are not removed but rather inactivated by
the 'truth and validity' of the irrational belief being weakened and the alternative
rational belief being strengthened. In other words, rational and irrational beliefs are not
opposing ends of one dimension, and changing one belief does not automatically change
the other (Ellis & Dryden, 1987). Rather, therapeutic change involves both challenging
the irrational beliefs and constructing new rational beliefs. Therefore, opinion is divided
regards the importance of including rational as well as irrational beliefs in an assessment
inventory. DiGiuseppe and Leafs (1990) results suggested that the strength of belief in
rational beliefs best distinguished clinical from non-clinical groups. Thus, accurate
assessment of the therapy process may require the measurement of both types of belief.
However, other research has suggested that the absence of negative thinking is more
important in coping than positive thinking (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Certainly on a
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practical level, the inclusion of rational statements would double the number of items,
substantially increase the size of the sample required for statistical analysis, and reduce
user acceptability. Therefore, only irrational beliefs were used in the Frustration-
Discomfort Scale.
3.4.3 SCALING METHOD
Considerable thought was given to the scaling categories since these held implications
for the interpretation of scores. For instance, the Survey of Personal Beliefs uses an
agree-disagree continuum. However, it is unclear as to what disagreement with an
irrational belief statement means. It may indicate weak or absent irrational beliefs, or it
could also imply strong rational beliefs. REBT hypothesises that rational and irrational
beliefs are separate types of belief and are not just at different ends of the same
dimension (Ellis & Dryden, 1987). Therefore, a weak irrational belief does not imply the
presence of a corresponding strong rational belief, or vice versa. Furthermore, REBT
theory proposes that both rational and irrational beliefs may be held simultaneously.
Yapp and Dryden (1995) in their extended model of belief structure, suggest that
rational and irrational beliefs are held with varying degrees of strength as well as at
different levels of activity. They class activity on three levels: Dominant-active when the
belief is powerfully held, concealed-active for a less strongly held belief, and passive for
a weakly held belief. Dominant-active refers to a belief that is currently operational and
creating emotional/behavioural dysfunction. Whilst a concealed-active belief is
operational but masked by the dominant belief. For these reasons, the Frustration-
Discomfort Scale is unidirectional rather than bipolar, and ranges from absent to very
strong. This avoids problems with the interpretation of belief agreement/disagreement
and enables the separation of irrational from rational beliefs.
A related issue concerned the dimension on which belief statements are best scaled. A
distinction has been made between 'intellectually' agreeing with a belief and
'emotionally' accepting the belief, with Ellis (1979b) arguing that this is determined by
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the strength and frequency with which a belief is held. That is, 'intellectual' as opposed
to 'emotional' agreement indicates weakly held rational beliefs. On the other hand,
Hauck (quoted in Yankura & Dryden, 1994) suggests this distinction reflects conviction
versus understanding. Other dimensions have also been suggested, including thought
frequency and how rigidly or dogmatically the beliefs are held (Kendall, et al., 1995).
However, this raises the question as to how concepts such as rigidity and conviction are
operationally defined. It was decided to use 'strength of belief as the scale dimension
since this is one of the criteria described in REBT, and avoids some of the difficulties
inherent in estimations of frequency. Respondents were asked to rate their strength of
belief on the two statements, using a five point Likert scale, since the reliability and
validity of unipolar scales appears to be optimal length at around 5 points (Wilkman &
Warneryd, 1990). The categories used were, absent, mild, moderate, strong, and very
strong.
3.4.4 ITEM REVERSAL AND VALANCE
Consideration was given to the use of reverse-scored items as a means of reducing
response sets and acquiescence. However, simple item reversals were problematic in that
changing 'I can't stand if to 'I can stand it' alters the statement from an irrational to a
rational belief. As noted above, rational and irrational beliefs are best considered
separate processes. Furthermore, although conventional wisdom suggests using reversed
negatively worded items to reduce response bias, such as acquiescence (Nunnally,
1978), this comes at a cost. Reversed negatively worded items are difficult to write
without increasing the complexity of the question and making interpretation more
difficult. Deciding whether a negatively worded question is untrue (e.g. 'Do you
disagree that 'I feel I do not have much to be proud of) is cognitively complex and
tiring for respondents, particularly in a long series of items (Wason, 1961).
It is also debatable whether reversed items are useful in reducing measurement error,
indeed there is evidence that they may increase such problems. Bond and Dryden (1997)
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noted that the use of reversed questions in their study might have lead to confused
responses although respondents were specifically warned of this arrangement. Benson
and Hocevar (1985) compared reversed item, regular, and mixed item scales and
concluded that mixed items reduced response validity. Similarly, Schriesheim,
Eisenbach, and Hill (1991) found in their study of questionnaire reliability that regularly
worded items were the most reliable, whereas the inclusion of polar opposites or negated
polar opposites severely reduced reliability. They concluded by asking why item
reversal methods in questionnaire design continued to be recommended, given the lack
of empirical support. Furthermore, there is evidence that reversed items may produce
spurious sub-scales. Schmitt and Stults (1985), using the Rosenberg self-esteem scale,
showed it required only ten percent of respondents to mistakenly answer negative
questions the 'wrong' way to produce a separate reverse-scored factor.
Neither are reversed items necessarily a cure for acquiescence, since this method will
only average acquiescence scores, which is itself not an accurate assessment of beliefs
(Kline, 1992). Moreover, it will only do so if both negative and positive reversals are
equivalent which is not the case when considering rational and irrational beliefs. Kline
argues that, whilst it is important to be aware of the danger of response sets, the
influence of acquiescence can be overlooked if a test shows clearly demonstrated
validity. The same applies to social desirability as long as items are avoided with
obvious desirability or very unequal response splits.
Bond and Dryden (1997) found that reversing scale direction in their studies represented
a major weakness, noting that this reversal may well have resulted in confused responses
although students were warned of this arrangement. Overall, they recommend avoiding
reversed scales and suggest using scales with equal numbers of positive and negative
worded items as an alternative. This option was explored with Professor Dryden during
an initial meeting to discuss the development of the scale and a preliminary
questionnaire was constructed with equal positive and negative items. That is items
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involving avoidance of discomfort/frustration as opposed to those involving loss of
comfort/goals. For example, typical items from this scale were:
'I absolutely must be treated fairly. I can't stand it if I'm not'
'I absolutely must not be treated unfairly. I can't stand it if I am'
and,
'I absolutely must be relaxed. I can't stand not being calm'
'I absolutely must not feel anxious. I can't stand such feelings'
However, a number of problems became apparent when developing this version of the
questionnaire. First, a major constraint was the size of the inventory if both negative and
positive items were included in the scale. The original eighty items would have grown to
a somewhat unwieldy one hundred and sixty. Secondly, the complex wording required
by REBT theory made writing equivalent items in both negative and positive forms
tortuous, with difficulties arising from the use of double negatives. The complexity of
the sentence structure and the perceived similarity of the questions also risked reducing
acceptability. Furthermore, the focus of the questionnaire was primarily that of
Frustration-Discomfort intolerance rather than the broader concept of non-ego
disturbance. The evidence discussed in chapter one suggested the primary focus for
frustration intolerance was negative and avoidant rather than the pursuit of positive
gratification. For these reasons, negatively worded items were used in preference to
positive worded items. However, valence remains an important issue in frustration
intolerance particularly regarding the relationship of immediate positive gratification
with other areas. For this reason, a specific group of items was included that related to
positive gratification.
3.4.5 ITEM SELECTION AND GENERATION
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To adequately explore the underlying structure of a construct, and satisfy content
validity, all relevant aspects of the construct need to be included in the item pool. To
avoid potential problem resulting from restricted sampling of domains two methods
were used to guide this process. First, an extensive search was made of the literature for
examples of frustration intolerance, particularly using recent articles and publications
(e.g., Dryden & Gordon, 1993; Ellis, 1996a). An important guide to the potential range
of beliefs involved in frustration intolerance was the list compiled by Neenan and
Dryden (1999) detailing forty-four different types of non-ego disturbance. The use of a
pre-publication copy of this article enabled items corresponding to most of the
categories to be included in the final questionnaire. Secondly, five existing belief
categories were employed as a framework (Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1989; Ellis &
Dryden, 1987). The content areas used were achievement, affiliation, comfort, fairness,
and control with the additional category of positive gratification (Dryden & Yankura,
1993). Beliefs worded in terms of an individual 'never experiencing happiness again'
were not included in the scale. As discussed in chapter one, it is debatable whether such
beliefs are more definitive of awfulising rather than frustration intolerance, although
clearly both categories of irrational belief are closely interrelated.
In order to obtain a reasonable sample of items for each domain, items were categorised
into six sub-scales based on their content. However, whilst REBT theory offers a
framework for the classification of irrational belief content there is little empirical
evidence to guide the placing of individual beliefs. There are no clear definitions of
content areas, and no previous analysis of the factor structure of frustration intolerance
beliefs. Therefore, the following descriptions of content areas served as only provisional
definitions to guide initial selection.
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Affiliation: Intolerance of the frustration or discomfort involving relationships
Fairness: Intolerance of unfair circumstances or treatment
Comfort: Intolerance of uncomfortable situations or experiences
Achievement: Intolerance of the frustration involving achievement goals
Gratification: Intolerance of delayed gratification
Control/Certainty: Intolerance of lack of control and uncertainty
Clearly, the categories are not exclusive making the theoretical classification of items
difficult. To try to systematise this process, six clinical psychologists experienced in
cognitive behaviour therapy categorised the items in terms of the proposed content areas.
However, agreement regarding many items proved elusive, with 36% of items placed in
more than one category. Most overlap occurred between the control, achievement, and
discomfort categories, and between those of gratification and discomfort.
A further potential problem in item selection is the use of redundant items with similar
meanings and wordings. Such items will tend to correlate together and form factors
termed 'bloated specifics' (Cattell, 1978). Since they represent groups of statements that
are essentially paraphrases of one another, they will reflect specific variance rather than
meaningful relationships within a group of variables. Whilst closely associated items
allow a more precise measurement of a specific construct it is at the cost of a loss of
generality. This 'bandwidth-fidelity trade off (Cronbach & Gleser, 1957) means that to
measure a broader construct a larger number of items need to included. Close attention
was to item redundancy as well as the REBT model regarding structure, wording, and
item content. As a leading authority on REBT, Professor Dryden reviewed the initial
questionnaire to help insure correspondence of structure and content with REBT theory,
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leading to revision of question wording and layout. As a further check on content
validity, Albert Ellis was also asked to comment on the questionnaire wording and




A pilot study, with twenty out patients referred to the clinical psychology department,
used a pilot questionnaire that was the product of a number of previous revisions
(appendix 3). Ten of these clients completed the questionnaire within an interview
format to obtain direct feedback regarding possible difficulties in comprehension and
ease of use. Based on the pilot study analyses several items were removed or reworded.
3.5.2 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
The overall distribution of scores is shown in figure 3.2. The item frequency
distributions across the five-point scale were examined, particularly those items with
extreme positive ratings, since item scores for a clinical population were expected to
show a negative skew. Sixteen items had frequency distributions below the twentieth
percentile in the two lowest categories. Seven of these items had frequency distributions
with more than 40% of their scores in the absent or mild categories (table 3.1). Whilst
none of these items displayed extreme frequency problems, that is less than 10% of
responses on two adjacent points, the results did suggest that the content of these items
was too specific and they were removed. The scores of five other items below the
twentieth percentile: Q(58) persistence, Q(38) weight control, Q(7) sacrifices, Q(53) let
down, and Q(61) gratification delay, showed a more even distribution and were retained
in the scale. Four other items, referring to discipline, routine, parental inattention, and
change, were replaced because ofwording and redundancy difficulties.
Item total score
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Table 3.1 Percentage frequency distributions for eliminated items
Absent Mild Moderate Strong Very
Strong
I absolutely must not come into contact with 50 17 22 11 0
things that are unclean
I can't stand it
I absolutely shouldn't have to face problems 44 28 11 5 11
I can't stand having to do so
I absolutely must not have a hard time getting 23 47 12 12 6
what I want
I can't stand such difficulties
My parents absolutely shouldn't have been 41 18 23 0 18
so unaffectionate
I can't bear that they were
My parents expect that I absolutely must not fail 41 22 16 11 11
I can't stand failing to meet such demands
I absolutely must not be uncertain about 41 6 18 23 12
physical symptoms
I can't stand being unsure
I absolutely shouldn't have to go to bed or 17 41 11 11 17
get up when I don't want to
I can't stand having to shift
3.5.3 ITEM REVISION
The pilot study resulted in the retention of forty-three items with little or no alteration,
and the addition of twenty-one new or rewritten items. The initial instructions were also
revised to clarify the distinction between frustration and ego-disturbance. The final
version of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale consisted of seventy-four items. The
following items were reworded or replaced to increase generality, reduce difficulties in
comprehension, avoid double negatives, ambiguous meaning, compound questions, and
redundancy.
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The past absolutely must not be left unexplained. I can't stand being in the dark
7 absolutely must have an explanation. I can't stand being in the dark'
I must not change how I am. I couldn't bear to be 'phoney'
I absolutely must not experience too much change. I can't tolerate it
7 absolutely must not change myself. I can't bear the discomfort ofchange'
I absolutely must not have to do things I dislike. I can't bear the hassle
7 absolutely must not do things that could be upsetting. I can 't stand being upset'
I absolutely must not have too much routine. I can't stand it
7 absolutely need excitement in my life. I couldn 't stand a lack ofexcitement'
'/ absolutely must have the buzz I need. I can't stand being deprived ofthis'
I absolutely shouldn't have to discipline myself. I can't stand giving myself a hard time
7 absolutely need to indulge myself. I can't stand being deprived ofenjoyments'
I absolutely must not have worries. I can't stand being disturbed by such thoughts
7 absolutely must not have certain thoughts. I can't bear such thoughts'
People close to me absolutely should not have left me. I can't bear that they did
'Close relationships absolutely must not end. I couldn't bear to start again'
My parents absolutely should not have been so overprotective and restrictive.
I can't bear that they were
'Other people absolutely must not restrict me. I can't stand it ifI am restricted'
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Other people absolutely must not cause me extra problems. I can't bear it they do
7 absolutely must not experience extra problems. I couldn't stand any more problems'
I absolutely must not waste opportunities. I can't bear to do so
I absolutely shouldn't have wasted so much time in the past. I can't bear to think I did
7 absolutely must not waste time. I can't bear to waste time'
I absolutely must not risk making important mistakes. I couldn't tolerate that
I absolutely must not be prevented from achieving my best. I can't stand to be frustrated
in this
'Ifa job is worth doing, I absolutely must notfall short. I cannot accept lower
standards'
My parents absolutely shouldn't have been so belittling. I can't stand it
My parents absolutely should not have been so disapproving. I can't bear that they were
I absolutely must not feel uncared for. I couldn't bear to feel that way
I absolutely should not have been taken for granted. I can't stand that I was
I absolutely should not have been so unappreciated. I can't stand to be treated so unfairly
Those close to me absolutely must not be inattentive. I can't bear to be ignored
I absolutely must not be taken advantage of. I can't tolerate it
7 absolutely must not be overlooked. I couldn't stand such unfairness'
7 absolutely must not be taken for granted. I can't stand being unappreciated'
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3.6 ANALYSIS OF THE FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
3.6.1 RESPONSE RATES
The response rate is important in any survey but was of particular interest in the present
study, in that frustration intolerance was hypothesised to be associated with poor therapy
engagement and procrastination. This potentially might reduce response rates of those
individuals with high frustration intolerance. Therefore, methods of improving response
rates were explored: The literature on this subject suggests that important influences are
reminders, introductory letter stating study aims, reassurance regarding confidentiality
(Conner & Waterman, 1996). Therefore, information regarding the confidentiality and
the purpose of the questionnaire were included in a covering letter. The readability
scores for the scale was 64% on the Flesch reading ease formula and a 6.2 Flesch-
Kincald reading grade, equivalent to an eleven year old British reading age, and within
the recommended levels for comprehension of standard documents. Follow-up letters
were sent to the first hundred clients, but generated few additional replies. Analysis of
the total replies confirmed that the response rate with follow up letter (45%) was not
significantly different to overall returns This was not continued due to the additional
administration incurred.
There was a possibility that the length and number of questionnaires might reduce
response rates. However, the clinical group response rate was 44% (257 replies),
comparable to response rates from postal studies in other psychology departments. For
example, Ambrose, Button, and Ormrod (1998) report a 42% reply rate. Turvey et al.
(1998) conducted a postal survey of consecutive psychology referrals in North East Fife
and obtained a reply rate of 46% post treatment. He compared non-responders, on
diagnosis and demographic characteristics, with responders and with all cases referred to
the Fife adult clinical psychology department over the previous two years. Results
concluded that the differences between these two groups were minor. However, whilst
this indicates the responders are a representative clinical sample differences may still
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exist between this group and non-responders as regards low frustration tolerance.
Therefore, more detailed analysis of this group is reported in chapter seven.
3.6.2 MISSING DATA
Inspection of the pattern ofmissing data indicated that this was randomly spread across
the items. The mean percentage number of missing values for each item was 0.32%.
Only three items had more than 1.0% missing values: Q(36) comfortable and Q(6)
powerlessness with 1.2%, and (31) emotional neglect with 1.8%. Nine cases with more
than 10% ofmissing values were removed from the study (eight from the patient group
and one from the student group). Since remaining cases contained only a small
percentage ofmissing data, a group mean was to avoid loss of cases.
3.6.3 OUTLIER IDENTIFICATION
Six extreme positive outliers were found, three of which had unusual patterns of scoring
on other tests in the battery, suggestive of either response set, inaccurate understanding
of instructions, or poor motivation. These were removed from the analysis. The
remaining three positive outliers were retained as members of the population. Of three
negative outliers, two were removed on similar grounds.
3.6.4 SCORING METHOD AND ANALYSIS
As discussed above, the design of the scale had included both a self-worth and
frustration intolerance statement, connected to a demand, for each item. This aimed to
identify the category of belief to which the irrational demand referred, since in theory a
belief describing discomfort or frustration may actually involve issues of self-worth.
However, combining the scoring of these two statements proved extremely difficult.
Several methods of weighting frustration intolerance scores to take into account the
corresponding level of self-esteem were investigated, but these did not show meaningful
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results. Indeed, a simpler solution was to screen for items that were clearly more
associated with issues of self-worth rather than frustration intolerance. Whilst this may
overlook specific situational differences in beliefs it was not thought to be a major
limitation since the scale was designed to measure core underlying beliefs. Furthermore,
analysis of individual items indicated that most showed a substantial relationship to
frustration intolerance compared to self-esteem (table 3.4). Therefore, only the
frustration intolerance scores were used, and scores from the self-esteem statements
were not employed in the analyses.
3.7 RESULTS
3.7.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
With 15 cases eliminated due to problematic or missing data, 242 cases were included in
the patient group and 87 in the student group for statistical analysis. The mean age of the
patient group was 38.77 (SD 13.22), with a range between 18 and 74, consisting of 95
men (39.3%) and 147 women (60.7%). Whilst for the student group ages were not
obtained, all came from a final year undergraduate course in which most students were
aged 20 or 21. Gender distribution showed 22 men (25.3%) and 51 females (58.6%),
with 14 (16.1%) missing.
The means and standard deviation are presented in table 3.2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
were non-significant, indicating normal distributions, for clinical, student and combined
groups. Likewise, kurtosis and skewness statistics were within acceptable limits (table
3.3). Figures 3.3 to 3.5 show the histograms of the total Frustration discomfort scores for
the different groups. There was no significant association between the full scale and age
(r (240) = -.06, ns) or gender (t (313) = .23, ns)












The kurtosis and skewness statistics for each item indicated that nearly half the items
could be classed as having a non-normal distribution based on a standard score outside
the -2 to +2 range (appendix 14). Whilst in larger samples moderate deviations from
normal in skewness and kurtosis do not have a substantive effect on statistical analysis
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2000), three items did have quite extreme skewness scores
above 0.7: Q(4) diet control, Q(7) sacrifices, and Q(51) self-change.
Table 3.3 Normality statistics: Frustration-Discomfort Scale
SE SE K-S










































Figure 3.5 Distribution of Frustration-Discomfort scores: Student group
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3.7.2 PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
A series of preliminary reliability, frequency, and correlational analyses were conducted
to identify items that were inappropriately included in the scale due to problems in these
areas.
3.7.3 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
Frequency analysis was used to examine the distribution of responses across the five
point rating scale for each frustration question. It has been recommended that
dichotomous scales should have at least a 90-10 split to avoid frequency problems due to
skewness (Kline, 1992). This criterion has been adapted by other researchers so that
items have been deemed to have frequency problems if any two adjacent scale points on
each item have less than 10% of responses (The WHOQOL group, 1998). Whilst none
of the items failed this criterion, examination of the frequency distributions showed that
several items were very negatively skewed (appendix 15). Thus, Q(51) self-change and
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Q(4) diet control had 51% of the replies in the 'absent' category, and items Q(47)
emotional neglect and Q(7) sacrifices had 47% and 45% respectively. Additionally,
items Q(21) buzz, Q(36) comfortable, Q(37) taking time, Q(52) emotional deprivation,
and Q(66) difficult tasks all had approximately 40% of replies in the 'absent' category.
3.7.4 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Reliability is the measure of the accuracy and stability of a scale. The measurement of
internal consistency involves an estimation of the consistency or homogeneity of items
selected to represent a particular construct. Statistically, reliability is the proportion of
variability in item responses resulting from differences in respondents rather than error
within the test. Cronbach's coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is the most commonly
used summary statistic of internal reliability. However, there are problems associated
with its use (Schmitt, 1996). First, alpha is related to both the strength of item
correlation as well as the length of the test, and this has to be taken into account when
judging the level of alpha. This is because with increasing numbers of items the
reliability value will increase, even if the actual degree of correlation remains the same.
Therefore, longer tests require a higher criterion. Secondly, alpha is not a measure of the
homogeneity of items. For this a direct measure of item content saturation, the
proportion of shared to total item variance, such as the mean inter-item correlation is
often more useful. A further difficulty with alpha is that it does not indicate if a scale is
unidimensional. If a test is multidimensional, computing an overall score will
underestimate the true reliability of the individual components. Thus, it is more
appropriate to use alpha to measure the reliabilities of separate sub-scales. Cortina
(1993) has argues that an index of the spread of inter-item correlations should also be
used to indicate the homogeneity of the scale.
The generally agreed lower limit for alpha is .70 (Nunnally, 1978), with alpha scores
between .72 and .88 representing acceptable to high reliability (John & Benet-Martinez,
2000). Therefore, the initial level of the alpha coefficient of .963 for the full scale was
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very good (table 3.4). However, as noted above, caution is required before accepting
high alphas as generally a good thing, since they may simply reflect item redundancy.
The danger is that by narrowing item content the internal consistency will increase but at
the cost of reduced construct validity. However, examination of the inter correlation
matrix did not reveal any items with very high intercorrelations (e.g. above 0.7). Only
one pair of items, Q(39) disturbed feelings, and Q(64) quick emotional relief (.63), had
an inter correlation above .60. The highest correlation on the fairness scale was between
Q(73) disrespect and Q(30) appreciation (.55); On the discomfort scale Q(74), task
interest and Q(68) in the mood (.63): On the achievement scale, Q(47) disorganisation
and Q(12) unfinished work (.53); On the affiliation scale, Q(52) emotional deprivation
and Q(31) emotional neglect (.54); And on the gratification scale, Q(66) difficult tasks
and Q(54) effort (.43).
As regards the relationship of individual items with the full scale, corrected item-total
correlations below .30 are generally considered too low (Nunnally, 1978). Examination
of the full scale reliability table indicates two items, Q(l) upset others and Q(48)
excitement with very low correlations . A more conservative criteria of .35 would also
exclude Q(45) suppress feelings', Q (21) buzz, Q( 11) waste time, and Q(3) boring tasks.
Whilst the mean inter-item correlation was .26, and within the optimal range for item
homogeneity of between .20 to .40, the relatively low figure suggests
multidimensionality (Briggs & Cheek, 1986). This was supported by the wide spread of
inter-item correlations between -.08 to .63.
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Table 3.4 Full-scale reliability analysis and correlation with Rosenberg Self-esteem
Scale




1 Upset others .29 27***
2 Risk rejection .42 - 25***
3 Boring tasks .35 -.04
4 Diet control .36 -.16*
5 Painful memories .55 -.26***
6 Powerless .40 _ 23***
7 Sacrifices .43 -.09
8 Safe situation .47 _ 34***
9 Doubts .55 _ 21***
10 Past injustice .53 - 20**
11 Waste time .31 -.00
12 Unfinished work .35 -.06
13 Disagreements .40 -.21**
14 Continuing .47 - 30***
15 Loss .56 - 25***
16 Ignored .43 -.03
17 Restriction .44 -.11
18 Task hassle .46 _ 21***
19 Support .53 30***
20 Unfair life .60 _ 3j***
21 Buzz .34 -.11
22 Hassle free .61 _ 24***
23 Oppos. beliefs .49 -.07
24 Waiting .53 -.05
25 Craziness .50 _ 23***
26 Understanding .58 -.12
27 Extra problems .68 - 24***
28 Relationship work .49 _ 21***
29 Slipping back .55 -.16*
31 Emotional neglect .46 19**
32 Upsetting tasks .65 _ 27***
33 Alone .40 _ 24***
34 Relationship diff. .54 -.09
35 Oppositional acts .52 -.08
36 Comfortable .55 _ 23***
37 Taking time .42 -.08
38 Self-discipline .48 -.20**
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39 Disturbed feelings .66 22***
40 Understood .58 - 18**
41 Emotional control .56 -.26***
42 Confidence .61 -.21**
43 Noise .39 -.13*
44 Self-conscious .45 - 35***
45 Suppress emotions .33 .11
46 Easy solutions .66 _ 24***
47 Disorganisation .50 -.08
48 Excitement .24 - 28***
49 Time pressure .60 - 28***
50 Interference .62 - 22***
51 Self change .42 -.09
52 Emo. deprivation .58 - 25***
53 Let down .62 - 25***
54 Effort .53 -.26***
55 Task obstruction .55 -.13*
56 Personal flaws .54 _ j t ***
57 Thoughts .55 _ 42***
58 Persistence .54 -.18**
59 Below par .53 19***
60 Neglect others .47 _ 23***
61 Gratification delay .58 -.01
62 Submission .49 -.08
63 Disrupt routines .58 _ 23***
64 Emotional relief .62 30***
65 Task perfection .42 -.13*
66 Difficult tasks .48 32***
67 Relationship loss .47 17**
68 In mood .53 38***
69 Trapped .57 33***
70 Unfair change .48 -.11
71 Morbid thoughts .54 _ 27***
72 Indulge .39 -.15*
73 Disrespect .56 -.13*
74 Task interest .48 -.21**
N = 232 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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3.7.5 'MAP' ANALYSIS
A 'MAP' analysis, based on the 'Multi-trait Analysis Program' used by Hays et al.
(1988) was conducted (table 3.5). Originally an SPSS (Windows) program, it has been
adapted by other researchers as a general strategy to identify items that correlate higher
on sub-scales other than their own predicted sub-scale (The WHOQOL group, 1998).
Twenty-three items (31%) were loaded higher on other sub-scales rather than their own
designated sub-scale. Furthermore, seven items had low corrected item-total correlations
(r < .4) both with their own and with other sub-scales: Q(l) upset others, Q(3) boring
tasks, Q(4) diet control, Q(33) alone, Q(43) noise Q(45) suppress feelings, and Q(48)
excitement.
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1 I absolutely must not risk
upsetting other people
I can't bear to upset others
2 I absolutely must
not risk being rejected








II III IV V VI
13 1 absolutely must not be involved
in arguments and conflicts
I can't stand such disagreements
15 I absolutely must not suffer loss
It would be unbearable
.401
.568 .525 .516
19 I absolutely must not be deprived
of the support I need
I can't go on without support
28 I absolutely shouldn't have to work
so hard at relationships
I can't stand it being so difficult
31 My parents absolutely shouldn't
have neglected my emotional needs
It is an unbearable gap
33 I absolutely must not be alone
I can't stand being by myself
34 Those close to me absolutely must
not be so difficult
I can't stand it when they are difficult
35 Those close to me absolutely must not
act against my wishes
I can't stand it if they do
52 I absolutely must not be deprived now
of the affection I needed in the past
I can't bear to be deprived further
67 Close relationships absolutely
must not end















(II) FAIRNESS item- I II III IV V VI
total
Alpha =.862 correlation
10 I absolutely shouldn't have been .548
treated so unfairly in the past
I can't bear such injustice
16 I absolutely must not be overlooked .517
I couldn't stand such unfairness
20 I absolutely don't deserve what has
happened to me
I can't stand life being so unfair
23 I absolutely must not be opposed
when I know I'm right
1 can't stand that happening
24 I absolutely must not be kept waiting
I can't tolerate waiting
30 I absolutely must not be taken for granted
I can't stand being unappreciated
40 Other people absolutely must
understand me
I can't bear it otherwise
53 I absolutely must not be let down by
other people
I can't stand being let down
60 Those I care for absolutely shouldn't
have been treated so badly
I can't bear that it happened
62 I absolutely must not give into other
people's demands
I can't stand having to do so
70 I absolutely shouldn't have to change
when others are at fault
I can't tolerate doing so









73 I absolutely must not be treated .671 .500
with disrespect
I can't tolerate disrespect
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Corrected Sub-scale Correlation
(III) COMFORT item- I II III IV V VI
total
correlation
5 I absolutely must not experience .510 .574
painful memories
I can't tolerate such pain
8 I absolutely must not go too far .497
from where I feel safe
I can't stand feeling insecure
18 I absolutely shouldn't have to do .508
things right now
I can't stand the hassle
22 I absolutely must be free of hassles .663 .521
I can't stand even the slightest hassle
27 I absolutely must not experience .707 .613 .509 .643
extra problems
I couldn't stand any more problems
32 I absolutely must not do things that .686 .598 .502 .576
could be upsetting
I can't stand being upset
43 I absolutely must not be disturbed .344
by noise
I can't stand such disturbance
44 I absolutely must not be the centre .491
of attention
I can't bear to feel self-conscious
46 I absolutely must have an easier way .689 .596 .518 .518 .574
around problems
I can't stand facing problems
49 I absolutely must not have too many .657
demands on my time
I can't stand the stress involved
51 I absolutely must not change myself .439
I can't stand the discomfort of change
58 I absolutely shouldn't have to persist .536 .595
at unpleasant tasks
I can't stand having to do so
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Corrected Sub-scale Correlation
(III) COMFORT (continued) item- I II III IV V VI
total
Alpha = .893 correlation
63 I absolutely must not have my familiar .568 .554
routines disrupted
I can't bear the disturbance
64 I absolutely must be free of distressing .644 .550 .653
feelings as quickly as I can
I can't bear for them to continue
711 absolutely must not have
morbid thoughts




(IV) ACHIEVEMENT item- I II III IV V VI
total
Alpha =.834 correlation
11 I absolutely must not waste time .440
I can't bear to waste time
12 I absolutely must not leave .547
work unfinished
I can't bear to leave work unfinished
37 I absolutely must not do things slowly .455
I can't stand taking my time
38 1 absolutely must not relax my .620
self-discipline
I can't bear the slightest lapse
47 I absolutely must not be disorganised .623
I can't bear disorganisation
50 I absolutely must not have interference .530 .559 .592 .556
from other people
I can't bear such hassles
55 I absolutely must not be blocked in
getting things done
I can't stand being obstructed
56 I absolutely must not have the
personal flaws that I do
I can't tolerate such shortcomings
59 I absolutely must not feel below par
(e. g. due to lack of sleep or illness)








65 If a job is worth doing, I absolutely
must not fall short
I cannot accept lower standards
.563
68 I absolutely must be in the mood
before I tackle something




(V) GRATIFICATION item- I II III IV V VI
total
Alpha = .783 correlation
3 I absolutely must not have boring .365
tasks to do
I can't stand being bored
7 I absolutely must not make sacrifices .430
for the sake of the future
I can't stand losing out today
21 I absolutely must have the buzz I need .403
I can't stand being deprived of this
36 I absolutely must remain comfortable .495 .560
for as long as possible
I can't stand having to shift
45 I absolutely must not suppress .349
my feelings
I can't stand bottling my feelings up
48 I absolutely need excitement in my life .373
I couldn't stand a lack of excitement
54 I absolutely shouldn't have to make .421 .578
so much effort
I can't stand having to push myself
61 I absolutely shouldn't have to delay .528 .591
getting what I want
I can't stand such delays
66 Tasks that I attempt absolutely must .415 .558 543
not be too difficult
Otherwise, I can't stand doing them
72 I absolutely need to indulge myself .527 .637
I can't stand being deprived of
enjoyments
74 I absolutely must be interested in a
task that I attempt





4 I absolutely must not lose strict
control ofmy diet
I can't stand the slightest lapse
6 I absolutely must not be at the
mercy of events
I can't stand being powerless to act
9 I absolutely must be certain .493 .508
about decisions
I can't stand having doubts
14 My situation absolutely must .501
not remain as it is
I can't stand for it to continue
17 Other people absolutely must .415
not restrict me
I can't stand it if I am restricted
25 I absolutely must not experience .524
mental difficulties
I can't stand to feel I'm losing my mind
26 I absolutely must have an explanation .538 .597
I can't stand being in the dark
29 I absolutely must not experience .611 .548 .499 .516
any signs of slipping back
I couldn't bear to have such feelings
39 I absolutely must not experience .675 .621 .673
disturbing feelings
I can't bear such feelings
41 I absolutely must not lose .689 .536
control over how I feel
I couldn't bear that to happen
42 I absolutely must be confident of .533 .531 .532 .563
success before I start
I can't stand uncertainty
57 I absolutely must not have .592 .515 .560
certain thoughts
I can't bear such thoughts
69 I absolutely must not feel trapped .558 .505
I can't bear to feel trapped
Corrected Sub-scale Correlation





3.7.6 INTERACTION WITH EGO-DISTURBANCE
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An essential aspect of reliability is that items should be measuring the same concept and
not another dissimilar concept. For frustration intolerance, the essential discrimination is
with self-worth beliefs. It is prudent, therefore, to screen items for any that show a
stronger relationship with issues of low self-esteem than with frustration intolerance.
However, this is not straightforward since some items will overlap with both concepts.
Therefore, a number of approaches were taken to explore this relationship. The simplest
approach was to examine the intercorrelation between the Frustration-Discomfort items
and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. This was carried out following preliminary
analysis of the self-esteem scale described in detail in chapter six. Comparison with the
corrected item-total correlations shows that only three items did not have significantly
higher correlations with the Frustration-Discomfort Scale compared to self-esteem (table
3.4). These were Q(l) upset others, Q(56) personal flaws and Q(57) thoughts. The
overall correlation between the two scales was moderately significant (r (232) = -.36, p <
.001).
A slightly different perspective comes from analysing the differences between the
frustration and esteem statement scores for each item. Paired t-tests indicated that all but
five items had significantly higher frustration scores, suggesting that overall statements
predominately reflected frustration intolerance. The five items that had similar levels of
scores on both scales were: Q(2) risk rejection, Q(16) ignored, Q(20) unfair life, Q(52)
emotional deprivation, and Q(56) personal flaws. Lastly, a comparison was made
between the percentage of responses that had higher esteem scores in relation to the total
number of positive responses (minus the number of ties) for each item. Eight items had
more than 40 % higher esteem scores: Q(2) risk rejection, Q(4) diet control, Q( 16) unfair
life, Q(52) emotional deprivation, Q(56) personal flaws, Q(67) relationship loss, and
Q(73) disrespect.
3.7.7 COMPARISON OF CLINICAL AND STUDENT GROUPS
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The selection of items for further analysis was not primarily based on a criterion
approach, however it was important to have some indication of the ability of individual
items to distinguish between clinical and non-clinical populations. Although, caution
needs to be exercised in accepting students as representative of a non-clinical
population, it is reasonable to assume this group would show lower overall Frustration-
Discomfort scores. Therefore, independent t-tests were conducted between the two
groups to compare item mean scores (table 3.6).
Table 3.6 Comparing Frustration-Discomfort item means scores between clinical and
student group
































































Table 3.6 (Continued) Independent t-tests comparing Frustration-Discomfort item
means between clinical and student groups
Scale item t Mean
Difference
25 Craziness 2.56* 0.45
26 Understanding 2.79** 0.42
27 Extra problems 6.29*** 0.89
28 Relationship work 2.58** 0.45
29 Slipping back 5.06*** 0.86
30 Appreciation 0.64 0.00
31 Emotional neglect 5.81*** 0.93
32 Upsetting tasks 3.43*** 0.56
33 Alone 0.22 0.00
34 Relationship difficulty 2 23*** 0.50
35 Oppositional acts 1.59 0.21
36 Comfortable 2.57** 0.35
37 taking time 4 45*** 0.65
38 Self-discipline 2.79** 0.44
39 Disturbed feelings 5.90*** 0.82
40 Being understood 2.32* 0.35
41 Emotional control 5.15*** 0.79
42 Confidence 3.40*** 0.55
43 Noise 1.64 0.25
44 Self-conscious 3 49*** 0.63
45 Suppress emotions 0.02 0.00
46 Easy solution 4.80*** 0.77
47 Disorganisation 3.57*** 0.60
48 Excitement 3.67*** -0.59
49 Time pressure 4 23*** 0.71
50 Interference from others 4 39*** 0.78
51 Self-change 1.92 0.28
52 Emotional deprivation 5.80*** 0.91
53 Let down 0.58 0.00
54 Effort 2.41* 0.34
55 Task obstruction 0.51 0.00
56 Personal flaws 5.25*** 0.84
57 Thoughts 5.56*** 1.02
58 Persistence 0.68 0.00
59 Below par 4.08*** 0.64
60 Neglect others 1.36 0.26
61 Gratification delay 1.90 0.28
62 Submission 0.73 0.12
63 Disrupted routines 4 24*** 0.57
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Table 3.6 (Continued) Independent t-tests comparing Frustration-Discomfort item
means between clinical and student groups
Scale item t Mean
Difference
64 Emotional relief y 23*** 1.14
65 Task perfection 2 y^*** 0.56
66 Difficult tasks ^ ^2*** 0.68
67 Relationship loss 3 26*** 0.58
68 In the mood 2.13* 0.32
69 Trapped 3 10** 0.49
70 Unfair change 2.01* 0.32
71 Morbid thoughts 6.18*** 1.10
72 Indulge 1.34 -0.21
73 Disrespect 0.08 0.00
74 Task interest 0.06 0.00
N = 242 (clinical) N = 87 (student) ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
3.8 ITEM SELECTION
The results of the preceding analyses were used to determine whether any items should
be removed from the scale. Ten items were highlighted as being potentially
inappropriate or problematic. Three items had poor frequency distributions and also
exhibited very significantly skewed distributions: Q(4) diet control, Q(7) sacrifices, and
Q(51) self-change. Two items exhibited very low full scale corrected item-total
correlations: Q(l) upset others and Q(48) excitement. The mapping analysis indicated
that Q(l) upset others, Q(3) boring tasks, Q(4) diet control, Q(33) alone, Q(45) suppress
feelings, and Q(48) excitement had corrected item-total correlations below 0.4 with their
own sub-scales.
Whilst selection of items was not based on criterion measures, it was notable that Q(48)
excitement was the only item that was significantly higher in the non-clinical as
compared to the clinical group. It may also be noted that all seven of the other items
being considered for exclusion, other than Q(56) personal flaws, failed to differentiate
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these two groups. Nevertheless, 'personal flaws' was the least satisfactory item in terms
of overlap between self-esteem and frustration intolerance, appearing in all three
analyses. In retrospect, it is apparent that intolerance of 'personal flaws' is conceptually
much closer to self-worth than frustration intolerance.
Two items, Q(51) self-change, and Q(7) sacrifices, had moderately distorted
distributions, but were not below the criterion Since, these two items are viewed as
representing important aspects of low frustration tolerance in the literature they were
included in further analyses. The other eight items, showing problems on a number of
areas, were eliminated. These were Q(l) upset others, Q(3) boring tasks, Q(4) diet
control, Q(33) alone, Q(43) noise, Q(45) suppress feelings, Q(48) excitement, and Q(56)
personal flaws. Following the removal of each item with the lowest corrected item-total
correlation or other problem a cyclical process of recalculating the internal consistency
was carried out. The resulting 66 item scale had an alpha of .962, with all items above .3
on the full scale and, apart from Q(68) in the mood, all items above .4 on their
designated sub-scales.
3.9 DISCUSSION
Preliminary analysis of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale indicated that several items
required removal due to problems of reliability, frequency distribution, or conceptual
overlap. Whilst personal flaws was moderately correlated with the scale, the results
suggested that this item was conceptually better placed within the category of ego
disturbance. The item most poorly related to other Frustration-Discomfort items was
excitement. The reason for this is unclear since frustration intolerance has been
conceptually associated with short-term hedonism and the need for excitement (e.g.,
Ellis, 1994.p 349) However, personality trait research does separate these two areas.
Thus, the excitement facet in the NEO-Personality Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae,
1992) lies within the Extraversion domain whereas items involving impulse gratification
are included in the Impulsiveness facet within the Neuroticism domain. Perhaps more
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importantly, the Extraversion items in this inventory have a positive functional
orientation whereas the Neuroticism items largely refer to emotional disturbance.
Likewise, Eysenck and Eysenck (1991) have described two distinct Impulsivity
components, Psychoticism and to a lesser extent Extraversion.
This raises also issues regarding functional and dysfunctional impulsive gratification, the
former tending to be associated with higher levels of adventurousness and activity levels
rather than emotional disturbance (Dickman, 1990). Thus, evidence suggests that
Eysenck's Extraversion-Venturesomeness and Impulsiveness scales are related to higher
alcohol use, but only Impulsiveness is related to alcohol problems (Nagoshi, Wilson, &
Rodriguez, 1991). Similarly, a measure of irrational beliefs significantly predicted
alcohol problems but not alcohol use (Camatta & Nagoshi, 1995). The irrational belief
measure also had a positive association with impulsiveness but a negative association
with Venturesomeness, although both were non-significant. This is consistent with the
present finding of a lack of association between excitement and other frustration
intolerance beliefs. It suggests the 'excitement' and 'buzz' items may be measuring
functional extraversion rather than demands for immediate gratification and indulgence.
It did not prove feasible in practice to take into account the more subtle differences in
item content by comparing self-esteem and frustration intolerance scores, and only the
frustration intolerance item scores were employed. Nevertheless, statistical comparisons
showed that statements predominately reflected frustration intolerance, and the results
indicated that the psychometric characteristics of the scale were good. The distributions
were normal, with individual items free of extreme frequency problems. Internal
consistency, as measured by Cronbach's alpha, was high for both the full and
hypothesised sub-scales. However, John and Benet-Martinez (2000) caution against the
use of alpha without evidence regarding the multidimensionality of the scale, and
certainly high alpha does not necessarily imply a unidimensional scale. Having said this,
the 'MAP' analysis indicated that the proposed content categories were inadequate,
particularly as regards control and gratification. This underlined the need for empirical
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analysis to determine the underlying structure. The most powerful approach in this
regard is confirmatory factor analysis, however this requires an established a-priori
model. Since there is no existing model of the factor structure of frustration intolerance,





Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to simplify a complex set of variables. It
aims to discover which variables are correlated together so as to form factors. These
factors are assumed to reflect the processes, or latent structure, underlying the
relationship between variables. In terms of Messick's (1989) types of evidence for
construct validity, this method investigates the structural validity of the scale. That is,
whether this structure corresponds with hypothesised construct domains. Whilst
theoretical categories have been suggested the factor structure of frustration intolerance
has not been previously investigated. Therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was
initially employed rather than confirmatory factor analysis, which is designed to test
explicit factor structure.
4.2 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
As with other multivariate techniques, exploratory factor analysis is sensitive to
distortion due to violation of statistical assumptions and poor data. Since factor analysis
can produce superficially plausible results, even with the most distorted data, the
potential for misleading conclusions is high. The data were therefore initially examined
to determine its suitability for factor analysis.
4.2.1 SAMPLE SIZE AND COMPOSITION
The size of the sample used for the analysis after removal of outliers was 329. The
sample size in factor analysis must be large enough to give stable correlation coefficients
and, therefore, be replicable in other groups. In a small sample, the standard errors of the
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correlations would be so large that the sample matrix would not resemble the 'true'
population matrix. However, opinions are divided as to what size of sample is adequate.
The ratio of sample size to the number of variables has been the traditional guideline,
with recommendations ranging between 5:1 (Comrey & Lee, 1992) to 10:1 (Gorsuch,
1983). Recent studies indicate that so long as subjects exceed numbers of variables, this
ratio is not as important as the absolute sample size and the size of the magnitude of the
factor loadings (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988). Arrindel and Van der Ende (1985) have
argued that the ratio of subjects to factors is most important, with this ratio needing to be
in excess of 20:1. As a guide, Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that a sample size of 200
is fair and 300 good. Tabachnick and Fidell (2000) also recommend as a general rule, at
least 300 cases. With 66 remaining variables, the present sample fulfils the requirements
for sample size, both in terms of variable and factor ratios, and for absolute sample size.
An essential test of the reliability of a scale and the selection of factors is whether the
solution generalises to other populations. That is, will the same factors be found in
different samples? Comrey and Lee (1992) emphasise that care must be taken when
combining different groups for factor analysis, since the factor structure may be
different. The student sample group would be expected to differ in some important
respects from the patient group. However, for exploratory work it is more important to
have a wide sample rather than a representative sample to ensure adequate variance. The
student and clinical groups were therefore combined.
4.2.2 SCREENING FOR NORMALITY AND NON-LINEARITY
Multivariate statistics are based on the assumption of a linear model. However,
departures from normality are less important in factor analysis and will only degrade the
correlations. Linearity between pairs of variables is often assessed by the inspection of
bivariate scatterplots. However, with 66 variables, inspection of all pairs would require a
large number of individual comparisons for a complete assessment. Therefore, variables
most likely to depart from linearity were screened, which indicated no obvious
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distortions. Although a number of distributions were skewed, most were skewed in the
same direction, therefore a reasonable degree of linearity was accepted.
5.2.3 FACTORABILITY OF THE CORRELATION MATRIX
Inspection of the correlation coefficients in the correlation matrix showed many
correlations above .3, indicating that the data contained reliable factors. Bartlett's test of
Sphericity was highly significant indicating the variables were significantly correlated
and therefore suitable for factor analysis. To test the degree of intercorrelations among
the variables the Kaiser-Maeyer-Olkin (KMO) was used. This measure of sampling
adequacy needs to be above .6 to be acceptable, and at .92 was considered to be very
good (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000).
4.3 METHOD
4.3.1 ROTATION
A principal component analysis was used. This extraction method is the one of choice
for condensing a large number of variables into a smaller group of components
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). Varimax rotation was initially used since this has
advantages in the ease of factor solution interpretation. It gives clearer separation of
factors since factor scores are unrelated (Kim & Mueller, 1978). However, this rotation
assumes that factors are orthogonal, that is independent and not highly correlated.
Theoretically, different aspects of frustration intolerance were likely to be related,
suggesting that an oblique rotation might be more appropriate. However, with oblique
rotation the factor axes are no longer constrained, therefore the interpretation is more
complex, and communalities and proportions of explained variance cannot be calculated.
Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) argue that the preferred course of action is to rotate both
orthogonally and obliquely. The factor correlations from the oblique rotation can then be
examined regarding the degree of association between the factors and thus the
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appropriateness of each rotation. It is also often the case, when there is a good stable
solution, that oblique and orthogonal solutions are almost identical (Kline, 1994). Thus,
Tacq (1997) recommends that an orthogonal rotation is performed first and then
comparison made with an oblique rotation.
4.3.2 FACTOR DETERMINATION
Most commentators on factor analysis agree that the most important decision to be made
is determining the number of factors to extract. This has been likened by Comrey and
Lee (1992) to trying to decide 'how short someone must be to be called short', since
there is no practical method of arriving at a precise answer. However, as Comrey (1978)
points out, rotating with either too few or two many factors can result in very misleading
solutions even from the clearest data. With too many factors, the Varimax program will
build minor, at the expense of major, factors. Thus, variables that load on major factors
may be overlooked. Whereas with too few factors extracted, the variance from the
excluded factors will be added to those remaining, distorting their appearance. On
balance, Comrey suggests that it is best to extract too many factors rather than too few,
since in the latter case not only will factors be lost but the remaining factors will be
distorted by the inclusion of variance. He therefore recommends that a number of
solutions with varying numbers of factors are examined and a decision made between
these based on their meaningfulness.
There are a number of guidelines to help decide on the number of factors. A commonly
used criterion, and the default method of the SPSS program, is that of Kaiser (1958).
This retains only the components that have an Eigenvalue greater than 1. This is based
on each standardised variable contributing a variance of 1, and therefore components
with values below 1 will have less importance than individual variables and can be
ignored. However, in large matrices (i.e. over 50 variables) this criterion will greatly
overestimate the number of factors to be retained (Cattell, 1978), and may include those
that have no practical importance. In the present analysis, seventeen variables had
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Eigenvalues greater than 1, a total number of factors that would clearly be inappropriate.
Examination of the Eigenvalues reveals that the first four factors all have values larger
than two and that after the sixth factor changes in the remaining eigenvalues become
relatively smaller. This would suggest a solution of between four and six factors.
A second criteria is the Scree test (Cattell, 1966). This recommends that all Eigenvalues
before the one where the line decelerates most should be retained. On this basis, four
factors appear to be indicated (figure 4.1). However, this method, whilst limiting the
factors to those which account for fairly large and distinct amounts of variance, may risk
rejecting factors that are of psychological importance even though they only account for
small amounts of variance.
Figure 4.1 Scree plot
Component Number
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4.3.3 FACTOR LOADING CRITERIA
The Scree test indicated that four factors represented the best solution (figure 4.1).
However, following Comrey's advice to err on the side of more rather than fewer
factors, four, five and six factor solutions were computed. Following this, the rotated
component matrix was examined to explore the variables loading on each factor.
Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) recommend from the results of their study that factors
with four or more loadings above .60 are reliable, regardless of the size of the sample.
Also, that factors with ten or more low loadings (< .40) are reliable when the sample size
is greater than 150. They further suggest that it may possible to tentatively interpret
factors with a few low loadings if the sample size is over 300. However, it could be said
that a factor so defined is very weak and close to being variable specific. How high a
variable loading on a factor needs to be for it to be considered significant for description
purposes cannot be answered precisely. However, factors with low loadings are
particularly unstable across samples and for that reason usually rejected. A common
cut-offpoint is usually .32 or larger, since this indicates that at least 10 % of the variance
of that variable is associated with the particular factor. Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest,
as a guideline, that loadings of above .71 can be rated as excellent (50% variance), .63
very good (40%), .55 good (30%), .45 fair (20%), and .32 as poor (10%). As a rule of
thumb loadings greater than .5 can be considered to have practical significance (Hair et
ah, 1998). For the present analysis the criterion adopted was that variables loadings
above .45 were used in the interpretation of the factors, and for inclusion in sub-scales.
In addition to the assessment of factor loadings, communalities for each variable were
also examined. Communalities measure the amount of variance in individual variables
that has been accounted for by a factor solution, that is the shared variance. Therefore,
small values would suggest that a particular variable is a poorly accounted for by the
factors, and adds little to the solution. A very high score (> .9), on the other hand, would
suggest that much of the variance of an item had been accounted for by other variables
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and was therefore redundant. However, since an ideal marker variable is one that loads
highly on one factor but not others, this may result in a relatively low communality for
such items, although it contains unique information. A criterion of .35 was used in the
interpretation of factors.
The last, and perhaps the most important consideration, is the degree to which the
extracted factors are theoretically meaningful and the component solution has
psychological relevance. Thus, the point where factors can no longer be interpreted as
coherent concepts suggests an endpoint. Note was also made of the proportion of pure
and complex factor items. Pure factor items load only on one factor and not on others,
and can be termed 'marker variables'. The need to overdetermine factors with good
markers has been emphasised by Comrey and Lee (1992). They suggest that each factor
should have ideally five, and at least three, markers to define a factor in the analysis.
Complex variables, that is those variables having major loadings on more than one
factor, are not useful in the definition of factors, but they are important for
understanding the items themselves and their relationship to these factors. Using a
criterion of a loading of 0.4 on more than one other factor, only three of the items in the
sub-scales were classed as complex variables. Finally, Kim and Mueller (1978) suggest
that, given the uncertainty of these individual criteria, a combination of methods should
be used and the final judgement based on the interpretability of the solution in relation to
current research. This was the approach taken in the present analysis.
4.4 RESULTS
4.4.1 FOUR-FACTOR SOLUTION
A four-factor solution produced strong factors that satisfied Guadagnoli and Velicer
(1988) recommendations for stability and reliability. Examination of the Eigenvalues
shows that after the first four factors there is a distinct gap and following successive
values are small (table 4.1). In addition, most values in the residual correlation matrix
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were close to zero. Both findings support the evidence for a four-factor solution
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). The extracted and rotated variance explained for the first
sixteen factors is displayed in table 4.1. The four factors accounted for 42.6% of the
variance (table 4.2): factor I (13.95%), factor II (11.35%), factor III (10.25%), and factor
IV (7.02%).
Factor loadings are shown in table 4.3 with variables are ordered by size and loadings
under 0.3 excluded to ease interpretation. Communalities are displayed in table 4.4. The
component matrix is displayed in appendix 16. The factors were conceptually distinct,
and the content of the items loading above .4 on each factor had a clear theoretical
relationship to each other. Forty-nine of the sixty-six items loaded at .45 or higher on
one of the factors. All variables had factor loadings above .30 with one or more factors.
Eight variables failed to load substantially (> .40) on any factor: Q(60) other neglect,
Q(13) disagreements, Q(69) trapped, Q(58) below par, Q(6) powerless, Q(42)
confidence, Q(44) self-conscious, and Q(7) sacrifices. These items showed little
conceptual coherence. Full loadings are shown in appendix 17.
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Table 4.1 Eigenvalues for the first sixteen components, and extracted sums of squares
for first six factors
Component
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total
%of
Variance Cumulative % Total
% of
Variance Cumulative %
1 19.434 29.445 29.445 19.434 29.445 29.445
2 3.464 5.249 34.694 3.464 5.249 34.694
3 2.894 4.385 39.079 2.894 4.385 39.079
4 2.313 3.505 42.584 2.313 3.505 42.584
5 1.580 2.394 44.978 1.580 2.394 44.978
6 1.453 2.201 47.179 1.453 2.201 47.179
7 1.394 2.113 49.292
8 1.378 2.088 51.380
9 1.302 1.973 53.353
10 1.238 1.876 55.229
11 1.166 1.767 56.996
12 1.112 1.685 58.681
13 1.062 1.608 60.289
14 1.046 1.585 61.875
15 1.011 1.531 63.406
16 .928 1.406 64.812
Table 4.2 Total variance explained: Four-factor solution
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
%of
Component Total Variance Cumulative %
1 9.212 13.957 13.957
2 7.491 11.350 25.307
3 6.767 10.253 35.561
4 4.636 7.024 42.584
Table 4.3 Four-factor item loadings3
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Component
1 2 3 4




extra problems .627 .379
slipping back .599
morbid thoughts .576 .333







upsetting tasks .522 .475





safe situation .437 .361
relationship loss .426
risk rejection .405
neglect of others .392 .332
disagreements .391 .305
trapped .389 .359







gratification delay .532 .335
unfair change .530 .324






let down .345 .499
relationship difficulty .322 .483
waiting .454 .332 .328
being understood .365 .444
relationship work .406 .433




Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Table 4.3 Four-factor item loadings3
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Component
1 2 3 4
time pressure .340 .610





freedom from hassles .418 .539
disrupted routines .515 .390
comfortable .304 .501
interference from others .351 .441 .344









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 12 iterations.
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Table 4.4 Four-factor communalities
Initial Extraction
risk rejection 1.000 .224
painful memories 1.000 .402
powerless 1.000 .236
sacrifices 1.000 .255
safe situation 1.000 .339
doubts 1.000 .390
past injustice 1.000 .349
waste time 1.000 .443
unfinished work 1.000 .570
disagreements 1.000 .288




task hassle 1.000 .412
support 1.000 .350
unfair life 1.000 .469
buzz 1.000 .288
freedom from hassles 1.000 .501




extra problems 1.000 .586
relationship work 1.000 .359




upsetting tasks 1.000 .540
relationship difficulty 1.000 .380
oppositional acts 1.000 .450
comfortable 1.000 .424
taking time 1.000 .302
lapse of self-discipline 1.000 .517
disturbed feelings 1.000 .619
being understood 1.000 .392
emotional control 1.000 .429
confidence 1.000 .425
self conscious 1.000 .342
easy solutions 1.000 .544
disorganisation 1.000 .587
time pressure 1.000 .536
interference from others 1.000 .488




let down 1.000 .442
effort 1.000 .443
task obstruction 1.000 .532
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.




below par 1.000 .351
neglect of others 1.000 .291
gratification delay 1.000 .457
submission 1.000 .411
disrupted routines 1.000 .488
quick emotional relief 1.000 .595
task perfectionism 1.000 .416
difficult tasks 1.000 .516
relationship loss 1.000 .284
in the mood 1.000 .461
trapped 1.000 .362
unfair change 1.000 .410
morbid thoughts 1.000 .452
indulge 1.000 .389
disrespect 1.000 .521
task interest 1.000 .436
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
4.4.2 FIVE AND SIX-FACTOR SOLUTIONS
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The five-factor solution only accounted for a very small amount of additional
cumulative variance (2.4%), with the fifth factor itself accounting for 2.7% after rotation
(table 4.5). The fifth factor contained only one variable loading above 0.45, Q(25)
craziness. The factor loadings are displayed in appendix 18.
Table 4.5 Total variance explained: Five-factor solution




1 9.076 13.751 13.751
2 7.506 11.373 25.125
3 6.652 10.079 35.204
4 4.676 7.085 42.289
5 1.775 2.689 44.978
Extraction of six factors also added only 3.7% overall cumulative variance (table 4.6),
with the extra two factors accounting for 9.6% explained rotated variance. The factor
loadings are displayed in appendix 19. The sixth factor in this solution is composed of
only two items with substantial loadings, Q(13) disagreements, and Q(15) loss, with loss
also loading on emotional discomfort. Clearly, if a factor has only one high loading
variable it will be poorly defined. However, with two variables, the situation is more
ambiguous and the reliability of the factor has to be judged from the relationship
between them and with other variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). In this regard,
Comrey (1978) notes that a common problem in factor analysis is the generation of low
level factors due to the presence of two or more variables that are very similar to each
other. He suggests that if a factor has only two variables then they should be clearly
distinct in what they measure. Comrey suggests testing this by removing one from the
analysis. With the removal of disagreements, the factor grouping disappears, suggesting
that this factor may be item specific.
Table 4.6 Total variance explained: Six-factor solution
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1 7.361 11.153 11.153
2 6.614 10.021 21.174
3 6.275 9.508 30.682
4 4.567 6.920 37.602
5 3.869 5.862 43.464
6 2.452 3.715 47.179
The fifth factor in the six-factor solution was composed of some of the items from the
original affiliation sub-scale. However, only three items had substantial loadings: Q(31)
emotional neglect, Q(52) emotional deprivation, and Q(67) relationship loss. However,
it is noted that the communality values for relationship loss was still low (.360) as were
those for the other two variables associated with this factor, Q(2) risk rejection (.293)
and Q(19) support (.380). This indicates that these items had little of their variance
accounted for by the solution. This suggests the factor is a reflection of the two
emotional deprivation/neglect items, which have very similar content. As before, when
'emotional deprivation' was removed the factor disappeared and the resulting factors
five and six had little psychological coherence, with only three substantial loadings.
Additional extractions beyond six factors contained no variables with substantial
loadings.
4.4.3. OBLIQUE ROTATION
It is unusual for psychological variables not to be associated to some extent, and there
was good reason to believe that at least some of the facets of frustration-intolerance were
likely to be correlated. Therefore, it was prudent to compare the previous results with an
oblique rotation, which allows for correlated factors after rotation. This was carried out
using the direct oblimin technique. The degree of obliqueness of the factors can be
controlled by variations in the delta parameter. Harman (1976) recommends caution in
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using the default delta value and suggests that several rotations be computed with the
one closest to simple structure interpreted. In this present analysis, different values of
delta made little difference to the overall factor structure, therefore zero was used to
allow for a moderately correlated factor solution.
There is disagreement as to whether the structure matrix or the pattern matrix should be
interpreted. Tabachnick and Fidell (2000) suggest the pattern matrix, since it is easier to
see the variables that comprise the factor, and this is shown in table 4.7. Reassuringly,
the results of the oblique rotation closely matched the orthogonal rotation: The same
patterns of variables and factors were replicated and both the composition and the item
order for each factor were very similar for both rotations. This evidence increased the
confidence that the factor solution was reliable and robust. The attempt at an oblique
rotation with five and six factors failed to converge after 50 iterations. This was taken as
further evidence that a four-factor solution was a better fit to the data.
Examination of the component correlation matrix generated by the oblique rotation
showed that the factor correlations ranged between .42 and .25 (table 4.8). Tabachnick
and Fidell (2000) suggest that correlations above .32 indicate an oblique rotation is more
appropriate. However, interpreting factor loadings in an oblique rotation is difficult.
Therefore, given that the factor solutions in both rotations were almost identical, the
orthogonal rotation was used for interpretation of variable loadings on individual factors.
Table 4.8 Component correlation matrix: Four-factor oblique rotation
Component 1 2 3 4
1 1.000 .350 .383 .421
2 .350 1.000 .287 .307
3 .383 .287 1.000 .247
4 .421 .307 .247 1.000
Table 4.7 Oblique rotation of principal component analysis: Patttern matrix3
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Component
1 2 3 4
















upsetting tasks .469 .386





relationship work .406 .379
neglect of others .380
disagreements .362























lapse of self-discipline .668
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table 4.7 Oblique rotation of principal component analysis: Patttern matrix3
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Component














freedom from hassles .342 .480
disrupted routines .368 .474
comfortable .459
interference from others .306 .374
sacrifices .350
self conscious .334
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 18 iterations.
4.5 FACTOR INTERPRETATION AND DESCRIPTIONS
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The factors with item loadings, commonalties and sub-scale corrected item correlations,
are presented in a summary form in tables 4.9 to 4.12. The proposed factor labels are
given in brackets. Items that were included in the final sub-scales are highlighted in bold
type. There was four complex variables loading above .4 on other factors in addition to
their own designated scale and these are marked *. Item Q(21) buzz was not included in
the entitlement sub-scale although it had good factor loadings because of poor
communalities and a relatively low corrected item-total correlation. Item Q(55) task
obstruction had substantial loadings on both entitlement and achievement but was
thought to be conceptually closer to the latter. Likewise, Q(46) easy solutions included
in the comfort sub-scale rather than emotional discomfort. These two items are detailed
on both factor lists for reference. Thus, all but two items appeared to conceptually fit
with sub-scales, and there was little problem with interpretation due to conflicting items.
Only four items were complex, that is having substantial loadings on more than one sub-
scale. Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that complex items are not necessarily
problematic providing that there are sufficient 'marker' items with significant loadings
on each sub-scale, which was the case in the present analysis.
Whilst selection of items was based on the criteria discussed above, rigidly applying
these would have produced unequal sub-scales. Since it is useful for sub-scales to be of
equal length, some degree of subjective choice was involved in selecting marginal items.
This lead to the final sub-scales, comfort, emotional discomfort and entitlement having
thirteen items each, and achievement eight items, making a full scale of 47 items.
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4.5.1 FACTOR I (EMOTIONAL DISCOMFORT)






64 Quick emotional relief .716 .595 .704
39 Disturbed feelings .709 .619 .735
57 Thoughts .680 .515 .640
14 Continuing situation .647 .445 .566
27 Extra problems .627 .586 .717
29 Slipping back .599 .490 .622
71 Morbid thoughts .576 .452 .605
20 Unfair life .569 .469 .609
5 Painful memories .569 .402 .586
25 Craziness .562 .385 .517
41 Emotional control .547 .429 .581
52 Emotional deprivation .544 .453 .595
15 Loss .534 .389 .588
32 Upsetting tasks .522 .540*(III) .666
46 Easy solutions .516 .544* (III) .664
19 Support .487 .350 .542
31 Emotional neglect .444 .331 .468
8 Safe situation .437 .339 .494
67 Relationship loss .426 .284 .473
2 Risk rejection .405 .224 .437
60 Neglect of others .392 .291 .447
13 Disagreements .391 .288 .434
69 Trapped .389 .362 .529
58 Below Par .366 .351 .440
6 Powerless .342 .236 .398
The theme running through this factor is the intolerance of emotional discomfort. High
loading items involve not only beliefs about the unpleasantness of the experience, but
also demands to be quickly free of such experience and avoid its return. They include
intolerance of the sensations, thoughts, and situations associated with emotional distress
and the belief these are unbearable. Dryden and Gordon (1993) describe these beliefs as
one of the major forms of frustration intolerance. Whilst many of the items were initially
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placed in a general 'comfort' category a separate sub-scale is clearly indicated. It is
always possible with a factor that involves emotional distress that this merely reflects
disturbance (Smith, 1982). However, care was taken to try to assess underlying beliefs
with items that directly referred to symptoms or emotions being removed during scale
development. Nevertheless, emotional intolerance and the degree of emotional distress
clearly interact. Therefore, validation of this sub-scale will in particular require evidence
that it can predict emotional disturbance independent of variance due to negative affect.
Several theorists place the role of avoidance and intolerance of anxiety as central to the
maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g. McNally & Lorenz, 1987; Goldstein &
Chambless, 1989). Descriptions of avoidant personality disorder also highlight low
tolerance for emotional distress and the pervasive use of avoidance to cope with strong
feelings (Beck, Freeman, & Associates, 1990). Similarly, chronic depression has been
associated with higher levels of avoidant coping (Krantz & Moos, 1988). Worry has also
been proposed as functioning as a form of cognitive avoidance (Wells, 1994), and
intolerance of uncertainty hypothesised as the central process in worry and generalised
anxiety disorder (Dugas et al., 1998). Anxiety disorder models have also described the
role of catastrophic interpretations of physiological sensations in the development of
panic disorder (Clark, 1986). Similarly, Reiss and McNally (1985) propose an anxiety
sensitivity trait that involves a fear that sensations of arousal may have harmful
consequences.
REBT has long emphasised the importance of emotional intolerance particularly
regarding secondary disturbance. The original description of frustration intolerance was
in terms of discomfort anxiety, that is anxiety about anxious discomfort (Ellis, 1979b;
1980a). This was extended to incorporate discomfort depression, and other emotions
(e.g. Dryden, 1987). Indeed, Warren and Zgourides (1991) note the similarity between
the concept of anxiety sensitivity and that of discomfort anxiety and frustration
intolerance (see also Ellis, 2002). However, an important difference between REBT and
this model is that REBT distinguishes between 'catastrophising' and 'awfulising'. That
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is, it is not the probability of unpleasant events occurring, or the degree of distress
predicted, that is primarily related to increased emotional disturbance. Rather it is the
'irrational' belief that such events would be absolutely awful or intolerable (Ellis &
Dryden, 1987). Warren et al. (1989) found that measures of both irrational beliefs and
the probability of catastrophic thoughts significantly contributed unique variance in the
prediction of avoidance in anxiety as well as in other problems. However, awareness of
bodily sensations, by themselves, did not. This study used the Malouf and Schutte
(1986) Belief scale, which is a single measure of irrational belief, thus preventing a more
detailed analysis of specific belief processes.
To fully represent the concept of discomfort disturbance the emotional discomfort sub-
scale would need to reflect intolerance of a range of affect, including depression and
anxiety. Interestingly, recent studies using the anxiety sensitivity scale, showed that
anxiety sensitivity was high both in depressed patients with no coexisting anxiety
disorder, as in anxiety patients (Otto et al., 1995). Replicating these results, Taylor et al.
(1996) found that only the 'fear of cognitive dyscontrol' factor correlated with
depression when anxiety symptoms were partialled out. The two other factors forming
anxiety sensitivity, fear of physical symptoms and fear of public embarrassment, were
unrelated. They suggest that fear of mental incapacity may be the 'depression-specific'
form of anxiety sensitivity. Furthermore, Cox, Enns, and Taylor (2001) found this factor
was mediated by rumination over being depressed. However, other results suggest that
anxiety sensitivity is specific to anxiety. For instance, Muris et al. (2001) found that
controlling for trait anxiety the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and depression
disappeared. On the other hand, there is evidence that anxiety sensitivity is significantly
related to increased subjective distress with a cold pressor test (Schmidt & Cook, 1999),
and higher reported levels of chronic pain (Schmidt & Telch, 1997).
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4.5.2 FACTOR II (ENTITLEMENT)
Table 4.10 Factor (II) loadings, communalities, and reliability
Corrected
item-
Q F h2 total
correlation
30 Appreciation .663 .514 .656
73 Disrespect .654 .521 .657
16 Ignored .619 .405 .533
35 Oppositional acts .605 .450 .626
23 Oppositional beliefs .596 .429 .585
61 Gratification delay .532 .457 .617
70 Unfair change .530 .410 .553
55 Task obstruction .524 ,532*(IV) .604
21 Buzz .522 .288 .414
26 Understanding .518 .446 .601
17 Restriction .515 .334 .479
72 Indulge .513 .389 .453
62 Submission .509 .411 .561
53 Let down .499 .442 .599
34 Relationship difficulty .483 .380 .571
24 Waiting .454 .430 .558
40 Being understood .444 .392 .553
28 Relationship work .433 .359 .482
10 Past injustice .421 .349 .500
42 Confidence .377 .425 .548
Many of the beliefs in this factor concern relationships and this factor can be seen as
representing an aspect of affiliation. However, unlike the equivalent demands for
affiliation involved in ego-disturbance, these are not based on a need to protect and
bolster self-worth. Thus, items reflecting possible relationship loss, such as Q(67)
relationship loss, Q(19) support, and Q(2) risk rejection do not load on this factor.
Rather they have significant loadings on emotional discomfort. Indeed, Q(l) upset others
had an almost zero correlation with this factor (r = .09), suggesting that people scoring
on high on this factor were less concerned with others distress and more concerned with
their own desires. Therefore, these items seem to involve a demand that one should not
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be frustrated or discomforted by other people, rather than intolerance of relationship
distress per se. Many of the items are also from the initial fairness category, however
entitlement includes a wider range of beliefs, with Q(61) gratification delay, Q(21) buzz,
and Q(72) indulgence, all reflecting demands for gratification.
Therefore, the broader concept could be summarised by what Dryden and Gordon
(1993) have described as 'I must get what I want'. That is, a sense of entitlement that
one's desires must be meet and that other people should indulge and not frustrate these
desires. Thus, it is not the desire for gratification, or even immediate gratification, that is
dysfunctional but the sense of entitlement that desires must be indulged in spite of
significant negative consequences. Thus, both fairness and gratification may be best
conceived as facets of a broader entitlement factor. This factor clearly has parallels with
the entitlement sub-scale on the DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978). Burns (1980) describes
this sub-scale as measuring the demand that a person's wants are met by others. He
argues that these beliefs are also associated with a lack of personal effort since it follows
that other people and the world should attend to these desires. He specifically associates
this DAS sub-scale with low frustration tolerance and to problems with anger,
resentment, and self-pity. Robb (1992) has also discussed the concept of 'rights',
specifically in relation to assertiveness training, as tending to encourage demands for
entitlement and anger.
Entitlement is closely associated with the concepts of justice, fairness, deservedness, and
rights. There has been much philosophical debate as to the nature and definition of these
concepts, which are often used interchangeably (see Pojman & McLeod, 1998). For
example, Kleinig (1971) distinguishes between different types of deservedness. Raw
Deserts are not dependent on a system of rules (e.g. 'John deserves some good luck'),
whereas Institutional Deserts are derived from quasi-legal rules ('John deserves
promotion for his hard work'). In the latter, people are seen as responsible for following
certain rules regarding the treatment of others. Research on entitlement has largely
focused on what constitutes just rules and conduct, and various models have attempted
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to describe the rules by which individuals perceive outcomes as being fair (e.g. Adams,
1965; Tyler, 1994), or to which they are entitled (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Certainly,
evidence shows that it is the perception of injustice rather than objective measures of
deprivation that is important for an individual in judging contentment (Martin, 1986). In
particular, perception of fairness is based on what an individual believes they are entitled
to receive. Thus, entitlement regarding consideration from others appears to involve two
general issues: respect and explanation (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Miller (2001)
suggests that disrespect is perceived as unfair because it deprives the person of
something they are entitled to, or subjects them to something they do not think they
deserve. Whilst social psychological research has discussed the link between anger and
injustice the distinction between constructive and destructive reactions has often not
been recognised. More specifically, there has been no clear distinction made between
inferences, that is the rules by which fairness is judged, and the absoluteness and
flexibility with which people adhere to these rules. Thus, Major (1994) suggests that
individuals will believe their entitlements have been violated if there is perceived
illegitimate injustice relative to other people. Likewise, Mikula (1993) in attempting to
classify everyday conceptions of injustice suggests that the inference that others chose to
act unjustly is an important element in perceived injustice.
However, REBT argues that it is not the desire for justice, or the perception that rules of
justice have been violated, that leads to emotional disturbance, but rather the demand
that justice absolutely must exist. It is the absoluteness of such rules that is irrational and
which leads to unhealthy negative emotions. The frustrated desire for justice, by itself,
will not lead to emotional disturbance but rather to healthy negative emotion, such as
disappointment. There is also an interaction between inferences and absolute rules, and
for instance, there is evidence that anger prone individuals are more likely to infer
disrespect (Graham & Hudley, 1994). However, REBT would suggest this increased
sensitivity to injustice derives from a stronger sense of entitlement, rather than the other
way around. There has been little attempt to define the psychological concept of
entitlement in the social psychological literature, on this basis it is best used to describe
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an absolute requirement for justice, rather than the rules for justice per se. Similar to
REBT theory, Major (1994) has suggested that what distinguishes entitlement from
'related concepts like wants and expectations' is a sense of 'moral imperative', that is an
expectation that 'one should or ought to receive something' (Singer, 1981).
The interaction of entitlement with self-esteem is also important for the present study.
Crocker and Major (1989) have proposed that perceived injustice in disadvantaged
groups can be a means of protecting self-esteem, since failures can be attributed to
prejudice. However, they review evidence showing that, contrary to theories of self-
esteem, disadvantaged groups do not actually have lower self-worth. Alternatively,
Bushman and Baumeister (1998) have argued that anger, rather than being associated
with a defence against low self-esteem, is associated with a grandiose view of the self.
However, there is a question as to whether such grandiosity is best categorised as a form
of ego-disturbance. Certainly, the concept of entitlement is associated with notions of
self-centredness, self-righteousness, that ones own desires should have higher priority
and that one should 'get ones own way'. Indeed, from an analysis of different sub-types
of narcissism, DiGiuseppe et al. (1995) concluded that entitlement and grandiosity were
central to this disorder rather than emotional vulnerability and low self-worth. However,
whether entitlement beliefs are associated with high self-esteem is a question that can
only be answered empircally.
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4.5.3 FACTOR III (COMFORT)
Table 4.11 Factor (III) loadings, communalities, and reliability
Corrected
item-
Q F h2 total
Correlation
66 Difficult tasks .680 .516 .614
58 Persistence .623 .500 .624
49 Time pressure .610 .536 .684
68 In the mood .607 .461 .599
74 Task interest .594 .436 .547
54 Effort .567 .443 .621
51 Self change .548 .350 .502
18 Task hassle .543 .412 .547
22 Freedom from hassles .539 .501 *(1) .648
63 Disrupted routines .515 .488 .582
36 Comfortable .501 .424 .579
46 Easy solutions .480 .544*(I) .646
32 Upsetting tasks .475 ,540*(I) .625
50 Interference from others .441 .488 .589
44 Self-conscious .386 .342 .457
7 Sacrifices .369 .255 .390
The items loading on this factor refer to the demand that life should be easy,
comfortable, and free of hassles, effort, and inconvenience. These beliefs, described by
Dryden and Gordon (1993) as a major form of low frustration tolerance, are central to its
definition. Whilst the importance of emotional regulation and avoidance in
psychological problems has been recognised the pursuit of comfort has received much
less attention. In contrast to the more dramatic manifestations of emotional intolerance,
comfort beliefs may have subtle but wider effects, making them more destructive in the
long term.
Commitment to a range of meaningful goals is important for personal fulfilment and
emotional resilience (Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Emmons, 1996). Yet, intolerance of the
inevitable discomforts involved in pursuing and switching goals has been implicated in
reduced life satisfaction. Thus, DiGiuseppe (1991a) suggests that comfort beliefs
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undermine satisfaction in life by reducing the commitment to long term goals that
require persistence and effort. He suggests that patients often leave therapy when they
have achieved symptom removal, when they feel better, but without making long-term
changes in their general life. These wider changes require continued effort and
persistence and are, therefore, likely to be avoided by patients with high demands for
comfort. He argues that these beliefs, and their failure to change, are significant causes
of relapse since the situational triggers remain intact. Ellis (1985a) has also argued that
these beliefs often contribute to the maintenance of psychological problems, by reducing
the motivation for change within therapy. They impair engagement in the therapy
process, increase treatment failure, and encourage patients to pursue ineffective, but
more comfortable, types of therapy (Ellis, 1983).
The specific relationship of comfort beliefs with primary problems is unclear, since
these beliefs have previously been assessed in combination with other types of
frustration intolerance. However, the content of these items with their focus on lack of
persistence, task avoidance, and freedom from hassle suggests that they will be
prominent in failures of self-control. Thus, binge comfort eating, impulsive buying, and
procrastination would be expected to have significant associations with comfort beliefs.
However, self-control is clearly a complex process and breakdown in this process
presumably can occur for different reasons and at different points. Several theories have
been proposed to account for self-control failures, including threatened self-esteem
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991), regulation of negative affect (Baumeister & Scher,
1988) and toleration of frustration (Mischel, 1996). However, as behaviourists as well as
REBT have noted, the desire to take the quick, easy and immediate option is a 'normal'
aspect of human and animal behaviour. The decision to override this temptation and
tolerate the loss of comfort is a central component of self-control strategies.
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4.5.4 FACTOR IV (ACHIEVEMENT)
Table 4.12 Factor (IV) loadings, communalities, and reliability
Corrected
item-


































Since irrational dysfunctional beliefs are characterised as absolutistic, unrealistic, and
rigid, perfectionistic achievement goals are often been seen as exemplifying these
aspects (Ellis, 2002). However, as was discussed in chapter two, existing
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scales (Frost et al., 1990; Hewitt and Flett, 1989) show
inconsistent relationships with emotional disturbance. It was suggested that an
explanation for this was, firstly, a lack of clear differentiation between demands and
preferences in regard to item wording. Secondly, that the scales did not clearly
distinguish between perfectionism related to self-evaluation compared to frustration
intolerance. The items on the present sub-scale specifically attempt to assess intolerance
in the achievement domain, as opposed to lowered self-esteem. This appears to have
been successful, in that the achievement sub-scale and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale
are only very weakly correlated (r (232) = -.18), although the degree to which the scale
measures frustration intolerance remains to be explored in the validation studies.
Certainly, there is evidence from other areas that the intolerance of goal frustration can
be dysfunctional, and that this is separate from self-esteem difficulties. Thus, the original
defining characteristic of the Type-A behaviour pattern was that of excessive
achievement striving, and inflexible standards for performance (Friedman & Rosenman,
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1974). Further research indicated that the behavioural component most discriminative of
heart disease cases was the 'relatively stable tendency to react to a broad range of
frustrating-inducing events with responses indicative of, anger, irritation... and to
actually express antagonism, criticalness, uncooperativeness...' (Dembrowski &
Czajowski, 1989). A recent study that factor analysed Type-A reactions, based on
responses to frustrating-inducing scenarios, yielded two factors (Birks & Roger, 2000).
Interestingly, both factors involved striving for achievement but the 'toxic'
dysfunctional factor was characterised by impatience, anger, and the 'need to win at all
costs'. These descriptions are more typical of frustration intolerance than fragile self-
esteem, more often associated with the opposite characteristics of low confidence,
unassertiveness, and withdrawal. However, some theorists have proposed that type-A
behaviour is driven by threats to self-worth contingent on high standards (Martin, Kuiper
& Westra, 1989). Unfortunately, the contribution of these two categories of belief has
not been directly investigated. However, it is interesting that Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein,
and Dynin (1994) found that self-orientated perfectionism was highly correlated with a
measure of type-A achievement striving, but that impatience was related to both self and
socially prescribed perfectionism. This suggests that high achievement demand beliefs
are associated with some dysfunctional behaviour. However, whether these beliefs
continue to exert an influence independent of self-esteem requires empirical
investigation. Certainly, comparisons between the Multi-dimensional Perfectionism
Scale (Hewitt and Flett, 1989) and the Jones Irrational Beliefs test found that self-
orientated perfectionism was most strongly correlated with low frustration tolerance
(Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, & Koledin, 1991). A follow-up study using the Survey of
Personal Beliefs showed that self-worth was least correlated with self-orientated




The corrected item-total correlation was computed for the items on the revised sub-
scales selected from the exploratory factor analysis (tables 4.13 to 4.16). No items fell
below .4 on their own sub-scale. The coefficient alpha is also given for each sub-scale,
ranging from .907 to .820. The generally agreed lower limit for alpha is .7, and an alpha
exceeding .8 is generally considered satisfactory for research (Nunnally, 1978).
Therefore, the alpha for the first three sub-scales indicates very good reliability. Factor
IV (achievement) does have a lower, although still good, level of alpha primarily due to
its shorter length. The coefficient alpha for the full scale was .951 (table 4.17). The mean
inter-item correlation for each sub-scale is also shown, and these are within the optimal
range of item homogeneity of between .2 to .4 that Briggs and Check (1986) suggest
indicate the best balance between bandwidth and fidelity. That is, between the breadth of
the content being sampled and measurement precision (Cronbach & Gleser, 1957). The
wider range of correlations shown in the full scale, and its lower mean inter-item
correlation support the argument for frustration intolerance being composed of a number
of facets.
Table 4.13 Reliability analysis: Emotional discomfort sub-scale (I)
166
Scale item Corrected Item- Total
Correlation
64 Emo. relief .74
39 Disturbed feelings .75
57 Thoughts .65
14 Continuing .58
27 Extra problems .70
29 Slipping back .59
71 Morbid thoughts .63
20 Unfair life .60
5 Painful memories .59
25 Craziness .54
41 Emo. control .60
52 Emo deprivation .52
32 Upsetting tasks .64
Alpha = .907
Mean inter-item correlation = .433; Inter-item correlation range = .275 to .630
Table 4.14 Reliability analysis: Entitlement sub-scale (II)





35 Opp. acts .60
23 Opp. beliefs .61
61 Grat. delay .61





53 Let down .55
24 Waiting .56
Alpha = .883
Mean inter-item correlation = .368; Inter-item correlation range = .193 to .543
Table 4.15 Reliability analysis: Comfort sub-scale (III)
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Scale item Corrected Item-Total
Correlation
66 Difficult tasks .62
58 Persistence .62
49 Time pressure .67
68 In mood .60
74 Task interest .55
54 Effort .63
51 Self change .50
18 Task hassle .55
22 Hassle free .64
63 Disrupt routines .57
36 Comfortable .57
46 Easy solutions .62
50 Interference .59
Alpha = .896
Mean inter-item correlation = .397; Inter-item correlation range = .262 to .629
Table 4.16 Reliability analysis: Achievement sub-scale (IV)
Scale item Corrected Item-Total
Correlation
12 Unfinished work .63
47 Disorganisation .64
38 Self-discipline .60
11 Waste time .51
65 Task perfection .52
55 Task obstruction .51
37 Taking time .45
9 Doubts .46
Alpha = .821
Mean inter-item correlation = .363
Inter-item correlation range = .228 to .534
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5 Painful memories .54
9 Doubts .55
11 Waste time .30




18 Task hassle .47
20 Unfair life .59
22 Hassle free .62




27 Extra problems .68
29 Slipping back .56
30 Appreciation .54
32 Upsetting tasks .66
35 Opp. acts .53
36 Comfortable .56
37 Taking time .43
38 Self-discipline .48
39 Disturbed feelings .66
41 Emo. control .56
46 Easy solutions .66
47 Disorganisation .50
49 Time pressure .62
50 Interference .64
51 Self change .44
52 Emo deprivation .54
53 Let down .59
54 Effort .54
55 Task obstruction .55
57 Thoughts .53
58 Persistence .55






63 Disrupt routines .59
64 Emo. relief .61
65 Task perfection .42
66 difficult tasks .49
68 In mood .53
70 Unfair change .51
71 Morbid thoughts .55
72 Indulge .38
73 Disrespect .55
74 Task interest .48
Alpha = .951
Mean inter-item correlation = .292
Inter-item correlation range = -.019 to .630
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4.7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Means and standard deviations for the two groups are presented in table 4.18, and the
distributions displayed in figures 4.2 to 4.4. For both the student and patient groups, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the total Frustration-Discomfort scores were non¬
significant indicating normal distributions. The skewness (Z = -.04) and kurtosis (Z =
1.66) statistics for the patient group were also within the normal range. Similarly, for the
student group both skewness (Z = .67) and kurtosis (Z = -.83) were also normal. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were all non-significant for each of the sub-scales, indicated
that in a non-clinical group the distribution is normally distributed. There was evidence
of negative kurtosis (Z = -2.27) for emotional discomfort and achievement (Z = -2.46) in
the patient group. However, this was slight given the size of the sample, and the shape of
the distribution appeared satisfactory. Although non-normal kurtosis produces
underestimates of variance, these underestimates disappear with samples of more than
100 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). The skewness statistics for all patient sub-groups was
within acceptable limits. Overall therefore, the distributions were good and no
transformations were necessary.





There was no significant association between the full scale and age (r (240) = -.02, ns) or
gender (t (240) = .62, ns). Similarly, there was no significant relationship between these
variables and individual sub-scales. This is contrary to the results of Kassinove and
Eckhardt (1993) who, using the Survey of personal Beliefs, found significant gender
differences on the Awfulising and the Low Frustration tolerance scales, with males had
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better frustration tolerance than females. However, previous research using the Jones
Irrational Beliefs Test had indicated no gender differences (Zurawski & Smith, 1987;
Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984).
Figure 4.2 Distribution Frustration-Discomfort Scale: Combined group
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Figure 4.3 Distribution Frustration-Discomfort Scale: Patient sample
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Figure 4.4 Distribution Frustration-Discomfort Scale: Student sample
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An unweighted sum score, using the selected items for each sub-scale, was computed.
When using principal component analysis this simple method is often adequate, and no
major discrepancies occur in validity. Schmitt (1996) suggests that, as a minimum, a
matrix that includes sub-scale reliabilities, intercorrelations between sub-scales, and the
intercorrelations corrected for attenuation due to unreliability, should be presented for
multidimensional tests (table 4.19). Since corrected intercorrelations removes
differences due to differential reliability, it makes it easier to compare and identify sub-
scale pairs that lack discrimination and are highly correlated (John & Benet-Martinez,
2000). Uncorrected intercorrelations enable the size of alpha to be evaluated relative to
the overlap between scales. The reliabilities scores should be substantially larger than
these uncorrected intercorrelations, which is the case in the present scale. All sub-scales
were moderately intercorrelated, with emotional discomfort most strongly correlated
with comfort, achievement with self-entitlement, and entitlement with comfort. This
suggests that the use of the total score, as an indication of overall frustration intolerance
may be appropriate. The comfort and discomfort factors have the strongest
intercorrelation. To some extent this may be due to ambiguous item wording, for
example 'I can't stand facing problems', could refer to facing either emotional
difficulties or everyday hassles, and two items, Q(46) easy solutions and Q(42) freedom
from hassles, are complex items loading substantially on both factors. The correlations
between sub-scales and the full scale were: Emotional discomfort (r = .69), entitlement
(r = .73), comfort (r = .72), and achievement (r = .57).
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Table 4.19 Sub-scale intercorrelation matrix (observed correlations below the diagonal
in bold, and correlations corrected for attenuation above the diagonal)
Sub-Scales Emotional Entitlement Comfort Achievement
Discomfort
Emotional discomfort .54 .72 .59
Entitlement .56 .72 .65
Comfort .68 .65 .54
Achievement .51 .55 .47
4.9 DISCUSSION
Factor analysis supported the hypothesis that frustration intolerance is a
multidimensional construct, although the strong sub-scale intercorrelations indicate that
these are closely interrelated. A four-factor solution was suggested as the best
description of the data. Further factors appeared residual and contained few items, with
the composition of the primary factors being little changed by rotation to a four-factor
solution. The four-factor solution yielded meaningful sub-scales that showed high
internal consistency.
However, the original six theoretical categories of frustration intolerance beliefs required
some modification. The results did not indicate a separate certainty/control factor. One
reason for this may be related to the meaning of control. Perfection, certainty, and
control are terms describing absolute goals and it can be argued that they represent
different descriptive terms for demandingness rather than categories of frustration
intolerance. Each of these types of demand can be applied in a number of different
content areas, for example achievement ('I must be certain I have achieved my best') or
emotional discomfort ('I must be certain I won't be anxious'). Indeed, Neenan and
Dryden (1999) have also suggested that control beliefs span a number of content areas,
such as control of other people and of emotions.
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Although control/certainty items were associated with a number of sub-scales, they
loaded most frequently on the emotional discomfort factor. This is unsurprising, given
the considerable evidence regarding their role in the development and maintenance and
of anxiety and depressive disorders (Mineka & Kelly, 1989). For example, intolerance of
uncertainty has been found a strong predictor of trait worry and emotional coping
(Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). Indeed, the Intolerance of Uncertainty scale was
found to be a better predictor ofworry scores than the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Dugas,
Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). However, the need for control has also been implicated
in other problem areas, and for example has been proposed as a central element in type-
A personality (Appels, 1989). As regards entitlement, Bos and Lind (2002) propose a
theory of fairness judgements based on the need to reduce uncertainty. They argue, with
interesting parallels with the concepts of frustration intolerance and rigid
demandingness, that strict rules about fairness serve to reduce the discomfort associated
with uncertainty. This also illustrates how the different content areas, in this case
possibly demands for comfort and entitlement, may interact.
The initial conceptualisation and item placement for the affiliation category was
mistaken. This category was defined as the intolerance of frustration or discomfort in
relationships. It partly involved the idea that individuals can experience frustration
intolerance in the realm of ego disturbance (Neenan & Dryden, 1999). For instance, that
personal rejection can lead to lowered self-esteem and/or intolerance of the discomfort
or goal frustration involved. However, the items in this category did not coalesce to form
a stable factor, and the idea that relationship problems could be categorised within one
aspect of Frustration-Discomfort was overly simplistic. Instead, some of the items
loaded on the emotional discomfort factor, suggesting that for problems involving
emotional loss, such as Q( 15) loss, and Q( 19) support, the essential feature was the
toleration of emotional pain. Other items from this category loaded on the entitlement
factor, and this factor appeared most clearly associated with the intolerance of frustration
in relationships.
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However, the entitlement factor included a wider range of beliefs than those associated
with relationships, or indeed fairness, and more generally referred to the intolerance of
'not getting what one wants'. Injustice beliefs were also related to other factors apart
from entitlement, although entitlement appeared the primary focus. Thus, Q(20) unfair
life, which describes a general sense of injustice, loaded more strongly on the emotional
discomfort factor. This is consistent with the suggested association between unfairness
and self-pity, or 'discomfort' depression (Hauck, 1974). These two items, Q(20) unfair
life and Q( 10) past injustice, have substantial loadings on both emotional discomfort and
entitlement, and entitlement beliefs have been linked with anger. This is interesting in
that the relationship between depression and anger has long been the subject of debate,
and the overlap of types of fairness beliefs between factors may reflect these
interactions. Thus, unfair treatment has been proposed as a central theme in the
experience of hurt (Dryden, 1995b), which can be considered an amalgam of the basic
emotions of anger and depressed mood (Power & Dalgleish, 1997).
Also loading on the entitlement factor along with fairness were immediate gratification
items. Low frustration tolerance is frequently discussed in reference to short-term
hedonism, immediate gratification, and indulgence. Indeed, Neenan and Dryden (1999)
note that immediate gratification is almost synonymous with the concept of frustration
intolerance, with the additional feature that demands should be instantly met. However,
these terms are often used very broadly and it is unclear from the literature how they
relate to other irrational beliefs. For instance, Ellis sometimes refers to avoiding
emotional distress as immediate gratification, and appears to conceive of the pursuit of
pleasure and the avoidance of discomfort as two ends of the same dimension. However,
the present analysis suggest that discomfort intolerance and immediate gratification
separate into different factors, and that fairness and gratification are best conceived as
facets of a broader factor of entitlement.
Factor analysis is but a part of the process of validating a construct, not an end in itself.
The Frustration-Discomfort Scale appears to be a reliable multidimensional measure of
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frustration intolerance beliefs. However, it is necessary to determine whether the sub-
scales are measuring the constructs described. The following chapters will test scale
validity by investigating its ability to discriminate relevant groups. These studies will
examine differences in dysfunctional coping, procrastination, engagement in therapy,
and emotional disturbance. The discrimination between self-esteem and frustration
intolerance will also be analysed in more detail.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE AND EGO-DISTURBANCE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
REBT distinguishes between two categories of beliefs that lead to emotional
disturbance: one relating to ego disturbance and the other to frustration intolerance
(Ellis, 1994a). The central purpose of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale was to measure
frustration intolerance independently from issues of self-evaluation. Therefore, the
construct validity of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale requires evidence of a
significantly lower association with measures of self-evaluation compared to measures
conceptually related to frustration intolerance.
Ego disturbance and frustration intolerance are conceived as separate constructs,
although the relationship between the two remains largely unexplored. Moreover, the
content structure of both types of belief has tended to be oversimplified (Neenan &
Dryden, 1999). Essentially, REBT proposes that ego disturbance arises from absolute
global statements about the self as opposed to specific rating of individual acts or traits.
Nevertheless, an aspect of such global rating may involve relative comparisons. Thus,
individuals may consider their actions to be successful, but not successful enough
(Walen, DiGiuseppe, & Dryden, 1992). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this type self-
criticism always represents ego disturbance. It could be argued that only global self-
condemnation falls within the definition of ego disturbance. Condemnation of actions or
traits would not in itself constitute poor self-acceptance, even if associated with
demandingness beliefs. For instance, an individual might berate themselves for failing to
achieving a goals they absolutely should have achieved, without necessarily globally
rating themselves as a failure. This type of belief could be argued to represent frustration
intolerance in the domain of the self, rather than poor self-acceptance.
178
This has parallels with the theory that self-esteem is partly a function of the discrepancy
between the ideal and actual self. Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) proposes that
discrepancies between the actual self and the 'ought' and 'ideal' selves, that is, the
attributes the person believes they should or ideally want to have, contributes to
emotional disturbance. This clearly has close similarities with the concept of
demandingness in REBT. It also suggests a relationship with achievement frustration,
and indeed perfectionistic beliefs have been suggested as particularly related to these
discrepancies (Hewitt & Genest, 1990). However, whilst research has highlighted the
relationship between self-esteem and perfectionism (Stumpf& Parker, 2000), the failure
to achieve perfectionistic goals may also involve intolerance of failure, independent of
issues of self-acceptance. The emotions connected to such 'self intolerance' might
therefore involve frustration intolerant depression, or anger. Dryden (1990), in
classifying angry beliefs, describes self-worth anger at being blocked at achieving
important goals. However, individuals do have important personal goals that are not tied
to self-worth, and when these are blocked it may lead to frustration intolerant anger ('I
can't stand not achieving my potential').
In this regard, Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) have argued against the frequently
held view that aggression is related to underlying low self-esteem. Whilst empirical data
is sparse they present a range of observational and other studies to support their
hypothesis that violence is associated with the opposite tendency, that of high self-
esteem and superiority to others. Thus, violence is related to threats to high self-esteem,
when the person retaliates or risks losing face. However, since high esteem is not always
associated with violence they propose other factors moderate this relationship. In
particular the person who has ' unstable high self-esteem' (Kernis, 1993), and thus
fluctuating levels of global self-esteem, should be more vulnerable to ego threat and
therefore anger. There is evidence that such unstable beliefs and anger are positively
related (Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989). In other words, Baumeister and his
colleagues maintain a self-esteem theory of anger, but focus on high unstable self-
esteem rather than low self-esteem (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). From a
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psychodynamic perspective, narcissism has been viewed as compensating for low self-
esteem, although Kohut (1978) distinguishes between two types of narcissistic anger, the
first related to not getting what one wants, and the other to threatened self-worth.
As noted previously, REBT regards the concept of 'self-esteem' as embodying the very
process that underlies ego disturbance, that is self-worth based on self-rating. REBT
argues that this is philosophically mistaken, since human worth is not rateable. It further
suggests that a personal philosophy self-rating, even with high ratings, would leave an
individual vulnerable to loss of 'esteem' through failure or rejection. Therefore, REBT
has replaced 'improving self-esteem' with acceptance of the self, 'warts and all'. Within
this framework 'unstable high self-esteem' corresponds to high self-rating with an
underlying philosophy of low self-acceptance. REBT also proposes that anger can be
generated by both ego and frustration intolerance beliefs. Thus, whilst Bushman and
Baumeister (1998) suggest that not receiving 'respect' causes anger due to a defence
against loss of high self-esteem it could also be described in terms of frustrated
entitlement. As such, high self-esteem may have no special relationship to anger beyond
setting higher standards for entitlement and achievement.
In order to distinguish frustration intolerance from ego-disturbance the choice of self-
esteem measure was clearly important. As Byrne (1996) notes in her review, definitions
of self-concept are so varied that the researcher needs to select the test most appropriate
to their theoretical framework. One possibility was to use existing REBT scales that
assess self-acceptance beliefs. Whilst this has the advantage of using the same
theoretical orientation, such scales lack the range of background studies enjoyed by
longer standing measures, the most commonly used being the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). This was designed as a unidimensional measure of global self-
esteem. The items on the scale, whilst not phrased in REBT language, therefore reflect
global self-rating rather than rating of behaviours or traits. Since REBT posits that ego-
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disturbance occurs when an individual makes 'global negative ratings' of the self
(Dryden, 1995a, p. 18) this scale is theoretically consistent with the REBT model1.
It has been argued that the Rosenberg scale would benefit from the development of
meaningful sub-scales (Power, 1991). However, opinions are divided as to the
underlying structure of the scale. Some factor analysis studies have argued for a one-
factor solution (e.g. O'Brian, 1985), but the most frequent finding is that of two factors
(e.g. Bagley, Bolitho, & Bertrand, 1997). The reasons for this finding are also debated.
Kaplan and Pokorny (1969) suggest that the scale is multi-dimensional with the first
factor, comprising seven of the items, representing self-denigration and the other factor
defence of self-worth. Hensley and Roberts (1976) also found two factors, with positive
appraisal items loading on the first factor and negative items on the second. However,
like other studies (Carmines & Zellar, 1974; Hagborg, 1996), they conclude that the
scale is unidimensional and the factors reflect error due to response bias.
It has been argued that this response bias is due to the presentation of items in the
questionnaire. The Rosenberg scale follows conventional wisdom in using reversed
scored negatively worded items to reduce response bias, such as acquiescence
(Nunnally, 1978). However, this comes at a cost: Reversed negatively worded items
increase question complexity and make interpretation more difficult. This is likely to
increase error, and lead to responses that inappropriately mirror the previous reply
(Marsh, 1986). Schmitt and Stults (1985) have described such a response style, where
the person reads a question, decides what is being asked and then replies in the same
direction to the rest of the items, as 'careless' responding. Since the replies are not
random, with the negative items scored one way and the positive another, it will result in
the formation of two factors. Indeed, they show that it requires only ten percent of
1
Following from this proposal, that the Rosenberg scale is an appropriate measure of the REBT concept
of global self-rating and poor self-acceptance, the term 'self-esteem' has been used as a general term to
refer to the concept of self-worth based on rating. This is to avoid using a variety of different terms when
referring to the results. The author is aware that, given the conceptually differences between self-
acceptance and self-esteem, that this is open to criticism.
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respondents to answer some of the questions carelessly to produce a separate reverse-
scored factor. They also note that the first factor is typically associated with the negative
items, and increases with the degree of response error.
Kaufman, Rasinski, Lee, and West (1991) found two factors they interpreted as
representing general and transient self-evaluations. They also predicted that the
differentiation between the two factors should be greater with higher verbal ability. This
is contrary to the prediction made by Marsh (1986) who argued that if the factors are
related to response error the correlation between the negative and positive items should
increase with verbal ability, since negative item errors were related to verbal ability.
Marsh (1996) tested this using confirmatory factor analysis. He compared six different
models, including that of Kaplan and Pokorny (1969) and Kaufman et al. (1991) with
models reflecting response error. The results supported a unidimensional model with
substantial error largely associated with the negative items. It also showed that
correlations between the two factors increased with verbal ability. However, this study
was limited in that only seven of the scale items were included in the analysis. Corwyn
(2000) using confirmatory factor analysis evaluated the full scale comparing eight
competing models. As before, a two-factor model was indicated and the model
incorporating response error proved a better fit than models without such effects. The
response bias was primarily associated with negative items and decreased with verbal
fluency. He concludes that the theory underlying the scale is not questioned by this
research, but users of the scale need to be aware of the response bias and address this.
A further difficulty regarding scale interpretation is that scoring methods vary. For
instance, the Bagley et al. and the Sheasby, Barlow, Cullen, and Wright (2000) studies
have high scores indicative of good self-esteem. This is opposite to the scoring method
of some manuals (e.g., Johnson, Wright, & Weinman, 1995). The present results, to be
compatible with reported studies and intuitively more understandable, has followed a
high score equals high self-esteem method. A further complication in comparing
research is that different studies have also used different versions of the Rosenberg
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scale. The test format used in this research uses the version of Johnson et al. (1995),
although other studies use an alternative version with a different order of items (e.g.
Bagley et al., 1997; Sheasby et al., 2000). The item list as used in this study, along with
reliability statistics, are shown in table 5.8.
This study initially investigates the structure and adequacy of the Rosenberg scale.
Specifically, it examines whether the scale is best described by a two-factor model and
the degree these factors represent meaningful psychological dimensions, rather than
response error. Previous studies have been limited by reliance on child, adolescent, or
student samples, and adult studies have tended to use groups without psychological
problems. Next, the relationship of frustration intolerance beliefs with self-esteem is
examined.
5.2 METHOD
5.2.1 PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
The validation analysis of self-esteem involved the clinical group of 242 individuals.
Cross sectional data were gathered from the clinical group using the questionnaire
packet described in chapter three.
Opinions are divided regarding the best method of testing multifaceted constructs (Hull,
Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991). The use of a total score more adequately represents the general
frustration construct. However, by summing the sub-components the specific effects of
individual sub-scales are lost. Thus, a regression approach where individual sub-scale
scores are simultaneously entered as predictors is often used. This enables a better test of
the unique effects of sub-scales, although strong relationships between the sub-scales
can cause problems. For example, when sub-scales have substantial overlapping
variance some scales may fail to remain significantly related to the criterion, although
they may have important individual associations.
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In conducting the regression analyses care was taken to address normality assumptions
and to identify the presence of influential outliers. Screening for univariate outliers and
violations of normality were carried out on each individual scale, and have been reported
when appropriate in the descriptive statistics for these measures. In order to ensure that
the data was representative of the population, only truly exceptional observations were
considered for deletion, (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Further, to avoid
overfitting data, outliers among the variables were examined separately from solution
outliers. Two methods of outlier detection were used: The analysis of residuals and the
graphic examination of partial regression plots. Studentised residuals were inspected and
outliers with values in excess of ± 3.3 were considered for exclusion (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2000). Likewise, plots of standardised residuals with leverage values and with
Cook's distance, as a measure of influence, were examined. Tolerances for each variable
in the regression were also examined to exclude possible effects ofmulticollinearity. In
general, few problems were experienced following initial data screening and these are
detailed when appropriate.
5.3 RESULTS
5.3.1 ADEQUACY OF THE SELF-ESTEEM MEASURE: PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS
There was one missing case. Standard scores identified three cases with total scores
between ±2.5 and 3, but no cases above ± 3. Examination of these cases, which had
high self-esteem scores, indicated that the responses were consistent and therefore,
although extreme, they were retained as valid members of the population. However,
given the need for caution regarding 'careless responding' voiced by previous studies,
particular attention was paid to the scoring patterns between positive and negative items.
Analysis showed there was a significant difference between the two means, t (240) =
9.13, p < .001, with individuals scoring higher on negative items. A difference score
between negative and positive items was computed (table 5.1). Five cases had markedly
higher positive than negative item scores, (Z < -2.73). That is individuals indicated that
they had relatively lower self-esteem on positive items and higher self esteem on
negative items. There was also four extreme scores with the opposite pattern, that is,
higher negative than positive item scores (Z > 2.26). Examination of these extreme
scores indicated eight cases, four positive, and four negative. They were judged as being
spoilt and removed from the analysis. A further positive case, noting responses due to
poor physical health, was also eliminated. Thus, 232 cases were included in the analysis.
Table 5.1 Initial difference scores between negative and positive worded items
Frequency Valid Percent


















The removal of outlying cases requires very careful consideration. The most important
decision was whether the scores, whilst extreme, were still representative of the sample
population. If they are, than removal will result in an overfitted model not truly
reflecting the true range of scores. However, if the scores are spurious then these cases
will exert a false and distorting influence, the more so due to their extreme position. The
pattern of responses, in straight lines on one side or other of the questionnaire with no
regard to reversed items, indicated careless responding. Due to the reversed questions, it
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is very unlikely that responses would be so diametrically opposed to each other. It
suggests that individuals have decided that a response to the left or right of the scale
represents low self-esteem, and have continued with this regardless of item direction, as
described Schmitt and Stults (1985). These authors recommend that Rosenberg scores
are carefully examined to detect patterns of careless responding, and that such cases are
'best deleted prior to further analysis'. However, they also note that the identification of
careless responding is not straightforward. Certainly, similar endorsement of reversed
items is indicative of response error, and the simplest method of detecting this is to
examine the difference between negative and positive item scores.
As a further check on the appropriateness of the deleted items, the negative and positive
scale scores were compared to another measure of self-worth, the worthlessness rating
from the background inventory (table 5.2). For this, patients were asked to rate how
intensely they had experienced a sense of 'worthlessness' over the past month. All
except one outlying case had rated worthlessness at the maximum over the previous
month, suggesting their 'good' self-esteem scores were in error. Following removal of
outliers, both the negative and positive self-esteem scales increased their correlation
with the worthlessness measure. The negative and positive scales were strongly
correlated (r (232) = .75, p < .001), a noticeable increase compared to before removal of
outliers (r (240) = .60). The correlation between the positive and negative scales and the
full scale increased (r (232) = .93 and r (232) = .94) compared to before data screening (r
(240) = .87 and r (240) = .89). Examination of remaining cases suggested a much more
mixed pattern of careless responses. There was a tendency for responses to be influenced
by immediately preceding items, and to be answered in the same direction whether or
not the item was reversed.
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Table 5.2 Frequency distribution: feelings of'worthlessness'
Frequency Valid Percent
Valid not at all 36 15.1
slightly 40 16.7
moderately 61 25.5
very much so 102 42.7
Total 239 100.0
5.3.2 ROSENBERG SCALE: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The distribution of scores is shown in figure 5.1, the mean and standard deviation was
23.39 (SD = 5.75) (table 5.3). As expected, the clinical group mean in the present study
is significantly lower (t (231) = 25.56, p < .001) than that found by Chamberlain and
Haaga (2001) in an adult non-clinical group (mean = 33.04, SD = 5.39). There was a
significant correlation between age and self-esteem in the present sample (r = .22, p <
.001), which is consistent with previous findings.
Bagley et al. (1997) also reported a significant difference between male (31.36, SD =
5.13) and female students mean scores (28.32, SD = 5.49). This gender difference was
confirmed by the present results (table 5.4), with females having a significantly lower
level of overall self-esteem than males (F (1, 230) = 6.35, p < .05). Females also had
lower levels of positive self-esteem (F (1, 230) = 7.08, p < .01), and, to a lesser extent,
negative self-esteem (F (1, 230) = 4.34, p < .05). 'Very low' self-esteem (scores below
21) were found in 2.7% of high school students, compared with 38% of patients in the
present clinical population.
Table 5.3 Means and standard deviations ofRosenberg scales
Mean SD
Full scale 23.39 5.75
Negative sub-scale 10.79 3.29
Positive sub-scale 12.59 2.87
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Figure 5.1 Rosenberg Self-esteem scores
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Table 5.4 Means and standard deviations ofRosenberg scale by gender
Mean Standard
deviation
Male Female Male Female
Full scale 24.59 22.65 5.97 5.51
Negative items 11.36 10.44 3.49 3.11
Positive items 13.22 12.21 2.90 2.79
The Skewness and Kurtosis statistics were within acceptable levels for the full scale, and
the negative and positive sub-scales, with all standard scores below one deviation.
Cronbach's Alpha was .90 for the full scale, and .83 for the positive items and .82 for the
negative items (table 5.5). Bagley et al. (1997) reported full-scale alpha values of
between .85 to .90 for their adolescent samples. The ordering of items may be important
in the pattern of response error, and will be discussed further.
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1 I feel that I am a person ofworth, at least on an equal plane with others
2 All in all, I am inclined to feel I am a failure
3 I feel I have a number of good qualities
4 I am able to do things as well as most other people
5 I feel I do not have much to be proud of
6 I take a positive attitude towards myself
7 On the whole, I am satisfied with myself
8 I wish I could have more respect for myself
9 I certainly feel useless at times
10 At times I think I am no good at all
Alpha = .900 N = 232
5.3.3 FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE AND SELF-ESTEEM
The correlation matrix between Frustration-Discomfort and self-esteem scores shows an
expected significant relationship between the two types ofbelief categories (table 5.6).
Table 5.6 Correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and self-esteem scale
Full Positive Negative
Scale Scale Scale
Frustration-Discomfort total -.36*** - 28*** _29***
Emotional discomfort _ 44*** -.36*** _42***
Entitlement -.16* -.09 -.20**
Comfort - 36*** _ ^]*** _ 35***
Achievement ^7** -.06 _ 24***
N = 232. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
However, the entitlement and the achievement frustration sub-scales had a noticeably
weaker association with self-esteem. Indeed, they failed to correlate significantly the
positive self-esteem scale, whilst significantly associated with negative scale. This












levels of negative condemnation but are unrelated to the degree of positive self-
acceptance.
A series of regression analyses were conducted to explore the interaction between
Frustration-Discomfort and self-esteem. First, all four sub-scales were entered as a block
with self-esteem as the criterion measure (table 5.7). The regression analysis was highly
significant with all the variables, except achievement, contributing uniquely to self-
esteem score. The overlapping variance between self-esteem and frustration-intolerance,
as indicated by R2, amounts to 23% of shared variance. This is not changed if age is
controlled.
Table 5.7 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales predicting
self-esteem
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Emotional discomfort 5.10 .000 -.42
Entitlement 2.58 .006 -.24
Comfort 2.88 .006 -.23
Achievement 0.12 .926 -.07
Multiple R = .48
R2 = .23
F (4, 227) = 17.04, p < .001
Since frustration intolerance and self-esteem are both associated with negative affect, a
relationship between these scales may just reflect an overlapping relationship with
emotional disturbance. To control for this HAD scores were entered first in the
regression equation and then on step two the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales.
Frustration-Discomfort remained significant associated with self-esteem controlling for
negative affect (R2 cha = .06, Fcha (4,224) = 4.22, p < .001), accounting for 6% of shared
unique variance. However, only emotional discomfort remains a significant independent
predictor (table 5.8).
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Table 5.8 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales predicting
self-esteem, controlling for negative affect.
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Step 1
HAD score 8.90 .000 .51
Step 2
Emotional discomfort 3.46 .001 -.28
Entitlement 1.50 .135 .13
Comfort 1.35 .180 -.12
Achievement 0.64 .524 .06
5.3.4 HIGH AND LOW SELF-ESTEEM AND FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE
To investigate whether high levels of entitlement or achievement had corresponding
high levels of self-esteem quartile scores of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale were
examined. As expected, there were systematic and significant reductions in self-esteem
with higher overall levels of frustration intolerance (table 5.9). Both comfort and
emotional discomfort show a lowering of self-esteem with greater levels of frustration
intolerance. However, this systematic reduction in self-esteem is not so apparent with
the achievement and entitlement sub-scales. Indeed, for entitlement the difference
between the quartiles is not significant. Individuals in the highest quartile on
achievement frustration have a mean self-esteem score of 23.44 equivalent to the 50th
percentile, and mean positive self-esteem sub-scale score of 13.02, equivalent to the 57th
percentile. Likewise, even for the top 10% of entitlement scores the mean self-esteem
score was 22.57 equivalent to a low average score for the general population. A similar
mean self-esteem score was found for the 10th percentile of achievement scores (21.68).
In fact, those individuals with the least demands for achievement and entitlement had the
highest self-esteem, with mean scores for the 1st percentile of these sub-scales 26.40 and
25.04 respectively.
Table 5.9 Self-esteem means for Frustration-Discomfort quartiles
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Total Frustration-Discomfort Emotional discomfort
High 21.25 High 20.28
3 22.59 2 23.50
2 23.26 3 23.23
Low 26.54 Low 26.66
F = 9.58*** F= 13.66***
Entitlement Comfort
High 22.30 High 20.74
3 23.05 3 22.95
2 24.44 2 24.07
Low 23.91 Low 25.76







N = 232, (df = 3, 228) ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
Thus, there is no evidence that individuals with high entitlement or achievement scores
have high self-esteem. Nevertheless, the top quartile of entitlement had significantly
higher self-esteem relative to emotional discomfort (t (57) = 3.408, p < .01), and comfort
(t (57) = 2.38, p < .05). As did high achievement frustration when compared to
emotional discomfort (t (57) = 4.99, p < .001) and comfort (t (57) = 4.37, p < .001).
Therefore, these groups have relatively higher self-esteem than other patients but still
have a lower average score when compared to the general population.
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5.3.5 RELATIONSHIP OF ROSENBERG SCALES AND EMOTIONAL
DISTURBANCE
The correlations of the Rosenberg scale and emotional disturbance measures are shown
in table 5.10. Interestingly, the positive scale is not significantly correlated with anger,
which would be consistent with the proposal that these two scales measure slightly
different aspects of self-worth, with the negative scale reflecting self-condemnation.
Depression and anxiety scores are significant correlated with both positive and negative
sub-scales.
Table 5.10 Correlations between Rosenberg scale and emotional disturbance measures
Full Negative Positive
Scale items items
-.17* _ 19** -.11
_ 42*** _ 39*** 4Q***




N = 232 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
These results do not support the findings of Kaplan and Pokoney (1969) in which their
positive 'defence of self-worth' factor was uncorrelated with either depression or
anxiety. Calculation of scores based on their factors showed that 'defence of self-worth'
was significantly related to anxiety (r = -.28, p < .001) and depression (r = -.38, p <
.001). Their negative 'self-derogation' scale was also significantly correlated with both
these measures (r = -.44, p < .001; and r = -.48, p < .001).
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5.3.6 RELATIONSHIP OF THE DIFFERENCE SCORE TO OTHER MEASURES
The difference score distribution showed acceptable skewness (Z = -1.74) and kurtosis
(Z = -.77). The relationships between the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and the
difference score were linear and contained no significant outliers. Apart from comfort,
all of the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales had significant correlations with the
difference score. That is, the higher the negative score relative to the positive score the
greater the degree of frustration intolerance (table 5.11). There was a weak correlation
between age and the difference score (r = .17, p - < .01), but no association with gender
(F (1,231) = .04, ns). Anger was significantly correlated with the difference score (r
(232) = -.14, p < .05) but not depression (r (230) = -.02, ns) nor anxiety (r (230) = -.07,
Table 5.11 Correlations between difference score and Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales
Difference score
N = 232 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
A simultaneous multiple regression was conducted to investigate the contribution of
frustration intolerance beliefs to the difference score (table 5.12). With the Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales entered simultaneous as a block, the overall model was
significant. However, only the achievement frustration sub-scale remained a unique











To examine the relationship of age and achievement frustration a hierarchical regression
analysis was conducted (table 5.13). Age was entered at the first step, followed by
achievement and finally an interactive term of age x achievement, to determine if age
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moderated the relation between achievement and the difference score. Both age and
achievement produced significant change in R2. Since this was little different from the
variance accounted for by achievement on its own (R2 = .08), this would suggest that
both age and achievement are independent predictors with little overlap of variance.
Consistent with this interpretation the interactive term produced virtually no change in
R2, indicating that the effects of achievement are not moderated by age.
Table 5.12 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales predicting
difference score
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Emotional discomfort 1.63 .117 -.14
Entitlement 0.22 .900 .02
Comfort 0.81 .449 .07
Achievement 3.10 .003 -.25
Multiple R = .29
R2 = .09
Adjusted R2 -.07 F (4, 227) = 5.34, p < .001
Table 5.13 Summary of hierarchical regression analyses: Age and achievement on
difference score
Step R2 R2cha t P Beta
1 age 0.03 0.03 2.70 .008 .18
2 achievement 0.10 0.07 4.23 .001 -.27
3 age x achievement 0.11 0.00 0.98 .359 -.23
F for all regression models p < .01
To control for shared variance with self-esteem a further simultaneous regression was
conducted. When age and self-esteem were entered as a block achievement remained
significant (table 5.14). This indicates that the relationship between achievement
frustration and the difference score is independent of self-esteem. The partial correlation
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between achievement frustration and the difference score was also found to be the same
as the zero order correlation (r = -.28, p < .001, pr = -.28, p < .001). Indicating the
relationship is not due to overlap with negative affectivity.
Table 5.14 Multiple regression analysis: Achievement, self-esteem, and age on
difference score
Variables t P Beta
Entered
Age 2.25 .026 .14
Self-esteem -1.87 .063 -.12
Achievement -3.86 .001 -.25
Multiple R = .34
R2 = .11
Adjusted R2 = .10 F (3, 226) = 9.60, p< .001
As discussed above, one explanation of the difference between the positive and negative
scales has been that it reflects careless responding. However, examination of the
scattergram shows that the difference score increases with higher achievement scores
(figure 5.2). It will also be observed that, when the achievement score is split into four
quartiles, the higher achievement frustration the weaker the correlation between the
negative and positive scales (table 5.15). This decrease in the correlation with higher
achievement frustration suggests that the relationship is not an artefact of careless
responding. This is because individuals with high scores on achievement frustration, a
sub-scale that reflects perfectionist standards, would be expected to be more
conscientious in avoiding response errors. In which case the correlation should increase
with greater achievement scores. This is contrary to a simple explanation of the
positive-negative discrepancy involving measurement error. Rather it suggests this
represent a real difference in responding that also reflects achievement frustration
beliefs.
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Figure 5.2 Scattergram for achievement frustration and difference score
Achievement frustration






N = 232 All p<.001
The negative and positive scale means for difference score quartiles was examined (table
5.16). This shows that the difference between these scores reflects increases in negative
scores (F (3,228) = 22.99, p < .001), there was no significant change in positive item
scores (F (3,228) = 2.65, ns). In other words, the difference score represents increased
negative rather than positive responding.
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Table 5.16 Negative and positive scale means by difference scale quartiles













5.3.7 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
To further test the hypothesis that the self-esteem scale did have two facets, reflecting
psychologically meaningful processes rather than purely measurement error, a structural
equation modelling approach was used, utilising the AMOS program (Arbuckle, 1999).
The ratio of cases to observed variables is 23:1, and the cases to parameter ratio 6:1,
both meeting acceptable criteria. A sample size of about 200 is usually adequate with a
moderate model size and when the variables are normally distributed (Hair et ah, 1998).
A series of competing models, as indicated in the literature and discussed above, were
compared and their adequacy assessed by a variety of fit indices. Model A was the one-
factor scale representing global self-esteem; model B represented positive and negative
items; model C represented the two factors suggested by Kaufman et al. (1991) (items 9
and 10 forming the transient scale); and model D represented the two factors proposed
by Kaplan and Pokorny (1969) (items 1, 3 and 4 forming the self-worth scale). In
addition, measurement error due to item wording was also evaluated using the correlated
uniqueness method (Marsh, 1989; Bagozzi, 1993). In this method, covariances are fitting
among the negative and positive items residuals, the correlation between error terms
being used to represent method effects. To test whether method effects were associated
predominately with either negative or positive worded items, either the negative or
positive error terms were allowed to freely correlate within a one-factor model (models
E and F). Next, a one-factor model that incorporated a more complex arrangement of
measurement error was tested. Examination of the response patterns had suggested that,
in addition to method error due to difficulty with negative items, that errors were also
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related to item grouping. That is, pairs of items similar items tended to be scored in the
same direction, response bias depending on particular sequences of items. To test this
the error terms of pairs of items were allowed to correlate and this was incorporated into
the one and two-factor models (models G to J).
Lastly, the above results had suggested that the difference between the positive and
negative scales was related to achievement frustration. To test this hypothesis, the one
factor model was fitted to a median split of achievement scores (models K and L). If
achievement frustration is differentially related to the negative and positive scales, then
the one-factor solution will have a poorer fit with higher levels of achievement. Since, it
may be assumed, individuals high on perfectionism will not be more careless in
responding than those low on perfectionism, improvements in fit should reflect trait
effects rather than response error. Whilst splitting the group reduces sample size each
sample remained within the recommended minimum of 100 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1989).
The most frequently used measure of overall fit is the model Chi-square, which ensures
that the model is a good representation of the overall set of relationships. A non¬
significant x2 indicates a good fit, Although moderate sample sizes are more likely to
often lead to significant x2 values (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). The comparative fit index
(CFI) is an incremental fit index and produces a statistic between zero and one (Bentler,
1990). Values above .90 are regarded as indicating adequate fit, and above .95 as a good
fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). The root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) is a non-
incremental fit index that attempts to correct for inadequacy of the Chi-square with large
samples (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). It represents the discrepancy per degree of freedom.
Values over .1 should lead to rejection of the model, those from .05 to .08 are
acceptable, and values below .05 indicate a close fit to the data. A further recommended
incremental fit index is the Tucker-Lewis (1973) index. This index takes into account
model parsimony with additional paths reducing the TLI value. Like the CFI, a TLI
score of above .90 is regarded as reasonable.
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Table 5.17 Goodness of fit indices for Rosenberg self-esteem models
Model df x2 P TLI CFI RMSEA
A One-factor 35 160.08 .00 .969 .980 .122
B Negative/positive factors 34 132.75 .00 .975 .984 .110
C Transient/general factors 34 101.90 .00 .983 .989 .091
D Self-worth/denigration factors 34 131.73 .00 .975 .985 .109
E One-factor negative errors 25 70.59 .00 .984 .993 .087
F One-factor positive errors 25 81.98 .00 .980 .991 .097
G One-factor (paired errors) 29 33.70 .251 .999 .999 .026
H Negative/positive factors 28 33.43 .220 .999 .998 .028
(Paired errors)
I Transient/General factors 29 33.70 .251 .999 .999 .026
(Paired items)
J Self-worth/denigration factors 28 32.21 .262 .999 .999 .025
(Paired items)
Table 5.18 Goodness of fit indices: One-factor model comparing high and loi
achievement score groups (n = 116 and 124)
Model df t P TLI CFI RMSE7
K High achievement score 35 117.65 .00 .956 .972 .143
L Low achievement score 35 99.35 .00 .970 .981 .122
These results indicated that the two-factor models had better fits to the data compared to
the one factor model A (table 5.17). Being nested, a formal x2 difference test could be
used to these compare models. Thus, the negative and positive sub-scale model was
significantly better than the one factor model (x2 diff = 27.33, df = 1, p < .001).
Nevertheless, these models had significant x2, and failed to prove adequate fits regarding
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RMSEA values. However, the two models that took into account measurement error
were superior to the simple two-factor models. Thus, the negative error model (E) was a
significantly better fit than the negative/positive model (B) (%2 diff = 62.16, df = 9, P <
.001). On the other hand, the more complex error models (G to J) with correlated pairs
of similar items, produced even closer fits, with all models having a very close fit to the
data. Interestingly, the Kaufman et al. (1991) model (C), which has the best fit of the
basic models, loses its superiority when method error is incorporated. This suggests that
the two items (9 and 10) representing the transient scale may factor together due to their
position on the scale. Certainly, as was found by Corwyn (2000), this pair of items had
uniquenesses with the highest correlations (.46 in the two-factor model).
As predicted, fitting the one-factor model to high and low achievement scores (models K
and L) showed that high scores had a noticeably worse fit (table 5.18). This indicated
that the two facets of global self-esteem do differ as regards achievement beliefs. The
models are graphically displayed in figures 5.3 to 5.12 with standardised parameter
estimates and factor loadings.
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FIGURE 5.3 Self-esteem model A
.52
202
FIGURE 5.4 Self-esteem model B
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FIGURE 5.5 Self-esteem model C
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FIGURE 5.6 Self-esteem model D
.66








FIGURE 5.9 Self-esteem model G
.59
FIGURE 5.10 Self-esteem model H
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Preliminary analysis of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale supported Schmitt and Stubs'
(1985) cautionary remarks regarding careless responding, whereby individuals having
decided on the response direction stick to this regardless of reversals. However, even
once the outstanding careless responses had been identified there was still evidence of
measurement error. The results suggested that the pattern of response error is more
complex than individuals just scoring in one direction. Examination of endorsement
patterns showed responses were often influenced by the direction of preceding groups of
items, rather than the overall response direction.
The findings raise the question whether the conclusion of previous studies, that the
negative and positive factors are reflections of measurement error, is premature (e.g.
Marsh, 1996). Certainly, the confirmatory analysis indicated that two-factor models
initially showed better fit, but when error due to response direction was taken into
account a one-dimensional construct representing global self-esteem is a better model.
However, when error due to paired items were incorporated into the different models
there is little to choose between one or two factor models. This suggests that the
negative and positive items may also be reflecting different, if very closely related,
facets of self-esteem.
The results also suggest that the difference score between the negative and positive items
was meaningful. Thus, the achievement sub-scale was a significant predictor of the
difference score, and since higher achievement scores were associated with greater
differences between the scales, this relationship appeared unconnected with simple
measurement error. However, it is unclear how best to conceptualise the two facets of
global self-esteem. It can be argued that, both facets reflect global self-rating, but that
the negative scale has an additional element of self-directed criticism. Thus, increased
difference scores reflected increased negative, but not positive, scores. In addition, the
difference score was uniquely predicted by achievement and that this relationship
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remained when controlling for overall self-esteem raises the interesting possibility that
the difference score reflects frustration intolerance rather than ego disturbance. This
interpretation is supported by the results of the multiple regression analysis indicating
that achievement frustration was not a significant predictor of self-esteem. Thus, whilst
both self-esteem sub-scales involve conditional global judgements the personal criticism
element may reflect intolerance of specific behaviours or traits. It is, in other words,
what DiGiuseppe (1996) has described as a mismatch between wants and reality, with an
individual intolerant of failing but not rating themselves as a global failure regarding
this. Personal criticism may therefore represent demands to perform better, rather than a
belief in personal inferiority. Overall, this points to the need for a more detailed analysis
of the types of belief that constitutes ego disturbance to differentiate these beliefs from
frustration intolerance (Neenan & Dryden, 1999).
As expected, there was a significant relationship between frustration intolerance and
self-esteem. However, the correlation of Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales with self-
esteem was substantially lower than between these sub-scales and overall frustration
intolerance. There was also substantial variation between sub-scales. It was expected
that comfort and emotional discomfort would be most closely associated with emotional
distress and therefore would have the highest correlation with self-esteem. Achievement,
like the entitlement sub-scale, was not significantly associated with the positive self-
esteem, but was correlated to the negative scale. This is again consistent with the
negative scale reflecting frustration intolerance in terms of personal criticism, and with
high achievement or entitlement scores being unrelated to self-acceptance but associated
with performance demands. It has been suggested that the DAS achievement and
entitlement sub-scales may be associated with high self-esteem and that narcissistic
individuals are more likely to score high on these scales (Beck et al., 1990). Likewise,
Schmidt et al. (1995) describe their unrelenting standards scale as representing
'individuals who place themselves before others and are only satisfied when they are
"number one." DiGiuseppe et al. (1995) note that individuals classed as compensating
narcissists in their research scored highest on achievement irrational beliefs, and
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compared to the other narcissist clusters also scored highest on frustration intolerance
beliefs. However, the present results did support the hypothesis that individuals with
high achievement and entitlement scores had higher levels of self-esteem. Even for the
top 10% of entitlement and achievement scores the mean self-esteem scores represented
a low average relative to the general population.
This was supported further by the finding that anger, which has a low relationship with
self-esteem, was the only emotion significantly related to the difference score. Whilst
anxiety and depression, which do correlate with overall levels of self-esteem, were
unrelated to the difference score. This is consistent with the results of Fairbrother and
Moretti (1998) who, in their investigation of self-discrepancy and the autonomy-
sociotropy dimension, found that the actual-ideal but not the actual-ought discrepancy
was significantly related to depression. Similarly, Flett, Hewitt, and Mittelstaedt (1991),
using the 'Attitudes Towards the Self Scale', found that global ratings of the self were
associated with depression but that the sub-scale measuring self-criticism was not. The
present results found no significant relationship between anger and positive self-esteem,
but one between anger and negative self-esteem. This suggests that angry individuals
indulge in personal criticism but that low self-acceptance is at best only weakly
associated with anger. Thus, the theory that anger is related to either a defence of high
self-esteem or low self-esteem is not supported by these results. Rather the primary
relationship of anger seems to be with frustration intolerance, and this relationship and
that of other emotions will be examined in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
RELATIONSHIP OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE WITH
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the relationship between the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and
measures of emotional disturbance. In this regard, it was important to determine not only
whether irrational beliefs are correlated with emotional distress, but whether specific
beliefs are associated with particular disorders, and if this association is separate from
that with general negative affectivity (Kendall et al., 1995). Similarly, it is important to
discriminate between the two categories of belief in their relationship to disturbance, and
to show these represent distinct belief processes. Convergent validity is investigated by
comparing the Frustration-Discomfort Scale with other measures of similar
dysfunctional beliefs, and likewise discriminative validity by comparison of the student
and clinical groups.
6.2 ANGER
Historically, anger has been closely associated with the concept of frustration
intolerance. Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) have theorised that the basic emotions are
linked with goals and plans, with anger specially deriving from goal frustration. Based
on REBT theory, Dryden (1990) suggests three categories of irrational beliefs are
associated with anger: the violation of personal rules, frustration of personal goals and
threats to self-worth.
Clearly, the entitlement sub-scale includes many of the beliefs involving violation of
personal rules that have often been associated with anger, such as unfairness, self-
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righteousness, unjust treatment, and the frustration of gratification (DiGiuseppe et al.,
1994). However, entitlement has often been assumed to deriving from narcissistic high
self-worth and grandiosity (e.g. Raskin. Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Likewise, the
association between goal achievement frustration and anger has been described in a
number of theoretical approaches. In particular, the Type-A behaviour pattern links
competitive achievement orientation with anger and hostility (Friedmann & Rosenman,
1974). Hart et al. (1991), using a scale developed to measure irrational beliefs related to
Type-A behaviour (Thurman, 1985), found these beliefs moderated stressful events in
relation to Trait Anger but not Trait Anxiety. It has been suggested that anger is the most
important component in predicting cardiac disease. Thus, Birks and Roger (2000)
distinguished between 'toxic' and 'non-toxic' patterns, with both components involving
achievement orientation but dysfunctional behaviour also reflecting competitiveness and
impatience. This has parallels with research examining the construct of perfectionism, in
which a similar distinction has been made between positive striving and negative
perfectionism (for review see Enns & Cox, 2002).
Several theorists have proposed that the essential distinction between functional and
dysfunctional achievement orientation is that of self-esteem. Stumpf and Parker (2000)
suggest that dysfunctional perfectionism is largely mediated by self-esteem and
associated with the trait of neuroticism, whereas functional perfectionism is associated
with Conscientiousness. Likewise, it has been proposed that maladaptive Type-A
behaviour is a function of low self-esteem (Kuiper & Martin, 1989; Birks & Roger,
2000). However, it can be argued that measures of perfectionism have not clearly
distinguished between self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs. That is, whilst self-
esteem items are worded in terms of this dimension those items describing high
standards are phrased in more positive terms. REBT would argue that dysfunctional
beliefs are characterised by the presence of either demandingness or low self-
acceptance, and demandingness has not been used consistently in the wording of these
'functional' items. Therefore, it is unclear whether beliefs relating to high standards
would be associated with anger and other problems if worded to reflect irrational
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demands. It would be hypothesised that such beliefs would represent frustration
intolerance rather than self-worth. There is some evidence that demandingness in
addition to self-esteem is also implicated in dysfunctional perfectionism. For example,
Rice and Mirzadeh (2000) found that dysfunctional perfectionists were more critical and
demanding of their parents. Further, research suggests that both 'high standard' and
'self-worth' perfectionism may be involved in Type-A behaviour (Flett et al., 1994).
REBT proposes that anger can be related to both self-worth and frustration intolerance
beliefs, with low self-acceptance associated with ego-defensive anger (Dryden, 1990).
However, there is little empirical evidence regarding the relative contributions of self-
worth and frustration intolerance beliefs to anger. Indeed, although low self-esteem has
often suggested as playing an important role in anger (e.g., Beck, 1999) the evidence for
this relationship is sparse (DiGiuseppe, 1999). On the contrary, Baumeister, Smart, and
Boden (1996) have found no significant relationship between anger and positive self-
acceptance, although there was a low but significant relationship between anger and
negative self-condemnation. However, it was argued in the previous chapter that some
types of self-criticism might reflect punitiveness associated with personal frustration
rather than low self-acceptance. If so, the relationship between anger and self-worth may
be even weaker compared to the contribution of frustration intolerance.
6.3 DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY
Several theoretical approaches have proposed that depression can be divided into two
sub-types depending on underlying beliefs. Beck (1976) from the Cognitive Therapy
approach has distinguished between social approval and achievement orientation. From
a psychoanalytic perspective, Blatt (1995) describes the self-critical and dependent
types. However, each of these types of depression involves threats to self-worth,
differing only in its focus. In contrast, REBT argues that depression may be best
categorised in terms of self-worth as opposed to frustration intolerance beliefs. That is
ego depression and discomfort depression, with the latter referring to a loss of 'personal
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comfort' rather than self-esteem (Dryden & Neenan, 1995). Thus, Hauck (1974)
describes depression being associated with self-blame, self-pity, and other-pity. The last
two are related to frustration intolerance beliefs that problems in life are unbearably
hard, difficult, unfair and happen to those who don't deserve it. Secondary depression
(depressed about being depressed) can also reflect frustration intolerance beliefs, with
the aversiveness of the depressive symptoms generating further depression (Teasdale &
Barnard, 1993).
Perfectionist achievement beliefs have also been shown to play a role in depression
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Several studies show that 'maladaptive evaluative' sub-scales of
the Frost scale, concern over mistakes and doubts, showed the strongest association with
depression, however, the 'adaptive' sub-scales showed a small or negative relationship
with depression (e.g. frost et al., 1993). Similarly, both concern over mistakes and
Hewitt and Flett's socially prescribed perfectionism show moderate correlations with
depression once neuroticism/extraversion were controlled, "as-did-(Enns & Cox, 1999).
However, personal standards and self-orientated perfectionism had a negligible
relationship with depressed mood. Kawamura, et al. (2001) found that the 'adaptive'
sub-scales were negatively related to depression when controlling for anxiety. However,
when depression was controlled the 'maladaptive' sub-scales were significantly related
to higher anxiety.
There has been little exploration of the relationship between depression and
'impulsivity' (Farmer, 1998), with many of the earlier REBT studies investigating
depression suffering from the limitations discussed earlier: Inadequate measures
examining general levels of irrationality rather than specific belief categories. However,
Mcdermut, Haaga, and Bilek (1997) using the Belief Scale (Malouff and Schutte, 1986)
found that irrational beliefs were higher in a depressed compared to non-depressed
group when controlling for negative affect. Furthermore, six items were significantly
associated with depression. Three of these items were related to frustration intolerance: '
life should be easier than it is', 'many events from my past so strongly influence me that
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it is impossible to change', and 'things should turn out better than they usually do'. Two
other beliefs were related to self-esteem and achievement.
Specific belief categories regarding anxiety were also investigated by Deffenbacher et
al. (1986) using the Irrational Belief Test (Jones, 1969). They found that anxious
overconcern, problem avoidance, catastrophising, and the personal perfection sub-scales
all predicted trait anxiety. Furthermore, different types of anxiety had different patterns
of irrational belief. However, the conclusions from this study are limited by weaknesses
with the Jones test. Burgess (1990) also found that agoraphobic sufferers had higher
levels of beliefs regarding 'comfort' but not beliefs regarding 'approval', when
compared to generalised anxiety and normal controls. This also suggests that certain
types of anxiety might be associated with different aspects of frustration intolerance. For
instance, Dugas et al. (1998) found that intolerance of uncertainty was the most
important belief in discriminating GAD from a non-clinical group. Likewise, PTSD has
been characterised by anger and the avoidance of emotional distress, with both aspects
implicated in reduced treatment effectiveness (Foa et al., 1995). Ellis (1994c) has
suggested that intolerance of the symptoms is an important feature of PTSD, along with
beliefs regarding fairness and justice. The co-morbidity between PTSD, and other
anxiety disorders, with alcohol abuse has also been related to the avoidance of negative
affect (Cox et al., 1990).
One methodological difficulty is that self-report measures of anxiety and depression
show considerable overlap. This has led some researchers to argue that this reflects
shared variance in the form of a non-specific general factor of distress, termed negative
affect by Clark and Watson (1991). Nevertheless, they suggest that the two concepts
may be distinguished, with anxiety characterised by symptoms of somatic arousal and
depression by symptoms of anhedonia. In order to examine the unique contribution of
frustration intolerance to these emotions a regression strategy was used controlling for
negative affect using the alternative emotion as a covariable. The HAD scale was useful
in this respect since it focuses on anhedonic depressive and somatic anxiety symptoms.
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Similarly, because of the expected interrelationship between self-esteem and frustration
intolerance, self-esteem was controlled to determine the independent contribution of
these concepts.
6.4 METHOD
Participants and procedure were described previously. The measures of emotional
disturbance, and the self-esteem scale were given only to the clinical group, and
therefore no comparisons with the student group were made on these measures.
6.5 RESULTS
6.6 ANGER
6.6.1 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
There were no missing data. The Trait Anger Scale (Spielberger et al., 1983) standard
scores were examined to identify univariate outliers. There were five cases with standard
scores between ± 2.5 and 3, but no cases above ± 3 which guidelines suggest is the cut-
point for classification as outliers (Hair et al., 1998). Examination of bivariate plots and
residuals plots indicated that the relationships were linear, and multivariate assumptions
were met. The scale was positively skewed (Z = 4.71). This is consistent with published
norms, and the manual notes that whilst this makes the scale relatively insensitive with
low anger scores, it is not a problem when considering high levels of anger when raw
scores can be used without transformation.
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6.6.2 DESCRIPTIVE AND CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
There was a low, but significant relationship between anger and age (r (240) = -.15, p <
.05). There was no significant difference between the means for men and women (t
(240) = 1.08, ns). Using the manual recommended cut-points, 58% ofmales and 49% of
females were classified as having clinical levels of anger (table 6.1). The distribution of
Trait anger scores are displayed in figure 6.1.
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics: Trait anger scores
N Mean SD
Full sample 242 21.83 6.52
Male 95 22.41 7.11
Female 147 21.46 6.10
Figure 6.1 Distribution ofTrait anger scores
10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 27.5 30.0 32.5 35.0 37.5 40.0
Trait anger scale
The means and standard deviations of the angry and non-angry groups are shown in
table 6.2. All sub-scales of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale were higher in the angry
group. Self-esteem was also significantly lower in the angry group.
Table 6.2 Mean and standard deviations for angry and non-angry groups
Belief scale Non-angry Angry t
N 115 127
Frustration-Discomfort 83.1 (30.0) 106.1 (34.8) 5.48***
Emotional discomfort 28.6(11.5) 32.9(12.4) 2.80**
Entitlement 19.7(8.9) 29.8 (10.2) 8.15***
Comfort 19.7(10.6) 24.8 (11.7) 3.48***
Achievement 15.1 (7.1) 18.6(6.6) 4.06***
Self-esteem total score 24.2 (5.8) 22.7 (5.6) 1.98*
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
Correlations were calculated between the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and the
Trait Anger Scale. The findings reveal that all sub-scales are highly significant but, as
predicted, entitlement was most associated with trait anger (table 6.3). Contrary to
predictions, achievement had only a low relationship with anger, similar to comfort and
emotional discomfort.







N = 242 ***p < .001
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Since self-esteem overlaps with frustration intolerance, partial and zero order
correlations were calculated to examine the amount of variance contributed by each
variable in relation to anger. The zero order correlations between anger and self-esteem
are shown in table 6.4. As can be seen, the negative self-esteem scale was related to the
degree of trait anger. It has been argued in the previous study that the negative scale
might additionally reflect frustration intolerant criticism. The positive scale did not
correlate with the trait anger score and the entitlement and achievement scales were
significantly correlated with the negative but not positive scales.




Trait anger scale -.17* -.11 _ 19**
Emotional discomfort _ 44*** -.36*** _ 45***
Entitlement -.16* -.09 -.20**
Comfort -.36*** _^ j *** - 35***
Achievement -.17* -.06 _ 24***
N = 232 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
When partial correlations were calculated, controlling for total self-esteem score, all
Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales remained significant (table 6.5). On the other hand,
when controlling for Frustration-Discomfort, the self-esteem scales had little
relationship with anger (table 6.6). The same loss of significance was found when
controlling for each Frustration-Discomfort sub-scale separately. This indicates that
there is no association between self-esteem and anger once frustration intolerance is
taken into account.
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Table 6.5 Partial correlations between Trait anger and Frustration-Discomfort,







N = 229 ***p c .001








A simultaneous multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine which sub-
scales were the unique predictors of anger. In the first analysis all the sub-scales were
entered as a block with Trait anger scores as the criterion. The regression model was
highly significant, indicating that frustration intolerance accounts for 31% of the
variance in Trait anger scores. However, examination of the individual sub-scales
showed that once shared variance had been accounted for only entitlement remained a
significant predictor (table 6.7).
To determine the proportion of variance accounted for by entitlement compared to the
other sub-scales a hierarchical analysis was carried out, in which entitlement was entered
on step 1 followed by the other sub-scales. Entitlement accounted for 30% of the
variance in anger scores (Multiple R (1,240) = .55, R2Cha= .30, Fcha = 102.38, p < .001).
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There was very little change in R2 with the addition of the other sub-scales, and the
percentage of variance explained increased by a negligible 1% (R2cha (3,237) = .01, Fcha
= 1.50, ns). These results indicate that, when levels of entitlement are controlled for, the
other sub-scales do not have any significant relationship with anger. Examination
individual items indicated that, of the thirteen items significantly discriminating between
angry and depressed groups, all were included in the entitlement sub-scale.
Table 6.7 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales predicting
Trait anger
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Emotional discomfort 0.17 .862 -.02
Entitlement 8.29 .000 .66
Comfort 1.66 .099 -.13
Achievement 0.57 .573 -.04
Multiple R = .56
R2 =.31
Adjusted R2 =.30 F (4, 237) = 26.88, p < .001
6.6.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANGER AND DIFFERENCE SCORE
It had been hypothesised in the previous chapter that the self-esteem difference score
reflected frustration-intolerance beliefs primarily involving the achievement and
entitlement with which it was significantly correlated (table 6.8).
Table 6.8 Correlations between the difference score, mediating and criterion variables
Scale Difference score Trait anger Achievement
Trait anger -0.14*
Achievement -0.28*** 0.28***
Entitlement -0.17** 0.55*** 0.58***
N = 232 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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This was tested in a series of hierarchical regression analysis (table 6.9). In the first
analysis, positive self-esteem was entered on step 1 and the difference scale on step 2.
On the second analysis, achievement was entered on step 1. On the third analysis,
achievement, positive self-esteem, and the difference score were entered sequentially.
Both positive self-esteem and the difference score accounted for relatively small
amounts of variance, but both remained significant predictors of anger. However, when
achievement frustration was entered the relationship between the difference score and
anger no longer significant, with achievement accounting for 10% of the variance.
Finally, when achievement was entered first, both the positive self-esteem score and the
difference score failed to remain predictors. This indicates that the relationship between
the difference score, positive self-esteem, and anger is explained by their relationship
with achievement frustration. The difference score was related to anger independently
from global ratings of self-worth.
Table 6.9 Hierarchical multiple regression analyses: Difference score, with positive self-
esteem and achievement sub-scale, predicting Trait anger
Variables entered R R2 R2 cha F cha
Criterion: Trait anger
Regression 1
Positive self-esteem .13 .02 .02 4.04*
Difference score .21 .04 .03 6.32**
Regression 2
Achievement .32 .10 .10 26.66***
Difference score .33 .11 .01 0.63
Regression 3
Achievement .32 .10 .10 26.66***
Positive self-esteem .34 .12 .01 3.04
Difference score .35 .12 .01 1.41
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6.7 RELATIONSHIP OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE WITH
DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY
6.7.1 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
There were two missing cases from the HAD anxiety scale and three from the
depression scale, representing 1.3% of the data. The anxiety scores were converted to
standard scores to enable identification of univariate outliers. Only two cases had
standard scores between ±2.5 and 3, and no cases were above ± 3. Likewise, on the
depression scale there was one case with a standard score between ± 2.5 and 3, and no
cases above ± 3. Thus, there were no outliers with p < .001. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test was significant for both the anxiety (p < .001), and depression (p < .05), sub-scales,
although the kurtosis and skewness statistics were both non-significant at the p < .001
level. This indicates that the distribution is acceptable, and indeed visual inspection of
the distributions did not suggest marked deviation from normality and no
transformations were deemed necessary (figures 6.2 and 6.3). Means and standard
deviations are presented in table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Descriptive statistics: HAD scales
Mean SD
Full HAD scale 22.41 7.42
HAD-Anxiety 13.55 4.12
HAD-Depression 9.02 4.47
6.7.2 DESCRIPTIVE AND CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
Using the suggested cut-point of 11 or more for each sub-scale to obtain the best
separation of cases from non-cases, 77% of the sample suffered anxiety problems and
35% suffered from depression, there was a substantial overlap between emotion
categories, with 31% classified as both anxious and depressed, 19% angry and
depressed, and 18% as having all three problems. The correlation between the HAD-A
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scale and HAD-D scale was r (239) = .51, p < .001. There was no significant gender
difference between the scales.
Figure 6.2 Distribution ofHAD anxiety scores
2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0
Had anxiety
Table 6.3 Distribution ofHAD depression scores
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0
Had depression
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Correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and the HAD scale are presented
in table 6.11. As expected there were significant positive correlations between total
frustration intolerance and these measures of emotional disturbance. In terms of the
separate sub-scales, only entitlement was not significant related with depression, with
emotional discomfort and comfort had the strongest association.
Table 6.11 Correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and HAD scale
Frustration- HAD total HAD-A HAD-D
Discomfort Scale
Full scale 43*** 4g*** 30***
Emotional discomfort 47*** 49*** 32***
Entitlement .21** 26*** .10
Comfort 43*** 41 *** 24***
Achievement 29*** 31*** 19**
N = 237 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
6.8 ANXIETY
6.8.1 DISCRIMINATIVE ANALYSIS
The means and standard deviations between anxious and non-anxious patients are shown
in table 6.12. Mean scores for all the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale were significantly different between the two groups.
Levene's test indicated that the variances for the comfort scale were unequal. However,
comparison with the results of the Mann-Whitney test showed equivalent levels of
significance to independent t-tests.
Table 6.12 Mean and standard deviations for anxious and non-anxious groups
Belief scale Non-anxious Anxious t
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***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
6.8.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Simultaneous multiple regression, in which all Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales were
entered as a block, showed that all the sub-scales were significant predictors of anxiety,
explaining 28% of the variance (table 6.13).
Table 6.13 Multiple regression: Frustration-Discomfort predicting anxiety


















Multiple R = .53
= .28
Adjusted R2 = .27 F (4, 235) = 22.99, p< .001
To examine the contribution of Frustration intolerance after controlling for shared
variance with self-esteem and depression a series of hierarchical regression analyses
were conducted. In the first analysis, to control for the influence of negative affect, the
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HAD-D scale was entered on step 1 and the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales on step 2
(table 6.14). Results indicated that when general negative affect was controlled the
frustration intolerance block still explained a significant proportion of the remaining
variance in anxiety scores, accounting for an additional unique variance of 13%.
However, only emotional discomfort remained a significant predictor of anxiety.
Table 6.14 Hierarchical multiple regression: Frustration-Discomfort predicting anxiety,
controlling for depression




Depression 9.21 .000 .51
Step2
Emotional discomfort 4.31 .000 .31
Entitlement 1.06 .290 -.08
Comfort 1.15 .251 .09
Achievement 1.55 .123 .10
Step 1: Multiple R = .51,R2 = .26, Fcha (1,237) = 84.75***
Step 2: Multiple R= .62, R2cha= .13, Fcha(4,233) = 12.05***
The contribution of frustration intolerance controlling for self-esteem, was investigated
next (table 6.15). Total self-esteem score was entered on step 1 and the Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales on step2. Self-esteem was a significant predictor at step 1 and
Frustration-Discomfort remained significant at step 2, explaining an additional 16% of
additional variance. Entitlement was a significant negative predictor of anxiety. When
entered separately, the other three sub-scales only contribute 3% of variance compared
to 14% from emotional discomfort.
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Table 6.15 Hierarchical multiple regression: Frustration-Discomfort predicting anxiety,
controlling for self-esteem




Self-esteem 6.99 .000 .42
Step2
Emotional discomfort 4.13 .000 .33
Entitlement 2.01 .041 -.17
Comfort 2.19 .032 .18
Achievement 2.23 .024 .16
Step 1: Multiple R = .42, R2 = . 18, Fcha( 1,228) =48.83***
Step 2: Multiple R = .58, R2cha= .16, Fcha(4,224) = 13.97***
Lastly, both negative affect and self-esteem, were controlled for, with HAD-D entered
first, followed at step 2 by self-esteem and then on step 3 by the Frustration-Discomfort
sub-scales (table 6.16). Depression and self-esteem were significant predictors, with
self-esteem explaining an additional 4% of variance. The Frustration-Discomfort sub-
scales remained significant, contributing an additional 10 % of variance when self-
esteem and general negativity were both taken into account. However, only emotional
discomfort remained a significant unique predictor, although achievement frustration
approached significance. In comparison, self-esteem when controlling for frustration
intolerance accounted for only an additional 4% (R2cha = .04, Fcha (1,224) = 12.31 ,P = <
.001), and a similar amount controlling for negative affect (R2 cha = .04, Fcha (1,227) =
12.84, p = < .001). When both variables were controlled self-esteem was no longer a
significant predictor of anxiety (R2cha = .01, Fcha(l,223) = 3.05, ns)
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Table 6.16 Hierarchical multiple regression: Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales
predicting anxiety, controlling for self-esteem and depression




HAD-D 9.17 .000 .52
Step2
Self-esteem total 3.58 .000 -.23
Step3
Emotional discomfort 3.81 .000 .29
Entitlement 1.08 .281 -.09
Comfort 1.08 .280 .08
Achievement 1.81 .072 .12
Step 1: Multiple R = .52, R2 = .27, Fcha (1,228) =84.08***
Step 2: Multiple R = .56, R2cha= .04, Fcha(1,227) = 12.84***
Step 3: Multiple R = .64, R2cha = .10, Fcha (4,223) = 9.59***
Examination of the partial correlation coefficients indicated that all the Frustration-
Discomfort scales were significantly associated with anxiety, even when controlling for
both negative affect and self-esteem (table 6.17).
Table 6.17 Partial correlations between anxiety and Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales
controlling for self-esteem, depression and both variables
Depression +
Frustration-Discomfort Zero-order Depression Self-esteem Self-esteem
Full scale 47*** 27*** 28*** 24***
Emotional discomfort 51*** 41 *** 4Q*** .36***
Entitlement 27*** 24*** 22*** 22***
Comfort 42*** 29*** 22*** .26***
Achievement 22*** .26*** 29*** 25***




The presence of multivariate outliers was assessed using the Mahalanobis measure and
other diagnostic statistics. This indicated one case whose score lay a considerable
distance from the others, had substantially higher leverage value (figure 6.4) and
standardised DFBETA for the achievement scale was above the recommended
guidelines (Z = ±2). This case had been excluded from the self-esteem analysis due to
careless responding on the Rosenberg scale. The depression score was very low, but in
contradiction to this, the background questionnaire indicated the main emotional
problem during the previous month was depressed mood. Given this evidence it was
thought prudent to run the analyses with and without this case.
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6.9.2 DESCRIPTIVE AND CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
234
The means and standard deviations between depressed and non-depressed patients are
shown in table 6.18. All sub-scales of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale, except
entitlement, were significantly higher in the depressed group, as was Self-esteem.
Although Levene's test indicated that self-esteem scale variance was unequal, Mann-
Whitney tests showed equivalent levels of significance to independent t-tests for all
comparisons.
Table 6.18 Mean and standard deviations for depression and non-depressed groups
Belief scale Non-Depressed Depressed t
Overall N 156 83
Frustration-Discomfort 89.3 (35.1) 105.9(31.6) 3.65***
Emotional discomfort 28.6(12.5) 35.1 (10.1) 4 ^3***
Entitlement 24.4(11.0) 26.0(10.5) 1.06
Comfort 20.1 (10.7) 26.6(11.9) 4.26***
Achievement 16.2(7.2) 18.3 (6.6) 2.19*
Self-esteem full scale 24.9 (5.7) 20.3 (4.5) 6.66***
Comfort and emotional discomfort, and to a lesser extent achievement, were all
moderately correlated to depression. Partial correlations indicated that the three sub-
scales continued to be significantly related to depression, after controlling for self-
esteem. However, with both negative affect and self-esteem controlled, only comfort
continued to be significantly related to depression (table 6.19). The removal of the
outlier had negligible effects on these results. The equivalent partial correlation analysis
for self-esteem is shown in table 7.20. This indicates that the relationship between
depressed mood and self-esteem is remains significant after controlling for negative
affect and Frustration-Discomfort.
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Table 6.19 Partial correlations between depression and Frustration-Discomfort sub-
scales controlling for self-esteem and anxiety
Controlling for
Frustration-Discomfort Zero-order Anxiety Self-esteem Anxiety +
Self-esteem
Full scale 33*** .12 .20** .06
Emotional discomfort .36*** .13* .20** .05
Entitlement .13 .02 .06 -.03
Comfort 37*** .20** 25*** .14*
Achievement .20** .04 .14* .03
N = 227 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
Table 6.20 Partial correlations between depression and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
controlling for Frustration-Discomfort and anxiety
Zero-order Anxiety Frustration- Anxiety +
Discomfort Frustration-
Discomfort
Rosenberg Self-esteem ..47*** ..33*** . 40*** . 32***
N = 227 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
6.9.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
To further investigate the relationship between depression and frustration intolerance a
series of multiple regression analyses were conducted. A simultaneous multiple
regression was performed with all Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales entered as a block.
The Frustration-Discomfort group significantly predicted depression, explaining 18% of
the variance (table 6.21). The achievement sub-scale was not significant. The removal of
the outlier was found to have no effect on the overall variance explained or the
significance of individual items.
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Table 6.21 Multiple regression: Frustration-Discomfort predicting depression
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Emotional discomfort 2.90 .004 .24
Entitlement 3.78 .000 -.34
Comfort 4.04 .000 .35
Achievement 1.57 .119 .12
Multiple R = .43
R2 =.18
Adjusted R2 =.17 F (4, 234) = 13.03, p < .001
A hierarchical regression analysis, controlling for self-esteem, was then conducted (table
6.22). Self-esteem was entered on step 1 and the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales on
step2. Self-esteem was a significant predictor at step 1, accounting for 22% of the
variance and the frustration discomfort block was a significant predictor at step 2,
explaining an additional 8% of the variance. However, emotional discomfort and
achievement did not remain significant. Entitlement, similar to its relationship with
anxiety, was a negative predictor of depressed mood.
Table 6.22 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting depression from Frustration-
Discomfort, controlling for self-esteem




Self-esteem 8.20 .000 .48
Step2
Emotional discomfort 1.55 .134 .13
Entitlement 2.96 .003 -.25
Comfort 3.47 .001 .29
Achievement 1.55 .122 .11
Step 1: Multiple R = .47, R2 = .22, Fcha (1,228) = 65.93***
Step 2: Multiple R = .55, R2cha= .08, Fcha (1,224) = 6.41***
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Next, a hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to control for negative affect
(table 6.23). The HAD-A scale was entered on step 1 and the Frustration-Discomfort
block on step 2. The Frustration-Discomfort group remained significant predictors for
depression, with comfort as a significant positive and entitlement a significant negative
predictor.
The failure of emotional discomfort to remain a significant predictor when controlling
for negative affect or self-esteem may merely reflect the degree of shared variance
between these variables. However, it could also suggest that secondary symptom stress,
or depression about being depressed, is much less important compared to fear of fear.
Thus, item Q(25) relating to fear of mental disturbance was not significantly related to
depression (r (239) = .11, n.s.), but was correlated with anxiety (r (239) = .27, p < .001)
even controlling for depression (pr (239) = .16, p < .05). This is in contrast to Cox, Enns,
and Taylor's (2001) finding that the highest loading item, in a depressed group, on the
cognitive dyscontrol factor was 'when I am nervous, I worry I might be mentally ill'.
Table 6.23 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting depression from Frustration-
Discomfort, controlling for anxiety
Variables t p Beta
entered
Criterion: Depression
Stepl 9.21 .000 .51
Anxiety
Step2
Emotional discomfort 0.87 .385 .07
Entitlement 3.00 .003 -.25
Comfort 3.19 .002 .26
Achievement 0.81 .418 .06
Step 1: Multiple R= .51, R2 = .26, Fcha (1,237) = 84.75***
Step 2: Multiple R= .56, R2cha= .05, Fcha(l,233) = 3.96**
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Lastly, both negative affect and self-esteem were controlled in a hierarchical multiple
regression (table 6.24). Self-esteem entered on step 2 accounted for 8% of variance after
negative affect had been controlled. The Frustration-Discomfort block also remained
significant, accounting for 3% additional variance. Comfort remained a significant
predictor with a unique contribution specific to depression. In comparison, self-esteem
when controlling for the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales accounted for 9% additional
variance (R2 cha = .09, Fcha (1,224) = 28.78, p = < .001), and 5% when controlling for
both variables (R2cha = .05, Fcha (1,223) = 18.81, p = < .001).
Table 6.24 Hierarchical multiple regression analyses: Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales
predicting depression, controlling for self-esteem and anxiety
Variables t p Beta
entered
Criterion: Depression
Step 1: Multiple R=. 52, R2 = .27, Fcha (1,23 8) = 84.08***
Step 2: Multiple R - .59, R2cha= .08, Fcha (1,237) = 28.58***
Step 3: Multiple R = .62, R2cha= .03, Fcha(1,237) = 2.64*
6.10 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS
It was predicted that discrete patterns of beliefs would be more predictive of certain
difficulties compared to others. To test this hypothesis the patient sample was classified by
cut points for anxiety and depression, and for clinical anger. A cross sectional comparison
was made between three groups: Patients classified as having an anger problem, but not

















The means and standard deviation of each group on the measures are shown in table
6.25. There was no significant differences between these groups on age (F (2,157) =
2.316, ns) or gender (%2 = 1.87, n.s). Since sample size was unequal and the Levene test
indicated that groups did not have homogeneous variance on Trait anger or emotional
discomfort, the Kurskal-Wallis test was used. The results match those found using a one¬
way ANOVA except that the emotional discomfort scale marginally failed to reach
significance with the Kurskal-Wallis test (p = .089).
Table 6.25 Mean and standard deviations for anger, depression, and anger/depression
groups
Belief scale Anger Depression Depression Kurskal-
+ Anger Wallis x2
N 79 47 36
Frustration-Discomfort 101.3 (35.0) 114.1 (33.7) 95.3 (25.3) 6.37*
Emotional discomfort 30.9(13.0) 36.2(10.7) 33.8 (9.3) 4.85
Entitlement 29.4(10.6) 30.5 (9.8) 20.1 (8.4) 22.54***
Comfort 22.7(10.4) 28.4(13.2) 24.2 (10.0) 6.29*
Achievement 18.3 (6.9) 19.1 (6.2) 17.2 (7.2) 1.07
Self-esteem full scale 24.4 (5.4) 19.8 (4.8) 21.0 (4.0) 23.01***
HAD-A 12.8(4.1) 15.9 (3.2) 15.7 (3.2) 21.62***
HAD-D 6.6 (2.7) 13.7 (2.6) 14.1 (2.5) 120.85***
TAS 26.3 (4.6) 27.3 (5.5) 16.8(2.8) 82.53***
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
As expected, there was no difference between the depressed and anger/depressed groups
on depression scores (t (77) = .374, n.s), or between the anger and anger/depressed
groups on TAS scores (t (83) = .973, n.s.). The anger group had lower levels of anxiety
compared to the other two groups. Also as expected, entitlement was significantly higher
in the two anger groups (F (2,159) = 13.48, p < .001). The anger/depressed group had
higher overall Frustration-Discomfort scores than both the anger (t (124) = 2.04, p < .05)
and the depressed group (t (80) = 2.91, p < .01). The depressed and anger groups did not
differ significantly from each other on total Frustration-Discomfort (t (113) = .93, n.s).
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The higher total Frustration-Discomfort score in the anger/depressed group appears to
reflect higher comfort (t (81) = 2.56, p < .05) and emotional discomfort scores (t (112),
2.49, p < .05) compared to the anger group. Although emotional discomfort and comfort
are associated with depression, it is important to note that there was no difference
between the depressed and anger group on either comfort (t (113) = 1.19, n.s.) or
emotional discomfort (t (70) = .74, n.s.). Thus, the higher scores on these two scales
would seem specific to the combination of anger and depression, rather than reflecting
an association with depressed mood.
Furthermore, the increase in Frustration-Discomfort in the anger/depression group does
not appear related to greater emotional distress in this group, since there was no
significant difference between levels of anxiety or depression between the depressed and
anger/depressed groups. Nor was it related to higher Frustration-Discomfort scores
associated with anger, since the anger group had lower overall Frustration-Discomfort
scores. There is also little difference in self-esteem between these two groups. One
possible explanation is that individuals in the angry/depressed group tend to experience
more frustration intolerance depression, in addition to depression related to ego
disturbance. If so, it would follow that beliefs most likely to be associated with this type
of depression, namely comfort and emotional discomfort, would be elevated in this
group. The correlation analysis of the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and the HAD-D
scores for the depressed group supports this explanation. Thus, although the sample size
is small, three sub-scales are negatively correlated with depression in the depressed
group: entitlement (r (36) = -.42, p < .01), achievement (r (36) = -.15, n.s.), and
emotional discomfort (r (36) = -.04, n.s.), with comfort having a small positive
correlation (r (36) = .06, n.s.). In contrast, correlations between the Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales and the HAD-D are positive, although nonsignificant, in the
depressed/angry group: emotional discomfort (r (47) = .10, n.s.), comfort (r (47) = .21,
n.s.), entitlement (r (47) = .05, n.s.), and achievement (r (47) = .06, n.s.).
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6.11 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CLINICAL AND STUDENT
POPULATION
6.11.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Significant differences in the mean Frustration-Discomfort scores were found between
the clinical and student groups. Mann-Whitney tests showed equivalent levels of
significance to the independent t-tests (table 6.27). All sub-scales, except entitlement,
were higher in the clinical population. Not surprisingly, given that a primary feature of
clinical problems is emotional distress, emotional discomfort had the largest mean
difference. Age was not correlated with entitlement, and therefore the lack of
differentiation between the two groups on entitlement was not age related. However, it is
possible that the overall composition of the clinical group was not representative of
entitlement problems. Thus, 55% of clients were classed as anxiety/depression, with
which entitlement has a lower correlation, whereas only 13% were classed as having
anger problems. Indeed, when comparing a sub-group of anger patients with the student
group entitlement mean scores were significantly higher in the clinical group (t (166) =
4.17, p<.001).
Table 6.27 Frustration-Discomfort mean scores and standard deviations for clinical and
student groups
Clinical Non-clinical t Mean
difference






95.1 (34.5) 72.6 (27.1) 5.50***
30.9 (12.2) 18.5 (9.4) 8.64***








***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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Comparison of individual Frustration-Discomfort items between the clinical and student
groups has been presented in chapter three (table 3.6). This indicated that fifteen of the
items included in the final scale did not significantly differentiate the two groups. It
would be expected that some beliefs would have elevated scores in the student group,
since the particular frustrations of academic life such as academic work demands might
specifically activate these. The lack of discrimination displayed by items Q(55) task
obstruction, Q(18) task hassle, Q(74) task interest, Q(58) persistence, and Q(24) waiting,
all ofwhich are task orientated, would be consistent with this.
6.11.2 LOGISTIC REGRESSION
A hierarchical logistic regression analysis was conducted to determine the unique
contribution of sub-scales to clinical status. Each Frustration-Discomfort sub-scale was
entered separately, with those having the weakest relationship with clinical status
entered first. The regression model with all four sub-scales as predictors was significant,
indicating that Frustration-Discomfort reliably distinguishes between a student and
patient population (x2 (4) = 95.59, p < .001. In addition, the Hosmer and Lemeshow
measure was non-significant suggesting a good model fit. The Nagelkerke R2 was .368,
that is, 37% of the variance between these two groups was accounted for by frustration
intolerance beliefs. Classification tables show good prediction of cases, with an overall
success rate of 78.4%, and with 91.4% of patients and 42.5% of students correctly
identified.
The results of the separate regression steps indicated that entitlement, entered on step 1,
had little relationship with status (-2LL = 379.61, x2 (4) = 0.481. n.s.), and did not
account for any substantial degree of variance (Nagelkerke R2 = .002). Achievement
entered second, was a significant predictor (-2LL = 360.23, x2 (4) = 19.38, p < .001),
and accounted for 8.6% of the variance (Nagelkerke R2 = .086). Next comfort was also
significant (-2LL = 338.79, x2 (4) = 21.44, p < .001), and accounted for a further 8.6%
of variance (Nagelkerke R2 = 0.172). Finally, emotional discomfort entered last, was
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significant (-2LL = 284.50, x2 (4) = 54.29, p < .001), and accounted for 19.6% of
additional variance above and beyond that already explained by the other sub-scales
(Nagelkerke R2 = .386).
6.11.3 REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS

















deviations above the norm, and these were all students who had been wrongly classified
in the patient group in the analysis (Figure 6.5). This would be expected, given that the
student group will include a small number of emotional distressed individuals. Indeed,
the mean scores for these ten individuals were significantly higher than that of the
clinical group for all Frustration-Discomfort sub-scale means except comfort. Mann-
Whitney tests showed there was no significant difference between these groups.
However, there was still no significant difference in entitlement mean scores, between
the clinical and student groups, following removal of these cases (t (317) = 1.15, ns).
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6.12 DIVERGENT AND CONVERGENT VALIDITY
It was predicted that the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales would show stronger
correlations with measures of the same construct, compared to other constructs and
measures of emotion disturbance. The two sub-scales from the Schema questionnaire,
'Entitlement' and 'Insufficient self-control', were clearly close in conception to aspects
of low frustration tolerance. These two scales formed an 'impaired limits' domain,
representing deficiencies in long-term goal formation, commitment and responsibilities.
The DAS self-control sub-scale contained items related to frustration intolerance beliefs
and demandingness, for example the avoidance of risk, emotional control, and easy
solutions to problems.
There were strong intercorrelations between the Frustration-Discomfort and Schema
overall scores, and the pattern was theoretically meaningful (table 6.28). Hypothesised
differences between correlation coefficients were tested using a Fisher z transformation
method (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992). As expected, the correlation between the
two scales was significantly higher with the correlation of Frustration-Discomfort with
self-esteem (Z = 5.15, p < .001). The difference in correlations was significant for
entitlement (Z = 17.7, p < .001), comfort (Z = 3.51, p < .001), and achievement (Z =
7.17, p < .001). However, emotional discomfort was moderately correlated with both the
Schema sub-scales and self-esteem, and did not therefore have a significantly higher
correlation with either scale (Z = .90, ns).
The individual Schema sub-scales also interacted as expected. Entitlement was
correlated with both the Schema entitlement and the Self-control sub-scales. This
probably reflects the overlap of items between the Schema sub-scales with specific
anger items included in both. The Self-control sub-scale is described as reflecting
difficulties with frustration tolerance and an 'exaggerated emphasis on discomfort-
avoidance' (McGuinn & Young, 1996). Not surprisingly, it correlates highly with both
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comfort and emotional discomfort. The achievement frustration sub-scale had a weaker,
although still significant, relationship with the schema scale.
The DAS sub-scale had lower correlations with the Frustration-Discomfort Scale than
the schema scale, although significant at p < .001. However, the correlation of the DAS
with the Schema sub-scales was also low, and marginally lower than with the
Frustration-Discomfort scale. There was no significant relationship between the DAS
and self-esteem, which supports the construct validity of the Frustration-Discomfort
Scale as measuring aspects of self-control separate from self-esteem. Overall, the DAS
is most strongly associated with entitlement, but had no strong relationship with any one
scale.
Table 6.28 Intercorrelations of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale with the Rosenberg
scale, Schema, and DAS sub-scales
Schema Schema Schema
Total Entitlement Self-control DAS Self-esteem
Full scale .60*** 34*** .58*** 26*** -.36***
Emotional 49*** .17* 50*** 19** _ 44***
Entitlement ^y*** 49*** 4g*** 26*** -.16*
Comfort 24*** 2i*** 56*** .20** -.36***
Achievement 23*** 25*** 2g*** 22*** -.17*
Self-esteem 3y*** .12 _ 42*** -.05
N = 229 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
Six items on the Frustration-Discomfort Scale correlated p < .001 with the DAS: Q(58)
persistence, Q(46) easy solutions, Q(41) emotional control, Q(61) gratification delay,
Q(23) oppositional beliefs, and Q(24) waiting. Correlations between the Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales and items on the Schema scale were also conceptually consistent.
Both the comfort scale and emotional discomfort scales were most strongly correlated
with the item ' I can't force myself to do things I don't enjoy, even when I know it's for
my own good' (r = .56 and .43, p < .001). Similarly, the entitlement scale was most
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strongly correlated with 'I lose my temper at the slightest offence' (r = .43, p < .001).
Unexpectedly, the achievement scale was most correlated with 'I get bored very easily'
Intercorrelations with the emotional disturbance measures indicated that both the DAS
and Schema sub-scales correlated highest with anger (table 6.29). However, the
correlation between anger and the Schema scales are confounded in that three of the
Schema questions directly refer to anger. Neither the DAS nor the Schema entitlement
scale correlated significantly with depression or anxiety. However, the Schema self-
control scale was moderately correlated with anxiety and depression. The lack of
relationship between the DAS and the anxiety, depression, and self-esteem scales was
unexpected. There was no significant difference in the mean DAS score in depressed
compared to non-depressed patients (t (236) - .15, p = .878) or between anxious and
non-anxious patients (t (237) = .86, p = .393). In contrast, Power et al. (1995) found that
the self-control sub-scale distinguished between depressed and healthy groups.
However, examination of the sub-scale items reveals that these are very positively
worded with reference to positive control and happiness, and also the imperative
'shoulds' are not worded in absolute terms.
Table 6.29 Intercorrelations of the DAS and Schema sub-scales and emotional
disturbance measures
(r = .30, p < .001).
















N = 228 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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6.13 DISCUSSION
These results showed that overall the Frustration-Discomfort scale was significantly
related to emotional disturbance. More importantly, different emotional disorders were
uniquely associated with different dimensions of frustration intolerance, and these were
consistent with predicted theoretical relationships. In addition, the Frustration-
Discomfort beliefs remained significantly related even when negative affect and
overlapping variance with self-worth was taken into account. Given that a substantial
degree of overlap was expected between these variables this indicates that the
Frustration-Discomfort factors are robust and meaningful, and independent from self-
evaluative beliefs.
Entitlement was a significant predictor of anger independent of self-esteem, accounting
for 30% of the variance. In contrast, the positive self-esteem scale had no significant
association with anger, and the negative scale a weak significant correlation that failed
to remain significant when controlling for frustration intolerance. This suggests that
anger is overwhelmingly associated with frustration intolerance beliefs, rather than self-
worth. Achievement frustration was also correlated with anger, even when controlling
for self-esteem, although it contributed little additional variance to that of entitlement.
However, the relationship between achievement, the difference score, and anger was
interesting. The difference score was correlated with anger and achievement and this
was not diminished when controlling for self-esteem. This supports the hypothesis that
the difference scale represents self referential beliefs but not those involving global self-
evaluation. These beliefs may involve demands regarding personal performance but
reflect intolerance of their behaviour rather than global self condemnation.
Regarding anxiety, all four sub-scales contributed significant unique variance even when
self-esteem was controlled, accounting for 16% of the remaining variance. This
compares to 4% of variance explained by self-esteem when Frustration-Discomfort was
similarly controlled. When negative affect was partialled out only emotional discomfort
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remained a significant predictor. This sub-scale was predicted to have a unique
relationship with anxiety, and highlights the importance of secondary symptom
disturbance in the maintenance of anxiety disorders. It would be of interest to investigate
further the role of individual sub-scales in relation to specific anxiety disorders. For
instance, there is evidence that anxiety sensitivity and anger are significant predictors of
PTSD symptoms and outcome (Fedoroff et al., 2000; Riggs et ah, 1992), suggesting that
both entitlement and emotional intolerance may be centrally involved in this disorder.
The relationship of frustration intolerance with depression was less pronounced
compared to anxiety. Frustration-Discomfort accounted for 18% of variance and this
was reduced to 8% when controlling for self-esteem. This compared to 22% of the
variance explained by self-esteem, reduced to 9% when controlling for Frustration-
Discomfort, suggesting that both these belief categories are equally involved in
depression. As predicted, comfort was the only significant positive unique predictor.
However, the interaction of these beliefs with depression is likely to prove complex, and
the correlational design means that causal explanations are unable to be made. For
instance, it has been suggested comfort beliefs may lead to general dissatisfaction with
life, and reduced opportunities for rewarding fulfilment, and therefore may contribute to
the development of depression (DiGiuseppe, 1991a). On the other hand, depressed mood
itself may generate secondary beliefs that problems are too difficult to overcome
because of low mood.
The relationship of anger and depression with frustration intolerance was intriguing.
Comparison of sub-scale scores indicated that the angry/depressed group was higher on
frustration intolerance compared to other emotion groups. It was proposed that this
might be explained if the anger/depressed group reflected higher levels of 'discomfort
depression'. That is, patients with coexisting anger and depression were more likely to
endorse frustration intolerance beliefs, specifically in respect to the comfort and
emotional discomfort sub-scales, compared to depressed patients without anger. This
might support the hypothesis that angry-depression involves a different sub-type of
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depression (Eckhardt & Deffenbacher, 1995). It is also consistent with REBT theory that
hypothesises that two types of depression may be distinguished in terms of frustration
intolerance and self-worth beliefs.
DiGiuseppe (1999) has argued that individuals alternate between anger/depression due
to shifting beliefs regarding the direction of blame and self-efficacy. That is, with other-
blame and high self-efficacy the emotion is anger but with self-blame and low self-
efficacy it is depression. Other-blame is an important category of irrational beliefs (Ellis
& Dryden, 1987), and one that has been proposed as central to anger (Hauck, 1980).
Similar to self-blame, it involves global condemnation of others as opposed to simple
attributions of fault. However, the relationship of other-blame with frustration
intolerance or self-worth is unclear. Evidence from the General Attitude and Belief Scale
(Bernard, 1998) indicates that, compared to other sub-scales, these beliefs had a weaker
relationship with emotional disturbance, including anger, and failed to distinguish
between clinical and non-clinical groups. The present research certainly points to
entitlement beliefs as central to anger, and whether other-blame is independently related
to this emotion is a question for further research. Likewise, the shifts between anger and
depression experienced by some individuals could be explained by the co-existence of
both frustration intolerance and self-worth beliefs, and changes in the relative salience of
these. Thus, low self-blame and deserved loss will be related to depression but, with
greater levels of entitlement, this deprivation turns to anger and, with greater levels of
comfort beliefs, to discomfort depression. The relative salience of these types of belief
may depend on a variety of factors including attributions regarding blame or fairness
(Frijda, 1986).
The hypothesised relationship of the achievement sub-scale to anxiety and depression
was supported. Achievement was significantly correlated with both anxiety and
depression even when controlling for self-esteem. However, this relationship was
weaker in regard to depression. Achievement also remained significantly correlated with
anxiety when controlling for negative affect, but failed to remain so with depression. In
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comparison, previous research has shown a stronger association between maladaptive
perfectionism and depression rather than anxiety (Minarik & Ahrens, 1996). This
suggests that, in the absence of global self-evaluation, perfectionistic beliefs may be
more closely related to tension and anger than depression. The present findings also
indicate that high standards, when worded in terms of intolerance of frustrated
achievement goals, are significantly related to emotional disturbance. This suggests the
conclusion that perfectionistic high standards, when separated from negative self-
evaluation, are necessarily functional is mistaken (Frost et al., 1993). It remains to be
investigated whether perfectionism when related to frustration intolerance as opposed to
self-evaluation is associated with distinct types of anxiety. Certainly, for example, the
finding that aspects of adaptive perfectionism were related to PTSD after controlling for
depression is of interest (Kawamura, 2001).
There are some possible limitations to the study. Kendall et al. (1995) underline the need
for appropriate dependent measures of emotion. A particular issue as regards REBT
theory is the distinction made between healthy negative and unhealthy negative
emotions, for example between 'annoyance' and 'anger'. REBT theory also argues that
intense emotion is not necessarily indicate disturbed emotion. Some of the items on the
measures of emotional disturbance do not reflect this distinction, for instance one item
on the TAS is worded 'I feel annoyed...'. However as Mcdermut et al. (1997) have
noted, there are no current measures of emotion that employ REBT emotional theory,
and with both the TAS and the HAD valid and reliable measures of clinical disturbance,





Self-control problems encompass a wide range of behaviours including alcohol and drug
use, compulsive shopping, comfort eating, self-harm, and procrastination (see
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994 for review). They can be argued to represent the
failure to regulate desire in spite of long-term negative consequences, to be closely
associated with cognitive and behavioral avoidance, and to typify frustration intolerance
This chapter aims to investigate the relationship between frustration intolerance and
these problems, specifically examining self-harming.
The relationship between Frustration-Discomfort intolerance and self-harming has
frequently been noted in the clinical literature. Likewise, an association between self-
harming and other self-control problems has also been described. For instance, Favazza
and Conterio (1989) report that 61% of self-mutilators describe a history of eating
disorder. In turn, individuals with bulimia and bingeing/purging eating disorders are
more likely to abuse alcohol, with increases in abnormal eating going along with
increases in substance abuse (Krahn, 1991). Other studies also report significant
relationships between alcohol, drug abuse, eating problems and self-harming (Lacey,
1993). A diagnosis that frequently coexists with self-harm, eating disorders and
substance abuse, is that of borderline personality. Indeed, self-harming has been
considered a marker for borderline personality. This group is characterised by unstable
relationships as well as self-control problems including substance abuse, binge eating,
and anger. A variety ofmodels have been proposed to explain failures in self-control and
the percieved association between these problems.
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Impulsiveness has been proposed as a central trait underlying self-control difficulty
(Favazza & Simeon, 1995). Evens, Platts, and Liebenau (1996) found that individuals
who repeated self-harm when compared with initial presenters had higher levels of
impulsiveness. Likewise, Simeon et al. (1992) found a significant correlation between
frequency of self-mutilation and impulsivity. Supporting this, Links, Heslegrave, and
Reekum (1999) found that 'impulsiveness' was the characteristic most strongly
predicting enduring borderline personality problems. Other researchers have suggested
that a sub-group of patients show a range of impulse disorders, in addition to any
specific problem. Lacey and Evens (1986) have described this group as suffering from
'multi-impulsive personality disorder'. However, the evidence for an association
between measures of impulsiveness and impulse control disorders has been mixed.
Stanford and Barratt (1992), for instance, reported no relationship between total scores
on an impulsivity scale and total number of impulsive disorders. Similarly, Hawton et al.
(1999) did not find a predicted difference in impulsivity scores between repeating and
non-repeating self-harming adolescent groups. This lack of relationship between
measures of impulsivity traits and behaviours is a common finding. Although some
studies do find correlations between impulsiveness and, for instance, borderline
personality (Trull, 1992), a difficulty is that that the diagnostic criteria for this
personality disorder includes the problems argued to coexist with it. A similar limitation
occurs in research on impulsiveness, whereby problems defined as impulsive are then
used in a circular manner to support the definition. Furthermore, the categorisation of
problems as being impulsive often appears to lack a clear conceptual basis. For example,
it is unclear what aspects of bulimia are impulsive, with clinical evidence suggesting that
eating violations, whilst seemingly spontaneous, are frequently planned. Indeed, there is
considerable disagreement as to whether impulsive disorders are functionally equivalent,
or if the similarities are superficial, for instance simply reflecting greater emotional
disturbance in these groups (Wilson, 1991).
Another theory that may link these problems is the regulation of affect (e.g. Baumeister
et al., 1994) For instance, it has been argued that alcohol is used to regulate negative
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affect, in particular by reducing tension (Conger, 1956; Cooper et al., 1995). However,
the evidence for a general relationship between stress and drinking has been inconsistent
(Sayette, 1999) and it has therefore been suggested that affect regulation may be
important for some individuals but not others (Cooper et al., 1992). In this regard,
anxiety sensitivity has been proposed as a distinguishing feature of this group rather than
simply trait anxiety (McNally, 1996). Similarly, bulimia and binge eating are suggested
as methods of reducing negative affect, specifically in relation to the discomfort
associated with self-awareness of the failure to meet personally high standards
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). Bulimics are also more likely to have other self-
control problems and, for instance, twenty-one percent of compulsive shoppers report a
history of substance abuse and a third reporting frequent binge eating (Faber et al.,
1995).
As regards self-harm, characteristically this is described as following a build up of
frustrating events and associated tension (Herpertz, 1995). This increased level of
arousal is relieved by the act of self-harming, with individuals reporting a sense of
relaxation and reduced distress. Experimentally these clinical observations are supported
by research showing immediate and significant reductions in psychophysiological
arousal following self-mutilation using guided imagery (Haines et al., 1995). It has been
argued that the effectiveness of this tension reduction method results in the behaviour
becoming a habitual means of coping with unpleasant emotional states. Lacey and Evens
(1986) have also suggested that problems of impulse control are 'closely related to
difficulty in coping with depressive emotions and anxiety'. A similar hypothesis,
suggesting impulsivity results from attempts to reduce psychological distress, has been
proposed by Favazza and Rosenthal (1993). Several writers have emphasised the
importance of 'affective instability' in self-harm, and Linehan (1993) considers that a
biological tendency to exaggerated emotional responses and lack of skill at regulating
these is a central to borderline personality. Kruedelbach et al. (1993) found that for
substance abusers, craving was higher in response to negative emotional states, such as
tension, in individuals diagnosed with borderline personality. Binge eating has also been
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viewed as a maladaptive affect regulation strategy aimed at short-term reduction in
discomfort (Telch, Agras, & Linehan, 2000). Other examples of this relationship are
provided by evidence that attempts to enhance positive or reduce negative emotion may
mediate between impulsiveness and alcohol intake (Cooper et al., 1995). More
generally, it has been suggested the central characteristic of personality disorder is
avoidance of painful affect and cognitions resulting from aversive conditioning (Young,
1994).
It is unclear if all emotions are implicated in this disregulation or if some are more
problematic. Herpetz (1995) found that more than three-quarters of his sample of self-
harmers emphasised ending 'intolerable tension', with anger the second most frequent
emotion. The importance of depression has also been highlighted and the results of
Hawton et al. (1999) suggested that depression was the main factor associated with
repetition of deliberate self-harm. However, a study by Kent et al. (1997) found there
was no evidence to support depression as a mediator between eating disorder and self-
harm. They argued that it was more likely that low self-esteem, which occurs
independently of depression, is associated with both of these problems. They speculate
that, rather than depression, a combination of low self-esteem and poor impulse control
is central to self-harming behaviour.
Certainly, anger and hostility are prominent in self-harm (Crook, Raskin, & Davies,
1975), and the frequency of self-mutilation is correlated with chronic anger (Simeon et
al., 1992). Similarly, Milligan and Waller (2001) found that a range of internally
directed impulsive behaviours, including purging and self-harm, were associated with
higher trait anger in non-clinical individuals. However, the reason for this association is
less clear. It may be that all emotional states are aversive, and that self-harming and
other impulsive behaviours represent general strategies to reduce negative affect
including anger. Several theorists have suggested a relationship between self-esteem and
'self-anger'. Power and Dalgleish (1997) argue that a basic emotion involved in self-
harm is that of self-disgust. Thus, childhood abuse may lead to lower self-esteem and a
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tendency to be disgusted with aspects of the self. For such individuals, derogatory
thoughts and accompanying feelings would be particularly aversive, consistent with
Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) theory that the individual is escaping self-awareness.
Whilst several self-control problems, such as compulsive shopping, have been related to
low self-esteem (Faber, 1992) there are weaknesses with this model. For instance, in
contrast to evidence that bulimia is related to low self-esteem (Mizes, 1988), Weisberg,
Norman, and Herzog (1987) describe bulimics as characteristically narcissistic,
egocentric, and angry. Clearly, dissatisfaction with aspects of ones behaviour is not the
same as poor self-worth, and possibly reflects frustration at not achieving ones best.
Similarly, compulsive shopping has been associated with percieved relative deprivation
(Floch & Loewenstein, 1991). This again raises the issue as to whether such frustrations
are best regarded as aspects of ego disturbance or frustration intolerance. The narrow
definition of frustration intolerance as pertaining to loss of 'comfort' ignores other facets
of this concept, particularly the frustration related to entitlement and frustration of
achievement goals. More generally, whilst bingeing has been specifically linked to
negative affect regarding the self (Heatherton, Herman, & Polivy, 1991) other self-
control problems can be triggered by a variety of everyday frustrations and discomforts.
Thus, Herpertz (1995) found that 83% of self-harmers report specific frustrating events
prior to self-injury. In this respect, Cognitive behavioural models of self-harming have
proposed that successful coping depends on the reappraisal of negative events as being
less threatening (Ryan, Parle, & Babridge, 1998). REBT would also argue that, in
addition to inferences regarding the degree of threat, that disturbance primarily entails
core beliefs about its intolerability and awfulness. Certainly, the evidence does not
support the theory that self-harming simply reflects a lack of coping skills (Haines &
Williams, 1997).
REBT theory would suggest that the central underlying process in self-control problems
is that of frustration intolerance. However, it is unclear if different types of self-control
problem can be distinguished in terms of the different dimensions of frustration
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intolerance. Likewise, associations between problems may also reflect the interactions
between groups of belief. Generally, theoretical models have often focused on one
psychological process and assumed that this underlies different types of self-control
problem. Yet a model in which there are a number of interacting processes can be
proposed, involving different dimensions of frustration intolerance, both as primary and
secondary aspects of the behaviour. For example, maintaining abstinence from smoking
may depend on toleration of withdrawal symptom discomfort (West, Hajek, & Belcher,
1989), the experience of emotional discomfort (Kenford et al., 2002), or a sense of
deprivation and entitlement (Riley, 1992).
7.2 METHOD
7.2.1 PROCEDURE AND MEASURES
The Dysfunctional Coping Inventory was included as a part of the questionnaire packet
distributed to the clinical group, as described earlier. This was designed specifically for
this study and its development is described in the following section. In this inventory,
one item referred to self-harming, 'I injury myself or overdose', and this was used as a
measure of self-harm. Clearly, the definition of self-harm varies considerably, and
ranges from a narrow definition of repetitive non-suicidal cutting to broader definitions
including suicide attempts. Generally, deliberate self-harm has been distinguished from
attempted suicide by the function of the behaviour, the former having non-lethal intent.
However, there is an overlap between these categories, and overdosing can be used as a
form of non-suicidal self-harming. Given this, and the difficulty of determining the




All individuals in the clinical group were involved in the Dysfunctional Coping
Inventory study (n = 242). For the analysis of self-harm, 56 patients who gave positive
replies on item Q(7) of the coping inventory were classified as self-harming. These
individuals were compared to the remaining clinical group of 186. The self-harming
distribution was significantly positively skewed (Z = 13.29), with 76% of patients non-
harming (table 7.1). The two missing values were excluded from the self-harm analysis.
Table7.1 Responses to Q(7) 'I injure myself or overdose'
Frequency Percent
not at all 184 76.0
somewhat 28 11.6
moderately 11 4.5




7.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE DYSFUNCTIONAL COPING INVENTORY
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The initial aim was to measure a range of dysfunctional coping behaviours that were
related to Frustration-Discomfort intolerance. However, a number of difficulties
emerged. First, it was necessary to distinguish the types of dysfunctional behaviours that
might be relevant, and to choose an appropriate assessment scale. Although many
coping measures are available, reviews suggested that many suffer from considerable
methodological problems (Endler & Parker, 1990). For example, the two most widely
used scales, the Ways of Coping Questionnaire (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988) and the
COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989), have poor reliability and validity (De
Ridder, 1997). There is also a lack of consensus as to the concept of coping or the types
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of responses that best describe this. A further difficulty in this respect is that coping
scales have tended to measure positive coping responses, whereas the Frustration-
Discomfort scale is concerned with irrational beliefs and dysfunctional behaviour.
Although Endler and Parker's (1990) Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations does
measure avoidance strategies, examination of the avoidance sub-scale items indicates
many items refer to positive coping methods.
It was therefore decided to produce an inventory focusing on a range of dysfunctional
coping strategies, specifically problems of self-control. A survey of the type of
dysfunctional behaviours associated with frustration intolerance in the REBT literature
resulted in a checklist of nineteen items. Individuals were asked to rate the nineteen
items in terms of their usual methods of coping with 'distress, discomfort, or
frustration'. Items were scored on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 0 ('not at all')
to 3 ('very much so').
7.3.2 DYSFUNCTIONAL COPING INVENTORY: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Seventeen replies were missing (0.4%) and means were substituted for these items. Two
items had less than 10% of responses in adjacent categories: Q(16) vomiting/laxative use
and Q(13) drug use. In addition, Q(18) rumination had a markedly skewed distribution
with over 73% of the responses in the highest category. Examination of item
intercorrelations showed that two items, Q(l) difficult tasks and Q(2) withdraw, were
highly correlated, suggesting redundancy (r (242) = .71). Reliability analysis took the
form of an iterative process: items with the lowest reliability were removed and item-
total correlations recalculated. Initial reliability analysis is presented in table 7.2. However,
even after removal of the three items with frequency problems and redundancy,
reliability was still poor. The mean inter-item correlation (.12) and the alpha coefficient
(.667) were below acceptable levels and indicated a relatively poor degree of association
between some items: Seven items fell below the criterion for corrected item-total
correlations (> .3).
Since this lack of association might suggest independent dimensions, an exploratory
factor analysis using varimax rotation was applied to the remaining fifteen items. This
indicated that there may be at least three factors involved, but there were insufficient
items to adequately represent the two smaller factors, each ofwhich only contained three
items. The first rotated factor accounted for 17% of the variance and the other two 11 %
each, with 39% of overall variance accounted for. However, reliability analysis of the
first factor showed low homogeneity, with a mean item correlation of. 17 and alpha of
.645, suggesting that items were poorly interrelated. Communality values were also low,
with eight of the items having values below .35, indicating that relatively little of the
variance of these items was explained. The Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy at
.67 was also just above the acceptable value of .60.
Table 7.2 Dysfunctional Coping Scale: Reliability analysis
Corrected
item-total correlations
1 I avoid difficult tasks .356
2 I withdraw from unpleasant situations .421
3 I mentally shut off .402
4 I restrict my eating by diet or exercise .187
5 I seek reassurance .355
6 I keep myself constantly 'busy' .064
7 I injure myself or overdose .269
8 I distract myselfwith more pleasant activity .337
9 I enlist the help of others .208
10 I put things off .393
11 I use alcohol for relief .192
12 I restrict myself to familiar routines .334
13 I use recreational drugs for relief .161
14 I become over involved in work .158
15 I comfort eat .419
16 I restrict my eating by vomiting or laxatives .214
17 I overspend on unnecessary things .445
18 I go over and over worries in my mind .273
19 I rely on medication to obtain symptom relief .386
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The coping inventory was therefore thought to be inappropriate as an overall measure of
dysfunctional coping, although individual items were used in further analysis.
Examination of skewness statistics and inspection of the item distributions indicated
that, in addition to the three items mentioned above, a further three items had
significantly skewed distributions with Z scores p = < 0.01: Q(4) dieting, Q(11) alcohol,
and Q( 18) ruminations. Although in larger samples moderate deviations in skewness and
kurtosis from normality do not have a substantive effect on statistical analysis
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000) non-parametric tests were used for all these items.
7.4 RESULTS
7.4.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-CONTROL ITEMS
The dysfunctional coping intercorrelation matrix is shown in table 7.3. Q(7) Self-harm,
is significantly correlated with Q(17) overspending, Q(16) 'bulimia', Q(15) comfort
eating, and Q(13) drug and Q(11) alcohol use. This is consistent with research that
suggests these problems are interrelated (Lacey, 1993). However, there was no
significant relationship between alcohol use (defined as endorsement of 'moderately' or
'very much so') and 'bulimia' (x2 (2) = 2.60, ns), but self-harmers were more likely to
use alcohol (x2 (2) = 8.64, p < .01), and use 'bulimic' purging (x2 (1) = 10.76, p < .001).
Comparing 'bulimia' with self-harmers without 'bulimia' indicated that the self-harming
group had higher levels of anger (t (63) = 2.80, p < .01), but there was no significant
differences regarding depression, anxiety or self-esteem. The 'bulimic' group had
significantly higher scores on the comfort sub-scale, (t (63) = 2.28, p < .05).
Overspending itselfwas most strongly related to comfort eating, 'bulimia', and cognitive
avoidance.
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Table 7.3 Correlation matrix (Spearman's rho): Dysfunctional coping inventory







































.06 .09 -.07 -
-.01 .20 -.02 .02 -
.08 .28 -.09 -.06 .25 -
-.03 .16 -.18 .11 .36 .20 -
.04 .03 -.14 .24 .19 .12 .23
.06 .21 -.01 .13 .12 .06 .25 .01
.05 -.09 -.07 .21 .09 .08 .10 .18 .09
.04 .10 .43 -.07 .01 .14 .03 -.09 -.01 -.10 -
.08 -.32 -.01 .20 .23 .04 .24 .03 .19 .10 .14
.24 .05 .09 .21 .10 -.02 .10 .07 -.01
.07 .21 -.03 .25 .25 .04 .19 .13 .20
.11 .24 .07 .18 .06 -.03 .14 .04 .27 .02 .15 .19 .14 .20
.16 .14 .03 .17 .22 .11 .24 .08 .17 .19 .01 .22 .05 .17 .15
.06 .09 .14
.12 .21 .31 .22
Correlations above .13, p > .05; above .17, p > .01; above .20, p > .001 (Correlations p > .001 shown in
bold)
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Q(12) Routine and Q(10) procrastination were significantly correlated with Q(2)
behavioural avoidance items and, less expectedly, Q(17) overspending. Some
differences between cognitive and behavioural avoidance emerged. Consistent with
Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) proposal that bulimics and binge eaters are trying to
avoid disturbing thoughts, the 'bulimia' item significant correlated with Q(3) cognitive
avoidance but not with behavioural avoidance. Self-harming and drug use had the same
pattern. Interestingly however, restricted eating had no relationship with the avoidance
items. Routine was the only item that correlated with behavioural avoidance but not
cognitive avoidance. Not surprisingly, the two items Q(14) overworking and Q(6)
activity were significantly related to each other but had negligible relationships with
other self-control items, apart from overworking being correlated to overspending.
7.4.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-CONTROL ITEMS AND FRUSTRATION
INTOLERANCE
The correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and individual items are
shown in table 7.4 (Spearman's rho was used as the non-parametric statistic when
appropriate). The relationship of each item with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is also
included for comparison. As expected, both self-esteem and frustration intolerance were
significantly correlated with a range of dysfunctional problem behaviours.
Clearly, the wording of the procrastination item can be interpreted as referring to a wide
range of activities from the avoidance of distressing situations to the avoidance of
everyday tasks. Therefore, not surprisingly it is significantly correlated with both
comfort and emotional discomfort. Using a hierarchical multiple regression analysis,
comfort, when entered on stepl, was a significant predictor of procrastination (Fcha =
14.95, p < .001). Emotional discomfort entered next failed to account for any further
variance (Fcha = .59, p = .444), nor did entitlement (Fcha = .06, p = .814). However,
achievement frustration was a significant negative predictor (Fcha = 8.86, p = .003).
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Table 7.4 Correlations between coping items, Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales, and













. 24*** .18** 22*** .03 27*** .04
Withdrawal -.19* .26*** 29*** .12* 3Q*** .10
Cognitive
avoidance
- 25*** 24*** 31 *** .14* 2i*** .09
Eating
restriction
-.14* .13* .15* -.01 .14* .14*
Reassurance _ 24*** 28*** 24*** 28*** 2i *** .18**
Activity -.12 .11 .01 .13 -.04 39***
Self harm R 38*** 19*** 24*** .14* 17** .07
Pleasurable
distraction
- 22*** 22*** 19** 24*** 23*** -.01
Support .07 19** .15* 2i*** 17** .09
Procrastinate _ 28*** .18** .20** .11 24*** oi
Alcohol R -.13* .02 .03 .06 .03 .04
Routine _ 3i*** 2|*** 23*** 17** 39*** 2i***
Drugs R -.09 .04 .09 .05 .09 -.05
Overwork .01 .14 .09 .13 .01 34***
Comfort
eating
- 38*** 28*** 27*** 23*** 24*** .19**
Vomiting R -.16* .07 .09 .03 -.01 .12*
Overspend - 25*** 31*** 28*** 32*** 27*** .08
Rumination R - 30*** 28*** 29*** 22*** 19*** 28***
Medication - 25*** 34*** 39*** .20** 33*** .15*
N (self-esteem) = 232; N (Frustration-Discomfort) = 242 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p <
.05
Neither the alcohol or drug use items were correlated with any of the Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales, although self-esteem was weakly correlated with alcohol use.
There was no significant difference on mean Frustration-Discomfort scores between
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individuals using alcohol moderately/very much and those using it slightly/not at all (t
(242) = .76, ns). This is surprising given that alcohol problems have been specifically
linked to low frustration tolerance beliefs (Ellis et al., 1988; Greenwood, 1985). It is also
contrary to previous results that have found positive correlation between irrational
beliefs and drinking problems (Hutchinson et al., 1998). Neither Q(48) excitement or
Q(21) buzz were discriminators of alcohol use, and the only significant discriminating
item was Q(72) indulgence (t (240) = 2.41, p < .05).
Consistent with entitlement as involving immediate gratification and indulgence, this
sub-scale was most strongly associated with overspending. This is also consistent with
the beliefs described by compulsive shoppers and reported by Rook (1987), such as 'to
hell with everything else. I want it and I'm going to get it' and its association with
gratification (Christenson et al., 1994). Overspending was also related to both comfort
and emotional discomfort sub-scales, suggesting that overspending is multi-determined
and can serve a number of functions. Thus, it may reduce emotional distress, it is
comfortable and easy, and indulges gratification. Entitlement had the highest correlation
regarding 'obtaining support from others, but this was not significantly correlated with
self-esteem. This is contrary to expectations, but may indicate that individuals with low
confidence avoid social contact, whereas individuals with high entitlement scores expect
support. It also questions the assumption that requests for support necessarily reflect low
confidence and inability to cope.
Interestingly, the item with one of the strongest relationships to frustration intolerance
was restricted routines. This was also most highly associated with the comfort sub-scale
and indeed could be argued to epitomise the concept of the avoidance of hassle. The
strongest correlation with frustration intolerance and particularly related to both
emotional discomfort and comfort was the use of medication to cope with distress. In
turn, medication was most strongly associated with cognitive avoidance, and to a lesser
extent behavioural avoidance, as well as procrastination. It might be argued that the
association between medication and frustration intolerance was due to a shared
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relationship with negative affect. That is, individuals who are taking medication are also
more likely to be more generally distressed. However, it is striking that the partial
correlation of Frustration-Discomfort with medication remains significant even when
controlling for self-esteem (pr (229) = .29, p < .001), and the total HAD score (pr (235)
= .23, p < .001). This indicates that the relationship is not due to association with
negative affect or self-esteem.
Unsurprisingly, achievement frustration was significantly correlated with using work
and activity as a means of coping. It also was significantly, although weakly, related to
the bulimic and eating restriction items. Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002) have
suggested that bulimia does not just co-exist with perfectionism but is the very
'expression of perfectionism in the domain of eating', and they argue for a definition of
perfectionism involving negative self-evaluation. However, the significant correlations
between frustration intolerance and restricted eating and vomiting suggests that these
beliefs are also implicated in eating disorder, separate from self-evaluation. Comfort and
emotional discomfort were most closely associated with eating restriction, but not
vomiting. However, achievement was associated with both behaviours, supporting the
suggestion that these two behaviours may serve different roles. Thus vomiting may
primarily serve in addition to maintain weight targets, whilst restricted eating may also
aim to reduce emotional discomfort, as Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) have
speculated. This is consistent with the high scores on the 'self-oriented perfectionism'
and 'personal standards' perfectionism sub-scales obtained by individuals with anorexia
(Bastiani et al., 1995). Both these sub-scales have close similarities with the items on the
achievement frustration scale. The association of achievement frustration with overwork
also supports the hypothesis that high personal standards can be dysfunctional in other
areas. Whilst ruminative worry was significantly correlated with achievement this was
also similarly associated with the other frustration intolerance sub-scales.
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7.5 ANALYSIS OF SELF-HARM
7.5.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
The measures of anxiety and depression, and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale, TAS,
and the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales were all normally distributed in the self-harm
group. The TAS and the anxiety scale were slightly positively skewed in the non-
harming group. The male-female ratio corresponded to the overall ratio for psychology
referrals, and there was no significant gender difference between self-harming and other
patients (x2 (1) = 1.00, ns), but the self-harm group was significantly younger (t (236) =
3.16, p < .01).
7.5.2 CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
Point-biserial correlations between Frustration-Discomfort, the emotional measures, and
self-harm category were significant apart from the achievement sub-scale, with self-
esteem having the strongest correlation (table 7.5). All variables displayed a linear
relationship.
Table 7.5 Biserial correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort, emotional
disturbance scales, and self-harm category
Self-harm category












N = 240 (n = 230 self-esteem) ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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To investigate the overall level of emotional disturbance self-harmers were classified as
to whether they had co-existing anger, depression, or anxiety, based on cut-points on
these measures. These groups were then compared to similarly classified non-harmers.
Self-harmers were found to be significantly more anxious than other anxious patients, (t
(181) = 3.61, p < .001), although anger (t (121) = 1.18, ns) and depression (t (80) = 1.77,
ns) showed no difference. Self-harmers also had significantly lower self-esteem
compared to emotionally disturbed non-harmers (t (209) = 6.10, p < .001). There were
substantial differences in the proportion of self-harmers with two or more emotional
problems. Thus, 76% of self-harmers had two and 36% had all three problems,
compared to 48% and 12% receptively for non-harmers. An overall disturbance score
indicated that self-harmers had significantly higher levels of emotional problems (t (209)
= 4.92, p<.001).
Self-harmers had higher emotional discomfort scores and comfort scores (t (211) = 3.38,
p < .001, and t (211) = 2.21, p < .05), but entitlement or achievement were not higher
compared to other emotionally disturbed non-harmers (t (211) = 0.19, and t (211) = 1.53,
ns). As expected there was a strong correlation between entitlement and anger in both
self-harming and non-harming groups (r (52) = .62, r (186) = .52, p < .001), but no
significant relationship between self-esteem and anger for either group (r (50) = -.09, r
(180) = -.10, ns).
To evaluate the association between self-directed anger and self-harming the three
individual Frustration-Discomfort items with self-evaluative themes were analysed:
Q(56) personal flaws, Q(33) alone, and Q(2) risk rejection. An interesting difference
emerged between the two groups: The three items had substantially higher correlations
with anger in the self-harm group compared to non-harmers (table 7.6). Whilst these
correlations just failed to reach significance (all p < .06) it is notable that, in comparison,
the correlations of these items with anger for non-harmers were negligible. Overall, the
combined score of these items was significantly correlated with anger in the self-
harming group (r (56) = .37, p < .01) but had no relationship in non-harmers (r (184) =
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.09, ns). For both groups, these items were significantly related to achievement (r (56) =
.34, p < .01) and entitlement (r (56) = .44, p < .001).
Table 7.6 Correlations between Frustration-Discomfort items and the TAS for self-harm
and non-harming groups.
Self-harm Non-harming
n = 55 n = 184
Personal flaws .26 .12
Alone .25 .08
Risk rejection .25 -.01
A possible explanation of these group differences is that self-harmers have low self-
esteem and condemn these flaws as reflecting global personal failure. However, contrary
to this, the correlation between self-esteem and these three beliefs was not significant in
the self-harm group (r (56) = -.21, ns), but was significant in non-harmers (r (186) = -
.48, p < .001). Furthermore, when the variance due to self-esteem was partialled out, the
partial correlation between anger and these beliefs remained moderately correlated and
little changed from the zero order con-elation (r (48) = .36, p < .01). This suggests that
the relationship between anger and the intolerance of personal flaws and rejection, as
represented by these items, is independent of the level of self-esteem.
An alternative explanation is that self-harmers are not condemning themselves in terms
of absolute levels of self-worth. Rather they condemn themselves for relative failure, for
not being good enough compared to a personal standard. If so, then the self-esteem
difference score (the difference between negative and positive self-esteem items), but
not overall self-esteem, would be negatively correlated with anger. This was found the
case. As expected from previous results the difference score was significantly correlated
to achievement frustration in both self-harming and non-harmers (r (50) = -.29, p < .05
and r (180) = -.25, p < .001 ). However, the difference score was only correlated with
anger in the self-harming group (r (50) = -.27, p < .05 and r (180) = -.12, ns). Likewise,
the correlation between the difference score and entitlement was substantially stronger in
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the self-harm group (r (50) = -.30 and r (184) = -.15, both p < .05). Thus, for self-
harmers the greater the discrepancy between what a person believes they should be like
and their actual self-evaluation the higher the level of anger.
This raises an important theoretical issue. In descriptions of ego-disturbance, a failure to
achieve an absolute standard leads to generalised self-condemnation. However, these
results suggest that anger in self-harming is associated with the discrepancy between
percieved and ideal self-standards, but not with overall self-esteem. That is, the person
does not necessarily believe they are worthless, but rather not good enough. As
discussed in chapter five this can be argued to represent intolerance of personal failings,
rather than global evaluation of self-worth, are therefore indicative of frustration
intolerance. That anger and the self-evaluation items significant correlated with
entitlement, rather than with self-esteem, would support this interpretation.
7.5.3 LOGISTIC REGRESSION
To examine determine which variables were most predictive of self-harm logistic
regression analyses were conducted (table 7.7). These analyses were also used to test the
independence of self-esteem and Frustration-Discomfort belief categories in predicting
self-harm. Since age was significantly related to self-harming this was controlled in the
analyses, with self-harm category the dependent variable.
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Table 7.7 Logistic regression analyses predicting self-harm
B SE Wald x2 P
Regression 1
Age -.04 .01 9.47 .002**
Emotional discomfort .05 .02 6.64 .010**
Entitlement -.01 .02 0.24 .623
Comfort .03 .02 1.18 .181
Achievement -.02 .03 0.40 .526
Regression 2
Age -.46 .02 8.93 .003**
Anger .07 .03 7.39 .007**
Anxiety .13 .05 5.68 .017*
Depression .10 .04 4.98 .026*
Regression 3
Age -0.03 0.02 3.04 .081
Self-esteem -0.17 0.04 18.18 .001***
Emotional discomfort 0.04 0.02 4.04 .044*
Regression 4
Age -0.05 0.02 10.80 .001***
Anxiety 0.10 0.06 2.74 .098
Depression 0.10 0.04 5.22 .022*
Emotional discomfort 0.03 0.02 4.15 .042*
N - 228 *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
In the first regression, the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales were entered as a block.
The overall model was significant (-2LL = 249.59, x2 (5) — 28.66, p < .001), with
Frustration-Discomfort producing a significant improvement in model fit after
accounting for age (x2 (4) = 18.55, p < .001), but only emotional discomfort was a
significant unique predictor of self-harm. Frustration-Discomfort beliefs accounted for
an additional 11% of variance (Nagelkerke R2 = 0.18). In the second regression, the
emotional variables (anxiety, depression and anger) were entered as a block. The model
was significant (-2LL = 245.64, x2 (4) = 41.98, p < .001), and all the emotional variables
were significant predictors of self-harm, accounting for 19% of the variance (Nagelkerke
R2 = 0.25). In the third regression, both emotional discomfort and self-esteem were
entered. The model was significant (-2LL = 193.94, x2 (3) = 45.92, p < .001), and both
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the belief categories were found to be independent predictors of self-harm, and produced
a significant improvement in model fit after controlling for age (x2 (2) = 38.85, p <
.001). Together, the belief categories accounted for an additional 21% of the variance.
Classification tables show an overall success rate of 80%, with 26% of self-harmers
correctly predicted. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test (x2 (8) = 8.95, p = .35) indicated a
good model fit. Lastly, emotional discomfort was entered as a block with depression and
anxiety. When controlling for negative affect, emotional discomfort continued to be a
significant predictor.
It was suspected that anger would mediate the relationship between self-harm and
entitlement. Baron and Kenny (1986) have described the following conditions necessary
for the assumption of mediation: (1) the dependent and independent variables are
associated, (2) the mediator and dependent variable are associated, (3) that the
relationship between dependent and independent variables is significantly reduced when
the mediator is controlled. The first two conditions have been satisfied, with entitlement
a significant predictor of self-harm (x2 (1) = 4.68, p < .05). However, entitlement no
longer remains significant when entered with anger, indicating that anger is a mediator
between entitlement and self-harm (table 7.8).
Table 7.8 Logistic regression analyses predicting self-harm status from entitlement and
anger
B SE Wald x2 P
Age -.04 .01 .7.46 .006**
Entitlement .01 .02 0.22 .644
TAS .07 .03 5.81 .016*
7.5.4 DISCRIMINANT ITEM ANALYSIS
Independent t-tests were calculated to determine the Frustration-Discomfort items that
significantly discriminated between the self-harming groups (table 7.9). Since self-
harming was related to age a matched age sample was created by limiting the non-
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harming group to fifty years (n = 134), and there was no significant difference in mean
age between these groups. Fifteen items were significant. The three highly significant
items, Q(29) slipping back, Q(41) emotional control, and Q(57) thoughts all loaded on
the emotional discomfort sub-scale. Of the items excluded from the final scale Q(56)
personal flaws was highly significant and also loads on the emotional discomfort factor.
The two items regarding the need for excitement, Q(21) buzz, and Q(48) excitement
were not significant, and neither was Q(72) indulgence or Q(61) gratification delay.
Table 7.9 Discriminative item analysis for self-harming
Scale item Sub-scale t
57 Thoughts emotional discomfort 2 21 ***
41 Emotional control emotional discomfort 3.62***
29 Slipping back emotional discomfort 3.94*
71 Morbid thoughts emotional discomfort 2.83**
64 Quick emotional relief emotional discomfort 2.52*
20 Unfair life emotional discomfort 2.47*
14 Continuing situation emotional discomfort 2.29*
25 Craziness emotional discomfort 2.30*
17 Restriction entitlement 2.64**
53 Let down entitlement 2.06*
63 Disrupted routines comfort 2 29***
18 Task hassle comfort 2.34*
51 Self-change comfort 2.27*
55 Task obstruction achievement 1.99*
38 Lapse of discipline achievement 2.11*
56 Personal flaws 4 09***
N - 55/134 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
7.6 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING
7.6.1 INTRODUCTION
The logistic regression analyses had indicated significant relationships between the
emotional disturbance, beliefs measures, and self-harm. There are problems with a
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regression approach in validating multifaceted constructs (Hull, Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991).
In particular, since most multidimensional scales have high correlations between the
components, the presence of multicollinearity can lead to instability of estimated
coefficients. Regression also does not overcome problems due to differing reliabilities
between sub-scales and is less suited to examining the relationship between these scales.
As an alternative, structural equation modelling has been increasingly used in scale
construction and to assess construct validity. The advantage of this approach is that it
enables relationships as a whole to be tested. It is also a vigorous means of assessing
construct validity since a-priori models can be tested against competing models.
Structural equation modeling was conducted using the AMOS program (Arbuckle &
Wothke, 1999). The adequacy of the models was assessed by a variety of fit indices: The
model Chi-square is the most frequently used measure of overall fit. A non-significant %2
indicates a good fit, although it cannot be used to compare non-nesting models.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2000) suggest that as a rule of thumb for a good fitting model a
ratio of %2 to the degrees of freedom of less than 2 is required. The comparative fit index
(CFI: Bentler, 1990), of which values above .90 are regarded as indicating adequate fit,
and above .95 as a good fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). The root mean square of
approximation (RMSEA: Browne & Cudeck, 1993): A non-incremental fit index
representing the discrepancy per degree of freedom. For this, values over .1 should lead
to rejection of the model, those from .05 to .08 are acceptable, and values below .05
indicate a close fit to the data. The Tucker-Lewis (1973) Index: This takes into account
model parsimony so that an inconsequential path reduces the TLI value, with a TLI
score > .90 considered reasonable. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike,
1987) is a relative measure that penalises complexity, with poor fitting and complex
models obtaining higher values.
Since self-harming is split into dichotomous groups it might be argued to violate the
assumptions of normality. However, the Maximum likelihood method used in AMOS is
robust to departures from normality. The ratio of observed variables to cases is at least
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27:1 meeting acceptable criteria. A sample size of above 200 is usually adequate with a
medium model size (Hair et al., 1998).
7.6.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The regression analysis had indicated that entitlement, emotional intolerance, and
comfort were significantly correlated with self-harm, with both self-esteem and
emotional discomfort unique predictors. However, the interaction between these
variables was unclear. To explore this, five models were tested based on the theoretical
and empirical literature outlined in the review. This literature suggests that emotional
intolerance, self-esteem, anxiety/tension, and anger are central variables. Therefore, all
models included these variables, with entitlement fully mediated by anger. Since age
was significantly related to self-harm and to self-esteem this was also included in the
model. In model A, depression and anxiety fully mediate between self-esteem and self-
harm, and between emotional discomfort and self-harm (figure 7.1). In Model B, self-
esteem is directly related to self-harm, as well as being partially mediated by depression
(Figure 7.2). In model C self-esteem continues to be partially mediated by anxiety but
depression is not included as a predictive variable (figure 7.3). Model D is the same as
model C except that self-esteem also has a direct path to anger (figure 7.4). Model E was
the same as model C excepting that comfort was added with a direct path to self-harm
and a partial mediated relationship through anxiety. The graphical presentation of these
models in figures 7.1 to 7.5 show standardised regression weights and squared multiple
correlations, representing the amount of explained variance for each exogenous variable.
7.6.3 MODEL COMPARISON
Fit statistics for each of the model are shown in table 7.10. Model A was clearly an
unacceptable fit to the data, with a significant x2, unacceptable discrepancy ratio, and
RMSEA, although all path coefficients were significant. This indicated that the direct
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relationship between self-esteem and self-harming could not be ignored. Model B did
have a direct path from self-esteem to self-harm and this path coefficient was significant
(B = -.29, p = .001), whereas the path from depression to self-harm was not (B = .36, p
=.586). Overall however, model B was an inadequate fit to the data. Models C and D
excluding depression did show good fits to the data. The AIC values also showed a
marked decrease indicating a more parsimonious structure. Since these two models are
nested, they can be compared with each using the x2 difference test. In this test, the less
parsimonious model x2 is subtracted from the other x2 value, and if the additional
constraints of the more complex model (that is one with less degrees of freedom) are
worthwhile then the new Chi-square value will be non-significant. This test indicated
that model C was statistically the better model compared to model D (x2diff = 1.67, df =
1, ns). This suggests that there is no direct relationship between self-esteem and anger.
Whilst Model E also a reasonable fit to the data, the regression paths from comfort to
self-harm and to anxiety were not significant.
Table 7.10 Tests ofmediation: Fit statistics
Model Chi-square Df X2/ df Sig TLI RMSEA AIC
Model A 78.38 15 5.23 0.00 .964 0.132 136.4
Model B 63.66 14 4.55 0.00 .970 0.121 123.7
Model C 11.33 10 1.13 0.33 .999 0.023 61.3
Model D 9.66 9 1.07 0.38 .999 0.017 61.7
Model E 20.55 12 1.71 0.06 .994 0.054 84.6
The further possibility was examined that emotional discomfort and entitlement were
directly related to self-harm in addition to being partial mediated by the emotional
variables. However, the path coefficients for both entitlement and emotional discomfort
to self-harm were not significant (B = -.04, p = .606 and B = -.03, p = .706), and the
overall model essentially unchanged. This indicated that the two frustration intolerance
sub-scales were fully mediated by the emotional disturbance variables.
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In summary, the preferred model C was one in which self-harm is related to entitlement
and emotional discomfort, and these beliefs were mediated by anger and anxiety
respectively. Self-esteem was partially mediated by anxiety as well as having a direct
relationship to self-harm. There was no significant relationship between anger and self-
esteem, and depression was not found to be a mediating variable.
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FIGURE 7.1 Self-harm structural equation model A.
Showing standardised parameter estimates with significance
levels determined by critical ratios
















FIGURE 7.2 Self-harm structural equation model B.
Showing standardised parameter estimates with significance
levels determined by critical ratios
(***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05)
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FIGURE 7.3 Self-harm structural equation model C.
Showing standardised parameter estimates with significance
levels determined by critical ratios
























FIGURE 7.4 Self-harm structural equation model D.
Showing standardised parameter estimates with significance
levels determined by critical ratios
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Figure 7.5 Self-harm structural equation model E.
Showing standardised parameter estimates with significance
levels determined by critical ratios
(***p < .001,**p < .01, *p < .05)
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7.7 DISCUSSION
This study provides further evidence of the usefulness of distinguishing between the two
categories of belief, and the separate dimensions of frustration intolerance. This was
supported by the differential relationships these had with the range of self-control
problems. The 'dysfunctional coping' item most strongly correlated with frustration
intolerance was reliance on medication, and this was significant even when controlling
for levels of negative affect. There is evidence that medication use can impede long-term
treatment. For example, although patients suffering from PTSD and using
benzodiazepines were less likely to drop out of therapy, they were also less likely to
improve (Minnen, Arntz, & Keijers, 2002). This is consistent with the results presented
in chapter nine showing that both medication and comfort beliefs were related to greater
numbers of treatment sessions. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that comfort
beliefs prevent individuals making changes in the background situations that trigger
disturbance, therefore increasing the chances of relapse (DiGiuseppe, 1998). This might
explain why the presence of other 'impulsive' problems have been found to be a strong
predictor ofpoor long-term prognosis, for instance in eating disorders (Sohlberg, 1989).
As expected, total Frustration-Discomfort scores were significantly related to both
cognitive and behavioural avoidance. Interestingly, the second highest correlation after
medication was with routine. This would be consistent with the suggestion that many
long-term problems are associated, not with dramatic behavioural disturbance, but a
general avoidance of commitment that reduces life satisfaction (DiGuiseppe, 1991).
Thus, Ellis (e.g. Ellis & Bernard, 1985) has proposed a number of guidelines that
enhance psychological health, including commitment to goals, risk-taking, and long-
range hedonism. There were differences between the types of avoidance: Medication,
bulimia, and self-harm were only associated with cognitive avoidance, where as comfort
eating and routines were associated with behavioural avoidance. This is consistent with
the evidence that bulimics are more likely to use avoidant coping strategies (Cattanach
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& Rodin, 1988) particularly thus aimed at reducing personal awareness (Heatherton &
Baumeister, 1991).
The results also support the proposal that different types of dysfunctional coping are
related to different aspects of frustration intolerance. Thus in regard to self-harm,
emotional discomfort was the most strongly associated sub-scale. However, self-esteem
emerged as the strongest overall predictor accounting for 24% of the variance compared
to 10% attributed to emotional discomfort. The failure of the model in which depression
was a mediating variable is consistent with other findings showing no relationship
between depression and self-harm (Kent et ah, 1997). However, it may also reflect the
limitations of the HAD depression scale which focuses on hedonistic aspects of
depression rather than self-depreciation. Thus, the path between self-esteem and self-
harming may represent this aspect of self-disgust, as Power and Dalgleish (1997) have
argued. In addition to this path, both emotional discomfort and self-esteem are
associated with self-harm by way of anxiety. Clearly, anxiety may result from threats to
self-esteem but secondarily involve emotional intolerance beliefs. This is consistent with
other studies indicating that tension is the primary affective pathway for self-harm
(Haines & Williams, 1997; Herpetz, 1995).1
The other major affective pathway was that of anger. There was no relationship between
anger and emotional discomfort, suggesting that emotional intolerance concerned
tension rather than anger. This is compatible with evidence regarding the experience of
anger as an empowering emotion and one that individuals wish to maintain rather than
remove (DiGiuseppe, Tafrate, & Eckhardt, 1994). It is unclear whether individuals who
self-harm have lower emotional toleration than other patients rather than, as has been
1 This interpretation is supported by a separate study which used the short revised Frustration-Discomfort
scale to investigate adolescent self-harming (C, Hewitt, 2001). This found that, regarding frustration
intolerance, only the emotional discomfort sub-scale was significantly associated with self-harming.
Measures of anger and disgust were also higher in self-harmers. Emotional discomfort did not remain
significant when controlling for depression, using the beck depression inventory. This measure, compared
to the HAD, includes many items relating to self-condemnation. This suggests, at least in adolescents, that
emotional discomfort is largely associated with the distress related to this measure.
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suggested, higher amounts of distress (Linehan, 1993). The results indicated that the
self-harm group was significantly more anxious and was more likely to suffer from a
combination of disturbed emotions. However, in the logistic regression, when depression
and anxiety were controlled, emotional discomfort continued to be significant. This
suggests self-harming individuals did have higher levels of disturbance but, in addition,
they were also less tolerant of these emotions.
There was also no clear evidence of a relationship between self-esteem and anger in self-
harming. Rather, anger was strongly associated with entitlement beliefs. The implication
for clinical intervention is that assuming increased self-acceptance will also reduce
levels of anger may be wrong. Rather, anger has an independent role and requires
separate intervention. Having said this, there was a indication from the self-esteem
difference score that some beliefs related to the self do have an association with anger.
These appeared related to beliefs regarding not being good enough, rather than absolute
low self-esteem. However, the assessment of this relationship is limited by the lack of
detailed framework of ego-disturbance beliefs (Neenan & Dryden, 1999).
The assessment of the role of impulsiveness proposed by some theories clearly rests on
the definition of this concept, which has been somewhat nebulous. The four items
regarding gratification failed to discriminate between the groups. However, two
achievement items, self-discipline and task obstruction, were significant discriminators,
although the content of these items could be said to be in opposition to the concept of
impulsiveness. Whilst achievement was not significantly correlated with self-harm the
relationship may have been attenuated by the small number of items on this sub-scale.
Certainly, it would be interesting to explore these relationships using the revised
achievement sub-scale. The ambivalence towards change expressed by many
individuals with anger and self-harming is reflected in that the intolerance of self-change
item was a significant discriminator.
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There are a number of limitations to this study. Certainly, the use of single questions to
measure self-control behaviour was inadequate for detailed assessment of these complex
problems. In retrospect, Rosenbaum's (1980) Self-control Schedule containing items
assessing the use of cognition to control emotion, problem solving, self-efficacy, and
delay of gratification, may have been a more appropriate measure. This scale has been
found to correlate with irrational beliefs on the Jones (1968) IBT, with the strongest
association being with frustration reactivity sub-scale, and has the benefits of established
validity and reliability. However, it largely focuses on positive coping skills rather than
dysfunctional behaviour, and does not address problems such as self-harming, eating
problems, and overspending. A second limitation was that the present scale did not make
a clear distinction between the use of potentially dysfunctional methods of coping and
those that were actually perceived as causing problems. This may be one reason why the
expected association between alcohol use and frustration intolerance did not emerge. For
instance, Camatta & Nagoshi (1995) found that a measure of irrational beliefs
significantly predicted alcohol problems but not alcohol use.
Combining different types of self-harm into one question may have reduced the
relationship of specific beliefs and aspects of this behavior. For instance, intolerance of
emotional disturbance may be more associated with cutting than with overdosing
(Sidley, 1998). As regards the structural model of self-harm, it is important to remember
that the meaningfulness of the results is dependent on the adequacy of the model itself,
and the variables included (Quintana & Maxwell, 1999). It should also be noted that
causal paths cannot be specified on the basis of cross-sectional designs, and it is likely
that the relationship between emotions and beliefs may not be entirely directional but
interactive. Lastly, the relatively small numbers of individuals in the self-harm group





Procrastination exemplifies the type of self-defeating behaviour assumed to be
associated with frustration intolerance. Indeed, Ellis and Knaus (1977) suggest that
frustration intolerance beliefs are almost invariably associated with procrastination,
either in a secondary or primary role, and that low frustration tolerance 'constitutes the
main and the most direct cause of procrastination'. That is, people avoid tasks because
of the belief they shouldn't have to do uncomfortable things and that they can't tolerate
the effort and discomfort involved. Self-worth beliefs, as the other main category of
disturbance in REBT, are also assumed to contribute to procrastination. As such, self-
acceptance is dependent on achieving arbitrary criteria for success and approval, leading
to fear of failure and perfectionistic standards. Secondary problems associated with low
self-esteem may arise when individuals condemn themselves for being procrastinators.
Likewise, secondary problems can also involve Frustration-Discomfort intolerance, as
with the intolerance of anxiety resulting from threatened self-esteem.
Although REBT has emphasised the central role of low frustration tolerance, research in
general has tended to focus on self-esteem as the primary cause of procrastination (e.g.
Ferrari, 1991a; 1994). Results do show a relationship between the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem scale and measures of procrastination, although correlations are only low to
moderate (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988; Ferrari, 1991a). Explanations for this
association have varied. Burka and Yuen (1983) suggest that procrastination is a way of
protecting self-esteem based on achievement success, in that lack of preparation can
serve to excuse failure. Such self-handicapping strategies have been described in a
number of areas (Baumeister & Scher, 1988), including preparation for exams (Tice &
Baumeister, 1997). However, it would be expected that such strategies would be
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connected to low self-efficacy, yet self-efficacy regarding academic tasks is unrelated to
procrastination (Milgram, Marshevsky, & Sadeh, 1995). Furthermore, self-handicapping
is not necessarily a function of low self-esteem or fear of failure, and individuals with
high self-esteem may use self-handicapping to enhance self-presentation (Tice, 1991).
Thus, Lay, Kneish, and Zanatta (1992) have suggested that self-handicapping and
procrastination are different types of behavior, with handicapping representing a rational
trade off between self-presentation and achievement. Indeed Mayer (2000) found no
evidence for self-handicapping but rather that individuals would procrastinate if this was
strategically useful.
Social evaluation is often associated with increased anxiety and the aversiveness of
anxiety itselfmay be central in motivating procrastination (McCown & Johnson, 1991).
In a laboratory study, procrastination depended both on the availability of enjoyable
alternatives and the belief that distracting activity would improve the persons mood
(Tice, Bratslavsky & Baumeister, 2001). All participants were found to procrastinate to
some extent, however individuals in the experimental condition, which involved both
distraction and a belief in improved mood, hardly engaged with the task at all. The
authors argue that this indicates procrastination is not simply the indulgence of
immediate gratification but an attempt to manage negative affect. Thus, feeling bad did
not lead to procrastination by reducing task performance, self-efficacy, or from a desire
for self-control, but because it switched priorities to obtaining immediate relief from
negative emotions. However, other evidence regarding the role of anxiety has been
contradictory. A number of studies have shown no relationship between state anxiety
and trait procrastination prior to examinations (Lay, Edwards, Parker, & Endler, 1989;
Lay & Silverman, 1996). Research also shows that phobic patients are willing to pay
eight times more than procrastinators to avoid a task, suggesting that procrastinators and
anxiety disordered patients are not comparable on levels of emotional aversiveness
(Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995).
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One explanation for this contradictory evidence is that procrastinators are not a
homogeneous group. Thus, Solomon and Rothblum (1984) found two factors on their
PASS scale that accounted for most of the variance in self-reported reasons for
procrastinating. These were labelled 'task aversiveness' and 'fear of failure'. Fear of
failure was the largest factor, accounting for 49% of the variance. However, whilst task
aversiveness accounted for only 18% these items were most frequently endorsed,
suggesting that fear of failure is a smaller but more distinct sub-group. The two groups
also had quite distinct relationships with other variables. Fear of failure was significantly
related to anxiety and low self-esteem. In contrast, task aversiveness had no association
with anxiety and only a very low correlation with self-esteem (r = .13). Therefore,
Rothblum (1990) suggests that the relationship between low self-esteem and fear of
failure procrastination is mediated by evaluative anxiety. This acts as a discriminative
cue for avoidance, with the reduction of anxiety in turn reinforcing procrastination.
However, caution is required before assuming fear of failure is the primary cause of
procrastination. Schouwenburg (1995) found that only for individuals high on both fear
of failure and trait procrastination were the two significantly related. Fear of failure
appeared to be relevant only in a particular sub-set of procrastinators and that for most
individuals it is not the main cause (Schouwenburg, 1992). Thus, anxiety may only play
a significant role in a particular sub-group of individuals, those with fear of failure
beliefs. Depressed mood, on the other hand, has been found to have a significant
relationship with both fear of failure and task aversiveness (Solomon & Rothblum,
1984). Indeed, Lay (1995) found a stronger relationship between procrastination and
'dejected' emotions than 'agitated' emotions. However, although he argues low mood is
more characteristic of procrastination than anxiety, he suggests this is a consequence of
procrastination rather than a cause.
Perfectionism and procrastination have also often been linked (Burns, 1989; Ellis &
Knaus 1977), although at first sight they appear to be opposing tendencies. For example,
Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice (1994) suggest that the setting of unrealistically high
goals is likely to increase chances of failure, and consequently greater negative affect
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and avoidance of tasks. However, the evidence of an association using broad measures
of procrastination has been inconsistent, possibly indicating a more complex relationship
(Flett, Hewitt, & Martin, 1995). Thus, Frost et al. (1990) found no significant
relationship between overall scores on their Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale and
procrastination frequency on the PASS, although they were associated with
'procrastination problems'. Examining the six perfectionism sub-scales, they found that
'concern over mistakes' and 'doubts' significantly correlated with procrastination
problems but not frequency. 'Parental expectations' and 'criticism' were more weakly
related to both frequency and problems. Finally, both 'personal standards' and
'organisation' had no correlation with problems a significant negative correlation with
frequency. The PASS fear of failure scale had a significant positive relationship with all
sub-scales, except organisation, and was highest on 'Concern over mistakes' and
'doubts'. Task aversiveness was positively related to all sub-scales, except organisation
and personal standards. Likewise, Stober (1998) found procrastination was correlated
with 'Concern over mistakes'/'doubts' but not with 'parental expectations'/'criticism' or
'personal standards', and was negatively correlated with 'organisation'. Studies using
Hewitt and Flett's (1989) Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale have also produced
similar findings. Of the three sub-scales: self-orientated, other-orientated and socially-
prescribed perfectionism, only socially-prescribed perfectionism was significantly
correlated with PASS frequency and problem scores (Flett, Blankstein Hewitt, &
Koledin, 1992). Socially-prescribed perfectionism was also most strongly related to the
fear of failure factor with task-aversiveness having almost zero correlation with all three
perfectionism scales. Socially-prescribed perfectionism has in turn been associated with
fear of negative evaluation, need for approval, and low self-esteem (Flett, Hewitt,
Blankstein, & O'Brian, 1991; Stumpf & Parker, 2000).
This suggests that 'fear of failure', and the perfectionism sub-scales correlated with this,
are linked by their association with self-evaluation. Indeed, the concept of perfectionism
has often been discussed and defined in terms of critical self-evaluation (Frost et al.,
1990). However, REBT theory would posit that perfectionism is involved with the
290
domains of both self-worth and frustration intolerance. Indeed, it is has been argued that
the essential feature of dysfunctional perfectionism is avoidance of negative
consequences, not just those related with self-evaluation (Terry-Short et al, 1995).
However, this would not explain the absence of a relationship between high standards
and procrastination. One possible explanation is that the high standards items on the
perfectionism scales tend to be phrased in terms of positive preferences rather than as
absolute demands. REBT theory proposes that only the latter is associated with
dysfunctional behaviour. Indeed, there is evidence that interventions aimed at reducing
excessively high priorities placed on activities, such as academic writing, reduces
procrastination (Boice, 1989). Thus, perfectionistic achievement goals may lead to
problems because of unwilling to tolerate sub-optimum work, independent of issues of
self-evaluation. This points to the need for an assessment scale measuring intolerance of
frustrated high standards independent from self-evaluation.
Items on Solomon and Rothblum's 'task aversiveness' scale are similar in concept to
aspects of frustration intolerance, particularly demands for comfort. In this regard,
Milgram, Marshevsky, and Sadeh (1995) have found that task aversiveness, rather than
fear of failure, was most strongly related to task delay. Thus, individuals are more likely
to procrastinate on academic tasks perceived as boring or difficult and on unpleasant
routine everyday tasks (Milgram, Srolof, & Rosenbaum, 1988). Similarly,
procrastinators prefer tasks involving less effort (Lay, 1990). However, it is the
intolerance of discomfort, not just discomfort itself, that is central to the REBT model.
Thus, whilst most individuals prefer to avoid discomfort it is the intolerance of this
despite longer-term consequences that is characteristic of irrational beliefs. This
intolerance arises from irrational beliefs encapsulated as 'I can't stand it, I shouldn't
have to tolerate such discomfort or deprivation'. The REBT model is distinguished from
other cognitive theories in focusing primarily on these absolute evaluations rather than
just the appraisal of task difficulty or self-efficacy. Thus, procrastinators tend to rate
tasks as more aversive compared to non-procrastinators but this is unrelated to objective
academic performance (Lay, 1992).
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It is therefore important to distinguish between functional and dysfunctional
procrastination (Ferrari, 1993). In this respect, Ellis and Knaus (1977) describe
legitimate reasons for delay, including awaiting more information or more favourable
conditions. Although anxiety may be an unhealthy consequence of procrastination,
defining procrastination just in terms of distress (e.g. Bridges & Roig, 1997) is also
problematic since procrastination may reduce short-term anxiety. The definition of Ellis
and Knaus (1977) is preferable, as the needless delay of activities it has been decided are
best carried out. However, it is important to note that the desirability of immediate over
more delayed rewards is a common feature of animal as well as human behaviour
(Rachlin, 1995). Therefore, it might be expected that some degree of procrastination
would be a universal experience. Thus, the problem is not that procrastination occurs,
but why it continues to occur when it leads to difficulties the person wishes to avoid.
Clearly, some individuals will choose to delay tasks because they prefer other short-term
options, or because the consequences of delay are not sufficiently onerous. Therefore,
the definition of dysfunctional procrastination should refer not just to task delay, or the
choice of immediate reward, but behaving as such despite significant long term negative
consequences. This is consistent with recent definitions of irrational beliefs that focus on
their self-defeating consequences for personal goals. That procrastination is not
necessarily problematic or dysfunctional is perhaps reflected in the lack of relationship
between concerns about procrastination and its frequency (Milgram, Gehrman, &
Keinan, 1992), and procrastination and academic performance (Solomon & Rothblum,
1988; Beck, Koons, & Milgrim, 2000). For these reasons, the PASS problem scale may
be more indicative of underlying irrational beliefs than PASS frequency. Similarly, it
may be that only high procrastination scores will reflect dysfunctional behaviour
(Ferrari, 1994).
Procrastination is also associated with other behaviours conceptually related to
frustration intolerance. Thus, procrastination was significantly correlated with
Rosenbaum's (1980) self-control scale, which measures the ability to cope with a range
of unpleasant tasks (Ferrari & Emmons, 1995). Further, dysfunctional impulsiveness,
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characterised by careless responding and disorderliness, is highly correlated to avoidant
procrastination (Ferrari, 1993), whilst functional impulsiveness (Dickman, 1990),
characterised by risk taking and enthusiasm, is not. Procrastination has also been linked
with oppositional behaviour resulting from hostility and resentment. Such behaviour is
characteristic of passive-aggressive personality, the criteria for which specifically refer
to procrastination and non-completion of tasks. Whilst acknowledging that hostility
based procrastination may occur, Ellis and Knaus (1977) suggest this is infrequent.
Nevertheless, they also note the close association of anger with frustration tolerance
beliefs, particularly regarding fairness. Consistent with this, Ferrari et al. (1995) did find
a significant, although low correlation (r = .19) between anger and procrastination.
Milgram et al. (1988) also noted an association between 'covert negativism', resentful
coercion, and everyday procrastination. Ferrari and Emmons (1994) found a very low
but significant relationship between revenge and procrastination, although this was not
replicated in a second sample. There was also an association, again relatively low,
between just world beliefs and procrastination. Lastly, hostility has also been considered
important dysfunctional characteristic of Type A behaviour, which itself has been
associated with some aspects of procrastination (McCown, Johnson, & Petzel, 1989).
The model of procrastination proposed by Ellis and Knaus (1977) was based on REBT
theory rather than empirical evidence. Research regarding cognitive beliefs in
procrastination, and specifically frustration intolerance, is limited. Ferrari and Emmons
(1994) found no relationship between irrational beliefs, as measured by the Irrational
Beliefs Inventory (Newark et al., 1973) and procrastination. Likewise, Beswick,
Rothblum, and Mann (1988) found an almost zero correlation between a behavioural
measure of procrastination, the time taken to submit a paper, and a measure of irrational
beliefs (Ellis Scale of Irrational Cognitions; Macdonald, & Games, 1972). The
correlation with self-reported procrastination was significant but small, and multiple
regression analysis indicated that self-esteem accounted for most of the variance and
irrational beliefs very little. However, Solomon and Rothblum (1984) did find a
significant correlation between total procrastination scores on the PASS and the Ellis
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Scale. Similarly, research on the relationship between perfectionism and low frustration
intolerance has also been inconsistent, Thus, Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, and Koledin
(1991), using the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1969), found frustration intolerance
specifically associated with self-orientated perfectionism. However, a further study
using the Survey of Personal Beliefs (Demaria et ah, 1989) produced different findings,
with self-orientated perfectionism correlated to demandingness.
A major limitation of these studies is the use of inadequate measures of irrational belief.
Both of these scales simply sum responses to Ellis' original eleven examples of
'irrational beliefs'. Scales employing such simplified and outdated belief statements do
not reflect current theory and are poor measures of irrational cognition. More
importantly, they view irrational beliefs as a unidimensional construct failing to
adequately distinguish between self-worth and frustration intolerance. A study by
Bridges and Roig (1997) did aim to rectify this by using a multi-dimensional scale, the
Irrational Beliefs Inventory (Koopermans, Sanderman, Timmerman, & Emmelkamp,
1994). However, this scale uses pooled items from older scales and therefore lacks a
cohesive theoretical framework and continues to reflect outdated definitions of irrational
belief. Nevertheless, they did find that 'problem avoidance', the sub-scale conceptually
closest to frustration intolerance, was the only one to significantly correlate with
procrastination.
This review suggests that a number of Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales may be
involved in procrastination. REBT theory points to the comfort sub-scale being most
associated with procrastination and task aversiveness. Likewise, emotional discomfort
may be involved in secondary problems, with intolerance of anxiety arising from either
threats to self-worth or to future comfort. The possible role of anger and resentment in
procrastination would implicate the entitlement sub-scale, since this is a significant
predictor of anger independent of self-esteem. The separation of entitlement into
gratification and fairness sub-scales, in the revised scale, also enables separate
evaluation of these beliefs. REBT theory highlights the importance of short-term
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hedonism and demands for immediate gratification, and excitement in a range of
dysfunction, including procrastination (Ellis & Knaus, 1977). However, these terms are
used very generally to describe many different aspects of frustration and discomfort
intolerance, and it is unclear what role the pursuit of positive gratification itself plays in
procrastination. Lastly, evidence links achievement/perfectionistic demands with
procrastination. However, the strongest relationship has been with sub-scales, such as
socially prescribed perfectionism, most associated with self-evaluation. Perfectionism
sub-scales related to high-standards have either had no relationship, or a negative
relationship, with procrastination. However, as discussed in chapter two, it is unclear
how far these scales are representative of frustration intolerance achievement beliefs, or
whether they are assessing adaptive preferences for achievement.
8.2 METHOD
8.2.1 DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS
A correlational, cross-sectional design was employed. One hundred and seventy-five
psychology undergraduate students completed questionnaires as part of their courses in
abnormal psychology. Data was taken from both the preliminary scale study and the
revised scale study, which is described in chapter 10. Two students, one from each
study, failed to return all sections of the questionnaires. There was one outlier (708),
with very low scores across all scales suggestive of careless responding. These cases
were excluded from further analysis, leaving one hundred and seventy-two: Eighty-six




The preliminary or the revised Frustration-Discomfort Scales were completed by the
respective groups of students. Students in the revised scale study also completed the
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. In addition, the Procrastination Assessment Scale-
Students was completed by all students (PASS; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984). The PASS
is the most commonly used measure of academic procrastination. There are two
sections, which were modified for the present study. The first part assesses in six areas
the frequency of procrastination and the degree to which this is a problem. Normative
data indicate the first three areas, referring specifically to academic tasks, are the most
relevant, and in this study only these questions were included. The change from rating
'anxiety' to rating 'problems' resulting from procrastination had confounded affective
and behavioral responses (Rothblum, Solomon, & Murakami, 1986). Therefore,
following the advice of the authors the original 'problem' rating was used.'The second
part of the scale asks students to rate reasons for procrastinating on an essay. Twenty-six
items cover thirteen types of motivation including task aversiveness/frustration
intolerance, evaluation anxiety, and self-confidence. Alpha reliability has been reported
for both frequency (.71) and reasons (.81) and the scale has been demonstrated to be a
valid measure of academic procrastination in numerous studies (e.g. Brownlow &
Reasinger, 2000).
8.2.3 PROCEDURE
The results from both versions of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale were separately
analysed, enabling the relationship between these and procrastination to be validated
across both measures. The combined data of 172 students was also used to investigate
the factor structure of the PASS scale. This was thought necessary because Solomon and
Rothblum (1984) original study had a number of methodological weaknesses. Firstly,
given the multidimensional nature of the scale, the decision regarding the number of
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factors to retain is crucial in determining the final factor structure. However, their
reliance on an eigenvalue greater than one criterion is likely to lead to the inclusion of
irrelevant and unstable factors (Comrey, 1978). It has been recommended that other
methods, such as the Scree test, are also employed (Kline, 1994). The suspicion that too
many factors were included is supported by the fact that of the seven factors just two
accounted for most of the variance: 'Fear of failure' had 49.4% and 'task aversiveness'
18% of the variance. Unfortunately, the variance of the other factors was not reported,
although all had eigenvalues below 1.5. This suggests that a two or three-factor solution
might have been more appropriate. A second weakness is that, although reliability data
is lacking, the study did indicate that many of the items had very low endorsement, with
twelve items having less than 10% of replies in the two highest scoring categories. Such
skewed frequency distributions are very likely to distort the correlation matrix and the
eigenvalue criterion (Comrey, 1978).
8.3 RESULTS
8.4 PROCRASTINATION FREQUENCY AND PROBLEM SUB-SCALES
8.4.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Whilst procrastination on some activities is clearly commonplace, the problems resulting
from this are less pronounced (table 8.1). The high level of procrastination on reading
assignments in the present study probably reflects differences in course requirements for
American students. Defining generalised procrastination as high scores (4 or 5) on
exams and essays 34.9% of students frequently procrastinate on both tasks. However,
only 18.6% of students have problems on both tasks due to procrastination. Although
Rothblum et al., (1986) report that substantial numbers of students procrastinate (40%),
they define high procrastination as high scores on both procrastination frequency and
procrastination problems in exams. However, they describe problems in terms of
1 Personal communication (Solomon, 1997)
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anxiety. Since 'anxiety' is a common experience prior to exams, and includes 'healthy'
arousal, confounding this with procrastination will tend to inflate numbers. The present
figure of 16.9% of students with high problem scores for both exams and essays is
perhaps a more conservative estimate of generalised academic procrastination.
Table 8.1 Procrastination problems and frequency: Percentage of students scoring





The Total PASS score mean was 19.7 (SD 4.2). The sample consisted of 25.8% male
and 74.2% female students, with no mean gender difference in total PASS scores (t
(130) = .62, n.s.), consistent with previous research (Ferrari et al., 1995). The mean
procrastination frequency was 10.54, (SD 2.36), which was significantly higher than the
procrastination problems mean score of 9.20 (SD 2.44) (t (171) = 7.41, p < .001). There
was one low scoring outlier (Z = 3.25) which was retained in the analysis. The
distribution for the PASS total scores is shown in figure 8.1. The skewness and kurtosis

















Figure 8.1 Distribution of PASS scores
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PASS scores
8.5 PROCRASTINATION REASONS SUB-SCALE
8.5.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
A frequency analysis revealed that nine items had less than 10% of responses in the two
highest scale points: Q(22) others expectations, Q(20) resent deadlines, Q(18) deadline
challenge, Q(14) peer resentment, Q(12) deadline excitement, Q( 11) information
difficulty, Q(7) resent assignments, Q(13) choice difficulty, and Q(3) advice. Poor
frequency distributions for these items are also reported in the test norms. Apart from
Q(11), internal consistency was also poor for these items, and their corrected inter-item
correlations (< 0.30) would be considered too low (Nunnally, 1978).
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8.5.2 FACTOR ANALYSIS
The nine items with inadequate frequency distributions were removed and the remaining
items subjected to a principal component analysis using varimax rotation. The sample
size (n = 172) was adequate in terms of sample size to number of variables ratio, which
exceeds Gorsuch's (1983) recommended level of 10:1. It also exceeds the recommended
subjects to factors ratio of 20:1 that some researchers argue is a more important criteria
(Arrindel & Van de Ende, 1985). The Kaiser-Maeyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy (.830) and the Bartlett Sphericity test (p < .001) were both acceptable. The
scree test was used as the primary criteria for retaining factors.
Table 8.2 Reasons for procrastination scale: Eigenvalues and percentage variance
Factor
I II III IV
Percentage variance 26.83 16.19 10.34 6.18
Eigenvalue 4.56 2.75 1.76 1.05
Four factors had eigenvalues above one, however there is a substantial drop after the
second factor and the final factor is only just above the criterion (table 8.2). The scree
plot indicates three factors lie above the scree line (figure 8.2). Given that the eigenvalue
criteria generally overestimates the number of factors, this suggests that three is the
maximum number (Zwick & Velicer, 1986).
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Figure 8.2 Scree plot of eigenvalues
Component Number
The three and two factor solutions were compared, and the factor loadings and
communalities (the total amount of variance of an item shared with other variables in the
analysis) for the three factor solution shown in table 8.3. Examination of the third factor
items suggests these represent positive reasons for procrastinating. Thus, the highest
loading item and that most clearly defining the factor refers to waiting for more
information from the lecturer. However, this is the only pure item, and the remaining
items load on the other factors, particularly factor I. This suggest that these items reflect
a mixture of constructive concern regarding information and evaluative anxiety.
The first two factors consisted of five items with very good factor loadings (> .60). In
addition, these factors were well defined with each item loading only on its own factor.
The five items on factor I matched the items on Rothblum and Solomon (1984) 'fear of
failure' factor, reflecting performance evaluation issues as the essential feature. The top
three items on factor II also match the items on Rothblum and Solomon 'task
aversiveness' factor. Since, item loadings below .5 are not reported by these authors, it is
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unclear if the present items loaded at a lower level on this factor. Nevertheless,
examination of item wording suggests that all involve issues of discomfort. Indeed, the
highest loading item 'feeling too lazy' is almost synonymous with the frustration
intolerance comfort sub-scale. The item 'feeling overwhelmed by the task' loads
relatively equally on aversiveness and fear of failure. This is consistent with both factor
concepts, since feeling 'overwhelmed' could relate to the task being percieved as 'too
hard and uncomfortable' (frustration intolerance) or the person being inadequate for the
task (self-worth).
The analysis points to two dysfunctional procrastination factors each defined by five
items, with a weaker third factor reflecting functional procrastination. The first two
factors were used in subsequent analyses as a modified version of the scale. There was
no significant correlation between the two factors (r (171) = .11) suggesting they
represent orthogonal dimensions. Coefficient alphas were good to acceptable (Oliver &
Benet-Martinez, 2000), and the item-corrected correlations were high indicating good
internal constancy between sub-scale items (table 8.4). The task aversiveness sub-scale
mean was 13.70 (SD 4.46) and the fear of failure mean was 12.00 (SD 5.26). The fear of
failure distribution was significantly positively skewed (Z = 2.46). However, this level
of skewness in large samples is unlikely to substantially effect the analysis, therefore no
transformations were made (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). Distributions for each sub-
scale are shown in figures 8.3 and 8.4.
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Table 8.3 Reasons for procrastination: Factor loadings (>.30) and communalities (h2)
Factor
Item I II III h2
21 Concerned wouldn't meet own expectations .846 .733
24 Worried wouldn't meet own high standards .792 .628
15 Didn't trust yourself to do a good job .792 .735
6 Worried would get bad grade .717 .612
1 Concerned lecturer would not like work .712 .521
4 Had too many other things to do -.375 .226
24 Felt too lazy .764 .667
9 Really dislike writing essays .685 .524
16 Didn't have the energy to begin .683 .496
25 Pressured by friends to do other things .657 .542
16 Felt would it just takes too long .643 .491
10 Felt overwhelmed by the task .369 .530 .330 .526
23 Waiting for more information from lecturer .723 .563
2 Unsure what to include in essay .381 .672 .599
5 Difficulty asking lecturer for information .310 .597 .453
8 Didn't think had sufficient knowledge to begin .302 .515 .407
17 Classmates had not stated essay either .357 .450 .347
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Table 8.4 Procrastination reasons sub-scales: Corrected item-total correlations and
coefficient alpha
Factor I: Fear of failure Factor II: Task aversiveness
21 Own expectations .793














Alpha =.867 Alpha = .743
Figure 8.3 Task aversiveness distribution
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Figure 8.4 Fear of failure distribution
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8.5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PASS PROCRASTINATION SCALES
Using the combined groups from both studies, fear of failure and task aversiveness were
both significantly correlated with procrastination problem rating, although fear of failure
was more weakly related to procrastination frequency (table 8.5). However, when the
two groups of students were analysed separately marked differences were found, and
this will be examined later.
Table 8.5 Correlations between procrastination reasons and the frequency and problems
sub-scales
Fear of failure Task aversiveness
Frequency
Problem
PASS total 29*** 52***
53***
34***
N = 171 *p < .05; ***p<.001
305
Examining the three academic tasks, task aversiveness was significantly correlated with
procrastination on all three tasks, for both frequency (table 8.6) and problems (table 8.7).
However, fear of failure is only weakly associated with procrastination frequency, and
only on some academic tasks and not others. Thus, fear of failure is related to delaying
writing essays but not revising exams. This is contrary to expectations since, if
procrastination is related to avoidance of anxiety, exams would be expected to generate
greater evaluative fear. On the other hand, fear of failure is significantly correlated with
procrastination problems across all tasks. One explanation for these differences is that
fear of failure may be acting to motivate work, particularly in situations were there is
higher evaluative threat.
Table 8.6 Correlations between procrastination reasons and frequency sub-scale
Essay Exam Reading






N = 171 *p < 0.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 8.7 Correlations between procrastination reasons and problem sub-scale
Essay Exam Reading




N= 171 **p < .01; ***p < .001
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8.6 RELATIONSHIP OF PROCRASTINATION TO FRUSTRATION
INTOLERANCE
8.6.1 PRELIMINARY FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
Only the comfort scale was significantly correlated with the two PASS scales (table 8.8).
It is notable that achievement frustration had no significant association with
procrastination frequency or problems. Likewise, the lack of relationship between
emotional discomfort and the procrastination scores suggests that task delay is not
associated with anxiety avoidance. The same pattern was found when the three academic
tasks were separately analysed.
Table 8.8 Correlations between Frustration-Discomfort and PASS scores
PASS PASS PASS
Total score Frequency Problems
Emotional discomfort .14 .11 .14
Entitlement .17 .19 .12
Comfort .36*** .31** 32**
Achievement -.09 .08 -.08
Total score .20 .18 .17
N = 86 **p < .01; ***p < .001
The relationship between fear of failure, task aversiveness, and frustration intolerance
supports the conceptual separation of these scales (table 8.9). The Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales, and particularly comfort, were more strongly associated with
task aversiveness than with fear of failure, although emotional discomfort was equally
associated with both types of procrastination. Achievement had a negligible relationship
with task aversiveness, and a stronger although non-significant relationship with fear of
failure. Onwuegbuzie (2000) found similar result using the Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt
& Flett, 1989), in which fear of failure but not task aversiveness with associated with
both the self-orientated and socially-prescribed sub-scales.
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Table 8.9 Correlations between Frustration-Discomfort scores and reasons for
procrastination
Fear of failure Task aversiveness




Total score .27* 45***
N = 86 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
The relationship of individual Frustration-Discomfort items and types of procrastination
is shown in table 8.10. For clarity, only correlations with task aversiveness p < .001 are
shown. Two gratification items were significant, although items referring to excitement
were not correlated with procrastination. Personal flaws, which was dropped from the
scale because of its strong correlation with both self-esteem and frustration disturbance,
was related to both types of procrastination.
Table 8.10 Correlations between Frustration-Discomfort items and procrastination
reasons sub-scale
Sub-scale Task aversiveness Fear of failure
46 Easy solutions comfort 42*** .25*
18 Task hassle comfort 44*** .14
27 Extra problems emotional 4Q*** .28*
66 Difficult tasks comfort 3g*** .15
54 Effort comfort 3g*** .08
58 Persistence comfort 2g*** -.01
72 Indulge entitlement 3g*** .10
61 Gratification delay entitlement 35*** .09
56 Personal flaws 43*** 34***
48 Excitement .07 .01
3 Boring tasks -.16 .16
21 Buzz .18 -.02
N = 86 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Differentiation of high procrastination by individual items was examined by dividing the
sample into two groups based on procrastination problem scores (table 8.11). The items
predicting high procrastination problems largely came from the comfort sub-scale. It can
be seen that one achievement item, Q(12) unfinished work, was significantly predicted
lower procrastination problems. Neither Q(61) gratification delay or Q(72) indulgence
predicted procrastination problems (t (84) = 1.65 and 1.87, ns). However, indulgence but
not gratification delay was associated with higher frequency of procrastination (t (84) =
2.25, p < .05, and 1.32, ns). Similarly, neither item was significantly correlated with
problems, whereas both indulgence and gratification delay were correlated with
frequency (r (86) = .25, p < .05, and .22, p < .05).
Table 8.11 Frustration-Discomfort items distinguishing high and low procrastination
problem scores (n = 35/51)
Scale item Sub-scale t
46 Easy solutions comfort 3.56***
49 Time pressure comfort 2.89**
54 Effort comfort 2.76**
66 Difficult tasks comfort 2.31*
22 Freedom from hassle comfort 2.18*
14 continuing situation emotional 2.08*
56 Personal flaws 3.07**
12 Unfinished work achievement -2.45*
N = 86 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
8.6.2 FEAR OF FAILURE AND FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE INTERACTION
The specificity of the relationship between frustration intolerance beliefs and
procrastination was investigated. Controlling for fear of failure, partial correlations
indicated that comfort beliefs were still significantly related to procrastination problems
(pr (82) = .23, p < .05) and to frequency (pr (82) = .32, p < .01). When comfort beliefs
were controlled for, fear of failure continued to be significantly correlated with
procrastination problems (pr (82) = .24, p < .05) but not frequency (pr (82) = -.04, ns).
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To further examine the unique variance of the separate beliefs a simultaneous multiple
regression analysis was conducted. When Frustration-Discomfort beliefs were entered as
a block only comfort proved to be a significant predictor of procrastination problems
(table 8.12 and procrastination frequency (table 8.13). Although achievement
approached significance as a predictor of reduced frequency.
Table 8.12 Multiple regression analysis: Procrastination problems
Variables t P B
Entered
Emotional discomfort 0.69 .491 -.11
Entitlement 0.44 .660 -.06
Comfort 3.23 .002 .52
Achievement 1.66 .101 -.20
Multiple R = .40
R2 =.16
F (4,81) = 3.92, p<.01
Table 8.13 Multiple regression analysis: Procrastination frequency
Variables t P B
Entered
Emotional discomfort 1.09 .277 -.17
Entitlement 0.71 .477 -.10
Comfort 2.80 .006 .45
Achievement 1.84 .070 -.22
Multiple R = .40
R2 =.16
F (4,81) = 3.81, p < .01
To determine the independence of frustration intolerance from self-evaluation a
hierarchical analysis was conducted in which fear of failure was entered on step 1 and
the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales entered on step 2. Comfort remained a significant
predictor for both procrastination problems (table 8.14) and frequency (table 8.15),. For
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problems, the frustration block added 13% additional variance compared from 8% from
fear of failure. For frequency, the frustration block added 16% additional variance,
whilst the contribution from fear of failure was negligible. Achievement frustration was
a significant predictor of reduced procrastination controlling for fear of failure.
Table 8.14 Multiple regression analysis: Predicting procrastination problems
Variables t P 13
Entered
Step 1
Fear of failure 2.74 .008 .29
Step 2
Emotional discomfort 1.30 .197 -.20
Entitlement 0.01 .991 .02
Comfort 2.79 .007 .44
Achievement 1.99 .049 -.24
Step 1: Multiple R = .29, R2 = .08, Fcha(l,83) = 7.50, p < .01
Step 2: Multiple R = .461, R2cha = .13, Fcha(4,79) = 3.24, p < .05
Table 8.15 Multiple regression analysis: Predicting procrastination frequency
Variables t P 13
Entered
Step 1
Fear of failure 0.21 .836 .02
Step 2
Emotional discomfort 1.14 .260 -.18
Entitlement 0.67 .508 -.10
Comfort 2.85 .006 .46
Achievement 1.78 .079 -.22
Step 1: Multiple R = .05, R2 = .01, Fcha(l,83) = 0.17, ns
Step 2: Multiple R = .16, R2Cha = .16, Fcha(4,79) = 3.83, p < .01
The interaction between high scores on fear of failure and comfort was examined by
dividing the groups by median splits on exam procrastination problems (table 8.16).
Significantly fewer students with high scores on failure/low on comfort had exam
procrastination problems, compared to those high on both dimensions (x2 (1) = 4.77, p <
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.05; Cramer's V = -.33). A similar analysis for exam procrastination frequency was not
significant.
Table 8.16 Comparing students classified as high/low on fear of failure/comfort and
high/low on exam procrastination problems
Exam problems
Low % High %
High on both fear/comfort























The interaction between total problem scores and students classified as high/low on fear
of failure and comfort is presented in figure 8.5. As can be seen, students with high
scores on both dimensions (r (31) = .23), or with high comfort/low fear of failure (r (14)
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= .44), had a positive association with procrastination. In contrast, the slope for high
fear/low comfort is negative (r (14) = -.31) indicating a tendency for individuals with
high fear of failure, when comfort scores are low, to procrastinate less. Clearly, the
numbers are small for statistical analysis and in the revised scale population this
relationship was not replicated. However, it does suggest for some individuals that fear
of failure, when not accompanied by discomfort intolerance, may reduce problematic
procrastination.
8.6.3 REVISED FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
Comparing the study on the preliminary scale to the revised scale study, it was found
that the correlations between reasons for procrastination and PASS scales were
noticeably different (table 8.17). In particular, the relative importance of task
aversiveness compared to fear of failure was reversed with task aversiveness having a
weaker relationship with procrastination. However, mean scores did not significantly
differ between the two groups on total PASS scores or reasons for procrastinating.
Table 8.17 Correlations between reasons for procrastination and PASS scales for student
samples I and II
Fear of failure Task aversiveness












Both groups N = 86 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
In comparison with the preliminary study, the relationship between the revised
Frustration-Discomfort scales and the reasons for procrastination was also muted. On the
four-factor scale, only the comfort sub-scale was significantly correlated with task
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aversiveness, and fear of failure was not significantly correlated with any of the
Frustration-Discomfort scales (table 8.18).
Table 8.18 Correlations between revised Frustration-Discomfort scores and reasons for
procrastination
Fear of failure Task aversiveness




Total four factor score .19 .20
Gratification .10 .21*
Fairness .08 .11
Total five factor score
N = 86 **p < .01
The relationship between PASS and Frustration-Discomfort scores is shown in table
8.19. Consistent with the preliminary scale, comfort was significantly correlated with
procrastination problems and overall PASS scores, although it failed to reach
significance with procrastination frequency. Surprisingly, a notable difference from the
preliminary scale was that emotional discomfort, achievement, and entitlement were
negatively correlated with procrastination frequency, although only for achievement was
this relationship significant. This is reflected in the total Frustration-Discomfort score
which had a negative correlation with frequency but a significantly positive correlation
with problems.
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Table 8.19 Correlations between revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale, self-esteem, and
PASS scores
PASS PASS PASS
Total score Frequency Problems
Emotional discomfort .08 -.18 .25*
Entitlement -.10 -.21 .04
Comfort .31** .18 34**
Achievement -.13 -.26* .03
Total four-factor score .05 -.14 .21*
Gratification .04 -.01 .06
Fairness -.12 -.26* .05
Total five-factor score. .04 -.13 .19
Rosenberg self-esteem _ 42*** -.25* _ 45***
N = 86 (Rosenberg N = 83) *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
The difference between procrastination frequency and problems is illustrated by the
analysis of individual items distinguishing between high/low procrastination. The items
distinguishing high problem scores are shown in table 8.20. As in the preliminary scale,
comfort and emotional discomfort items were predictive of high problem scores. This
suggests that problem procrastination is related to avoidance of emotional distress or the
avoidance of difficulty and hassles. Examination of procrastination frequency also
shows that the comfort items are associated with increased procrastination frequency
(table 8.21). However, it can be observed that the achievement and emotional discomfort
items have a negative relationship and are therefore predictive of lower rates of
procrastination. Interestingly, one item Q(l) painful memories, has a positive
relationship with problems and a negative relationship with frequency.
Analysing the two entitlement facets separately showed that fairness is significantly
related to reduced frequency, but no significant relation to problems. Gratification also
had little relationship with any of the PASS scales, although individual items did show
some association. Thus, Q(3) gratification delay was weakly correlated with
procrastination frequency (r (86) = .22, p < .05) and problems (r (86) = .21, ns).
However, it was not predictive of either high problem or frustration scores (t (84) = .68
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and .26, ns) Likewise, Q(37) indulgence was significantly correlated with frequency (r
(86) = .25, p < .05) but not problems (r (86) = .14, ns), and was predictive of high
procrastination frequency but not problems (t (84) = 2.28, p < .05 and .63, ns).
Table 8.20 Revised Frustration-Discomfort items distinguishing low and high
procrastination problem scores (n = 37/49).
Scale item Sub-scale t
19 Difficult tasks comfort 2.45*
40 Task hassle comfort 2.57*
14 Easy solutions comfort 2 7Q***
1 Painful memories emotional 2.11*
25 Disturbing feelings emotional 3.43***
13 Thoughts emotional 4.20***
18 Upsetting situations emotional 2.08*
N = 86 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 8.21 Revised Frustration-Discomfort items distinguishing low and high
procrastination frequency scores (n = 36/50).
19 Difficult tasks comfort 2.19*
14 Easy solutions comfort 2.06*
1 Painful memories emotional -2.24*
43 Emotional control emotional -2.73**
12 Potential achievement -2.33*
24 Unfinished work achievement -2.32*
36 Indulgence gratification 2.28*
37 Disrespect entitlement -2.07*
8.6.4 ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL ACADEMIC TASKS
Correlation analysis of the revised Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales with individual
academic tasks, showed that achievement frustration was significantly related to lower
procrastination frequency on both essays and exams (table 8.22). As regards exams and
essays, it can be observed that comfort was related to procrastination problems and self-
esteem to both increased problems and frequency. However, high achievement
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frustration appeared to reduce the frequency of procrastination on exams and essay
preparation.






Emotional discomfort .18 .20 .21* -.17 -.12 .01
Entitlement -.05 .05 .10 -.34** -.13 -.01
Comfort .28** .30** .20 .08 .13 .23*
Achievement -.03 -.03 .14 -.25* -.24* -.11
Self-esteem -.33** 29*** -.33** -.19 -.27* -.14
N = 86 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
8.6.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE AND SELF-
ESTEEM
The failure to include a self-esteem scale in the first study limited the analysis of ego
disturbance and frustration intolerance interaction. This was remedied in the second
study. As before, attention was paid to the Rosenberg scoring patterns, given their
vulnerability to response errors (Marsh, 1996), although student response errors were
low compared to patients. There was one total score outlier and one discrepancy score
outlier, which were removed from the analysis. The mean was 30.27 (SD = 4.99),
consistent with norms from other student samples (e.g. Bagley, Bolitho, & Bertrand,
1997). Low self-esteem was significantly related to fear of failure (r (83) = .46, p < .01)
and to a lesser extent with comfort (r (83) = -.25, p < .05), but not task aversiveness (r
(83) = -.12). Self-esteem was significantly related to procrastination problems, and
procrastination frequency (table 8.18). Partial correlation analysis indicated that self-
esteem continued to be significantly correlated to total PASS scores when controlling for
fear of failure (pr (80) = .29, p < .01). This suggests that self-esteem is not fully
mediated by fear of failure and that other beliefs related to self-worth are involved in
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procrastination. Likewise, comfort remained significantly correlated to total PASS
scores when controlling for aversiveness (pr (80) = .22, p < .05).
Multiple regression was conducted to determine whether Frustration-Discomfort beliefs
predicted procrastination independent from self-worth. The Frustration-Discomfort sub-
scales were entered along with self-esteem, using procrastination problems as the
criterion measure. Only comfort and self-esteem remained significant predictors, (table
8.23). Comfort and self-esteem again remained significant predictors when
procrastination frequency was employed as the criterion. Emotional discomfort was a
significant predictor of lower procrastination frequency, with achievement approaching
significance (table 8.24). Altogether, self-esteem and comfort accounted for 25% of the
variance in procrastination problems (Multiple R = .50, R2cha = .25, Fcha(2,80) = 13.49,
p < .001) and 7.5% in frequency (Multiple R = .27, R2cha = .08, Fcha (2,80) = 3.24, p <
.05).
Table 8.23 Multiple regression analysis: Procrastination problems
Variables t P B
Entered
Self-esteem 3.67 .001 -.44
Emotional discomfort 0.37 .712 -.06
Entitlement 0.73 .466 -.09
Comfort 2.72 .008 .33
Achievement 0.96 .340 -.12
Multiple R = .54
R2 = .29
F (5,77) = 6.18, p<.001
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Multiple R = .56
R2 =.31
F (5,77) = 6.91, p < .001
A simultaneous multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship
of the five factor model to procrastination problems. However, it explained little
additional variance compared to the four-factor model (R2dif = .02; frequency R2dif =
.03) and relationships between variables remained essentially the same. Gratification
was not associated with either procrastination frequency (t (84) = 1.23, p = .222,13 = .17)
or problems (t (84) = 1.31, = .193,13 = -.19).
8.7 DISCUSSION
An objective of this study was to validate the preliminary and revised Frustration-
Discomfort Scales against an established procrastination measure. Analysis of the PASS
scale obtained two well-defined sub-scales that conceptually corresponded with the
REBT categories of self-worth/frustration intolerance. Both versions of the Frustration-
Discomfort Scale were differentially correlated with the task aversiveness scale as
compared to fear of failure, supporting convergent and discriminative validity. As
predicted by REBT theory both self-worth and frustration intolerance were involved in
procrastination. Both categories of belief, when each was respectively controlled,
significantly predicted procrastination problems. Furthermore, the Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales were differentially related with procrastination, with comfort
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remaining a significant predictor of both procrastination problems and frequency after
controlling for self-esteem. This supports the usefulness of employing a
multidimensional measure of frustration intolerance.
The relationship of achievement frustration with procrastination was of particular
interest. In the preliminary study, achievement had a negligible correlation with both
frequency and procrastination frequency. When controlling for fear of failure in a
multiple regression analysis, achievement was a significant predictor of reduced
procrastination problems. In the revised scale study, in which the achievement scale was
lengthened by the addition of further items, the relationship with reduced procrastination
was more pronounced. Thus, achievement was significantly correlated with reduced
frequency of procrastination, and approached significance in the multiple regression
analysis when controlling for self-esteem. There was no significant relationship to
procrastination problems. These findings are consistent with perfectionism research
which has often shown no relationship between the 'personal standards' sub-scale and
procrastination problems and a significant negative correlation with frequency (Frost et
al., 1990). In general, perfectionistic beliefs referring specifically to high standards do
not to correlate with measures of procrastination (e.g. Stober, 1998) and are frequently
unrelated or to have a negative correlation with emotional disturbance (Minarik &
Ahrens, 1996; Enns & Cox, 1999). Indeed, self-orientated perfectionism is associated
with improved problem solving and resourcefulness (Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, Solnik, &
Brunschot, 1996). On the other hand, perfectionism sub-scales linked with self-
evaluation are consistently related to maladjustment, avoidance of problem solving (e.g.
Hewitt & Flett, 1991), as well as procrastination (Flett et al., 1992). The present
achievement scale was aimed to assess dysfunctional perfectionistic beliefs separate
from self-evaluation. The results indicate that demands for high standards, and
intolerance of these being frustrated, reduce the frequency of procrastination but have no
effect on reported problems due to procrastination.
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This lack of association between the achievement sub-scale and procrastination raises
some theoretical questions, since REBT theory has emphasised the close relationship
between perfectionism and demandingness, as well as with procrastination (Ellis &
Knaus, 1977). Thus, Ellis (2002) describes perfectionists as holding irrational beliefs
more rigidly and persistently, and in this sense perfectionism may be said to be almost
synonymous with demandingness. However, these results suggest that to consider
demandingness as invariably counterproductive may be overly simplistic. Indeed, the
significant relationship between achievement and reduced procrastination frequency
suggests that holding demanding beliefs may productive. It might be argued that the
revised scale items do not directly refer to demands, however the preliminary
achievement sub-scale, whose items did refer to demands, also showed no evidence of a
positive relationship with procrastination. It might also be argued that achievement
demands, whilst motivating goal performance, may be associated with other costs. Thus,
individuals high on achievement frustration may procrastinate less but this may be
associated with other problems such as overworking or experiencing increased anxiety
in relation to their work.
The relationship of emotional discomfort with procrastination is also relevant to this
issue. Thus, emotional discomfort in the revised scale study was related to both
increased problems and to decreased procrastination frequency, although the latter failed
to reach significance. The reduction of procrastination frequency was particularly found
with essays and exams. A possible explanation is that increased anxiety, and intolerance
of this, may motivate the individual to work. This would be consistent with other studies
that have shown a negative association between avoidant coping and intolerance of
arousal, and procrastination (Burns et al., 2000). However, the relationship between
emotional discomfort and procrastination was not robust, and there was no significant
relationship between this and either procrastination frequency or problems in the
preliminary study. Other research has also failed to find an association between
depression (Owens & Newbiggin, 2000) or negative affect and procrastination (Pschyl et
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al., 2000). Indeed, Lay (1995) concludes that, in general, affect plays only a minor role
in procrastination.
The interaction of fear of failure and comfort beliefs also suggested a complex
interrelationship, both between the belief categories and with situational factors. Overall,
compared to fear of failure task aversiveness was more strongly related to
procrastination frequency, whilst both were equally related to problems. However, in the
preliminary study a combination of low comfort scores and high fear of failure led to a
negative relationship between fear of failure and procrastination problems. This suggests
that, given good frustration tolerance, fear of failure may also serve to reduce
procrastination. As with emotional discomfort, the relationship between fear of failure
and procrastination was also influenced by the situation, with fear of failure having a
weaker correlation with exam procrastination compared to essays. Milgram and
Toubiana (1999) found a similar result for homework, in that the more students were
anxious the less they procrastinated, but the reverse regarding exams.
Schouwenburg and Groenewoud (2001) suggest procrastination is related to the
tendency to discount future rewards combined with low Conscientiousness personality
trait (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995). Indeed, all of the five-factor Conscientiousness scale
facets have an inverse relationship with procrastination (Johnson & Bloom, 1995). The
present research suggests that whilst high achievement may reduce procrastination
frequency this relationship is relatively weak. Thus when variance due to achievement is
accounted for, self-esteem and comfort beliefs continue to remain strong predictors of
procrastination frequency. In contrast, when these two variables are controlled,
achievement is only a weak predictor of reduced frequency and unrelated to problems.
The most important influence on whether procrastination is dysfunctional is the presence
of 'irrational' beliefs involving comfort and self-worth. However, one limitation of the
study concerns the most appropriately measure of procrastination. The PASS is a self-
report measure and fails to distinguish between the frequency of functional and
dysfunctional procrastination. A more adequate test of the hypothesis that irrational
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beliefs are associated with dysfunction would be to use an objective measure of
procrastination problems as well as reported frequency.
As regards the other Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales, the entitlement scale, which is
significantly correlated with anger, failed to correlate with any measure of
procrastination. Indeed, of the entitlement facets in the revised scale, fairness had a
significant negative correlation with procrastination frequency. This does not support the
hypothesis of a link between anger and procrastination. There was also mixed support
for procrastination being related to the inability to resist 'immediate gratification'.
Overall, the other entitlement facet, gratification, had virtually no relationship with
either procrastination frequency or problems. However, the 'indulgence' item on both
Frustration-Discomfort scales was significantly related with increased frequency but not
with increased problems with procrastination. Similarly, the 'gratification delay' item on
both scales was not predictive of neither high levels of procrastination problems or
frequency, although it was significantly correlated with increased frequency. Also of
interest is that there was no relationship between the preliminary scale 'excitement',
'boredom', or 'buzz' items and procrastination measures. They also suggest that
excitement/boredom are not related to procrastination, and that 'sensation seeking' is a
separate concept to that of frustration intolerance and the demand for instant
gratification.
These findings suggest that self-indulgence increases the degree with which
procrastination occurs but that this increased frequency is not translated into subsequent
problems. It is also consistent with the argument that procrastination is commonplace
but only a small proportion of this is dysfunctional or results in problems. Thus, whilst
nearly 60% of students reported frequent procrastination only 25% had significant
procrastination problems. Such non-problematic procrastination possibly reflects both
functional procrastination and preference for immediate rewards. However, such short-
term hedonism is only 'irrational' if indulged in spite of significant costs that the
individual would prefer not to incur. Without these additional qualifications, short-term
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hedonism merely remains an indulgence, with the longer-term costs accepted as part of
this choice. Thus, using the revised scale, self-esteem and comfort accounted for 25% of
the variance of procrastination problems but only 7% of procrastination frequency. This
supports the argument that irrational beliefs, whether related to self-worth or frustration
intolerance, are associated most closely with dysfunctional consequences. It might be
alternatively suggested that indulgent individuals may not perceive procrastination as
problematic because they are less concerned regarding the consequences. However, as




THERAPY ENGAGEMENT AND OUTCOME
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The immediate emotional consequences of frustration intolerance are often not dramatic.
Rather, these beliefs play a subtle role in emotional disturbance, maintaining problems
by encouraging avoidance and undermining change. They have been highlighted as a
frequent cause of failure and as the most common and strongest form of resistance in
therapy (Ellis, 1983; 1985a). Specific beliefs described in the literature as associated
with resistance are included in several of the frustration-discomfort sub-scales. Thus,
Ellis (1980a) notes the importance of secondary avoidance in anxiety complaints, in
which emotional discomfort is thought of as unbearable and awful. Likewise, beliefs
related to general comfort are also implicated, since change even at the basic level of
attending sessions involves hassles and discomfort. Lastly, Ellis points out that 'ego-
grandiosity' is an aspect of frustration intolerance. Therefore entitlement beliefs, such
as: 'I shouldn't have to change, I should get what I want now', may also play an
important role in resistance.
For the client the process of change requires initial and continued attendance, and
engagement in therapeutic tasks. For example, completion of homework assignments
has been found a good outcome indicator in cognitive behavioural therapy (Burns &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Following therapy, persistence in working at problems has also
been suggested to be important predictor of relapse (DiGuiseppe, 1999). That is,
symptomatic improvement may be insufficient to maintain progress without longer-term
behavioural and environmental change. For clients, the difficulty is that such changes
often involve further emotional discomfort and effort, which is less appealing when
symptoms have improved. Some psychological problems have been particularly
associated with difficulties in therapy engagement. For example, entitlement beliefs and
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justified self-righteousness are central to anger and play an important role in creating
resistance in this group (DiGiuseppe et al., 1994). Similarly, it has been suggested that a
central feature of borderline personality problems is poor frustration tolerance (Ellis,
1994b), particularly the toleration of emotional discomfort (Linehan, 1993).
The problems of therapy engagement are highlighted by research on attendance rates.
Regarding referrals to a British adult psychology department, Conaghan, Traynor,
Davidson, and Ralston (2000) report that 26% of clients failed to attend the first
appointment and 21% of return appointments were either not attended or cancelled.
Other research indicates that 40% fail to attend the initial appointment (Trepka, 1986),
24% of clients discontinue before the third appointment (Balfour, 1986), and 60% fail to
complete therapy (Goode, 1997). Investigations of the reasons for non-attendance and
premature termination suggest that psychological aspects are more important than
demographic variables. For instance, Gerhand and Blakey (1994) found no differences
between terminators and completers as regards gender, age, occupation, length of
problem, or interference with life. Rather, the most common reason given by clients for
discontinuation was 'dislike of treatment'.
REBT theory suggests that a major aspect of premature termination and non-attendance
will be related to frustration intolerance due to intolerance of change and discomfort. It
also suggests that outcomes may be poorer due to failure to work at therapeutic tasks.
(Ellis, 1985a). On the other hand, therapy may also be lengthened due to dependence on
therapists approval associated with low self-acceptance (Ellis, 1985b). Clearly, both ego
disturbance and frustration intolerance beliefs may have a number of possible effects on
therapy. However, although many of the beliefs relating to therapeutic resistance have
been described there is little empirical evidence regarding these. The analysis of
frustration intolerance as a multidimensional construct enables investigation of their





Outcome and treatment data for the preliminary Frustration-Discomfort scale clinical
population was analysed along with the packet of questionnaires that each patient
completed prior to the first appointment.
9.2.2 PARTICIPANTS
The clinical sample for the preliminary scale comprised 242 individuals. Referrals came
from two geographical sectors one industrial and the other predominately rural.
Treatment involved 17 clinical psychologists, with the author seeing 47% of the total.
An analysis of questionnaire non-respondents was also carried out using a sample of 166
(50%) consecutive referrals. Drop out was defined as failure to attend the final session,
with DNA rates including cancellations.
9.2.3 MEASURES
Appointment data were routinely recorded in case notes by each therapist. This included
a global outcome rating on a scale of 1 (complete improvement) to 6 (worse). Rating
validity has been investigated in three previous studies (Turvey, 1997). These found
significant correlations between client and psychologist ratings (r (123) = .60, < 0.01)
and with standardised tests, and showed an 81% client/psychologist agreement of
'improved' (1-3) versus 'non-improved' (4-6) categories. Clients were also given a
'main problem' classification, which in the present study was limited to nine categories.
Information regarding treatment and problem history were taken from the background
questionnaire. This included a patient rating of emotional problem intensity over the past
month and the emotion 'most clearly describing the current problem'. Whilst
unsophisticated, these ratings were found to correlate well with assessment measures in
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the packet and described previously: (anger/TAS (r (239) = .47), anxiety/HAD (r (237) =
.53), depression/HAD (r (236) = .47), worthlessness/Rosenberg (r (229) = -.63).
9.3 RESULTS
9.3.1 DESCRIPTIVE DATA: BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE
The background questionnaire indicated that most problems were relatively longstanding
(table 9.1) and in the moderate to severe range (tables 9.2). Medication for the main
problem was being taken by 61% of clients (table 9.3), and 41% had previously received
psychological therapy or counselling. In rating feelings over the past month, 62%
complained of 'strong' anxiety, 51% depressed mood, 37% guilt, 32% anger, and 16%
embarrassment. Ratings of self-worth indicated that 43% of clients had strong feelings
of worthlessness compared to 33% who experienced little or no problem with
worthlessness. The current problem was specified as anxiety by 32% of clients,
worthlessness 18%, depressed mood 15%, anger and tension 10% each, guilt and hurt
5% each, and embarrassment 2%.
Table 9.1 Problem length
Frequency Percent
<6 months 5 2.1
6-12 months 26 11.0
1-3 years 87 36.9
>3 years 118 50.0







Table 9.3 Length of time on medication for current problem
Frequency Percent
None











For individuals taking medication, comfort (t (234) = 4.24, p < .001) and emotional
discomfort scores (t (234) = 5.28, p < .001) were significantly higher, but not entitlement
and achievement. Self-esteem was also significantly poorer in the medication group (t
(224) = 2.73, p < .01). Likewise, comparing severe with slight-moderate problem ratings
found that comfort (t (234) = 3.13, p< .01), emotional discomfort (t (234) = 5.60, p <
.001), and self-esteem scores (t (224) = 4.77, p < .001) were significantly higher in the
severe problem group. Medication use was unrelated to problem length (x2 (1) = 0.38,
n.s.) but was related to problem severity (x2 (1) = 4.89, p< .05). Only low self-esteem
differentiated individuals with problems of more than four years from more recent
problems (t (224) = 1.20, p < .05), and between in-patient/day-patient and outpatient
treatment history (t (227) = 1.99, p < .05). The latter was not related to length or severity
of problem. Partial correlations between frustration-discomfort and emotion self-rating,
controlling for self-esteem, and self-esteem with emotion self-rating, controlling for
frustration-discomfort, are shown in table 9.4.
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Table 9.4 Partial correlations between frustration-discomfort scores and self-rated
emotions (controlling for self-esteem), and between self-esteem and self-rated emotions
(controlling for frustration-discomfort)
Comfort Entitlement Emotional Achievement Rosenberg
Discomfort Self-esteem
Anxiety .16* .08 .18** 22*** -.14*
Depression 24*** 23*** .19** _ 31***
Jealousy .11 24*** 19** .01 -.10
Guilt .07 .15* 31*** 1 y** - 28***
Anger .10 23*** 2g*** 17** -.03
Hurt .07 22*** 32*** .09 22***
Tension .13 .16* .21** 24*** -.12
Embarrassment .06 .17* .15* .02 22***
N = 224 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
9.4 OUTCOME DATA
9.4.1 THERAPY ATTENDANCE
Attendance data are presented in table 9.5. The total DNA rate for all appointments was
21.2%. Excluding clients who never attended the initial session, the DNA rate for other
appointments was 20.4%. Individuals who failed to attend the initial appointment had
significantly higher Trait Anger scores (Mann-Whitney U (158,16) = 611, p < .001) and
higher entitlement scores, although this just failed to reach significance (U (158,16) =
936, p = .08). These two variables were also significantly related to drop out during
therapy.
Table 9.5 Attendance data
Frequency Percent
Completed therapy 158 65.3
Dropped-out 68 28.1
DNA initial session 16 6.6
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The distribution of attended appointments was very positively skewed (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z = .21, p < .001). Thus, 86% of clients were treated within 12 sessions
(median = 5) although four (2%) outlying clients (Z > 3.29) together accounted for over
12% of total therapy sessions, each averaging 47 appointments (figure 9.1). Three of this
xL
group showed very high total frustration-discomfort scores (above 80 percentile), and
particularly high comfort scores (above 90 percentile). This is shown graphically in
figure 9.2 To reduce distortion in the statistical analyses they were given appointment
values just above the next extreme score (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000).
Figure 9.1 Total appointments (outliers rescored as 30)
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 27.5 30.0
Total appointments
Comfort had a weak but significant correlation with sessions attended, which remained
significant after removing the four outliers (r (226) = .16, p < .05), as did self-esteem (r
(218) = -.15, p < .05). Anxiety (r (224) = 0.14, p < .05) and depression (r (223) = .17, p <
.01) were also significantly correlated with sessions attended. Interestingly, individuals
on medication (t (220) = 3.61 p < .001) and those with problem length over three years (t
(221) = 2.26 p < .05) attended significantly more sessions, but the problem severity
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rating was not significant (t (219) = 1.27, ns). Higher attendance was also correlated
with the 'medication' (r (226) = .19, p < 0.01) and 'task avoidance' items (r (226) = .19,
p < .01) on the coping questionnaire. The relationship between medication and sessions
attended remained significant when controlling for problem length (pr (221) = .22, p <
.001) and depression/anxiety scores (pr (223) = .21, p < .01), indicating that the
relationship was not due to greater emotional disturbance. Similar results were found
with non-parametric tests, and using the total number of sessions including missed
appointments.
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Comfort sub-scale
9.4.2 THERAPY DROPOUT
Of those patients who attended, 30% failed to complete therapy. Failure to complete was
significantly related to higher emotional discomfort (t (224) = 1.97, p < .05) and
entitlement scores (t (224) = 2.43, p < .05), but not comfort (t (225) = 1.45, ns),
achievement (t (225) = 1.22, ns), or self-esteem (t (216) = .68, ns). Dropouts from
u
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therapy also had significantly higher anger scores (t (224) = 3.84, p < .001), but did not
differ on anxiety or depression. Dropout was significantly higher for younger patients (t
(240) = 2.24, p < .05), but unrelated to gender, the length or severity of problems. There
was no significant difference between high and low self-esteem quartiles in terms of
dropout (x2 (3) = 3.28, ns).
A hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to test whether anger mediated the
relationship between irrational beliefs and overall dropout, including failure to initially
attend. Anger was entered on step 1 and then the two frustration-discomfort beliefs on
step 2 (table 9.7). The model was significant (-2LL = 296.47, x2 (3) = 16.02 p = .001),
with anger a significant predictor of overall dropout accounting for 9% of the variance.
However, the two irrational beliefs were no longer significant when anger was entered
on the first step, indicating these beliefs were fully mediated by anger.
Table 9.7 Logistic regression predicting overall dropout




TAS -.08 .02 13.08***
2nd step
TAS .71 .03 7.60**
Entitlement -.01 .02 0.01
Emotional discomfort .02 .02 1.43
N = 242 *** p < .001, ** p < .01
Therapist classification of main problem, completed at the end of therapy, is shown in
table 9.8. As expected, analysis by problem category showed certain groups were more
prone to therapy dropout. Although based on small numbers, the dropout rates for
addiction problems were 85%, anger 47% and eating disorder 60%. In comparison,
anxiety and depression had rates of 28% and 24% respectively. In the depressed group,
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failure to complete therapy was significantly related to Trait Anger scores (t (53) = 2.46,
p < .05) but not to higher depression, anxiety, frustration-discomfort, or lower self-
esteem scores. In those patients referred for anger problems both Trait Anger (t (32) =
2.39, p < .05) and entitlement scores (t (32) = 1.98, p < .05) were significantly higher for
dropouts. There were no variables that predicted dropout for anxiety problems.













There was no association between therapy outcome and age (r (226) = .07, n.s.) or
gender (t (224) = 1.10, n.s.). Higher emotional discomfort scores had (r (227) = -.15, p <
.05) a slightly better outcome, possibly reflecting better improvement rates for anxiety
problems (Turvey, 1997). There was no significant relationship with outcome ratings for
the other frustration-discomfort sub-scales, self-esteem (r (227) = -.04, p = 0.6),
medication, problem length, or problem severity.
9.4.4 ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE NON-REPLIES
Unsurprisingly, the largest proportion of non-replies came from individuals who failed
to attend for initial assessment (38%). Excluding these, non-replies were more likely to
dropout of therapy, with 47.6% dropping out compared to 30.1% in the replying group
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(X2 (1) = 9A p < .01). They also had significantly higher DNA rates in therapy, failing
to attend 33% of appointments compared to 23% (t (328) = 3.53, p < .001). Non-replies
were also discharged after fewer appointments (Mann-Whitney U (227,103) = 8347, p <
.001), and had significantly poorer outcome ratings (t (328) = 6.47, p < .001), with only
40% of non-replies achieving moderate progress or better compared to 68%. Non-replies
were also significantly younger (t (405) = 2.99, p < .01), but did not differ in gender.
Given the association between non-attendance and frustration intolerance scores, non-
replies are also likely to have had higher scores on frustration-discomfort, possibly
attenuating present results.
9.5 DISCUSSION
Both low self-esteem and high comfort scores were significantly associated with
increased number of therapy sessions. Whilst, the relationship was weak this is perhaps
to be expected given the complex nature of therapy engagement. Medication use was
significantly related to comfort and emotional discomfort beliefs, as well as higher
attendance. These relationships are consistent with theory, since these beliefs would be
expected to lengthen therapy, for instance due to reluctance to use homework tasks or
the need for continuing reassurance (Dryden & Yankura, 1993).
Also consistent with expectations, emotional discomfort was related to higher therapy
dropout. In this regard, comfort may be conceived as reflecting passive avoidance
compared to the active avoidance prompted by emotional discomfort. Thus, discussion
of 'painful topics' was cited as a reason for dropout by 30% of patients in a patient
survey . The different interaction of the comfort and emotional discomfort scales with
engagement supports the argument for separating these two facets of frustration
intolerance. Therapy dropout was also significantly associated with entitlement beliefs
and this is consistent with clinical literature that has identified anger disorders as being
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particularly difficult to engage in therapy (DiGuiseppe, 1995). Entitlement beliefs have
also been specifically linked to premature termination in relation to narcissistic
personality (Young & Flanagan, 1997). However, the results described in previous
chapters suggest that the entitlement sub-scale is not significantly correlated with high
self-esteem. This is also supported by the lack of a significant association between self-
esteem and dropout. Whilst the failure to predict treatment outcome with any of the
independent variables was disappointing, it is perhaps not unexpected given the simple
outcome measure and the use of only end of therapy ratings. Assessment of outcome at
longer follow up may well have been more revealing.
The pattern of relationships between self-rated emotions and beliefs was theoretically
consistent. Thus, Dryden (1995b) has described hurt, which correlated with entitlement
and self-esteem, as a mixture of frustration intolerance beliefs regarding deservedness
and unfairness, and low self-worth. It was also expected that emotional discomfort
would be associated with a range of negative affect, not just anxiety. That self-esteem is
correlated with depression, embarrassment, and guilt is also of no surprise. However, the
pattern of relationships with the achievement frustration sub-scale is interesting.
Research on perfectionism has suggested that high standards were not associated with
emotional disturbance but rather positive striving (Frost, et ah, 1990). However, the
present results do indicate a significant relationship between these types of
perfectionistic belief and anxiety, depression, and guilt. Furthermore, they remained
significant after controlling for self-esteem, indicating this relationship is not due to
perfectionistic self-evaluation. Indeed, the highest partial correlation is with 'tension'
with which self-esteem is unrelated. Also of interest is that entitlement was significantly
related to depression, but not to anxiety, when controlling for self-esteem. Similar to the
results discussed in chapter six, it suggest that 'discomfort depression' may be related to
aspects of frustration intolerance separate from self-worth depression. The relationship
of jealousy with entitlement but not self-esteem also underlines the specific interaction
1 This survey was supervised by the author and contacted 66 therapy dropouts (20 replies) from the
present group.
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ofbelief categories and problem categories. It also suggests that descriptions ofjealousy,
as partially deriving from insecure self-esteem, may be mistaken (Dryden & Neenan,
1995; Hauck, 1982). There was no evidence in the present results to suggest that
jealousy was associated with high or low self-esteem, and when comparing self-esteem
quartiles there was no significant difference in jealousy ratings.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE REVISED FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Scale construction involves a repeated sequence of investigations in which hypotheses
are tested and alterations made to the model. The work on the preliminary scale had
suggested a number of changes. Specifically, the preliminary scale had a complex design
involving questions regarding self-worth, demandingness, and frustration intolerance.
However, subsequent research had indicated that it might be as appropriate to use only
frustration intolerance statements (Bond & Dryden, 2000). The achievement scale also
required lengthening, and overlapping and redundant item content reduced. It also
remained unclear as to whether fairness and gratification were best considered separate
dimensions of entitlement or closely related facets. The purpose of the studies reported
in this chapter, is the development and investigation of this revised scale.
PART I: SCALE REDESIGN AND CONFIRMATORY ANALYSIS
10.2. SCALE REDESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
10.2.1 QUESTION STRUCTURE
It was decided that the original questionnaire structure was unnecessarily complex, and
this was redesigned. The preliminary scale incorporated separate questions regarding
both self-esteem and frustration intolerance, as well as using two sentences to refer to
demandingness and frustration intolerance. Whilst the self-esteem question did enable
some assessment of the two belief categories it proved impractical to differentiate
between these on this basis. Rather, it was more useful to employ regression techniques
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to partial out self-esteem and thus determine the unique contribution of frustration
intolerance, and to fdter out items with high correlations with self-esteem.
The use of a compound sentence to define irrational beliefs was based on theoretical
recommendation that both elements were required (DiGiuseppe, 1996). However, this
assumption has been subsequently questioned, with theoretical doubts as to whether
demandingness was the central belief (e.g. O'Kelly et al., 1998). Further, a series of
empirical studies led Bond and Dryden (2000) to conclude that it was secondary belief
content rather than primary demands that formed 'the primary mechanism through
which rational and irrational REBT beliefs affect the functionality of inferences'. It was
therefore decided to use a single sentence to refer to the frustration intolerance
derivative, 'I can't stand it', and dispense with the irrational demand.' The changes in
the question structure enabled the instructions to be substantially simplified, which
markedly improved readability. Readability analysis gave a Flesch reading ease score of
83.6% and a Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 4.2 (age 9), compared with 64% and 6.2
respectively for the preliminary test. The rating scale was also changed to 1-5 from the
original 0-4 for easier numerical analysis.
10.2.2 ITEM GENERATION AND SUB-SCALE SELECTION
All but two sub-scale items used in the preliminary sub-scales were transferred to the
new scale. Of forty-seven items, thirty-seven were used with only minor changes in
wording. These mainly involved telescoping the two parts of the questions and removing
the 'must' segment of the statement. A 'must' was added to one item to improve
comprehension. Four questions were rewritten to increase conceptual clarity. 'I
absolutely must not be let down by other people' was replaced by 'I can't tolerate being
treated with a lack of consideration.' 'I absolutely must remain comfortable for as long
as possible' was replaced by 'I can't stand the hassle of having to do things right now.' '
I absolutely must not be opposed when I know I'm right' was changed to 'I can't
tolerate criticism when I know I'm right.' 'I absolutely must not be deprived now of the
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affection I needed in the past' was reduced to 'I can't bear being deprived now of things
I lacked in the past'.
Two items: 'taking time' and 'restriction', both with low communalities on the
exploratory factor analysis, were not used. To increase the achievement frustration scale
three new items were created: Q(12) potential, Q(17) goal frustration, and Q(35) work
control. A further item, referring to intolerance of other people's behaviour, was added
to the entitlement scale. Since 'past injustice' was considered an important aspect of
entitlement, although having a relatively poor loading in the preliminary study, it was
included again in the sub-scale. Entitlement was also split into two smaller sub-scales to
test whether the concepts of fairness and gratification formed separate sub-scales. Items
were allocated to these groups on conceptual grounds, with gratification defined as being
blocked in obtaining a positive reward. The wording of two immediate gratification
questions was simplified. 'I absolutely must not make sacrifices for the future' and 'I
absolutely need to indulge myself were condensed into 'I can't stand giving up
immediate pleasures for the sake of a distant goal'.
It was thought that the preliminary emotional discomfort scale was weak on items
referring to depressed mood compared to anxiety. Thus, item Q(34), continuing
situation, was rewritten to emphasize the sense of hopelessness central to depressed
mood. Three other items were also generated: 'I can't stand how I always seem to have a
raw deal', 'I can't stand how things seem to work out for others but not for me' and 'I
can't stand life being so difficult for me'. However, it was considered that these three
items had considerable conceptual overlap and only the latter was finally included in the
scale. The revised scale with complete items is displayed in appendix 1.
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10.2.3 PARTICIPANTS
The participants and procedure followed that of the preliminary Frustration-Discomfort
study, using both clinical and non-clinical samples. The clinic sample consisted of 573
consecutive patients referred to the adult psychology department and sent the package of
questionnaires along with their first appointment. Of these 260 were returned, and
following removal of spoilt questionnaires, 333 individuals in the clinical group were
included in the confirmatory analysis The non-clinical population came from four
samples of psychology students who completed the Frustration-Discomfort
questionnaire as part of their course in abnormal psychology. Three of these were final
year undergraduates, two from St Andrews and one Edinburgh University (n = 79).
These groups were included with the clinical group in the confirmatory analysis. A
further group of first year students (n = 49), sampled as part of the procrastination study,
were included in the normative data and the discriminative analysis but, due to time
constraints, not in the confirmatory analysis. Patient age and gender distribution was
essentialy similar to the preliminary study, with 42% male and 58% female and mean
age 37.2 (range 17-74). Student gender distribution was 17% male and 83% female.
10.2.4 MEASURES
The clinical group received the revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale, Trait Anger Scale,
the HAD inventory, and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. The student group received
the Frustration-Discomfort Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and the PASS
inventory.
10.2.5 STATISTICAL APPROACH: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING
Whilst the preliminary study had used methods of exploratory factor analysis this
investigation employs confirmatory factor analysis. In this, the relationship of the
measured scale items to underlying constructs is specified, although the parameters
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themselves are freely estimated. This prior specification enables the hypothesised
number of factors to be tested against alternative models, thus avoiding the somewhat
arbitrary choice of number of factors in exploratory analysis. Another distinct advantage
of this approach is that, by removing error to a specific uniqueness term, relationships
between latent variables remain unaffected by measurement error.
Alternative models were suggested by the preliminary Frustration-Discomfort Scale
exploratory factor analysis. This supported a multi-dimensional structure of four oblique
factors, although REBT has tended to treat low frustration tolerance as a unitary
construct, implying a unidimensional scale. REBT literature also describes other groups
of belief regarding fairness and immediate gratification but these did not receive strong
support in the preliminary study, with these items tending to load on the entitlement
factor. It remained unresolved whether, with an increased range of item content, these
two facets were differentiated.
Preliminary data, frequency, reliability, and correlation analyses were carried out to
eliminate any items or cases that were inappropriate using criteria applied in the
exploratory factor analysis. This initial item screening served as the basis for the
confirmatory factor analysis of the full scale that included all satisfactory items. A
second process of item selection produced final shortened version. Whilst this was
informed by the preliminary data analysis it was not an ad hoc modification based on the
first confirmatory analysis. Thus, two sets of confirmatory factor analyses were carried
out. First, the theoretical model of Frustration-Discomfort was tested using the complete
set of items from the preliminary scale. Second, analysis of the short scale version was




Two patient questionnaires were returned incomplete. On preliminary analysis of the
Rosenberg scale a further four cases were identified as having high difference scores and
extreme scores across all questionnaires, indicating 'careless responding'. These six
cases were eliminated and there were no additional outliers. Missing value analysis
indicated that one item, Q(16) past injustice, had fifteen consecutive missing values due
to an administrative error. The other items had a mean percentage number of missing
values of .48, with only one item, Q(46) past deprivation, having more than five missing
values (2.7%). Inspection of the pattern ofmissing data indicated that this was randomly
spread across cases and therefore a group mean was used in further analysis of the
Frustration-Discomfort data. In total, 333 participants were included in the confirmatory
analysis: 254 patients and 79 students.
The degree of missing data and spoiled responses is indicative of the acceptability of a
scale. Whilst overall response rates were essentially the same for the preliminary and
revised scale, there were noticeable differences in the quality of responses. Thirteen
preliminary scale cases (5%) were removed due to spoilt or missing data compared to
six revised scale cases (2.3%). In addition the preliminary study had a substantially
higher number of replies (9 versus 3) showing 'careless responding' on the Rosenberg
and other scales.
10.3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Both patient and student groups were normally distributed, with the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test not significant. The distribution of the total Frustration-Discomfort Scale
for the combined sample is displayed in figure 10.1. Of the Sub-scales, entitlement and
achievement both showed normal distributions in the combined sample. Comfort had a
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significantly significant level of kurtosis (z-value -2.40), and emotional discomfort had
significant negative skewness (z-value -3.26) and kurtosis (z-value -3.20). However,
these deviations are modest and visual examination of the distributions did not suggest
important deviations from normality.
Visual inspection of individual item distributions also indicates that there were no
marked departures from normality. Only two items, Q(10) craziness and Q(26) effort,
showed a standard error ratio outside the ± 2 range with scores of 2.05 and 5.13. Seven
items showed moderate kurtosis deviations, the highest again being Q(26) with a value
of 4.77. This compares with nearly half of all the comparable items on the preliminary
scale falling outside this range on these statistics. Given these modest departures it was
not thought to be necessary to drop items on the basis of their distributions or transform item
scores.
Figure 10.1 Frustration-Discomfort scores: Combined group
60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0 140.0 160.0 180.0 200.0 220.0 240.0




Frequency analysis was used to examine the distribution of responses across the five
point rating scale for each frustration question (appendix 20). All items passed the
criterion of having no adjacent scale points with less than 10% of responses. Only three
items just failed to reach a stricter criterion of 20%: Q(2) time pressure, Q(16) past
injustice and Q(26) effort. Five of the corresponding items on the preliminary scale
failed to meet this criterion. Comparing the percentage responses across the rating points
for the preliminary and the revised scale showed a marked improvement in the
distribution shape. As can be seen from figures 10.2 and 10.3, the overall percentage of
individuals with belief ratings in the highest 'very strong' category was essentially the
same, with 16.5% compared to 16.8%. However, the revised scale had considerably
fewer responses in the first 'absent' category, with 11.8% compared to 20.5%. Increased
endorsement of lower categories on the preliminary scale suggests response bias, with
individuals choosing the zero rating as an easier option. Certainly, one reason for this
careless responding would be the complexity of items (Marsh, 1986), supporting the
decision to simplify the question structure and format.
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10.3.4 FULL SCALE: RELIABILITY AND 'MAP' ANALYSIS
346
Reliability analyses were initially carried out to identify inappropriate items. The alpha
for the full scale is clearly high, probably reflecting the number of items rather than
indicating unidimensionality (Schmitt, 1996; Cortina 1993). All items were found to
have corrected item-total values of above 0.4, both on the full and assigned sub-scales
(appendix 21). An analysis based on the 'Multi-trait Analysis Program', used by Hays,
Hayashi, Carson, and Ware (1988), was also conducted for both the four-factor model
(appendix 22) and for the fairness and the gratification sub-scales in the five-factor
model (appendix 23). The 'MAP' analysis aims to identify items that correlate higher on
sub-scales other than their own predicted sub-scale. Three items showed this pattern.
Q(8) unfair life had been placed on the emotional sub-scale based on the exploratory
factor analysis, but was found to correlate marginally higher with the entitlement sub-
scale (r = .50 compared to r = .49). It had been noted when originally placing the item
that this was a complex item with aspects related to both sub-scales. However, given the
reference to deservedness it was decide to place this conceptually in the entitlement
scale. Likewise, on empirical grounds, Q(21) extra problems had been placed into the
emotional discomfort sub-scale, and Q(31) doubts into the achievement sub-scale.
However, both had loaded more strongly on the comfort sub-scale: Q(21) r = .80
compared to r = .64, and Q(31) r = .55 compared to r = .43. Conceptually it can be
argued that these beliefs primarily relate to loss of comfort, and it was therefore decided
to reassign these three beliefs to new sub-scales. The two items gratification items from
the preliminary scale, 'sacrifices' and 'indulge' had both loaded substantially on two
factors: entitlement and comfort. The new condensed item Q(36) indulgence also
predictably loaded almost equally on both of these sub-scales.
The correlation analysis was recalculated. All items loaded highest on their respective
sub-scales, and had adequate corrected item-total correlations, the weakest being Q(9)
disorganisation. Cronbach alphas for each sub-scale were greater or equal to .85
indicating high internal consistency. The two sub-scales fairness and gratification
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included in the five-factor model were also separately analysed using the 'MAP'
procedure. One fairness item Q(45) criticism loaded marginally higher on the
gratification sub-scale. Conceptually this item was considered to have more in common
with fairness rather than gratification and was not therefore reallocated. In conclusion,
there were no items that failed to reach inclusion criteria and all showed good reliability
and frequency distributions. No items were therefore rejected as unsuitable for the full-
scale analysis.
10.3.5 SHORT SCALE: ITEM SELECTION
Preliminary analysis showed that reliabilities were high, with the overall scale having an
alpha of .958 and sub-scale values between .916 to .845. Whilst this represents
impressive internal consistency it may also point to difficulties in other respects. In
particular, alpha needs to be interpreted in relation to other parameters, such as scale
length, inter-item correlations and the nature of the construct being investigated (John &
Benet-Martinez, 2000). High alpha, for instance in excess of .95, may simply reflect
high intercorrelations among items indicating an overlapping, narrow or redundant item
content. Such scales, in which items essentially paraphrase each other, have been termed
'bloated specifics' (Cattell, 1978). Since the content range has been narrowed, these
scales will show high internal validity but at the cost of reduced construct validity. To
overcome this requires balancing sub-scale purity, achieved by including only items that
load on a particular sub-scale, with a broader range of items. These items should
adequately sample the most important aspects of a conceptual domain but avoid
conceptual overlap. Block (1995) has also underlined the dangers of uncritical use of
factor analysis noting that pre-selection of items with essentially the same content can
artificially create factors and distort existing factors.
Therefore, particular importance was placed on reducing redundancy and conceptual
overlap when deciding item selection for the final scale. All items having r > 0.6
intercorrelations were considered for removal. Examination of the sub-scale
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intercorrelation matrix indicated only one pair of items with correlation above .70, that is
Q(25) disturbed feelings and Q( 13) thoughts (r = .73). It was decided that these items
were assessing different, although closely interrelated, aspects. Other items with
substantial correlations were: Q(40) task hassle with Q(32) freedom from hassle (r =
.70), and Q(21) extra problems (r = .62); Q(39) morbid thoughts with Q( 13) thoughts (r
= .63) and Q(25) disturbed feeling; Q(49) difficult life and Q(34) continuing situation (r
= .68); Q(30) consideration with Q(37) disrespect (r = .67) and appreciation (r = .62).
Two items on the achievement scale, Q( 17) goal frustration and Q(12) potential (r =
.67), were felt to be different aspects of achievement frustration. In summary, Q(32)
freedom from hassle, Q(21) extra problems, Q(39) morbid thoughts, Q(30)
consideration, Q(37) disrespect, and Q(49) difficult life, were removed from the scale.
Two further items, Q(l) painful memories and Q( 11) ignored, overlapped conceptually
with Q( 13) thoughts and Q(27) appreciation and were also were removed.
Items that were weakly related to one sub-scale, showed evidence of complex loadings
on other sub-scales, and had relatively low loadings on their predicted sub-scales, were
also considered for removal. Five items that clearly fell into this category were identified
and removed: Q(31) doubts, Q(4) waiting, Q(8) unfair life, and Q(36) indulgence, Q(47)
disrupted routines. Final selection, following removal of all 13 items, took into account
the strength of the corrected item-total correlation with each sub-scale and the need to
have an acceptable range of item content. Thus, items Q(2) time pressure, Q(6) task
interest, Q(9) disorganisation, Q(42) waste time, Q(48) others behaviour, Q(46) past
deprivation, Q(16) past injustice, and Q(23) understanding were removed. Corrected
item-total correlations being recalculated after each item was removed. In the five-factor
model items (11), (16), (23), (36), (37), (46), and (48) were retained and added to the
items in the entitlement sub-scale to form separate gratification and fairness sub-scales.
Thus, the final four-factor scale consisted of 28 items and the five-factor scale of 35
items, with 7 items in each sub-scale (appendix 4). There is debate as to the optimum
number of items required to define a factor. Kline (1994), for instance, argues that a
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reliable and valid test should have a least 10 items. However, John and Benet-Martinez
(2000) note that this decision also depends on the construct being measured, the range of
item content, and the trade off between reliability and practical utility.
10.3.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Corrected item-total and mean inter-item correlations for each sub-scale are presented in
table 10.1. Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranged from .833 to .875 for the sub-scales,
indicating good internal consistency with acceptable levels of item redundancy. The
overall alpha for the four-factor model was .936, and for the five-factor .945. The two
weakest items in relation to the overall scale were Q(3) gratification delay and Q(12)
potential, however all items had correlations above .450. The mean inter-item
correlation in not being influenced by scale length is a clearer measure of item
homogeneity. Although the sub-scales are designed to measure narrower facets, none of
the sub-scales exceed the level of .5 above which Briggs and Check (1986) suggest
items tend to become overly redundant. The full scale mean inter-item correlation for the
four-factor solution was .344 (alpha = .936). The mean inter-item correlation for the
five-factor solution was .333 (alpha = .945). This is well within the optimal range of
item homogeneity between .2 to .4 that Briggs and Check suggest offer the best balance
between bandwidth and fidelity. This indicates that the scale adequately represents the
complexity of the frustration intolerance concept.
Analysis of the sub-scale distributions for the total sample showed that comfort had a
significant positive skew (2.24) and emotional discomfort a negative skew (-2.29).
Predicable, the patient group was negatively skewed on emotional discomfort and
students positively skewed on comfort scores, but both these sub-scales had normal
distributions in the overall sample. Since the level of skewness was mild, no
transformations were considered. There was one outlier on the fairness scale (case 708),
a very low scoring student which was retained.
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Table 10.1 Shortened scale: Corrected item-total correlation and alpha
COMFORT
14 I need the easiest way around problems;
I can't stand making a hard time of it .602
19 I can't stand doing tasks that seem too difficult .666
22 I can't stand doing tasks when I'm not in the mood .623
26 I can't stand having to push myself at tasks .701
29 I can't stand the hassle of having to do things right now .633
40 I can't stand doing things that involve a lot of hassle .724
44 I can't stand having to persist at unpleasant tasks .637
Alpha .875 Mean inter-item correlation .500
GRATIFICATION
3 I can't stand having to wait for things I would like now
7 I can't stand it if other people act against my wishes
11 I can't tolerate being overlooked
15 I can't bear it if other people stand in the way ofwhat I want
33 I can't stand having to give into other people's demands
36 I can't stand giving up immediate pleasures for the sake of a distant goal
46 I can't bear being deprived now of things I lacked in the past
Alpha .838 Mean inter-item correlation .428
FAIRNESS
16 I can't bear to have been treated unjustly .494
23 I can't stand being left in the dark with no explanations .521
27 I can't tolerate being taken for granted .651
37 I can't tolerate being treated with disrespect .635
41 I can't stand having to change when others are at fault .691
45 I can't tolerate criticism especially when I know I'm right .552
48 I can't tolerate other people's bad or stupid behaviour .529
Alpha .833 Mean inter-item correlation .415
ENTITLEMENT
3 I can't stand having to wait for things I would like now .499
7 I can't stand it if other people act against my wishes .632
15 I can't bear it if other people stand in the way ofwhat I want .683
27 I can't tolerate being taken for granted .547
33 I can't stand having to give into other people's demands .625
41 I can't stand having to change when others are at fault .665








Alpha .846 Mean inter-item correlation .415
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Table 10.1 (continued) Shortened scale: Corrected item-total correlation and alpha
EMOTIONAL DISCOMFORT
5 I must be free of disturbing feelings as quickly as possible;
I can't bear if they continue .646
10 I can't bear to feel that I am losing my mind .600
13 I can't bear to have certain thoughts .728
18 I can't stand situations where I might feel upset .613
25 I can't bear disturbing feelings .756
34 I can't get on with my life, or be happy, if things don't change .570
43 I can't stand to lose control ofmy feelings .585
Alpha .867 Mean inter-item correlation .485
ACHIEVEMENT FRUSTRATION
12 I can't stand being prevented from achieving my full potential .604
17 I can't bear the frustration of not achieving my goals .604
20 I can't tolerate lowering my standards even when it would be useful to do so .565
24 I can't bear to move on from work I'm not fully satisfied with .591
28 I can't stand doing a job if I'm unable to do it well .581
35 I can't stand feeling that I'm not on top ofmy work .602
38 I can't tolerate any lapse in my self-discipline .588
Alpha .839 Mean inter-item correlation .427
10.4 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
10.4.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION
Two sets of five models were tested. The first model was a unidimensional model in
which all the items were assumed to load on a general construct of Tow frustration
tolerance'. The two-factor model had comfort and emotional discomfort loading on a
'discomfort' factor, and entitlement and achievement loading on a 'frustration' factor.
The four-factor model was the solution most strongly supported by the exploratory
factor analysis. A five-factor model split the entitlement sub-scale into two further sub
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groups, relating to fair treatment from others and gratification. The exploratory factor
analysis indicated moderately high intercorrelations between all sub-scales, therefore all
models were oblique with no orthogonal solutions tested. These models were also
compared with their equivalent model using the shortened scale. The measurement
model was tested using confirmatory factor analysis implemented by the AMOS 4
program (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). This employs maximum likelihood estimation
and, with only minimal deviations from normality in the present data, this method is
robust and appropriate. The sample size of 333 was above the recommended level of 200
subjects (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000), and able to achieve adequate power levels
(MacCallum, Brown, & Sugawara, 1996).
The adequacy of the competing models was evaluated using six different fit indices: (1)
The most frequently used measure of overall fit is the model chi-square, with a non¬
significant x2 indicating a good fit: (2) The x2 divided by the degrees of freedom. As a
rough rule of thumb, a ratio of between 2 to 3 suggests a good fitting model (Carmines
& Mclvor, 1981); (3) The comparative fit index (CFI: Bentler, 1990). An incremental fit
index producing a statistic between 0 and 1, with values above .90 regarded as indicating
adequate fit, and above .95 as a good fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980); (4) The root mean
square of approximation (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993). A non-incremental fit
index that attempts to correct for inadequacy of the x2 with large samples. Values over .1
should lead to rejection of the model, those from .05 to .08 are acceptable, and values
below .05 indicate a close fit to the data. Tighter criteria have been recently
recommended with a cut-off of .95 for CFI and .06 for RMSEA (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Lastly, (5) the degree of parsimony was also taken into account. The Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973) is influenced by model parsimony, and a TLI score
of above .9 is regarded a reasonable fit; (6) The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC;
Akaike, 1987) is a relative measure that penalises complexity, with poor fitting and
complex models obtaining higher values.
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10.4.2 RESULTS: FULL SCALE
The chi-square test was significant in all of the models indicating that there were
discrepancies between the models and the data. However, frequently it is the case that
minor variations in fit will produce significant x2 statistics (Hu & Bentler, 1995).
Examination of goodness-of-fit indices (table 10.2) indicates that the one and two factor
models did not pass the more stringent criteria for RMSEA and CFI. This suggests that,
although the models were adequate, they nevertheless had a relatively poor fit to the
data. Both the four and five factor models proved to be excellent fit on these criteria,
with only slight differences between the statistics for these two models. Since the
models are nested, formal comparison of the two models was conducted using the x2
difference test. This indicated that the five factor model, although slightly more
complex, was a significant improvement on the four factor model (x2 diff = 110.96, df =
3, p < .001). Nevertheless, the four and five factor models do not markedly differ in
model fit. As Wegener and Fabrigar (2000) note, a more complex model is only to be
preferred if it substantially improves model fit or theoretically understanding.
Examination of the factor correlation matrix in reveals high intercorrelations between
factors (table 10.3). In particular, the two entitlement factors share over 70% of their
variance (r = .84), with a very high corrected correlation of .99.
Table 10.2 Full scale: Fit indices for competing models
Model t df X2/df CFI TLI RMSEA AIC
Single factor 3931.09 1127 3.49 .926 .932 .087 4225.1
Two factor 3297.64 1126 2.93 .943 .947 .076 3593.6
Four factor 2637.13 1121 2.35 .963 .960 .064 2943.1
Five factor 2526.17 1118 2.26 .966 .962 .062 2838.2
The four-factor standardised loadings are shown in table 10.4. Two items had low
squared multiple correlations: Q( 16) past injustice and Q(36) indulgence. All loadings
were statistically significant for every analysis. All items had substantial loadings on
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their sub-scales (i.e. above .45) and only one item, Q(9) disorganisation, was below .5.
Squared multiple correlations (SMC) are also presented for each item. The squared
multiple correlation represents the proportion of an items variance that is accounted for
by its predictors. The factor loadings for the five-factor model are shown in table 10.5.
Four items had low squared multiple correlations, suggesting lack of fit (i.e. < 0.3): Q(6)
Task interest, Q(4) waiting, Q(8) unfair life, and Q(9) disorganised. Factor inter-
correlations are shown in tables 10.3.
Table 10.3 Full scale factor inter-correlations: Five-factor model








































Table 10.4 Full scale factor loadings: Four-factor model
Item Factor Factor Factor Factor


















































































Table 10.5 Full scale factor loadings: Five-factor model
Item Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
























































10.4.3 RESULTS: SHORT SCALE
No ad-hoc changes were made to the scale, with item selection based on preliminary
analysis and conceptual considerations and independent of the full scale confirmatory
analysis. This enabled comparison of the shortened and full-scale model fit.
As in the first confirmatory analysis, whilst all models had significant x2 other fit indices
indicated that the four and five-factor models were both good fits to the data (table 10.6).
The one and two factor models showed a considerably poorer fit, with both the x2 ratio
and the RMSEA values indicated unacceptable degrees of fit. Comparison of RMSEA
values and confidence intervals of the four and five factor models showed considerable
overlap (54-66; 55-65), suggesting only marginal differences in the degree of fit.
However, the AIC value is markedly lower in the four-factor model. A smaller value on
this measure indicates a good fit with greater parsimony and a model less prone to
overfitting (Hair et al., 1998). This suggests that the four-factor model would be
preferred on grounds of parsimony. In other words, the added information gained from
increasing the number of factors is outweighed by the increased complexity of the
model.
Table 10.6 Short scale: Fit indices for competing models
Model t df X2/df CFI TL1 RMSEA AIC
Single factor 1531.51 350 4.38 .949 .940 .101 1699.5
Two factor 1224.90 349 3.51 .962 .956 .087 1394.9
Four factor 758.46 344 2.21 .982 .979 .060 938.5
Five factor 1208.37 550 2.20 .977 .974 .060 1438.4
Examination of the intercorrelation between the sub-scales is also helpful in comparing
these models. The correlations corrected for attenuation due to unreliability are
particularly informative since this enables the size of the alpha coefficient relative to
overlap between the scales to be evaluated. This should be larger than the
intercorrelation and if not the case than the two scales lack discrimination. All four sub-
scales, although moderately intercorrelated, met this criterion. However, as can be
observed in table 10.10, the correlation between the fairness and gratification five factor
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model sub-scales is noticeably high (r = .72). The parameter estimate, which corrects for
measurement error, between the gratification and fairness factor was .864, compared to
estimates for the other factors of .560 to .716. The standardised factor loadings for both
the five and four factor models were all substantial and significant, ranging from .554 to
.826 (tables 10.7 and 10.8). Factor inter-correlations for the short scale are shown in
tables 10.9 and 10.10. correlations between the sub-scales and the full scale were:
Comfort (.65), entitlement (.67), emotional discomfort (.70), achievement (.64), fairness
(.68), and gratification (.78).
Table 10.7 Short scale: factor loadings four-factor model
Item Factor Factor Factor Factor SMC


































Table 10.8 Short scale: factor loadings five-factor model
Item Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor













































































Table 10.9 Sub-scales Intercorrelations: Short scale four-factor model
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Comfort Entitlement Emotional Achievement
Discomfort
Comfort * .65 .72 .56
Entitlement .56 * .66 .71
Emotional .62 .56 * .70
Achievement .48 .60 .60 *
Corrected correlations in bold. All correlations p < .001
Table 10.10 Fairness and gratification intercorrelations: Short scale five factor model
Comfort Emotional Achieve Gratification Fairness
Discomfort
Gratification .62 .61 .59 * .87
Fairness .46 .54 .57 .72 *
Corrected correlations in bold. All correlations p < .001
10.4.4 NORMATIVE DATA
Descriptive statistics showed that men and women in the clinical group did not
significantly differ on Frustration-Discomfort total scores (appendix 24). Of the sub-
scale scores, only emotional discomfort was significantly higher for females (t (252) =
2.53, p < .05). This possible reflects that females also had higher anxiety scores (t (251)
= 2.39, p < .05) and lower self-esteem (t (246) = 2.50, p < .05). There were no gender
differences for the self-esteem scale or the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales in the non¬
clinical group. Normative data are presented in appendices 25 to 28.
Unlike the preliminary scale, there was a weak but significant relationship between the
total Frustration-Discomfort score and age (r (248) = -.15, p < .05). Age was also
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significantly correlated with entitlement (r (248) = -.24, p < .001) and with emotional
discomfort (r (248) = -.15, p < .05), indicating that these two types of belief decrease
with greater maturity. The reduction in entitlement beliefs with age is consistent with the
suggestion that egocentricity gradually declines with cognitive growth (Liotti, 1992).
Both the fairness and gratification facets had significant relationships ( r (248) = -.19 and
-.28, p < .001). However, was no significant relation between age and comfort (r 248) =
.02) or achievement (r (248) = -.11).
PART II: VALIDATION ANALYSIS
10.5 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CLINICAL AND STUDENT
POPULATIONS
Independent unequal variance t-tests indicated significant differences in Frustration-
Discomfort scores between the clinical and non-clinical groups (table 10.11). Mann-
Whitney tests showed equivalent levels of significance. All the sub-scales differentiated
between groups, compared to the preliminary scale in which entitlement was non¬
significant. The achievement frustration sub-scale had the least separation between
groups, and this was reflected in the analysis of individual items. In the four-factor
model nine items did not distinguish between the two groups: Q(12) potential, Q(17)
goal frustration, Q(35) work control, Q(24) unfinished tasks, Q(15) task obstruction,
Q(19) difficult tasks, Q(22) in the mood, Q(44) persistence, and Q(3) immediate
gratification. This is consistent with expectations since frustrations with study and
motivation are likely to be a central issue for students. Five further items also lacked
discrimination in the five-factor model: Q(36) indulgence, Q(16) past injustice, Q(37)
disrespect, Q(23) understanding, and Q(4) waiting. However, it is difficult to argue a
similar case for these items and they possibly are just poor discriminating items.
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113.2 (25.3) 96.3 (18.8)
19.9(6.3) 17.4(4.2)








***p < .001, **p < .01
Boxplots show that the two groups have overlapping sub-scales scores, apart from that
of emotional discomfort (figure 10.4). This is expected since, with 74% scoring above
the HAD-A cutpoint, the clinical sample is primarily represented by anxiety problems
that are strongly associated with this sub-scale. It would also be expected that, for an
unselected clinical group, some patients would have normal scores on particular sub-
scales, and therefore overlap with the non-clinical population of which higher scoring
members may also have psychological problems. Differentiation between the groups can
be seen more clearly when comparing a specific clinical problem, such as anger (figure
10.5). Likewise, a psychological problem within the non-clinical population should have
scores on relevant sub-scales similar to a clinical group, but significantly different from
other students. Thus, students scoring above the 80th percentile on procrastination
problems on the PASS (n = 26), are not significantly different on comfort scores when
compared to the clinical population (t (278) = .21, p = .830). However, the
procrastinating students were significantly higher from other students on the comfort
sub-scale (t (122) = 3.23, p < .01), and non-procrastinating students were significantly
lower on comfort compared to the clinical group (t (350) = 4.94, p < .001). Interestingly,
the student procrastination group also had significantly lower emotional discomfort
scores than the clinical group (t (278) = 4.19, p < .001), supporting the argument that
procrastinators are not distinguished by clinical levels of anxiety. The same results were
obtained using non-parametric tests.
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10.6 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN SELF-ESTEEM AND FRUSTRATION-
DISCOMFORT
10.6.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In order to identify response errors negative and positive sub-scores were calculated and
a difference score derived. It was argued in chapter five that extreme difference scores
represented careless responding and were best eliminated from analysis. Three negative
extreme values on the difference scores were removed from the clinical group, whilst the
student scores had no extreme values (tables 10.12 and 10.13). There were three
additional missing values. The student mean was 30.86 (SD 4.83), and the clinical group
mean 24.27 (SD 5.66), with higher scores representing higher levels of self-esteem. As
might be expected in a predominately clinical sample the distribution was mildly
negatively skewed but otherwise reasonably normally distributed (figure 10.6). As in the
preliminary scale, age was weakly correlated with self-esteem (r (242) = .16).
Table 10.12 Self-esteem difference scores: Clinical group
Frequency Valid Percent

















Table 10.13 Self-esteem difference scores: Student group
Frequency Valid Percent










Figure 10.6 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (combined group, n = 329)
10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 27.5 30.0 32.5 35.0 37.5 40.0
Rosenberg self-esteem score
10.6.2 RELATIONSHIP TO FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT
Since the scale aimed to assess frustration intolerance, as opposed to self-worth, it was
important that items showed discriminative validity between these two categories of
belief. Therefore, whilst these belief interact and would be expected to be correlated,
items should not correlate more highly with self-esteem than with the overall
Frustration-Discomfort scale. All but two items, Q(16) past injustice and Q(42) waste
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time, were significantly correlated with self-esteem, and of these, two items, Q( 13)
thoughts and Q(34) continuing situation, were correlated r > .50 with self-esteem.
However, all items had substantially higher correlations with the Frustration-Discomfort
Scale (table 10.14). the relationship between the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and
self-esteem was weaker in the student group. Thus, the overall correlation was r (120) =
-.35, p < .001, compared to r = -.43 in the clinical group.
Comparison of the preliminary and revised Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales showed
that their correlations with self-esteem had increased. That this increase was relatively
small suggests the more elaborate methods aimed at separating self-worth and frustration
intolerance beliefs in the preliminary scale were unnecessary. Furthermore, the
correlation of self-esteem with the Schema 'impaired limits' scale (r = -.37) did not
significantly differ from its correlation with the Frustration-Discomfort Scale (r = -.43)
when tested using Fischer's Z-transformation (Z = 1.16, ns). In contrast, the Frustration-
Discomfort Scale correlates strongly with 'impaired limits' (r = .70) compared to the
moderate relationship with self-esteem (r = -.43), a difference that is highly significant
(Z = 5.02, p < .001). This evidence supports the discriminative validity of the
Frustration-Discomfort Scale.
Table 10.14 Correlations between Rosenberg self-esteem and Frustration-Discomfort


















p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
367
10.7 DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL MEASURES
10.7.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
There was only one missing case from the HAD scale, and no univariate outliers. The
distributions did not indicate marked deviation from normality. Means and standard
deviations (table 10.15) are not significantly different from the preliminary study, with
74% of patients classified as having anxiety problems and 39% depression, using a HAD
cut point of 11. HAD scores were unrelated to age.
Table 10.15 Descriptive statistics: HAD scale
Mean (SD)
Full HAD scale 23.17(7.91)
HAD-Anxiety 13.65 (4.45)
HAD-Depression 9.52 (4.54)
Correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and the HAD scale are presented
in table 10.16. All of the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales were highly significantly
related to anxiety and depression scores. Compared to the preliminary scale, correlations
also substantially improved (see table 6.11 for comparison). The correlation of
depression with the full scale increased from .27 to .42. Comfort increased its correlation
with depression (.34 to .44) and emotional discomfort with anxiety (.49 to .60) as well as
depression (.32 to .43). Likewise, achievement increased its correlation with anxiety (.31
to .40) and depression (.19 to .28).
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Table 10.16 Correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort and HAD scales


















N = 253 (self-esteem N = 248) ***p < .001, **p < .01
10.7.2 ANXIETY
Frustration-Discomfort and Rosenberg Self-Esteem mean scores were significantly
different between anxious and non-anxious groups (table 10.17). To determine if
frustration intolerance beliefs continued to exert an influence independent from self-
esteem and a shared association with negative affect the Rosenberg and HAD depression
scores were partialled out. All sub-scales remained significant, with emotional
discomfort highly correlated with anxiety even after self-esteem was controlled, and
moderately correlated after both variables were partialled out (table 10.18). Unlike the
preliminary scale, Q(10) the 'fear of mental incapacity' item was correlated with both
anxiety and depression (r (251) = .40 and .33, p < .001), and this remained significantly
related to anxiety (r (250) = .21, p < .001) and depression (r (250) = .14, p < .05) after
controlling for negative affect.




Full four-factor scale 76.0(21.1) 95.9(18.0) 7 33***
Comfort 16.7(12.4) 21.7(6.2) 5.67***
Entitlement 19.7 (6.4) 22.9 (6.0) 3.68***
Emotional discomfort 20.3 (7.0) 27.4 (5.3) 1 57***
Achievement 19.3 (5.8) 23.8 (5.8) 5.46***
Full five-factor scale 95.7 (25.4) 119.1(22.5) g 99***
Gratification 17.1 (6.2) 20.8 (6.1) 4 24***
Fairness 22.3 (5.8) 25.3 (5.7) 3.64***
Self-esteem scale 27.1 (5.3) 23.1 (5.3) 6.29***
***p < .001
Table 10.18 Partial correlations between anxiety and Frustration-Discomfort sub-s
controlling for self-esteem and depression
Controlling for
Frustration-Discomfort Self-esteem Depression Depression
+ Self-esteem
Full four-factor scale 41*** 38*** 34***
Comfort 29*** 2i*** J g**
Entitlement 30*** 2i*** 20**
Emotional discomfort oi *** 49*** 43***
Achievement 4Q*** 31*** 27***
Full five-factor scale 39*** 32*** 32***
Gratification 34*** 25*** 22***
Fairness 2g*** 2i*** 20***
N = 244 ***p<.001, **p<.01
10.7.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
When all the sub-scales were entered as a block, using simultaneous multiple regression,
only emotional discomfort proved to be a significant predictor of anxiety (table 10.19).
Most of the variance (37%) was explained by the emotional discomfort, the other three
sub-scales contributing an additional 1%. With a hierarchical multiple regression
analysis, when negative affect was controlled on step I, emotional discomfort remained a
significant predictor (t = 6.92, p < .001, B = .46), and overall the Frustration-Discomfort
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block accounted for 17% of variance (R2 cha = .17, Fcha (4,247) = 2.45, p = < .001). In a
further hierarchical analysis, when self-esteem was entered on step I, emotional
discomfort remained significant (t = 6.94, p < .001, B = .52). Emotional discomfort also
remained significant after both negative affect and self-esteem were controlled (R = .63,
R2 cha = .22, Fcha (4,242) = 21.88, p = < .001). Self-esteem was also a significant predictor
at step I (R = .43, R2 = .18, F (1,246) = 54.41, p = < .001) accounting for 18% of the
variance and frustration-Discomfort an additional 21%. In comparison, when controlling
for Frustration-Discomfort, self-esteem only accounted for an additional 2% (R2 cha =
.02, Fcha (1,242) = 7.84, p = < .001).
Table 10.19 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort four-factor sub-scales
predicting anxiety
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Comfort 0.71 .497 .05
Entitlement 1.64 .102 -.11
Emotional discomfort 8.05 .001 .57
Achievement 1.73 .084 .12
Multiple R =.61
R2 = .37
F (4, 248) = 37.33, p< .001
10.7.4 DEPRESSION
All Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales differentiated between depressed and non-
depressed groups (table 10.20). To determine their independence from self-esteem and
negative affect the Rosenberg and FIAD depression scores were partialled out. All sub-
scales remained significant, with comfort highly correlated with depression after self-
esteem was controlled, and moderately correlated after both variables were partialled out
(table 10.21).
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Table 10.20 Mean and standard deviations for depression groups
Non-Depressed Depressed t
N (155) (98)
Full four-factor scale 75.5 (20.0) 99.0(19.4) 5.32***
Comfort 18.7 (5.6) 23.2(7.0) 5.36***
Entitlement 21.1 (5.9) 23.6 (6.4) 3.14**
Emotional discomfort 28.1 (5.4) 24.0 (6.7) 5.30***
Achievement 21.7 (6.0) 24.2 (5.9) 2 27***
Full five-factor scale 107.8 (24.2) 122.8(23.8) 4 gj***
Gratification 24.9 (5.7) 21.5 (6.3) 3.34***
Fairness 24.9 (5.7) 25.8 (5.9) 2.68**
Self-esteem scale 25.6(5.8) 22.1 (4.8) 4 qg***
N = 244 ***p < .001, **p < .01
Table 10.21 Partial correlations between depression and Frustration-Discomfort sub-




Full four-factor scale 27*** 19** .11
Comfort 28*** 29*** .20**
Entitlement .14* .08 .05
Emotional discomfort 27*** .15* .07
Achievement 12** .07 .04
Full five-factor scale 25*** iy** .10
Gratification .14* .08 .04
Fairness .13 .04 .03
N = 244 ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
10.7.5 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Entering all Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales as a block both emotional discomfort and
comfort were significant predictors of depression accounting for 24% of variance (table
10.22). When self-esteem was entered on the first step, emotional discomfort (t = 2.28, p
= .023, B = .18) and comfort (t = 2.86, p = .005, B = .22) remained significant. Self-
esteem contributed 22% unique variance (R2 cha = .22, Fcha (1,246) = 70.18, p = < .001).,
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with an additional 8% by Frustration-Discomfort (R2 cha = .08, Fcha (4,242) = 7.05, p = <
.001). However, when negative affect is controlled on the first step, emotional
discomfort fails to remain significant, although comfort (t = 4.18, p = .001, 13 = .29)
remained a unique predictor of depression, the Frustration-Discomfort block accounting
for an additional 6% of variance (R2 cha = .06, Fcha (4,247) = 5.98, p = < .001). Self-
esteem also remained a significant predictor when controlling for negative affect (t =
5.21, p = .001, (3 = -.29) accounting for 7% of additional variance (R2 cha = .07, Fcha
(1,245) = 27.18, p = < .001).
Table 10.22 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort four-factor sub-scales
predicting depression
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Comfort 4.13 .001 .31
Entitlement 1.73 .085 -.13
Emotional discomfort 3.80 .001 .30
Achievement 0.47 .641 .03
Multiple R = .49
R2 = .24
F (4, 248)= 19.85, p < .001
10.7.6 ANGER
There were nineteen consecutive TAS cases missing due to an administrative error but
no other missing data. Three outliers had high scores but, since all were referred for
treatment of anger, they were judged extreme population members. As in the
preliminary analysis, the distribution was positively skewed, and a cut point of 21 (male)
and 22 (female) was used to designate clinical anger. The mean was 22.0 (6.7) with no
significant gender difference. Age had a significant negative correlation with anger (r
(229) = -.22, p < .001). Means and standard deviations for anger and non-anger groups
are presented in table 10.24. Entitlement was moderately highly correlated with trait
anger, as were the two separate entitlement facets, fairness, and gratification (table
10.23). This was similar to the level of association found in the preliminary scale.
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However, emotional discomfort did have an increased correlation with Trait anger,
suggesting this sub-scale is measuring a greater range of emotional intolerance
compared to the preliminary scale (.27 to .37) (see table 6.3 for comparisons).







Full Four-factor scale 46***
Full Five-factor scale 4g***
Self-esteem scale -.22
N = 235 ***p< .001
Table 10.24 Mean and standard deviations anger groups
Belief scale Non-anger Anger t
N 108 127
Full four-factor scale 80.9(19.4) 98.7(18.0) 7 3 j***
Comfort 18.8 (6.5) 21.6 (6.7) 3.33***
Entitlement 18.8 (5.4) 24.8 (5.4) g 4q***
Emotional discomfort 22.7 (6.5) 27.0 (5.6) 6.62***
Achievement 20.6 (5.8) 24.2 (5.8) 5.07***
Full five-factor scale 100.7 (23.4) 123.4(22.1) 7.66***
Gratification 16.8(5.5) 22.4 (5.7) 7 64***
Fairness 21.8 (5.4) 27.1 (5.1) 7 73***
Rosenberg self-esteem 25.7(5.8) 23.0(5.2) 3.67***
10.7.7 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A simultaneous multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the unique
variance of the four-factor sub-scales. When all the sub-scales were entered as a block
only entitlement proved to be a significant predictor of trait anger (table 10.25). Most of
the variance (30.4%) was explained by the entitlement sub-scale, the other three sub-
scales contributed a negligible additional 1% of variance. A further regression analysis
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was conducted to examine the five-factor model in predicting trait anger. Both fairness (t
(5,229) = 3.82, p < .001, 6 = .24) and gratification (t = 2.56, p < .05, B = .24) were
significant predictors. However, the variance explained by the five-factor model
compared to the four-factor model was marginally less (R = .55, R2 = .28, F = 19.53).
The variance explained for each sub-scale entered separately was: emotional discomfort
13% (R = .37, F = 36.11, p < .001), achievement 11% (R = .33, F = 28.07, p < .001),
fairness 27 % (R = .52, F = 86.26, p < .001), gratification 24% (R = .49, F = 73.82, p <
.001), and comfort 7% (R = .27, F = 17.98, p < .001). Thus, the fairness sub-scale was a
slightly weaker predictor of anger than the combined entitlement sub-scale. Self-esteem
was a significant predictor of trait anger (R = .22, R2 = .05, F = 11.31, p < .001), but
only accounted for 5% of the variance. When entered simultaneously with entitlement
self-esteem failed to remain significant (t = 1.81, p = .07, B = -.10).
Controlling for negative affect, by entering HAD total score on step I of a multiple
regression analysis, still left the Frustration-discomfort block accounting for over 23%
of the variance (R2cha = .23, Fcha (4,224) = 20.45, p = < .001), with entitlement remaining
a unique predictor of anger (t = 7.82, p < .001, B = -.57).
Table 10.25 Multiple regression analysis: Frustration-Discomfort four-factors predicting
trait anger
Variables t p Beta
Entered
Comfort 1.33 .186 -.10
Entitlement 8.14 <.001 .54
Emotional discomfort 0.12 .079 .14
Achievement 0.58 .755 -.02
Multiple R = .56
R2 = .32
Adjusted R2 = .30
F (4, 230) = 26.42, p < .001
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10.7.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE, SELF-
ESTEEM AND ANGER
To test the hypothesis that there was no association between the entitlement or
achievement sub-scales and high self-esteem, entitlement mean scores were analysed for
each quartile of the Rosenberg positive esteem sub-scale. Consistent with previous
results there was a systematic reduction in achievement and entitlement scores with
increased self-esteem (table 10.26). Lower scores on these sub-scales were also found at
the extreme ends of the distribution. Thus, at the 10th percentile both the entitlement
(19.38) and achievement (18.75) mean scores remained low. The same pattern was
found for the negative esteem sub-scale. Similarly, examination of Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scale percentiles also revealed that at high levels of entitlement and
achievement the mean total self-esteem scores are still relatively low, in comparison
with the two other sub-scales and with reported population means (table 10.27). Thus,
mean self-esteem for the present student group (n = 120) was 30.84 (SD = 4.8) and a
non-clinical adult group was 33.04 (SD = 5.39) (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001). A one¬
way ANOVA showed no significant difference between student self-esteem scores on
entitlement quartiles (F (3,80) = .09, p = .965) or on achievement quartiles (F (3,228) =
1.69, p = .176). These results indicate that both in clinical and non-clinical populations
the entitlement and achievement sub-scales are not associated with level of self-esteem,
or specifically high self-esteem.




High self-esteem 21.00 20.91
3 21.01 21.88
2 22.62 23.77
Low self-esteem 23.18 23.43
N = 228
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The correlation between self-esteem and anger was significant, although substantially
weaker in comparison with the correlation between entitlement and anger (table 10.23).
Indeed, when entitlement was partialled out self-esteem was no longer significant related
to anger (r (228) = -.22, p < .001; pr = -.12, ns).
In the preliminary scale, the self-esteem difference score was significantly correlated
with frustration intolerance, with achievement frustration a unique predictor. This had
suggested that the difference between the negative and positive scales might reflect
criticism of personal performance rather than global self-rating. These findings were
only partially replicated by the present results. Although, the difference score remained
weakly correlated with total Frustration-Discomfort scores (r (248) = -.14, p < .05) and
with achievement and entitlement (both: r (228) = -.15, p < .05), simultaneous multiple
regression showed neither achievement or entitlement were unique predictors.
Nevertheless, the difference score remained correlated with anger (r (230) = -.17, p <
.01), as well as with anxiety (r (248) = -.13, p < .05). Furthermore, of the five
Frustration-Discomfort items that correlated p < .01 with the difference score three were
achievement items: Q(12) potential (r = .26), Q(17), goal frustration (r = .207), and
Q(15) task obstruction (r = .18).
10.7.9 DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN ANGER AND DEPRESSION
Preliminary scale studies results had indicated that the beliefs associated with mixed
depression/anger could be distinguished from depression without anger. Specifically, the
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emotional discomfort and comfort scales were significantly higher in the
depressed/angry group, supporting the REBT model of two forms of depression, one
primarily related to loss of self-worth and the other to frustration intolerance. Using the
revised scale, the hypothesis was tested that these Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales
would be significantly higher in anger/depression than in depression or anger and would
differentiate between these groups.
With unequal sample size and variances, non-parametric tests were used. The anger and
anger/depressed groups did not differ in mean anger, and the angry/depressed and
depressed groups did not differ in depression scores. As predicted, total Frustration-
Discomfort scores were significantly different between the three groups (Kruskal-Wallis
X2 (2) = 24.16, p < .001). Individual comparisons indicated that Frustration-Discomfort
total scores were significantly higher in depressed/anger compared to anger (Mann-
Whitney U (59,68) = 1230, p < .001), and depressed groups (U (59,32) = 432 p < .001).
Comfort scores were significantly higher in anger/depressed compared to the anger
group (U (59,68) = 1186, p = .131), and higher in anger/depressed compared to
depressed group although this failed to reach significance (U (59,32) = 762, p = .131).
As would be expected, entitlement scores were significantly higher in both anger groups
compared to the depressed group (U (32,59) = 361, p < .001; U (32,68) = 570, p < .05),
but were also significantly higher in the anger/depressed compared to the anger group (U
(59,68) = 1536, p < .05). Emotional discomfort was significantly higher in
anger/depressed group compared to either anger (U (59,68) = 1957, p < .001), or
depressed groups (U (59,32) = 385, p < .001). Self-esteem was lower in the depressed
group compared to the anger/depressed group, although again this failed to reach
significance (U (57,30) = 666, p = .097).
In summary, the hypothesis that the combined anger/depression group would have
significantly higher levels of emotional discomfort and comfort when compared to
individuals in the separate categories was supported. Whilst comfort failed to reach
significance, due to the small numbers involved in the depressed group, the direction
was as expected.
10.7.10 CONVERGENT AND DIVERGENT VALIDATION
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There was a strong correlation between total Frustration-Discomfort scores and the
Schema impaired limits scales. Comparison with the preliminary scale intercorrelation
matrix (table 10.28) shows that the correlation has increased by .10. In particular, the
correlation with the schema entitlement scale has substantially increased from .34 to .60.
This reflects a general increase in intercorrelations for all the Frustration-Discomfort
sub-scales, with all correlations significant at p < .001.
Table 10.28 Intercorrelations of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale and Rosenberg Self-







N= 254 (self-esteem n = 248) ***p < .001, **p < .01
Self-control
Comfort .62*** 20*** 54***
Entitlement .66*** 72*** .55***
Emotional discomfort /J.(J*** 42*** .56***
Achievement 42*** 40*** .36***
Gratification .68*** .68*** .60***
Fairness 27*** .62*** 4g***
Full four-factor scale yQ*** .60*** .65***
Full five-factor scale 71*** 63*** .65***
Rosenberg Self-esteem _ 27*** -.18** _ 4Q***
The pattern of intercorrelations of the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales with the
schema scales was consistent with theoretical expectation, supporting convergent and
divergent validation. Thus, comfort (Z = 4.83, p < .001) and emotional discomfort (Z =
2.89, p < .001) correlated more strongly with 'self-control', which reflects 'exaggerated
emphasis on discomfort-avoidance' (McGuinn & Young, 1996), than with schema
'Entitlement', which is described as the 'insistence that one should be able to do or have
whatever one wants...'. In contrast, entitlement (Z = 4.18, p < .001) and achievement (Z
= 1.94, p < .05) correlated strongly with schema 'Entitlement' compared to 'self-
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control'. Similarly, fairness was also differentially correlated with the two scales (Z =
3.06, p < .001), and to a lesser extent gratification (Z = 1.97, p < .05).
To assess further the validity of the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales the schema items
were placed in four groups in terms of content. The first reflected egocentricity and the
second task perseverance (table 10.29). As expected, both correlated most strongly with
their entitlement and comfort beliefs respectively. Interestingly, item (11) concerning
'overdoing things' was relatively weakly correlated with the Frustration-Discomfort
subscales. The addictive behaviour item also had a weak relationship with the
frustration-discomfort echoing the findings of the Coping Questionnaire in chapter
seven. However, it was significantly correlated with emotional discomfort (r = .31 > P <
.001), comfort (r = .29, p < .001), and gratification (r = .27, p < .001). Unfortunately, the
Schema item wording refers to several addictive behaviours, making interpretation
difficult. As expected the anger items are strongly correlated with entitlement.
Interestingly, the achievement sub-scale was associated with three of the egocentric
schema items, and whilst these were clearly more strongly related to entitlement it does
suggest an overlap between these two sub-scales in terms of egocentricity, although the
beliefs involved differ.
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Table 10.29 Correlation between Schema 'impaired limits' items and Frustration-
Discomfort sub-scales
Schema items
1 Getting what I want
3 Doing what I want
4 Opposed by others















7 Complete tasks .47
8 Giving up .59 .43
13 Perseverance .56 .40
14 Concentration .51 .35 .46
15 Task enjoyment .59 .42 .41
9 Gratification .48 .40 .36
12 Bored .39 .39 .41
6 Addiction
11 Indulgence
17 Resolutions .44 .35
19 Impulsive .41 .40
2 Angry frustration .60
16 Control temper .49 .40
10 Angry control .39 .55 .40
18 Emotion expression .35
N = 254. Only correlations above .35 shown, all p < .0001
10.8 DISCUSSION
The confirmatory factor analysis supported a multidimensional model of frustration
intolerance. One and two-factor models were inadequate, but four and five factor models
both fitted the data well. The magnitude of the difference in fit between these two
models was small, and the degree of overlap as shown by the correlation coefficients
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large. Furthermore, the two 'entitlement' sub-scales had corrected correlations higher
than their reliability coefficients. This indicates that the two scales are correlated to an
extent that it is difficult to argue, either theoretically or in terms of practical
discriminative ability, that they represent distinct underlying concepts (John & Benet-
Martinez, 2000). In theory, factors can always be subdivided into smaller facets,
however the appropriate level of sub-division must be determined ultimately by the
conceptual meaningfulness and empirical usefulness of the facets (Briggs & Cheek,
1986). Thus, the four-factor model is preferred for reasons of parsimony. However, the
distinction between gratification and fairness may be important in specific areas of
disturbance, although there was little difference between these facets in their relationship
with the emotional measures, and no evidence of improved discrimination compared to
the full entitlement scale. However, the clinical population consists of heterogeneous
diagnostic groups and specific clinical groups relevant to gratification or fairness may
have different relationships with the two facets. Overall, the substantial intercorrelations
between factors suggest that the four dimensions may be subsumed within a single
frustration intolerance construct.
Comparison of the preliminary and revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale indicated
improvements in the readability, acceptability, and psychometric properties of the
revised scale. There was also a strengthening of correlations with anxiety, depression,
and anger, and with the convergent scales, as well as increased discrimination between
clinical groups, and with a non-clinical population. Both the full scale and relevant
individual sub-scales scores all showed noticeable statistical improvements. Therefore,
these results suggest that restricting the irrational belief wording to frustration
intolerance and omitting absolute demandingness does not reduce the relationship with
psychological disturbance. Similarly, shortening the scale to seven items in each sub-
scale did not result in a worse fit to the data in the confirmatory analysis. Rather, the
evidence suggests that this has reduced item redundancy whilst retaining the conceptual
range.
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The preliminary scale analyses had indicated that the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales
were specifically related to different types of emotional disturbance. This was further
supported by these results. Controlling for overlapping variance due to negative affect
and self-esteem emotional discomfort remained a unique predictor of anxiety. Likewise,
comfort remained a unique predictor of depression. Interestingly, achievement remained
moderately correlated with anxiety when controlling for self-esteem and when
controlling for negative affect. However, the relationship between achievement and
depression, as in the preliminary scale, much weaker. Nevertheless, it remained
significant when controlling for self-esteem, whilst not for negative affect. Achievement
and anger were also moderately correlated, and also remained so when controlling for
negative affect and self-esteem. This supports the construct validity of the achievement
scale as representing dysfunctional beliefs rather than adaptive perfectionistic striving.
Consistent with the preliminary scale results, there was no evidence of an association
between high self-esteem scores and trait anger. Indeed, findings suggest that issues of
self-worth play at best only a minor role in the generation of anger. Rather, frustration
intolerance and specifically beliefs relating to entitlement were the primary cognitions
associated with anger. Likewise, there was no association between entitlement and high
self-esteem scores. The correlation between entitlement and self-esteem scores, on both





'When I created Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy in 1955,
I knew exactly what it was. ..and wasn't. Now, I am not so sure!'
Albert Ellis (1996a)
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This research aimed to investigate the factor structure of beliefs related to frustration
intolerance. A second aim was to determine if the division of beliefs into two broad
categories, ego disturbance and frustration intolerance, was meaningful. That is, whether
frustration intolerance beliefs were independently related to psychological disturbance.
Connected with this was the investigation of the relationship of individual sub-scales
with different types of psychological disturbance. In this regard, it was important to
demonstrate that the Frustration-Discomfort Scale discriminated between emotional
problems separate from its association with general negative affect.
11.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
11.2.1 SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Potential items were generated from the REBT literature and in reference to recent
classification of non-ego disturbance beliefs. Items were designed to distinguish between
frustration intolerance and self-worth beliefs. Following a pilot study, a final scale
consisting of 74 items was produced. Prior to analysis, items were examined regarding
normality, response frequency distributions, and reliability. The item discrimination
from self-esteem and between student and clinical groups was also explored. These
investigations led to several items being dropped.
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A Principal components analysis using both varimax and direct oblimin rotations was
conducted using responses from clinical and student populations. This indicated
frustration intolerance was best described by four oblique factors: Comfort, emotional
discomfort, entitlement and achievement. These factors partially corresponded to the
content categories proposed by REBT theory. Following a series of validity studies,
using sub-scales derived from these factors, a shortened scale was developed. This
simplified the item structure and wording, primarily employing only frustration
intolerance beliefs. Confirmatory factor analysis was then employed to test the factor
structure identified in the preliminary scale. The results showed a good fit for both four
and five factors, although the four-factor model was preferred as the most parsimonious
solution. Sub-scales, each containing seven items, were derived from these factors and
the validity of the revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale investigated.
11.2.2 VALIDATION STUDY: SELF-ESTEEM
The adequacy of the self-esteem measure was examined using a structural equation
modeling approach. This suggested that the scale was measuring one underlying
concept, that of global self-esteem, but the difference between the negative and positive
facets was meaningful. It was argued that this difference score reflected personal
criticism rather than global self-condemnation. This score was uniquely predicted by
achievement frustration and remained significant when controlling overall self-esteem
scores and age. Anger was the only emotional measure significantly correlated with the
difference score. The comfort and emotional discomfort scales had the highest
correlations with low self-esteem. There was no evidence of a relationship between the
entitlement or achievement sub-scales and high self-esteem.
11.2.3 VALIDATION STUDY: EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
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Specific emotional disorders were uniquely associated with different dimensions of
frustration intolerance, even after controlling for negative affect and self-esteem.
Entitlement was uniquely associated with anger; emotional discomfort with anxiety; and
comfort with depression. Individuals with co-existing anger and depression, when
compared to those with separate problems, had significantly higher Frustration-
Discomfort scores, particularly comfort and emotional discomfort. The relationship
between anger and self-esteem was weak compared to that of anger with frustration
intolerance. Achievement frustration was significantly correlated with anxiety, anger,
and to a lesser extent depression. Correlations between the Frustration-Discomfort Scale,
Schema, DAS, and Rosenberg Self-Esteem scales provided support for convergent and
divergent validity. Apart from entitlement, all the preliminary Frustration-Discomfort
sub-scales differentiated between the student and clinical groups.
11.2.4 VALIDATION STUDY: SELF-CONTROL
Differential relationships were found between the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales and
specific self-control problems. Total scores were significantly related to both cognitive
and behavioural avoidance, with the strongest correlation with reliance on medication or
routine to cope with disturbance. Emotional discomfort and entitlement, mediated
respectively by anxiety/tension and anger, were significant predictors of self-harm. Self-
esteem had the strongest relationship with self-harming. The relation of entitlement to
self-harm was mediated by anger and was independent of self-esteem and emotional
discomfort.
11.2.5 VALIDATION STUDY: PROCRASTINATION
Both versions of the Frustration-Discomfort Scale were differentially correlated with the
PASS task aversiveness scale as compared to fear of failure, supporting convergent and
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discriminative validity. Both self-esteem and comfort were significant predictor of both
procrastination problems and frequency. There was evidence, although this was not
found on both samples, that achievement frustration and emotional discomfort might
reduce the frequency of procrastination on exams and essays. Contrary to theoretical
speculation, the entitlement and gratification facets had negligible associations with
procrastination.
11.2.6 VALIDATION STUDY: THERAPY ENGAGEMENT
Both low self-esteem and high comfort scores were significantly associated with
increased number of therapy sessions. Emotional discomfort was related to higher
therapy dropout, as were entitlement beliefs. Treatment outcome appeared unrelated to
any of the variables.
11.2.7 ANALYSIS OF REVISED SCALE
Comparison of the preliminary with the revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale indicated
improvements in the readability, acceptability, and psychometric properties of the
revised scale. Correlations with measures of emotional disturbance and with convergent
scales were stronger, and there was improved discrimination between clinical and non¬
clinical groups. In contrast to the preliminary scale, all Frustration-Discomfort sub-
scales including entitlement were significantly higher in the clinical population.
Consistent with the preliminary scale, comfort was a unique predictor of depression,
emotional discomfort of anxiety, and entitlement of anger, when controlling for both
negative affect and self-esteem. Also consistent with the preliminary scale, there was no
relationship between either low or high self-esteem and trait anger. Similarly, results
supported the finding that coexisting anger and depression showed increased emotional
discomfort and comfort scores when compared to the individual problems. It was
hypothesised that this reflected related to increased discomfort depression beliefs in
angry/depressed individuals.
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11.3 THE STRUCTURE OF FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE
The conceptual structure of the individual sub-scales was supported by the research
findings. Whilst the achievement sub-scale is related to the construct of perfectionism, it
was argued that existing perfectionism scales, like the achievement sub-scale on the
DAS, did not adequately represent dysfunctional beliefs related to frustration
intolerance. Whilst some perfectionism sub-scales assessed self-evaluative beliefs, other
sub-scales assessing high standards were not consistently phrased in terms of
imperatives. REBT proposes that only absolute imperatives lead to dysfunction, these
items would represent the preference to strive for achievement, thus confounding
adaptive and dysfunctional perfectionism. Indeed, Flett and Hewitt (2002) in suggesting
that self-orientated perfectionism is a more dysfunctional type of striving than
conscientiousness, note that a distinction needs to be made between a desire for high
standards and demands for absolute perfection. The Frustration-Discomfort achievement
sub-scale was designed to measure intolerance of frustrated achievement demands, as
opposed to the preference for high standards. It was hypothesised that if these beliefs
were worded in terms of frustration intolerance/demandingness then a stronger
relationship with psychological disturbance would emerge. This was supported by the
results.
Thus, in contrast to research using the perfectionism scales, achievement was
significantly related to anxiety, even when controlling for self-esteem and negative
affect. However, the relationship of achievement frustration with depression was less
distinct, although this was still significant after controlling for self-esteem. In
comparison, research using the perfectionism scales shows that self-orientated and
personal standards, the sub-scales conceptually closest to achievement frustration, have
a negligible or negative relationship to depression when negative affect is controlled
(Enns & Cox, 1999; Kawamura et al., 2001). Research using the Sociotropy-Autonomy
Scale also shows that the autonomy sub-scale is more weakly related to depression
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compared to sociotropy (Clark & Beck, 1991). Similarly, the DAS-24 dependency sub-
scale remains significantly elevated following depression, but the achievement and self-
control sub-scales do not (Power et ah, 1995). In addition, achievement also had a
moderate relationship with anger, and this was largely undiminished when controlling
for self-esteem or negative affect. Therefore, the present results suggest that, in the
absence of self-worth beliefs, achievement frustration may be more strongly related to
tension/anxiety and angry irritability than depression. This is consistent with type-A
personality research, in that this aspect of personality is one area of psychological
problems characterised by excessive standards for achievement, which in turn is linked
to angry hostility (Friedmann & Rosenman, 1974).
Comfort, which has previously been employed as an all-inclusive category for
frustration intolerance beliefs, was defined more narrowly by the analysis. This sub-
scale focused on the intolerance of difficulty and hassle, and was separated from beliefs
regarding emotional discomfort. Comfort beliefs were uniquely related to depression
when accounting for the overlapping variance from other sub-scales. The analysis of the
relationship of depression with anger was interesting, in that several theoretical
approaches have suggested two separate depression sub-types. However, the
psychoanalytic (Blatt, 1982) and the Cognitive Therapy models (Beck, 1976) both
describe these dimensions in relation to self-worth, differing largely in terms of whether
self-worth is based on interpersonal or achievement success. In contrast, REBT proposes
that a more important distinction can be made between self-worth and frustration
intolerance depression. This REBT model received some support. Thus, individuals
suffering from both depression and anger showed significantly higher levels of
frustration intolerance, and specifically comfort and emotional discomfort, compared to
individuals that were either depressed or angry.
Although emotional discomfort has similarities to anxiety sensitivity (Reiss & McNally,
1985) it aims to assess a wider range of emotions, focusing on the intolerance of
discomfort rather than its feared consequences. Whilst it has been suggested that
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frustration intolerance is central to anxiety disorders research regarding this is sparse
(Warren & Zgourides, 1991). The present findings are important in establishing this
relationship, and show that intolerance of emotional discomfort was uniquely associated
with anxiety even after controlling for negative affect and self-esteem. These results
were confirmed using the revised scale with both studies indicated that, compared to
self-esteem, emotional discomfort was by far the strongest predictor of anxiety
problems. As expected, cognitive and behavioural avoidance in general was associated
with both comfort and emotional discomfort beliefs. Whilst beliefs related to control
were included in emotional discomfort, the exploratory analysis did not support a
separate factor for control and uncertainty beliefs, and these items loading on a number
of different content categories.
REBT theory has viewed problems of self-control, in regards to frustration intolerance,
as aimed at the relief of discomfort (e.g. Wessler & Wessler, 1980). However, Dryden
and Yankura (1993) have emphasised a further aspect, that of attaining positive
gratification, and indeed a 'need' for excitement has been linked with self-control
problems such as compulsive gambling (Walker, 1992). The two items related to
excitement/buzz had poor correlations with the other Frustration-Discomfort items,
although the indulgence item was significantly related to comfort eating, overspending
and alcohol use. Since frustration intolerance statements were largely worded in terms of
deprivation rather than indulgence, it could be argued that purely positive gratification
beliefs have not been specifically assessed. Indeed, positive gratification may be best
assessed separately from frustration intolerance beliefs, perhaps in terms of 'needs'. In
terms of the present scale, whilst intolerance of gratification delay and deprivation were
found to be important aspects of frustration intolerance, the evidence indicated that these
were best considered facets of entitlement. In other words, 'I must not be deprived of
what I want' covers a range of associated demands including those regarding fairness
and intolerance of gratification frustration.
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Other areas of research have implicated aspects of frustration intolerance as important in
'impulsive' disorders. For instance, Lacey and Evens (1986) argue that 'multi-impulsive
personality' involves the failure of impulse control, and that this failure is related to
difficulties in coping with disturbing emotions. However, the present research suggests
that problems of self-control may be better conceived in terms of interrelated patterns of
belief, rather than as a general impulsive trait. Similarly, other theoretical models have
tended to rely on one dimension of beliefs, or have focused on their relation with self-
worth rather than frustration intolerance (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). However,
comfort or emotional discomfort beliefs alone do not fully explain the connections
between self-control problems. For example, it is unclear from the impulsivity model the
relationship of anger with such a wide range of 'impulsive' behaviours (Milligan &
Waller, 2001). In this respect, the frustration intolerance model would point to the
relationship of anger with entitlement, which in turn is associated with other frustration
intolerance beliefs. The research on self-harming suggests that the combination of anger
and emotional discomfort may be central to this pattern of behaviour. Frustration
intolerance beliefs have in common, not overwhelming impulsive desire, but the
intolerance of circumstance whether these are unpleasant emotions or frustrating
situations. Clearly, self-control problems are likely to involve a number of related sub-
tasks associated with different types of belief. These may include the effort of thinking
about longer-term consequences, the toleration of uncomfortable emotions, and the
inhibition of actions based on entitlement.
Whilst the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales were significantly related to measures of
emotional disturbance, it is also important and instructive to note the size of these
relationships. The effect sizes for both anxiety and anger were strong to moderate. Thus,
for the revised scale the relationship between anxiety and emotional intolerance showed
a correlation of r = .60. And, even when controlling for negative affect, 17% of the
variance was uniquely attributed to Frustration-Discomfort beliefs. Likewise,
entitlement had a correlation of r = .55 with anger, and accounted for 23% of variance
once negative affect had been controlled. However, the relationship between frustration
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intolerance and depression was less pronounced. Comfort did correlate moderately
strongly with depression (r = .44), comparable to the relationship with that of self-
esteem (r = -.47). However, once negative affect was controlled the amount of variance
explained by Frustration-Discomfort was substantially reduced from 24% to 6%. A
similar reduction was found for the relationship between depression and self-esteem.
These results reflect a number of issues. In general, it highlights the considerable
difficulties associated with the analysis of personality factors in depression (Coyne &
Wiffen, 1995). First, the use of self-report inventories to measure depression is
problematic. High scores on such measures in the absence of formal diagnosis may
reflect dysphoria rather than clinical depression, and therefore increase the shared
variance between negative affect and depression scores. Secondly, the number of
patients in the study classified as suffering from depression, separate from either anger
or anxiety, was small, pointing to the need for studies using adequate numbers of
individuals with formal diagnosis. Thirdly, how far anxiety and depression are
distinguishable has been the subject of considerable debate, with some investigators
arguing that these concepts substantially overlap (Kendall & Watson, 1989). Given this,
the fact that Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales were uniquely related to distinct aspects
of emotional disturbance, and remained so after shared variance associated with self-
esteem and negative affect were accounted for, underlines the importance of frustration
intolerance beliefs in emotional disturbance. Indeed, smaller effect sizes are often
reported between other types of belief and emotional disturbance. For instance,
Kawamura et al. (2001) found that perfectionistic beliefs accounted for only 4% of
additional variance in depression, and for 6% of the variance in anxiety, when
controlling for negative affect. Finally, the relatively weaker association between
Frustration-Discomfort scores with depression compared to anger may suggest the
relatively greater importance of frustration intolerance beliefs in problems such as anger.
However, problems such as anger and depression are clearly complex disorders and it
would be expected that Frustration-Discomfort beliefs would be involved at many
different levels.
11.4 EGO DISTURBANCE AND FRUSTRATION INTOLERANCE
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The research supported a model separating self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs.
It suggested this distinction was meaningful rather than, for instance, an artefact due to
the differences in item wording (DiGiuseppe, 1996). A possible criticism was the use of
a self-esteem measure rather than one assessing self-acceptance. In REBT theory these
are quite separate concepts, the first based on conditional self-rating and the second on
unconditional acceptance. However, this was not considered to be a serious limitation
since the Rosenberg scale was originally designed to reflect global self-evaluation which
is a definitive feature of ego disturbance and self-acceptance. Consistent with this
argument, that the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale can function as a measure of ego
disturbance, Chamberlain and Haaga (2001) obtained a 'surprisingly' high correlation (r
= -.56) between a measure of REBT unconditional self-acceptance beliefs and the
Rosenberg scale.
Nevertheless, it is possible that differences between a measure of REBT self-acceptance
and the Rosenberg scale exist. This may be particularly so when comparing high self-
esteem with high self-acceptance. For example, Chamberlain and Haaga (2001) found a
significant positive association between a measure of narcissistic personality and high
self-esteem on the Rosenberg scale (r = .35). In comparison, the present study found that
the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales had significant negative correlations with the
Rosenberg scale (r = -.36). The significant negative correlation of the two 'discomfort'
sub-scales with self-esteem was expected, given the overlap between these measures and
negative affect. However, achievement and entitlement had only very weak correlations
with overall self-esteem scores, and a non-significant correlation with the positive self-
esteem sub-scale. This is contrary to several theoretical accounts linking elevated self-
worth, and specifically those related to perfectionist and entitlement beliefs, with
frustration intolerance. For example, Schema Focused Therapy proposes that entitlement
derives from a sense of'specialness' combined with unrealistic expectations instilled by
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parental behaviour (Young & Flanagan, 1997), similar to psychodynamic theorists such
as Kohut (1978).
There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of relationship between high
self-esteem and entitlement. One is that the Frustration-Discomfort entitlement sub-scale
inadequately represents entitlement beliefs. Flowever, the correlation between Young's
(1990) own entitlement sub-scale and self-esteem in the revised scale study was also
negative and of the same magnitude (r = -.17) as that of Frustration-Discomfort
entitlement (r = -.20). Another possibility is that the patient population was insufficiently
representative of narcissism. However, a selected sub-group of patients scoring above
the 10th percentile on the Rosenberg scale, and therefore having relatively high self-
esteem, did not score significantly higher on either achievement or entitlement compared
to other patients. Comparisons using the student population also showed the same
pattern, with no difference between entitlement scores between the top and bottom self-
esteem quartiles.
It has also been suggested that narcissism is related to high unstable self-esteem rather
than just high self-worth (Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998). In REBT terms this
distinction would be described as high conditional self-esteem in contrast to high
unconditional self-acceptance, with the latter not expected to be associated with
narcissism. It can be argued that in practice, low global self-esteem and low self-
acceptance may be substantially the same, in that an individual with low self-esteem
scores will also have poor self-acceptance. However, high self-esteem is not necessarily
equivalent to high self-acceptance. This is because high Rosenberg scores may represent
positive self-rating, perhaps based on successful goal achievement, rather than
unconditional self-acceptance. Furthermore, only a proportion of individuals with high
self-rating will be narcissistic. Even so, this would not account for Chamberlain and
Haaga's (2001) finding of a positive correlation between the Rosenberg scale and
narcissism, but a negative correlation between the Rosenberg scale and entitlement in
the present study.
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An alternative explanation is that entitlement beliefs have a weak relation to self-worth,
and as this study would suggest, that frustration intolerance and self-worth are best
considered as separate domains. Thus, although deservedness and disrespect have been
proposed as being associated with defensive anger against loss of self-esteem
(Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996), the present results indicate these beliefs have
almost no association with self-esteem. For example, the 'disrespect' item on the revised
scale has a correlation of r = -.09 with the Rosenberg scale. This suggests that, whilst
this belief refers to the self in relation to others, the underlying meaning concerns
intolerance of 'not getting what one wants' rather than a threat to self-worth. In other
words, it is a frustration intolerance belief operating in the ego disturbance domain,
rather than a self-worth belief per se (Neenan & Dryden, 1999).
Therefore, it appears that frustration intolerance and entitlement are not synonymous
with high self-esteem. Nevertheless, it could be argued that individuals with high scores
on entitlement and achievement are better described as egocentric rather than
narcissistic. Indeed, the imperative to get what one wants and avoid what one doesn't
want, is essentially definitive of egocentricity rather than narcissistic high self-esteem. In
this regard, Kohut (1978) suggests that two types of 'narcissism' may need to be
distinguished, one related to frustration intolerance and the other to self-worth. Indeed,
Ellis uses the term grandiosity in terms of demandingness, the belief that the 'universe
should revolve around them', (Ellis, 1994a p 339), rather than simply referring to an
inflated sense of self-worth. Horney (1950) also describes neurotic demands, or 'claims',
in terms of entitlement. This includes entitlement to understanding and consideration, to
an easy life, freedom from emotional distress, fairness, and the satisfaction of needs.
However, while defining egocentricity in terms of the absolute priority of personal
needs, she views this as a disturbance of the self. REBT, in distinguishing between self
and frustration intolerance processes, clearly allows for grandiosity separate from issues
of the self. Thus, Rorer (1989) proposed that grandiose beliefs represented demands that
one self, other people, or the world must be different because the person wants it that
way. He contrasts this with beliefs that are arbitrary definitions of self-worth.
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It is true that existing measures of the self have been criticised as simplistic (Power,
1991), and the Rosenberg scale clearly does not adequately reflect the complexity of the
ego disturbance concept. Indeed, Neenan & Dryden (1999) have argued that ego
disturbance is simplistically defined by REBT theory and requires more detailed
multidimensional analysis. Further research using multidimensional measures of self-
acceptance is therefore required, in particular to explore the interaction between high
self-esteem, anger, and frustration intolerance. Regarding the present results, there was
evidence that the achievement and entitlement sub-scales were more strongly related to
the negative, compared to the positive, self-esteem scale. Achievement was also
associated with the self-esteem difference score, which in turn was a predictor of anger
independent of global self-esteem. This suggested that the difference score represented
criticism of personal performance separate from global self-rating. If so, this underlines
the need to distinguish between different types of self-criticism, rather than assuming
that all beliefs referring to the self are inevitably related to ego disturbance. Thus, self-
critical demands ('I should have done better') are not necessarily linked to the global
self-rating that is definitive of ego disturbance ('therefore I'm a failure'). Instead, they
may be just associated with frustration intolerance derivative beliefs ('I can't stand
failing'), particularly those related to entitlement and achievement. Furthermore,
although frustration intolerance criticism may be couched in global terms ('I'm such an
fool') this may represent an expression of frustration rather than worthlessness. This is
consistent with Carver and Ganellen's (1983) research showing that global negative self-
evaluation formed a separate factor to self-criticism, which they conceived as the
discrepancy between the actual and ideal self. Related to this issue, REBT also
distinguishes between demands on the self and other people (Ellis, 1977). Although both
are assumed to involve global 'damnation', it could be argued that demands on other
people might either refer to frustration intolerance or ego-disturbance beliefs. For
instance, it is possible to be intolerant of others behaviour without considering that
person 'damnable. The relationship between other-blame with frustration intolerance
beliefs, particularly entitlement beliefs and anger is an area for further research.
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11.5 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Considering the broader implications for cognitive-emotive assessment, it has been
argued that research into belief content-specificity and vulnerability has been limited due
to the use of global unidimensional measures (Power et al., 1994). The present study
suggests that, in addition to developing theoretically derived content dimensions,
different belief processes also need to taken into account. Thus, beliefs regarding
achievement and social relationship goals can be divided into two further distinct
categories regarding self-worth and frustration intolerance. The failure to distinguish
these between these two categories of belief risks overlooking important relationships.
Thus, regarding vulnerability to depression a general finding has been that core
dysfunctional beliefs return to normal with recovery from depression. Safran et al.
(1986) has argued that such core dysfunctional beliefs are defined by their associated
with the self. Furthermore, that such cognitions can be distinguished by being the most
resistant to change. However, it is possible that core beliefs related to the self are more
open to fluctuating mood and are disputed more readily in therapy compared to
frustration intolerant beliefs. As such, frustration intolerance beliefs may prove more
resistant to change, and therefore serve as better markers for enduring psychological
disturbance.
This research did not directly investigate the relationship of frustration intolerance with
demandingness or the other irrational belief processes. However, compared to the
preliminary scale the revised scale had stronger correlations with emotional disturbance
and showed better discrimination between clinical and student groups. This may reflect
the simplified structure of the scale both as regards general comprehension, and in that
the preliminary scale compounded frustration intolerance and demand beliefs. It may
also indicate that, as Bond and Dryden (2000) have suggested, irrational beliefs are best
phrased as secondary beliefs without reference to demands. Although REBT theory has
proposed a reciprocal or hierarchical association between demands and frustration
intolerance, for instance a 'need' implies the inability to tolerate its deprivation (Wessler
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& Wessler, 1980; DiGiuseppe, 1996), the empirical evidence regarding this arrangement
is lacking. Indeed, Ellis (2003) has recently argued that demands and awfulising are
distinct categories and that either type of belief may lead to the other or be most
prominent. However, the prominence of particular types of irrational beliefmay depend
on their belief content.
The evidence that achievement frustration was related to reduced frequency of
procrastination raises questions as to whether irrational beliefs are always
counterproductive. RJEBT hypothesises that people are sometimes productive in spite of
irrational beliefs, although psychological problems are highly correlated with such
beliefs (Ellis, 1989). Clearly, a model whereby an irrational belief leads to well-defined
consequences is oversimplistic and, in real life, a range of conflicting outcomes may be
involved. Thus, perfectionistic beliefs may motivate work but at the same time reduce
involvement in other pursuits. The important issue is whether an individual has the
flexibility to chose between goals, rather than the narrow success of specific goals alone.
In some circumstances rigid attitudes towards goals may be productive, however in the
longer term, when changing conditions require adaptation, the counterproductive nature
of irrational beliefmay become apparent. This highlights the importance, emphasised by
Ellis (1996b), of using a number of criteria to define irrational beliefs, including
flexibility as well as goal outcome.
There is also a question as to what are the most appropriate dependent measures when
evaluating frustration intolerance. Research investigating cognition and emotional
disturbance has tended to focus on psychiatric categories, predominately mood disorder,
overshadowing problems of self-control. However, frustration intolerance beliefs are
associated with avoidance of emotional distress and, for many problems, distress may be
experienced by other people rather than the individual themselves. Difficulties in self-
control may also not be dramatic, may take place over longer periods, and be less likely
to be identified as personal problems. For instance, comfort beliefs may eventually lead
to lowered achievement and life satisfaction but no acute emotional or behavioural
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disturbance. Furthermore, for many self-control behaviours simple measures of
frequency may not reflect underlying core frustration intolerance beliefs. Thus, while
many students were found to procrastinate substantially fewer had problems resulting
from this. It has been argued that the important feature of dysfunctional behaviour based
on frustration intolerance is that it continues in spite of negative consequences that the
person wishes to avoid. From this, measures of self-defined problem behaviours may be
more appropriate.
11.6 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
There has been a lack of empirical evidence to determine which irrational beliefs are
best targeted for dispute and for what problems (Deffenbacher et ah, 1986; Kendall et
ah, 1995). As Murran (1991) notes, this requires an assessment instrument sensitive
enough to identify specific irrational schema. Although REBT clinical assessment is
based on the analysis of specific situations, these are often complex, with the risk that
therapists may focus on irrelevant cognitions (Neenan & Dryden, 1999). A
multidimensional model of frustration intolerance points to the benefit of examining
different Frustration-Discomfort dimensions separately to fully assess presenting
problems. Most generally, these findings highlight the importance of clearly separating
frustration intolerance beliefs from self-worth in cognitive-behavioural interventions.
That this distinction is sometimes confused can be illustrated by the assertion, made in
relation to substance abuse and anger, that core beliefs relating to 'unlovabilty' underlie
low frustration tolerance (Beck, Wright, Newman, & Liese, 1983. p247).
More specifically, DiGiuseppe, Tafrate, and Eckhardt (1994) have noted that treatments
for anger lack the empirical evidence to determine which specific types of belief are best
targeted for intervention. Some approaches have highlighted low or fragile self-worth
(Beck, 1999). Others suggest that unstable high self-esteem is more important and that
treatment should aim to reduce excessive positive self-rating (Twenge & Campbell,
2003). However, present results indicate that low self-esteem has only a weak
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relationship with the experience of anger, and there was no relationship between anger
and high self-esteem. Indeed, for both the preliminary and revised scales, when
entitlement was partialled out self-esteem was no longer significant correlated with
anger. This is consistent with other recent studies that have found no significant
relationship between self-esteem and anger (e.g. Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Twenge
& Campbell, 2003).
In contrast, frustration intolerance and particularly entitlement had a robust association
with anger. Of course, the role of entitlement in anger has long been recognised,
however this has often been assumed to derive from superior self-worth (e.g. Raskin,
Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). The present research, underlining the role of frustration
intolerance and entitlement in anger, is consist with DiGiuseppe and Froh (2002) results
that showed high self-efficacy being associated with lower levels of anger, whereas
demands that things or people should be different were predictive of greater levels of
anger. Likewise, Lopez and Thurman (1988) using the Irrational Beliefs Questionnaire
found that the belief that most distinguished high from low anger was 'things don't go
the way they should'. This present research suggests intolerance related to entitlement
and achievement should be a primary focus in treatments for anger, rather than issues of
self-worth. Yapp & Dryden (1995) have described how successfully disputing one
category of belief may result in the emergence of concurrent beliefs triggering other
emotions. The importance of disputing coexisting categories may also apply to specific
dimensions of frustration intolerance. For example, disputing beliefs regarding comfort
may improve depressed mood but allow underlying beliefs regarding deprivation and
entitlement to become operational, leading to anger.
11.7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
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As a correlational study, the most important limitation is that definite conclusions
regarding casual relationships between variables cannot be made. In this regard, it is of
interest how the present cognitive model might be compared with the experimental
results of Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven & Baumeister,
2000). From their research, they propose that self-control is a limited resource
temporarily depleted with use. Thus, when individuals were asked to undertake tasks
involving self-regulation subsequent attempts to resist temptation were more likely to
fail. Although not incompatible with cognitive models, it does lead to different
predictions open to experimental investigation. In particular, they note that if self-control
depended on a cognitive 'schema' self-control might be expected to activate such
schema and increase subsequent self-control, contrary to their findings. However, this
assumes that such schema only involve functional beliefs. Yet, the REBT model
describes both rational and irrational schema, either of which may be independently
activated by frustrating situations. Therefore, REBT theory would predict that priming
irrational beliefs prior to a series of self-control tasks should reduce resistance to
temptation, whereas priming rational schema should increase this ability.
Although Baumeister et al. (1998) liken self-control to a muscle or willpower they admit
the nature of the limited resource is unclear. Therefore, it is of interest how these results
might be integrated into the REBT model. Certainly, frustration intolerant beliefs are
often described in quantitative terms, for example that tasks are 'too difficult' implying
that beyond a certain point the person becomes intolerant of further effort. It seems
reasonable to assume that intolerance beliefs are triggered in relation to both the level
and type of discomfort. For instance, everyday language commonly refers to 'only able
to take so much', and often outburst of anger or withdrawal are said to follow the
accumulation of events. On the other hand, frustration intolerance schema once activated
may be applied irrespective of the importance of the situation. Thus, individuals with
procrastination problems report delaying on both trivial as well as important tasks. This
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also raises the question as to what is meant by the strength of irrational beliefs. Further
research might investigate whether strong endorsement of Frustration-Discomfort items
is associated with the intolerance of an increased range of situations, or the intolerance
of smaller amount of discomfort. Baumeister's research also suggests that self-control is
limited and should therefore be conserved, at least in the short term. In contrast, REBT
treatment methods actively encourage exposure to frustrating situation in order to
weaken intolerance beliefs. It would be of interest to explore whether individuals who
have exerted self-control, such as stopping smoking, or coped with painful trauma, have
decreased Frustration-Discomfort scores. Certainly, evidence using the Rosenbaum self-
control scale suggests that such beliefs do play a central role in a range of health
behaviours (Rosenbaum, 1990). A further unanswered question is the role of rational
beliefs in the process of self-control, which was not examined by the present research.
The validity of this research was increased by the use of both clinical and student
populations, given that many previous studies of irrational beliefs have used non-clinical
populations. Nevertheless, the two clinical samples were relatively small and the types
of problem largely undifferentiated in terms of formal diagnosis. It would be useful to
compare specific groups identified as having specific self-control problems. Such groups
might be more appropriate for investigating the validity of frustration intolerance than
broader psychiatric categories. In this regard, the evidence that individuals with both
anger and depression had higher levels of comfort and emotional discomfort beliefs was
intriguing. However, conclusions regarding different types of depression can only be
tentative due to the small numbers in the depressed group and the lack of formal
diagnosis. Similarly, the lack of association between belief variables and therapy
outcome was disappointing, but possibly not surprising given the complex nature of
therapy change and the simple measures of improvement. It was encouraging that
differences in therapy engagement were found, and these were consistent with
expectations. These results also underlined the importance of a multidimensional
assessment of frustration intolerance. For instance, it has been argued that individuals
with poor frustration tolerance tend to seek 'interminable' help from others (Dryden &
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Yankura, 1993). However, whilst comfort beliefs were consistent with increased therapy
sessions entitlement beliefs and emotional discomfort were related to dropout. In this
regard, it would be interesting to examine whether specifically targeting particular
frustration intolerance beliefs would improve treatment effectiveness.
Finally, the question as to whether the Frustration-Discomfort Scale represents a trait or
state dimension was not addressed. Whilst it was demonstrated that specific irrational
beliefs were uniquely related to particular psychological problems, the cross-sectional
design leaves it unclear as to whether these beliefs change with effective treatment. Due
to limitations of time, it was not possible to assess treatment outcome following therapy
and this is a goal of future research. A longitudinal study would also help to assess
whether, in comparison to self-worth, frustration intolerance beliefs are more enduring
or increase vulnerability to relapse. At least for some individuals, these beliefs might
operate as enduring dispositions, consistent with REBT theory regarding the biological
basis for irrational beliefs. However, similar to self-worth models frustration intolerance
may be conceptualised as having both state and trait properties (Crocker & Wolfe,
2001). That is, enduring schema would determine the stable average levels of frustration
intolerance, but responses to specific situations would fluctuate around this level.
Specific responses might often reflect the core schema that determine more generalised
disturbance (Dryden, 2003). Certainly, the Frustration-Discomfort sub-scales are
substantially intercorrelated, suggesting that individuals prone to one group of
frustration intolerance beliefs are also likely to be vulnerable to others, and very high
Frustration-Discomfort scores may well reflect pervasive beliefs representing core
schema. Indeed, DiGuiseppe has suggested that frustration intolerance is an important
dimension of personality disorder, particularly regards persistence of disturbance.
11.8 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Models of psychological disturbance have tended to emphasise the self in the formation
of dysfunctional beliefs. Indeed historically, defences against threats to the self are at the
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heart of psychoanalytic explanations of disturbance. A unique feature ofREBT theory is
the distinction made between self-worth and frustration intolerance beliefs, and the
central importance of frustration intolerance in psychological problems. This research
has demonstrated the reliability and validity of a multidimensional measure of
frustration intolerance beliefs, and the usefulness of examining these separate
dimensions. In doing so it has provided evidence for the independent contribution of




Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in
humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-
74.
Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B., (1988). Hopelessness depression: A
theory-based sub-type of depression. Psychological Review, 96, 358-372.
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequality in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press.
Adelman, H. M., & Maatsch, J. L. (1955). Resistance to extinction as a function of the
type of response elicited by frustration. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 50,
61-65.
Adler, A (1927). Understanding human nature. New York: Greenberg.
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse
control. Psychological Bulletin, 82, 463-496.
Ainslie, G., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1981). Preference reversal and delayed reinforcement.
Animal Learning and Behavior, 9, 476-482.
Akaike, H. (1987). Factor analysis and AIC. Psychometrika, 52, 317-332.
Alden, L. E., Ryder, A G., & Mellings, T. M. B. (2002). Perfectionism in the context of
social fears: Toward a two-component model. In G. L. Flett and P. L. Hewitt
(Eds.), Perfectionism: Theory, research, and treatment. American Psychological
Association.
Ambrose, L., Button, E. J., & Ormrod, J. (1998). A long-term follow-up study of a
cohort of referrals to an adult mental health clinical psychology department.
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 37, 113-115.
Amsel, A. (1958). The role of frustrative nonreward in noncontinuous reward situations.
Psychological Bulletin, 55,102-119.
Amsel, A. (1962). Frustrative nonreward in partial reinforcement and discrimination
learning: Some recent history and a theoretical extension. Psychological review,
69, 306-328.
405
Amsel, A. (1967). Behavioral habituation, counterconditioning, and a general theory of
persistence. In A. H. Black, & W. F. Prokasy (1972) (Eds.), Classical
conditioning II: Current research and theory. New York: Appleton-Century-
Croft.
Amsel, A. (1990). Arousal, suppression, and persistence: Frustration theory, attention,
and its disorders. Cognition and Emotion, 4, 239-268.
Appels, A. (1989). Loss of control, vital exhaustion and coronary heart disease. In A.
Steptoe & A. Appels (Eds.), Stress, personal control and health. Brussels: Wiley.
Arbuckle, J. & Wothke, W. (1999). Amos users' guide version 4. Chicago: Small Waters
Corporation.
Arrindel, W. A. & Van del Ende, J. (1985). An empirical test of the utility of the
observations-to-variables ratio in factor and components analysis. Applied
Psychological Measurements, 9, 165-178.
Averill, J. R. (1983). Studies on anger and aggression: Implications for theories of
emotion. American Psychologist, 38, 1145-1160.
Ayduk, O., Mendoza-Denton, R., Mischel, W., Downey, G., Peake, P. K., & Rodriguez,
M. (2000). Regulating the interpersonal self: Strategic self-regulation for coping
with rejection sensitivity. Journal of Personality and clinical Psychology, 79,
776-792.
Bagley, C., Bolitho, F., & Bertrand, L. (1997). Norms and construct validity of the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale in Canadian high school populations: Implications
for counseling. Canadian Journal of Counseling, 31, 82-92.
Bagozzi, R. P. (1993). Assessing construct validity in personality research: Applications
to measures of self-esteem. Journal of Research in Personality, 27, 49-87.
Balfour, A. (1986). An innovation to encourage more "dropping in" to GP referrals (and
less dropping out). Clinical Psychology Forum, 5, 14-17.
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy. San Francisco: Freeman.
Bard, J. A. (1973). A self-rating scale for rationality. Rational Living, 8, 19.
406
Baron, R. M. & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical
considerations. Journal of Personality and Clinical Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Baumeister, R. F. (1990). Suicide as an escape from self. Psychological Review, 97, 90-
113.
Baumeister, R. F. (1996). Self-regulation and ego threat: Motivated cognition, self-
deception, and destructive goal setting. In P.M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Baugh (Eds.),
The psychology of action: Linking cognition to behavior. New York: Guilford
Press.
Baumeister, R. F. & Cairns, K. J. (1992). Repression and self-presentation: When
audiences interfere with self-deceptive strategies. Journal of Personality and
Clinical Psychology, 62, 851-862
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion:
Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Clinical
Psychology, 74, 1252-1265.
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice (1993). When ego threats lead to self-
regulation failure: Negative consequences of high self-esteem. Journal of
Personality and Clinical Psychology, 64, 141-156.
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing control: How and
why people fail at self-regulation. San Diego: Academic Press.
Baumeister, R. F. & Scher, S. J. (1988). Self-defeating behavior patterns among normal
individuals: Review and analysis of common self-destructive tendencies.
Psychological Bulletin, 104, 3-22.
Baumeister, R. F., & Smart, L., & Boden, J. (1996). Relation of threatened egotism to
violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem. Psychological
Review, 103, 5-33.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York:
International Universities Press.
Beck, A. T. (1983). Cognitive therapy of depression: New perspectives. In P. J. Clayton
& J. E. Barrett (Eds.), Treatment of depression: Old controversies and new
approaches. New York: Raven Press.
Beck, A. T. (1999). Prisoners of hate: The cognitive basis of anger, hostility, and
violence. New York: Harper Collins.
Beck, A. T. & Emery, G. (1985). Anxiety disorders and phobias: A cognitive
perspective. New York: Basic Books.
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., & Harrison, R. (1983). Cognitions, attitudes, and personality
dimensions in depression. British Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 1, 1-16.
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., & Harrison, R., Emery, G. (1983). Development of the
Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale: A measure of personality factors in
psychopathology. Unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.
Beck, A. T., Freeman, A., & Associates (1990). Cognitive therapy of the personality
disorders. New York: Guilford Press.
Beck, B. L., Koons, S. R., & Milgrim, D. L. (2000). Correlates and consequences of
behavioral procrastination: The effects of academic procrastination, self-
consciousness, self-esteem and self-handicapping. Journal of Social Behavior
and Personality, 15, 3-13.
Beck, A. T., Wright, F. D., Newman, C. F., & Liese, B. S. (1983). Cognitive therapy of
substance abuse. New York: Guilford Press.
Benson, J. & Hocevar, D. (1985). The impact of item phrasing on the validity of attitude
scales for elementary school children. Journal of Educational Measurement, 22,
213-240.
Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indices in structural equation models.
Psychological Bulletin, 107, 238-246.
Bentler, P. M. & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and the goodness of fit in the
analysis of covariance structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 588-606.
Bernard, M. E. (1998). Validation of the General Attitude and Belief Scale. Journal of
Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 16, 183-196.
Bernard, M. E. & Cronan, F. (1999). The Child and Adolescent Scale of Irrationality:
Validation data and mental health correlates. Journal of Cognitive
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 13, 121-132.
Bernard, M. E. & DiGiuseppe, R. (1989). Rational-emotive therapy today. In M. E.
Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.). Inside rational emotive-therapy: A critical
appraisal of the theory and therapy ofAlbert Ellis. San Diego: Academic Press.
Berkowitz, L. (1962). Aggression: A social psychological analysis. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration aggression hypothesis: Examination and
reformulation. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 59-73.
Berkowitz, L. (2000). Causes and consequences of feelings. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bessei, J. L. (1977). A factored measure of irrational beliefs. Paper presented at the
Second National Conference on rational-emotive therapy, Chicago.
Bastiani, A. M., Rao, R., Weltzin, T., & Kaye, W. H. (1995). Perfectionism in anorexia
nervosa. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 17, 147-152.
Beswick, G., Rothblum, E. D., & Mann, L. (1988). Psychological antecedents of student
procrastination. Australian Psychologist, 23, 207-217.
Bieling, P. J., Beck, A. T., & Brown, K. (2000). The Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale:
Structure and Implications. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24, 763-780.
Birks, Y. & Roger, D. (2000). Identifying components of type-A behavior: "toxic" and
"non-toxic" achieving. Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 1093-1105.
Blackburn, R. (1993). The psychology of criminal conduct: Theory, research, and
practice. Chichester. Wiley.
Blatt, S, J., Quinlan, D. M., Chevron, E. S., McDonald, C., & Zuroff, D. (1982).
Dependency and self-criticism: Psychological dimensions of depression. Journal
ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, 50, 113-124.
Block, J. (1995). A contrarian view of the five-factor approach to personality
description. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 187-215.
Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and
social judgement: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 24, 45-62.
Boice, R. (1989). Procrastination, Busyness and Bingeing. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, 27, 605-611.
Bond, W. B. & Dryden, W. (1996a). Modifying irrational control and certainty beliefs.
Clinical recommendations based on research. In W. Dryden (Ed.), Research in
counselling and psychotherapy. London: Sage.
Bond, W. B. & Dryden, W. (1996b). Testing a REBT theory: The effects of rational
beliefs, irrational beliefs, and their control and certainty contents on the
functionality of inferences II. In a personal context. International Journal of
Psychotherapy, 1, 55-77.
Bond, W. B. & Dryden, W. (1996c). Why two, central REBT hypothesis appear
untestable. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 14,
29-40.
Bond, W. B. & Dryden, W. (1997). Testing a REBT theory: The effects of rational
beliefs, irrational beliefs, and their control and certainty contents on the
functionality of inferences I. In a social context. Journal of Rational-Emotive and
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 15, 157-188.
Bond, W. B. & Dryden, W. (2000). How rational beliefs and irrational beliefs affect
people's inferences: An experimental investigation. Behavioural and Cognitive
Psychotherapy, 28,33-43.
Bond, W. B., Dryden, W., & Briscoe, R. (1999). Two mechanisms by which rational and
irrational beliefs may affect the functionality of inferences. British Journal of
Medical Psychology, 72, 557-566.
Bos, K van den. & Lind, E. A. (2002). Uncertainty management by means of fairness
judgements. In M. Zenna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 34). New York: Academic Press.
Brandt, R. B. (1996). Facts, values, and morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
410
Bridges, K. R., & Roig, M. (1997). Academic procrastination and irrational thinking: A
reexamination with context controlled. Personality and Individual Differences,
22, 941-944.
Briggs, R. S. & Cheek, J. M. (1986). The role of factor analysis in the development and
evaluation of personality scales. Journal of Personality, 54, 106-148.
Brockner, J., Shaw, M. C., & Rubin, J. Z. (1979). Factors affecting withdrawal from an
escalating conflict: Quitting before it's too late. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 15, 492-503.
Brondolo, E., DiGiuseppe, R., & Tefrate, R. (1997). Exposure-based treatment for anger
problems: Focus on the feeling. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 4, 75-98.
Brown, G. & Beck, A. T. (1989). The role of imperatives in psychopathology: A reply to
Ellis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 13, 315-321.
Brown, J. S. and Farber, I. E. (1951). Emotions conceptualized as intervening variable -
with suggestions towards a theory of frustration. Psychological Bulletin, 48, 465-
480.
Browne, M. W. & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A.
Bollen and J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Brownlow, S. & Reasinger, R. D. (2000). Putting off until tomorrow what is better done
today: Academic procrastination as a function of motivation toward college
work. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 15, 15-34
Burgess, P. M. (1986). Belief systems and emotional disturbance: An evaluation of the
rational emotive model. Unpublished doctoral dissertation; University of
Melbourne.
Burgess, P. M. (1990). Toward resolution of conceptual issues in the assessment of
belief systems in rational emotive therapy. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy:
An International Quarterly, 4, 171-184.
Burka, J. B., & Yuen, L. M. (1883). Procrastination: Why you do it and what to do about
it. Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley.
Burns, D. D. (1980). Feeling good. New York: Signet.
Burns, D. D. (1989). Feeling good handbook. New York: Plume.
Burns, D. D. & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Coping styles, homework compliance, and
the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Journal of Counseling and
Clinical Psychology, 58, 305-311.
Burns, R. L., Dittmann, K., Nguyen, N., & Mitchelson, J. K. (2000). Academic
procrastination, perfectionism, and control: Associations with vigilant and
avoidant coping. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 15, 35-46.
Bushman, B. & Baumeister, R. (1998). Threatened egoism, narcissism, self-esteem, and
direct and displaced aggression. Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence.
Journal of Personality and Clinical Psychology, 75, 295-309.
Bushman, B., Baumeister, R. & Stack, (1999). Catharsis, Aggression, and persuasive
influence: Self-fulfilling or self-defeating prophecies. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 76, 367-376.
Bushman, B., Baumeister, R., & Phillips, C. M. (2001). Do people aggress to improve
their mood? Catharsis beliefs, affect regulation opportunity, and aggressive
responding. Journal of Personality and Clinical Psychology, 81, 17-32.
Byrne, B. M. (1996). Measuring self-concept across the life span: Issues and
instrumentation. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Camatta, C. D. & Nagoshi, C. T. (1995). Stress, depression, irrational beliefs, and
alcohol use and problems in a college student sample. Alcoholism: Clinical and
Experimental Research, 19, 142-146.
Campbell, I. M. (1985). The psychology of homosexuality. In A. Ellis, & M. Bernard
(Eds.), Clinical applications of rational emotive therapy. 153-180. New York:
Plenum.
Carmines, E, G. & Mclver, J. P. (1981). Analyzing models with unobserved variables. In
G. W. Bohrnstedt & E. F. Borgatta (Eds.), Social measurement: Current issues.
Beverly Hills: Sage.
Carmines, E, G. & Zeller, R. A. (1974). On establishing the empirical dimensionality of
theoretical terms: An analytical example. Political Methodology, 1, 75-96.
412
Carver, C. S. & Ganellen, R. J. (1983). Depression and components of self-punitiveness:
High standards, self-criticism, and overgeneralization. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology. 92, 722-728.
Carver, C. S. & Scheier, M. F. (1996). Themes and Issues in the self-regulation of
behavior. In R. S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Advances in social cognition. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Carver, C. S. & Scheier, M. F. (2000). On the structure of behavioral self-regulation. In
M. Boekaerts, P. R. Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation.
San Diego: Academic Press.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F., & Weintraub, J. K. (1989). Assessing coping strategies:
A theoretically based approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
56, 267-283.
Cattanach, L. & Rodin, J. (1988). Psychosocial components of the stress process in
bulimia. International Journal ofEating Disorders, 7, 75-88.
Cattell, R. B. (1966). The Scree test for the number of factors. Multivariate Behavioral
Research, 1,245-276.
Cattell, R. B. (1978). The scientific use of factor analysis. New York: Plenum.
Chamberlain, J. M. & Haaga, D. A. F. (2001). Unconditional self-acceptance and
psychological health. Journal of Rational Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior
Therapy, 19, 163-176.
Chamberlain, J. M. & Haaga, D. A. F. (2001). Unconditional self-acceptance and
responses to negative feedback. Journal of Rational Emotive & Cognitive-
Behavior Therapy, 19, 177-189.
Champion, L. A., & Power, M. J. (1995). Social and cognitive approaches to depression:
Towards a new synthesis. British Journal Clinical Psychology, 34, 485-503.
Chang, C. E., & D'Zurilla, J. T. (1996). Irrational beliefs as predictors of anxiety and
depression in a college population. Personality and Individual Differences, 20,
215-219.
413
Christenson, G. A., Faber, R. J., de Zwaan, M., Raymond, N. C., Specker, S. M., Ekern,
M. D., Mackenzie, T. B., Crosby, R. D., Crow, S. J., Eckert, E. D., Mussell, M.
P., & Mitchell, J. E. (1994). Compulsive buying: Descriptive characteristics and
psychiatric comorbidity. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 55, 5-11.
Clark, D. A. (1997). Twenty years of cognitive assessment: Current status and future
directions. Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 996-1000.
Clark, D. A. & Beck, A. T. (1991). Personality factors in dysphoria: A psychometric
refinement of Beck's Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale. Journal of Psychopathology
and Behavioral Assessment, 13, 368-388.
Clark, D. A., Beck, A T., & Beck, J. S. (1994). Symptom differences in major
depression, dysthymia, panic disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 151, 205-227
Clark, D. M. (1997). A cognitive approach to panic. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
24, 461-470.
Clark, M. S. & Isen, A. M. (1982). Toward understanding the relationship between
feeling states and social behavior. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds.),
Cognitive social psychology. New York: Elsevier.
Clark, L. A. & Watson, D. (1991). Tripartite model of anxiety and depression:
Psychometric evidence and taxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 100, 316-336.
Comrey, A. L. (1978). Common methodological problems in factor analysis. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 648-659.
Comrey, A. L. & Lee, H. B. (1992). A first course in factor analysis (2nd ed.). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Conaghan, S., Traynor, E., Davidson, K., & Ralston, G. (2000). The efficacy of opt-in
systems: evidence to the contrary. Clinical Psychology Forum, 138, 36-38.
Conger, J. J. (1956). Alcoholism: Theory, problem and challenge: II. Reinforcement
theory and the dynamics of alcoholism. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,
13,296-305.
Conner, M. & Waterman, M. (1996). Questionnaire measures of health-relevant
cognitions and behaviours. In J, Haworth (Ed.), Psychological research.
Innovative methods and strategies. London: Routledge.
Cooper, M. L., Russell, M., Skinner, J. B., Frone, M. R., & Mudar, P. (1992). Stress and
alcohol use: Moderating effects of gender, coping, and alcohol expectancies.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101, 139-152.
Cooper, M. L., Frone, M. R., Russell, M., & Mudar, P. (1995). Drinking to regulate
positive and negative emotions: A motivational model of alcohol use. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 995-1005.
Cortina, J. M. (1993). What is Coefficient alpha? An examination of theory and
applications. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 78, 98-104.
Corwyn, R. F. (2000). The factor structure of global self-esteem among adolescents and
adults. Journal ofResearch in Personality, 34, 357-379.
Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory and NEO five
factor professional manual. Odessa, Fla.: Psychological Assessment Resources.
Costello, G. C. (1992). Conceptual problems in current research on cognitive
vulnerability to psychopathology. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16, 379-390.
Cox, B. J., Swinson, R. P., Shulman, I. D., Kuch, K., & Reichman, J. T. (1993). Gender
effects and alcohol use in panic disorder with agoraphobia. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 31, 413-416.
Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Taylor, S. (2001). The effects of rumination as a mediator of
elevated anxiety sensitivity in major depression. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 25, 525-534.
Coyne, J. C. & Gotlib, I. (1986). Studying the role of cognition in depression: Well
trodden paths and cul-de-sacs. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10, 695-705.
Coyne, J. C. & Whiffen, V. E. (1999). Issues in personality as diathesis for depression:
The case of sociotropy-dependency and autonomy-self-criticism. Psychological
Bulletin, 118,358-378.
Cramer, D. (1985). An item factor analysis of the Irrational Beliefs Test. British Journal
ofCognitive Psychotherapy, 3, 81-92.
415
Cramer, D., & Ellis, A. (1988). Irrational beliefs and strength versus inappropriateness
of feelings: A debate. In W. Dryden, & P. Trower (Eds.), Developments in
rational emotive therapy. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Crawford, J. R., Henry, J. D., Crombie, C., & Taylor, E. P. (2001). Normative data for
the HADS from a large non-clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 40, 429-432.
Crocker, J. & Major, B. (1993). Reactions to stigma: The moderating role of
justifications. In M. Zanna J. & Olson, (Eds.), The psychology of prejudice: The
Ontario Symposium (Vol. 7). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Crocker, J. & Wolfe, C. T. (2001). Contingencies of self-worth. Psychological Review,
108, 593-623.
Crook, T., Raskin, A., & Davis, D. (1975). Factors associated with attempted suicide
among hospitalized depressed patients. Psychological Medicine, 5, 381-388.
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests.
Psychometrika, 16, 297-334.
Cronbach, L. J. & Gleser, G. C. (1957). Psychological tests and personnel decisions.
Urbana: University of Illinois.
Davies, C. (1997). Normal and neurotic perfectionism in eating disorders: An interactive
model. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 22, 421-426.
De Ridder, D. T. D. (1997). What is wrong with coping assessment? A review of
conceptual and methodological issues. Psychology and Health, 12, 417-431.
DeBotton, A. (2000). The consolations of philosophy. London: Penguin.
Deffenbacher, J. L., Zwemer, W. A., Whisman, M. A., Hill, R. A., & Sloan, R. D.
(1986). Irrational beliefs and anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10, 281-
292.
Demaria, T. P., Kassinove, H., & Dill, C. A. (1989). Psychometric properties of the
survey of personal beliefs: A rational-emotive measure of irrational thinking.
Journal ofPersonality Assessment, 53, 329-341.
Dembrowski, T. M. & Czajkowski, S. M. (1989). Historical and current developments in
coronary prone behavior. In A. W. Siegman & T. M. Dembroski (Eds.), In search
of coronary prone behavior - beyond type A. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Dickman, S. J. (1990). Functional and dysfunctional impulsivity: Personality and
cognitive correlates. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 58, 95-102.
DiGiuseppe, R. (1991a). Maximizing the moment: How to have more fun and happiness
in life. Cassette recording. New York: Institute for Rational Emotive-Therapy.
DiGiuseppe, R. (1991b). Comprehensive disputing in RET. In M. E. Bernard (Ed.),
Using rational emotive therapy effectively. New York: Plenum.
DiGiuseppe, R. (1996). The nature of irrational and rational beliefs: Progress in rational
emotive behavior therapy. Journal of Rational Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior
Therapy, 14, 5-28.
DiGiuseppe, R. (1998). Unpublished research. Reported in seminars on REBT
assessment, personality disorder, and anger. Albert Ellis Institute, New York
City, July 1998.
DiGiuseppe, R. (1999). End piece: Reflections on the treatment of anger. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 55, 365-379.
DiGiuseppe, R. & Froh, J. J. (2002). What cognitions predict state anger? Journal of
Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 20, 133-150.
DiGiuseppe, R. Leaf, R. C., Exner, T., & Robin, M. (1988). The development of a
measure of irrational/rational thinking. Poster session presented at the World
Congress of Behaviour Therapy, Edinburgh.
DiGiuseppe, R. & Leaf, R. C. (1990). The endorsement of irrational beliefs in a general
clinical population. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior
Therapy, 8, 235-247.
DiGiuseppe, R., Robin, M., Leaf, R. C., & Gormon, B. (1989). A discriminative-
validation and factor analysis of a measure of irrational/rational beliefs. Poster
session presented at the World Congress of Cognitive Therapy, Oxford.
DiGiuseppe, R., Robin, M., Szeszko, P. R., Primavera, L. H. (1995). Cluster analysis of
narcissistic personality disorders on the MCMI-II. Journal of Personality
Disorders, 9, 304-317.
DiGiuseppe, R., Tefrate, R., & Eckhardt, C. (1994). Critical issues in the treatment of
anger. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 1, 111-132.
Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration
and aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dollard, J. & Miller, N. E. (1950). Personality and psychotherapy. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Dryden, W. (1987). Counselling individuals: The rational emotive approach. London:
Taylor and Francis.
Dryden, W. (1990). Dealing with anger problems: Rational emotive therapeutic
interventions. Sarasota: Professional Resource Exchange Inc.
Dryden, W. (1991). A dialogue with Albert Ellis: Against dogma. Buckingham. Open
University Press.
Dryden, W. (1994a). Rational emotive therapy. In W. Dryden (Ed.), Individual therapy
in Britain. London: Harper and Row.
Dryden, W. (1994b). Invitation to rational emotive psychology. London: Whurr.
Dryden, W. (1995a). Brief rational emotive behaviour therapy. Chichester: Wiley.
Dryden, W. (1995b). Preparing for client change in rational emotive behaviour therapy.
London: Whurr.
Dryden, W. (1995c). Facilitating client change in rational emotive behaviour therapy.
London: Whurr.
Dryden, W. (1996). When musts are not enough. In W. Dryden (Ed.), Inquiries in
rational emotive therapy. London: Sage.
Dryden, W. (2003). 'The cream cake made me eat it': An introduction to the ABC
theory of REBT. In W. Dryden (Ed.), Rational emotive behaviour therapy:
Theoretical developments. Hove: Brunner-Routledge.
Dryden, W. & Ellis, A. (1988). Rational emotive therapy. In K. Dobson (Ed.),
Handbook of cognitive-behavioral therapies. New York: Guilford Press.
Dryden, W., Ferguson, J., & Clark, T. (1989). Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational
emotive hypothesis: 1. Performing in an academic seminar. Journal of Rational-
Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 7, 119-129.
Dryden, W., Ferguson, J., & Hylton, B. (1989). Beliefs and inferences: A test of a
rational emotive hypothesis: 3. On expectations of enjoying a party. British
Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 17, 68-75.
Dryden, W., Ferguson, J., & McTeague, S. (1989). Beliefs and inferences: A test of a
rational emotive hypothesis:2. On the prospect of seeing a spider. Psychological
Reports, 64, 115-123.
Dryden, W. & Gordon, W. (1993). Beating the comfort trap. London: Sheldon Press.
Dryden, W. & Neenan, M. (1995). Dictionary of rational emotive behaviour therapy.
London: Whurr.
Dryden, W. & Still, A. (1998). REBT and rationality: Philosophical approaches. Journal
of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 16, 77-99.
Dryden, W. & Yankura, J. (1993). Counselling individuals: A rational emotive
handbook. (2nd ed.). London: Whurr.
Dryden, W. & Yankura, J. (1995). Developing rational emotive behavioural counselling.
London: Sage.
Dudley, R. T. (1999). The effects of superstitious belief on performance following an
unsolvable problem. Personality and Individual Differences, 26, 1057-1064.
Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (1997). Intolerance of uncertainty and
problem orientation in worry. Cognitive Research and Therapy, 21, 593-606.
Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., & Freeston, M. H. (1998). Generalized anxiety
disorder: A Preliminary test of a conceptual model. Behaviour Therapy and
Research, 36, 215-226.
Dugas, M. J., Gosselin, P., & Ladouceur, R. (2001). Intolerance of uncertainty:
Investigating specificity in a nonclinical sample. Cognitive Research and
Therapy, 25, 551-558.
Eckhardt, C. I. & Deffenbacher, J. L. (1995). Diagnosis of anger disorders. In H.
Kassinove (Ed.), Anger disorders: Definition, diagnosis, and treatment.
Washington DC: Taylor & Francis.
Eisenberger, R. (1992). Learned industriousness. Psychological Review, 99, 248-267.
Eisenberger, R. & Adornetto, M. (1986). Generalized self-control of delay and effort.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1020-1031.
Eisenberger, R. & Masterson, F. A. (1983). Required high effort increases subsequent
persistence and reduces cheating. Journal of Personality and Clinical Psychology,
44, 593-599.
Eisenberger, R. & Masterson, F. A. (1986). Effects of prior learning and current
motivation on self-control. In , M. L. Commons, J. A. Nevin, & H. Rachlin
(Eds.), Qualitative analysis of behavior (Vol. 5). The effects of delay and of
intervening events. Cambridge, M A: Ballinger.
Eisenberger, R., Masterson, F. A., & McDermitt, M. (1982). Effects of task variety on
generalized effort. Journal of Educational Psychology, 74, 499-505.
Eisenberger, R., Park, D., & Frank M. (1976). Learned industriousness and social
reinforcement. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 33, 227-232.
Eisenberger, R. & Shank, D. M. (1985). Personal work ethic and effort training affect
cheating. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 520-528.
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart.
Ellis, A. (1967). Goals of psychotherapy. In A. R. Mahrer (Ed.), The goals of
psychotherapy. New York: Meredith.
Ellis, A. (1971). The case against religion: A psychotherapists view. New York: Institute
for Rational Living.
Ellis, A. (1976a). Conquering low frustration tolerance. Cassette recording. New York:
Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy.
Ellis, A. (1976b). The biological basis of human rationality. Journal of Individual
Psychology, 32, 145-168.
420
Ellis, A. (1977). The basic clinical theory of rational emotive therapy. In A. Ellis & R.
M. Grieger (Eds.), Handbook of Rational-Emotive Therapy (Vol. 2), 3-30. New
York: Springer.
Ellis, A. (1979a). Discomfort anxiety: A new cognitive behavioral construct. In A. Ellis,
& W. Dryden (Eds.), The essential Albert Ellis. New York: Springer.
Ellis, A. (1979b). 'Discomfort anxiety': A new cognitive behavioral construct. Part I.
Rational Living, 14, 3-8.
Ellis, A. (1980a). 'Discomfort anxiety': A new cognitive behavioral construct. Part II.
Rational Living, 15, 25-30.
Ellis, A. (1980b). Rational emotive therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy:
Similarities and differences. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 4, 325-40.
Ellis, A. (1983). Failures in rational emotive therapy. In E. B. Foa, & P. M. G.
Emmelkamp (Eds.), Failures in behavior therapy. New York: Wiley.
Ellis, A. (1984). The essence of RET-1984. . Journal of Rational Emotive Therapy, 2,
19-25.
Ellis, A. (1985a). Overcoming resistance: Rational emotive therapy with difficult
patients. New York: Springer.
Ellis, A. (1985b). Dilemmas in giving warmth or love to clients. In W. Dryden (Ed.),
Therapists' dilemmas. London: Sage.
Ellis, A. (1987a). A sadly neglected cognitive element in depression. Cognitive Research
and Therapy, 11, 121-146.
Ellis, A. (1987b). The impossibility of achieving consistently good mental health.
American Psychologist, 42, 364-375.
Ellis, A. (1989). Comments on my critics. In M. E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.).
Inside rational emotive-therapy: A critical appraisal of the theory and therapy of
Albert Ellis. San Diego: Academic Press.
Ellis, A. (1991). The revised ABC's of rational-emotive therapy (RET). Journal of
Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 9, 139-172.
Ellis, A. (1993). How to be a perfect non-perfectionist. Cassette recording. New York:
Institute for Rational Emotive Therapy.
Ellis, A. (1994a). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. (2nd ed.). New York: Birch
Lane Press.
Ellis, A. (1994b). The treatment of borderline personalities with rational emotive
behavior therapy. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy,
12, 101-119.
Ellis, A. (1994c). Post traumatic stress disorder in rape victim: A rational emotive
theory. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 12, 3-25.
Ellis, A. (1996a). Better, deeper, and more enduring brief therapy: The rational emotive
behavior therapy approach. New York: Brunner Mazel.
Ellis, A. (1996b). Responses to criticisms of rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT)
by Ray DiGiuseppe, Frank Bond, Windy Dryden, Steve Weinrach, and Richard
Wessler. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 14, 97-
121.
Ellis, A. (1999). Ellis Emotional Efficiency Inventory. Unpublished test. New York:
Albert Ellis Institute.
Ellis, A. (2000). The importance of cognitive processes in facilitating accepting in
psychotherapy. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 7, 288-299.
Ellis, A. (2002). The role of irrational beliefs in perfectionism. In G. L. Flett & P. L.
Hewitt (Eds.), Perfectionism: Theory, research, and treatment. American
Psychological Association.
Ellis, A. (2003). Differentiating preferential from exaggerated and musturbatory beliefs
in rational emotive therapy. In W. Dryden (Ed.), Rational emotive behaviour
therapy: Theoretical developments. Hove: Brunner-Routledge.
Ellis, A. & Bernard, M. E. (1985). What is rational-emotive therapy (RET)? In A. Ellis.
& R. M. Grieger (Eds.), Handbook of rational-emotive therapy (Vol. 2). New
York: Springer.
Ellis, A. & DiGiuseppe, R. (1993). Are inappropriate or dysfunctional feelings in
rational-emotive therapy qualitative or quantitative? Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 17, 471-477.
Ellis, A. & Dryden, W. (1987). The practice of rational emotive therapy. New York:
Springer.
Ellis, A. & Harper, R. A. (1975). A guide to rational living. North Hollywood,
California: Wilshire.
Ellis, A. & Knaus, W. J. (1977). Overcoming procrastination. New York: Institute for
Rational Living.
Ellis, A., Mclnerney, J. F., DiGiuseppe, R., & Yeager, R. J. (1988). Rational emotive
therapy with alcoholics and substance abusers. New York: Pergamon.
Emmons, R. A. (1996). Personal goals and subjective well being. In P.M. Gollwitzer &
J. A. Baugh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition to behavior.
New York: Guilford Press.
Endler, N. S. & Parker, J. D. A. (1990). Multidimensional assessment of coping. Journal
ofPersonality and Clinical Psychology, 58, 844-854.
Enns, M. W. & Cox, B. J. (1999). Perfectionism and depression symptom severity in
major depressive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 783-794.
Enns, M. W. & Cox, B. J. (2002). The nature and assessment of perfectionism: A
critical analysis. In G. L. Flett and P. L. Hewitt (Eds.), Perfectionism: Theory,
research, and treatment. American Psychological Association.
Epstein, S. (1990). Cognitive-experiential self-theory. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook
of personality: Theory and research. New York: Guilford Press.
Erwin, E. (1997). Philosophy and psychotherapy. London: Sage.
Evans, J., Platts, H., & Liebenau, A. (1996). Impulsiveness and deliberate self-harm: A
comparison of 'first times' and 'repeaters'. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 93,
378-380.
Eysenck, H. J. (1992). The definition and measurement of psychoticism. Personality and
Individual Differences, 13, 757-786.
Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1991). The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-
Revised. Sevenoaks, Kent: Hodder and Stoughton.
Faber, R. J. (1992). Money changes everything: Compulsive buying from a
biopsychosocial perspective. American Behavioral Scientist, 35, 809-819.
Faber, R. J., Chistenson, G. A., Zwaan, M. de., Mitchell, J. (1995). Two forms of
compulsive consumption: Comorbidity of compulsive buying and binge eating.
Journal of Consumer Research, 22, 296-303.
Fairburn, C. G. & Cooper, Z. (1987). Behavioural and cognitive approaches in the
treatment of anorexia and bulimia nervosa. In P. J. V. Beumont, G. Burrows, &
R. C. Casper (Eds.), Handbook of eating disorders (Part 1): Anorexia and
bulimia nervosa. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Fairbrother, N. & Moretti, M. (1998). Sociotropy, autonomy, and self-discrepancy:
Status in depressed, remitted depressed, and control participants. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 22, 279-296.
Farmer, R. F. (1998). Depressive symptoms as a function of trait anxiety and
impulsiveness. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 54, 129-135.
Favazza, A. & Conterio, K. (1989). Female habitual self-mutilators. Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica, 79, 283-289.
Favazza, A. & Rorenthal, R. J. (1993). Diagnostic issues in self-mutilation. Hospital and
Community Psychiatry, 44, 134-140.
Favazza, A. & Simeon, D. (1995). Self-mutilation. In E, Hollander, & D. J. Stein (Eds.),
Impulsiveness and Aggression. Chichester: Wiley.
Fedoroff, I. C., Taylor, S., Asmundson, G. J. G., & Koch, W. J. (2000). Cognitive
factors in traumatic stress reactions: Predicting PTSD symptoms from anxiety
sensitivity and beliefs about harmful events. Behavioural and Cognitive
Psychotherapy, 28, 5-15.
Ferrari, J. R. (1991). Self-handicapping by procrastinators: Protecting self-esteem,
social-esteem, or both? Journal of Research in Personality, 25, 245-261.
Ferrari, J. R. (1993). Procrastination and impulsivity: Two sides of a coin? In W.
McCown, M. B. Shure, & J Johnson, (Eds.), The impulsive client: Theory,
research, and treatment. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Ferrari, J. R. (1994). Dysfunctional procrastination and its relationship with self-esteem,
interpersonal dependency, and self-defeating behaviors. Personality and
Individual Differences, 17, 673-679.
Ferrari, J. R., Johnson, J. L., & McCown, W. G. (1995). Procrastination and task
avoidance: Theory, research, and treatment. New York: Plenum.
Ferrari, J. R. & Emmons, R. A. (1994). Procrastination as revenge: Do people report
using delays as a strategy for vengeance? Personality and Individual Differences,
17, 539-544.
Ferrari, J. R. & Emmons, R. A. (1995). Methods of procrastination and their relation to
self-control and self-reinforcement: An exploratory study. Journal of Social
Behavior and Personality. 10, 135-142.
Flett, G. L. & Hewitt, P. L. (2002). Perfectionism and maladjustment: An overview of
theoretical, definitional, and treatment issues. In G. L. Flett and P. L. Hewitt
(Eds.), Perfectionism: Theory, research, and treatment. American Psychological
Association.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., Blankstein, K. R., & Koledin, S. (1991). Dimensions of
perfectionism and irrational thinking. Journal of Rational-Emotive and
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 9, 185-201.
Flett, G. L., Blankstein, K. R., Hewitt, P. L., & Koledin, S. (1992). Components of
perfectionism and procrastination in college students. Social Behavior and
Personality. 20, 85-94.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., Blankstein, K. R., & Gray, L. (1998). Psychological distress
and the frequency of perfectionistic thinking. Journal of Personality and Clinical
Psychology, 75, 1363-1381.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., Blankstein, K. R., & O'Brian, S. (1991). Perfectionism and
learned resourcefulness in depression and self-esteem. Personality and Individual
Differences, 12, 61-68.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., Blankstein, K. R., Solnik, M., & Brunschot, M. Van. (1991).
Perfectionism, social problem-solving ability, and psychological distress. Journal
of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 14, 245-274.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., Blankstein, K. R., Dynin, C. B. (1994). Dimensions of
perfectionism and type-A behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 16,
477-485.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., & DeRossa, T. (1996). Dimensions of perfectionism,
psychosocial adjustment, and social skills. Personality and Individual
Differences, 20, 143-150.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., & Martin, T. R. (1995). Dimensions of perfectionism and
procrastination. In J. R. Ferrari, T. L. Johnson, & W. G. McCown (Eds.),
Procrastination and task avoidance: Theory, research, and treatment. New York:
Plenum.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., & Mittelstaedt, W. M. (1991). Dysphoria and components of
self-punitiveness: A re-analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15, 201-219.
Flora, S. R. & Pavlik, W. (1992). Human self-control and the density of reinforcement.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis ofBehavior, 57, 201-208.
Foa, E. B., Riggs, D. S., Massie, E. D., & Yarczower, M. (1995). The impact of fear
activation and anger on the efficacy of exposure base treatment for post¬
traumatic stress disorder. Behavior Therapy, 26, 487-489.
Folkman, S. & Lazarus, R. S. (1988). Manual for the Ways of Coping Questionnaire.
Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Forzano, L. B. & Corry, R. J. (1998). Self-control and impulsiveness in human females:
Effects of visual cues. Learning and Motivation, 29, 184-199.
Frey, P. S. (1975). Affect and resistance to temptation. Developmental Psychology, 11,
466-472.
Friedman, M. & Rosenman, R. (1974). Type A behavior and your heart. New York:
Knopf.
Frijda, N. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frost, R. O., Marten, P., Lahart, C., & Rosenblate, R. (1990). The dimensions of
perfectionism. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 449-468.
Frost, R. O., Heimberg, R. G., Holt, C. S., Mattia, J. I., & Neubauer, A. L. (1993). A
comparison of two measures of perfectionism. Personality and Individual
Differences, 14, 119-126.
426
Funder, D. C. & Block, J. (1989). The role of ego-control, ego-resiliency, and IQ in
delay of gratification in adolescence. Journal of Personality and Clinical
Psychology, 57, 1041-1050.
Gartner, J., Larson, D. B. & Allen, G. D. (1991). Religious commitment and mental
health: A review of the empirical literature. Journal ofPsychology and Theology,
19, 6-25.
Gibbs, J. J., Giever, D., & Martin, J. S. (1998). Parental management and self-control:
An empirical test of Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory. Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency, 35, 40-70.
Gilbert, P. (1992). Depression: The evolution of powerlessness. Hove: Psychology
Press.
Glass, C. R. & Arnkoff, D. B. (1997). Questionnaire methods of cognitive self-statement
assessment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 911-927.
Glass, D. C., Singer, J. E., & Friedman, L. N. (1969). Psychic cost of adaptation to an
environmental stressor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, 200-
210.
Goldstein, A. & Chambless, D. (1978). A reanalysis of agoraphobia. Behavior Therapy,
9, 47-59.
Gottfredson, M. R. & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). Factor analysis. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum.
Graham, S. & Hudley, C. (1994). Attributions of aggressive and non-aggressive African-
American male early adolescents. Developmental Psychology, 30, 365-373.
Gray, J. (1987). The psychology of fear and stress. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Graziano, W. G., Jensen-Campbell, L. A., & Hair, E. C. (1996). Perceiving interpersonal
conflict and reacting to it: The case for Agreeableness. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 170, 820-835.
Greenwood, V. (1985). RET and substance abuse. In A. Ellis & M. E. Bernard (Eds.),
Clinical applications of rational emotive behavior therapy. New York: Plenum.
427
Greaves, D. (1996). The effects of rational-emotive parent education on the stress of
mothers of young children with Down syndrome. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Melbourne, Australia. Reported in O'Kelly, M., Joyce,
M. R., & Greaves, D. (1998). The primacy of the "shoulds": Where is the
evidence? Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 16,
223-234.
Guadagnoli, E. & Velicer, W. F. (1988). Relation of sample size to the stability of
component patterns. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 265-275.
Guidano, V. & Liotti, G. (1983). Cognitive processes and emotional disorder. New
York: Guilford Press
Haaga, D. A. F. & Davidson, G. C. (1989). Outcome research in RET. In M. E.
Bernard, & R. DiGiuseppe, (Eds.), Inside rational emotive-therapy: A critical
appraisal of the theory and therapy of Albert Ellis. San Diego: Academic Press.
Haaga, D. A. F. & Davidson, G. C. (1993). An appraisal of rational-emotive therapy.
Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, 61, 215-230.
Haaga, D. A. F., Dryden, W., & Dancey, C. P. (1991). Measurement of rational emotive
therapy in outcome studies. Journal of Rational Emotive & Cognitive Therapy, 9,
73-93.
Haaga, D. A. F., Dyck, M. J., & Ernst, D. (1991). Empirical status of cognitive theory of
depression. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 215-236.
Hagborg, W. J. (1996). Scores of middle-school-age students on the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale. Psychological Reports, 78, 1071-1074.
Haines, J. & Williams, W. L. (1997). Coping and problem solving of self-mutilators.
Journal ofClinical Psychology, 53, 177-186.
Haines, J., Williams, W. L., Brain, K. L., & Wilson, G. V. (1996). The
psychophysiology of self-mutilation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 471-
489.
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998). Multivariate data
analysis. (5lh ed.). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
428
Hammond, S. (1995). An introduction to multivariate data analysis. In G. M. Breakwell,
S. Hammond, & C. Fife-Shaw (Eds.), Research methods in psychology. London:
Sage.
Harman, H. H. (1976). Modern factor analysis (3rd ed.).Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Hart, K. E., Turner, S. H., Hittner, J. B., Cardozo, S. R., & Paras, K. C. (1991). Life
stress and anger: Moderating effects of Type-A irrational beliefs. Personality and
Individual Differences, 12, 1557-560.
Hauck, P. (1974). Overcoming depression. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
Hauck, P. (1980). Calm down: How to cope with frustration and anger. London: Sheldon
Press.
Hawton, K., Kingsbury, S., Steinhardt, K., Anthony, J., & Fagg, J. (1999). Repetition of
deliberate self-harm by adolescents: the role of psychological factors. Journal of
Adolescence, 22, 369-378.
Hays, R. D., Hayashi, T., Carson, S., & Ware, J. E. (1988). User's guide for the
Multitrait Analysis Program (MAP). The RAND Corporation, N-2786-RC, Santa
Monica, CA.
Heatherton, T. F. & Nicols, P. A. (1994). Personal accounts of successful versus failed
attempts at life change. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 664-675.
Heatherton, T. F. & Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Binge-eating as escape from self-
awareness. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 86-108.
Heatherton, T. F., Herman, C. P., & Polivy, J. (1991). Effects of physical threat and ego
threat on eating behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 138-
143.
Hensley, W. E. & Roberts, M. K. (1976). Dimensions of Rosenberg's Self-Esteem
Scale. Psychological Reports, 38, 583-584.
Herpertz, S. (1995). Self-injurious behaviour: Psychopathological and nosological
characteristics in subtypes of self-injurers. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 91,
57-68.
429
Herrmann, C. (1997). International experiences with the Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale - A review of validation data and clinical results. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research, 42, 17-41.
Hewitt, C. (2001). Depression, emotion, and frustration tolerance in adolescent
deliberate self-harm. Unpublished Doctorate of Psychology Dissertation,
University of Edinburgh.
Hewitt, P. L. & Flett, G. L. (1989). The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale:
Development and validation. Canadian Psychology, 30, 339 (abstract).
Hewitt, P. L. & Flett, G. L. (1991). Dimensions of perfectionism in unipolar depression.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 98-101.
Hewitt, P. L. & Flett, G. L. (1993). Dimensions of perfectionism, daily stress, and
depression: A test of the specific vulnerability hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 102, 58-65.
Hewitt, P. L. & Flett, G. L., Besser, A., Sherry, S. B., & McGee, B. (2003).
Perfectionism is Multidimensional: A reply to Shafran, Cooper and Fairbum.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41,1221-1236.
Hewitt, P. L. & Genest, M. (1990). The ideal-self: Schematic processing of
perfectionistic content in dysphoric university students. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 59, 802-808.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological
Review, 94, 319-340.
Higgins, E. T. (1996). Ideals, oughts, and regulatory focus: Affect and motivation from
distinct pains and pleasures. In P.M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Baugh (Eds.), The
psychology of action: Linking cognition to behavior. New York: Guilford Press.
Hirschi, T. & Gottfredson, M. R. (1993). Commentary: Testing the general theory of
crime. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30, 47-54.
Hoch, S. J. & Loewenstein, G. F. (1992). Time-inconsistent preferences and consumer
self-control. Journal ofConsumer Research, 17, 492-507.
Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth. New York: Norton and Co.
Hu, L. & Bentler, P. M. (1995). Evaluating model fit. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural
equation modeling: Concepts, issues, and applications Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Hu, L. & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indices in covariance structure
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation
modeling, 6, 1-55.
Hull, G. J., Lehn, D. A., & Tedlie, J. C. (1991). A general approach to testing
multifaceted personality constructs. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 61, 962-945.
Hutchinson, G. T., Patock-Peckham, J. A. Cheong, J., & Nagoshi, C T. (1998). Journal
ofRational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 16, 61-74.
Isen, A. M. (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition. In R. Wyer &
T. Scrull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Inc.
Isen, A. M. (1993). Positive affect and decision making. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland
(Eds.), Handbook of emotions. New York: Guilford Press.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt.
Jamner, L. D. & Schwartz, G. E. (1986). Integration of self-report and psychophysiology
indices of affect: Interactions with repressive coping strategies,
Psychophysiology, 23, 444.
Jennrich, C. I. & Sampson, P. F. (1966). Rotation for simple loadings. Psychometrica,
31, 313-323.
Joreskog, K. G. & Sorbom, D. (1989). LISREL-7: User's reference guide. Mooresville,
IN: Scientific Software.
John, O. P. & Benet-Martinez, V. (2000). Measurement: Reliability, construct
validation, and scale construction. In H. T. Reis, & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook
of research methods in social and personality psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, M., Wright, S., & Weinman, J. (1995). Measures in health psychology: A user
portfolio. NFER-Nelson.
431
Johnson, J. L. & Bloom, A. M. (1995). An analysis of the contribution of the five factors
of personality to variance in academic procrastination. Personality and Individual
Differences, 18, 127-133.
Jones, R. G. (1968). A factored measure of Ellis' irrational belief system with
personality and maladjustment correlates. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Texas Technological College.
Joyce, M. R. (1995). Emotional relief for parents: Is rational-emotive parent education
effective? Journal ofRational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 13, 55-
75.
Kaiser, H. F. (1958). The Varimax criterion for analytic rotation in factor analysis.
Psychometrika, 23,187-200.
Kaplan, H. B. & Pokorney, M. D. (1969). Self-derogation and psychological adjustment.
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 149, 421-434.
Kassinove, H. (1986). Self-reported affect and core irrational thinking: A preliminary
analysis. Journal ofRational -Emotive Therapy, 4, 119-130.
Kassinove, H. & Berger, A. (1996). Survey of Personal Beliefs. Unpublished test.
Kassinove, H., Crisci, R., & Tiegerman, S. (1977). Developmental trends in rational-
emotive school mental health programs. Journal of Community Psychology, 5,
266-274.
Kassinove, H. & Eckhardt, C. I. (1993). Irrational beliefs and self-reported affect in
Russia and America. Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 133-142.
Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: Philosopher, psychologist, antichrist. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Kaufman, P., Rasinski, K. A., Lee, R., & West, J. (1991). National educational
longitudinal study of 19888. Quality of the responses of the eighth-grade
students in NELS88. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.
Kawamura, K. Y., Hunt, S. L., Frost, R. O., & DiBartolo, P. M. (2001). Perfectionism,
anxiety, and depression: Are the relationships independent? Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 25, 291-301.
Kendall, P. C., Haaga, D. A. F., Ellis, A., Bernard, M., DiGiuseppe, R., & Kassinove, H.
(1995). Rational-emotive therapy in the 1990 and beyond: Current status, recent
revisions, and research questions. Clinical Psychology Review, 15, 169-185.
Kendall, P. C. & Watson, D. (Eds.). (1989). Anxiety and depression: Distinctive and
overlapping features. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Kenford, S. L., Smith, S. S., Wetter, D. W., Jorenby, D. E., Fiore, M. C., & Baker, T. B.
(2002). Predicting relapse back to smoking: Contrasting affective and physical
models of dependence. Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology, 70, 216-
227.
Kent, A., Goddard, K. L., Van de Berk, P. A. EL, Raphael, F. J., McCluskey, S. E., &
Lacey, J. H. (1997). Eating disorder in women admitted to hospital following
deliberate self-poisoning. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 95, 140-144.
Kernis, M. H. (1993). The role of stability and level of self-esteem in psychological
functioning. In R. Baumeister (Ed.), Self-esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard.
New York: Plenum.
Kernis, M. H., Grannemann, B. D., & Barclay, L. C. (1989). Stability and level of self-
esteem as predictors of anger arousal and hostility. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 56, 1013-1022.
Kim, J. & Mueller, C. W. (1978). Factor analysis: Statistical methods and practical
issues. London: Sage.
Kleinig, J. (1971). The concept of desert. In L. P. Pojman, & O. McLeod (Eds.), (1998).
What do we deserve? A reader on justice and desert. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Kline, P. (1992). The handbook of psychological testing. London: Routledge.
Kline, P. (1994). An easy guide to factor analysis. London: Routledge.
Klinger, E. (1975). Consequences of commitment to and disengagement from
incentives. Psychological Review, 82, 1-23.
Kobasa, S. C. & Puccetti, M. C. (1983). Personality and social resources in stress
resistance. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 45, 839-850.
433
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of self: A systematic approach to the psychoanalytic
treatment of the narcissistic disorders. New York: International Universities
Press.
Kohut, H. (1978). Thoughts on narcissism and narcissistic rage. In P. H. Ornstein (Ed.),
The search for the self. (Vol. 2). New York: International Universities Press.
Koopermans, P. C., Sanderman, R., Timmerman, I., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. (1994).
The Irrational Beliefs Inventory: Development and psychometric evaluation.
European Journal ofPsychological Assessment, 10, 15-27.
Krahn, D. D. (1991). The relationship of eating disorders and substance abuse. Journal
of Substance Abuse, 3, 239-259.
Krantz, S. & Moos, R. (1988). Risk factors at intake predict non-remission among
depressed patients. Journal ofCounseling and Clinical Psychology, 56, 863-869.
Kruedelbach, N., McCormick, R. A., Schulz, S. C., & Grueneich, R. (1993). Impulsivity,
coping styles, and triggers for craving in substance abusers with borderline
personality disorder. Journal ofPersonality Disorders, 7, 214-222.
Kuiper, N. A. & Martin, R. A. (1989). Type-A behaviour: A social cognition
motivational perspective. In G. H. Bower, The psychology of learning and
motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. 23). New York: Academic
Press.
Lacey, J. H. (1993). Self-damaging and addictive behaviour in bulimia nervosa. British
Journal ofPsychiatry, 163, 190 - 194.
Lacey, J. H. & Evens, C. D. H. (1986). The impulsivist: A multi-impulsive personality
disorder. British Journal ofAddiction, 81, 641-649.
Lane, S. H., Bessai, M. A., & Bard, J. A. (1977). Irrational beliefs assessment:
perspectives. In J. L. Wolfe, & E. Brand (Eds.), Twenty years of rational therapy.
New York: Institute for Rational Living.
LaPoint, K. A. & Crandell, C. L. J. (1980). The relationship of irrational beliefs to self-
reported depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 4, 247-250.
Lawson, R. (1965). Frustration: The development of a scientific concept. New York:
Macmillan.
434
Lay, C. H. (1990). Working to schedule on personal projects: An assessment of person-
project characteristics and trait procrastination. Journal of Social Behavior and
Personality, 5, 91-103.
Lay, C. H. (1992). Trait procrastination and the perception of person-task characteristics.
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 7, 483-494.
Lay, C. H. (1995). Trait procrastination, agitation, dejection, and self-discrepancy. In J.
R Ferrari, J. L. Johnson, & W. G. McCown, (Eds.), Procrastination and task
avoidance: Theory, research, and treatment. New York: Plenum.
Lay, C. H., Knish. S., & Zanatta, R. (1992). Self-handicappers and procrastinators: A
comparison of their practice behaviour prior to an evaluation. Journal of
Research in Personality, 26, 242-257.
Lay, C. H., Edwards, J. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Endler, N. S. (1989). An assessment of
appraisal, anxiety, coping, and procrastination during an examination period.
European Journal of Personality, 3, 195-208.
Lay, C. H. & Silverman, S. (1996) Trait procrastination, anxiety, and dilatory behavior.
Personality and Individual Differences, 21, 61-67.
Lee, C. W., Taylor, G., & Dunn, J. (1999). Factor structure of the Schema Questionnaire
in a large clinical sample. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 23, 441-451.
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality
disorder. New York: Guilford Press.
Links, P. S., Heslegrave, R., & Reekum, R. van (1999). Impulsivity: Core aspects of
borderline personality disorder. Journal ofPersonality Disorders, 13, 1-9.
Lindner, H. Kirkby, R. Wertheim, E. & Birch, P. (1999). A brief assessment of irrational
thinking: The shortened General Attitude and Belief Scale. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 23, 651-663.
Liotti, G (1992). Egocentricity and the cognitive psychotherapy of personality disorders.
Journal ofCognitive Psychotherapy: An international Quarterly, 6, 43-58.
Logue, A. W. (1996). Self-control. In W. O'Donohue (Ed.), Learning and behavior
therapy. MA: Allyan and Bacon.
435
Logue, A. W. & Pena-Correal, T. E. (1984). Responding during reinforcement delay in a
self-control paradigm. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 41, 267-
277.
Lopez, F. G. & Thurman, C. W. (1986). A cognitive-behavioral investigation of anger
among college students. Cognitive Research and Therapy, 10, 245-256.
Lorr, M. & Wunderlich, R. A. (1985). A measure of impulsiveness and its relation to
extraversion. Education and Psychological Measurement, 45, 251-257.
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., & Sugawara, H. M. (1996). Power analysis and
determination of sample size for covariance structure modeling. Psychological
Methods, 1, 130-149.
MacDonald, A. P. & Games, R. G. (1972). Ellis' irrational values: A validation study.
Rational Living, 7, 25-28.
Mackintosh, N. J. (1974). The psychology of animal learning. New York: Academic
Press.
Mahoney, M. J., Lyddon, W. J., & Alford, D. J. (1989). An evaluation of the rational
emotive theory of psychotherapy. In M. E. Bernard, & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.),
Inside rational emotive-therapy: A critical appraisal of the theory and therapy of
Albert Ellis. San Diego: Academic Press.
Maier, N. R. F. (1949). Frustration: The study of behavior without a goal. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Major, B. (1994). From social inequality to personal entitlement: The role of social
comparisons, legitimacy appraisals, and group membership. Advances in
Experimental Social psychology, 26, 293-355.
Malouff, J. M. & Schutte, N. S. (1986). Development and validation of a measure of
irrational belief. Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology. 54, 860-862.
Malouff, J. M., Valdenegro, J., & Schutte, N. S. (1987). Further validation studies of a
measure of irrational belief. Journal of Rational-Emotive Therapy, 5, 189-193.
Maltby, J., Lewis, A. C., & Day, L. (1999). Religious orientation and psychological
well-being: The role of the frequency of personal prayer. British Journal of
Health Psychology, 4, 363-378.
436
Marsh, H. W. (1986). The Bias of negatively worded items in rating scales for young
children: A cognitive-developmental phenomenon. Developmental Psychology,
22, 37-49.
Marsh, H. W. (1996). Positive and negative global self-esteem: A substantively
meaningful distinction or artifactors? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 70, 810-819.
Martin, J. (1986). The tolerance of injustice. In J. M. Olson, C. P. Herman, M. P. Zanna
(Eds.), Relative deprivation and social comparison: The Ontario Symposium
(Vol. 4). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Martin, R. A., Kuiper, N. A., & Westra, H. A. (1989). Cognitive and affective
components of the Type A behaviour pattern: Preliminary evidence for a self-
worth contingency model. Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 771-784.
Marzillier, J. (1987). A Sadly neglected cognitive element in depression: A reply to
Ellis. Cognitive Research and Therapy, 11, 147-152.
Matthews, G. & Deary, I. J. (1998). Personality traits. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Maultsby, M. C., Jr. (1974). Common Belief Scale. In D. S. Goodman & M. C.
Maultsby (Eds.), Emotional well being through rational behavior training.
Springfield, III: Charles C Thomas.
Maultsby, M. C. Jr. (1984). Rational behavior therapy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Mayer, C. L. (2000). Academic procrastination and self-handicapping: Gender
differences in response to noncontingent feedback. Journal of Social Behavior
and Personality, 15, 87-102.
McClelland, D. C., Atkinson, J. W., Clark, R. A., & Lowell, E. L. (1953). The
achievement motive. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
McCown, W. & Johnson, J. (1991). Personality and chronic procrastination by
university students during an academic examination period. Personality and
Individual Differences, 12, 413-415.
437
McCown, W., & Johnson, J., & Pretzel, T. (1989). Procrastination: A principal
components analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 197-202.
McCuller, T., Wong, P. T. P., & Amsel, A. (1976). Transfer of persistence from fixed-
ratio bar-press training to runway extinction. Animal Learning and Behavior, 4,
53-57.
McDermot, J. F., Haaga, D. A. F., Bilek, L. A. (1997). Cognitive bias and irrational
beliefs in major depression and dysphoria. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 21,
459-476.
McGuinn, L. K. & Young, J. E. (1996). Schema-focused therapy. In P. M. Salkovskis
(Ed.), Frontiers of cognitive therapy. New York: Guilford Press Press.
McNally, R. J. (1996). Anxiety sensitivity is distinguishable from trait anxiety. In R. M.
Rapee (Ed.), Current controversies in the anxiety disorders. New York: Guilford
Press.
McNally, R. J. & Lorenz, M. (1987). Anxiety sensitivity in agoraphobics. Journal of
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 18, 3-11.
Meng, X., Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1992). Comparing correlated correlation
coefficients. Psychological Bulletin, 111,172-175.
Messick, S. (1989). Validity. In R. L. Linn (Ed.), Educational measurement (3rd ed.).
New York: Macmillan.
Metcalf, J. & Mishel, W. (1999). A hot/cool system of analysis of delay of gratification:
Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106, 3-19.
Milgram, N., Gehrman, T., & Keinan, G. (1992). Procrastination and emotional upset: A
typological model. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 1307-1313.
Milgram, N., Marshevsky, S., & Sadeh, C. (1995). Correlates of academic
procrastination: Discomfort, task aversiveness, and task capability. Journal of
Psychology, 129, 145-155.
Milgram, N., Srolof, B., & Rosenbaum, M. (1988). The Procrastination of everyday life.
Journal of Research in Personality, 22, 197-212.
438
Milgram, N. & Toubiana, Y. (1999). Academic anxiety, academic procrastination and
parental involvement in student and their parents. British Journal of Educational
Psychology, 69, 345-362.
Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual review of
Psychology, 52, 527-553.
Miller, N.E. (1944). Experimental studies of conflict. In McV. J. Hunt (Ed.), Personality
and the behavior disorders (Vol. 1). New York: Ronald Press.
Milligan, R. J. & Waller, G. (2001). Anger and impulsiveness in non-clinical women.
Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 1073-1078.
Mineka, S. & Kelly, K. A. (1989). The relationship between anxiety, lack of control and
loss of control. In A. Steptoe & A. Appels (Eds.), Stress, personal control and
health. Brussels: Wiley.
Mikula, G. (1993). On the experience of injustice. In W. Stoebe, & M. Hewstone (Eds.),
European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 4). Chichester: Wiley.
Minarik, M. L. & Ahrens, A. H. (1996). Relations of eating behavior and symptoms of
depression and anxiety to the dimensions of perfectionism among undergraduate
women. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 155-169.
Mischel, W. (1974). Processes in delay of gratification. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 7).
Mischel, W. (1990). Personality dispositions revisited and revised: a view after three
decades. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research.
New York: Guilford Press.
Mischel, W. (1996). From good intentions to willpower. In P.M. Gollwitzer & J. A.
Baugh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition to behavior. New
York: Guilford Press.
Mischel, W. & Baker, N. (1975). Cognitive appraisals and transformations in delay
behavior. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 31, 254-261.
Mischel, W. & Ebbesen, E. B. (1970). Attention in delay of gratification. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 329-337.
Mischel, W., Ebbesen, E. B. & Zeiss, A. R. (1972). Cognitive and attentional
mechanisms in delay of gratification. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 21, 204-218.
Mischel, W. & Mettzer, R. (1962). Preference for length of delay of reward as a function
of age, intelligence, and length of delay interval. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 64, 425-431.
Mischel, W. & Staub, E. (1965). Effects of expectancy on working and waiting for
larger rewards. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 265-233.
Mizes, J. S. (1988). Personality characteristics of bulimic and non-eating disordered
female controls: A cognitive behavioral perspective. International Journal of
Eating Disorders, 7, 541-550.
Moore, B., Mischel, W., & Zeiss, A (1976). Comparative effects of the reward stimulus
and its cognitive representation in voluntary delay. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 34, 419-424.
Muran, J.C. (1991). A reformulation of the ABC model in cognitive psychotherapies:
Implications for assessment and treatment. Clinical Psychology Review, 16, 399-
418.
Muran, J.C., Kassinove, H., Ross, S. & Muran, E. (1989). Confirmatory and exploratory
analysis of irrational language with clinical and nonclinical subjects. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 45, 188-193.
Muraven, M. R. & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited
resources: Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126,
247-259.
Muraven, M. R., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as limited
resource: regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 774-789.
Muris, P., Schmidt, H., Merckelbach, H., & Schouten, E. (2001). Anxiety sensitivity in
adolescents: Factor structure and relationships to trait anxiety and symptoms of
anxiety disorder and depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 89-100.
Nagoshi, C. T., Wilson, J. R., & Rodriguez, L. A. (1991). Impulsivity, sensation seeking,
and behavioral and emotional responses to alcohol. Alcoholism: Clinical and
Experimental Research, 15, 661-667.
Navarick, D. J. (1982). Negative reinforcement and choice in humans. Learning and
Motivation, 13, 361-377.
Neenan, M. & Dryden, W. (1999). Rational emotive behaviour therapy: Advances in
theory and practice. London: Whurr.
Nesse, R. M. (1998). Emotional disorders in evolutionary perspective. British Journal of
Medical Psychology, 71, 397-415.
Newark, C. S., Frerking, R. A., Cook, C., & Newark, L. (1973). Endorsement of Ellis's
irrational beliefs as a function of psychopathology. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 29, 300-302.
Nietzel, M. T. & Harris, M. J. (1990). Relationship of dependency and
achievement/autonomy to depression. Clinical Psychology Review, 10,279-297.
Nisbett, R. E. & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more then we can know: Verbal reports
on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1997). Rumination and psychological distress among bereaved
partners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 855-862.
Nottingham, E. J. IV. (1992). Use of the Survey of Personal Beliefs Scale: further
validation of irrational beliefs with psychiatric inpatients. Journal of Rational-
Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 10, 207-217.
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Oatley, K. & Johnson-Laird, J. M. (1987). Towards a cognitive theory of the emotions.
Cognition and Emotion, 1, 29-50.
O'Brian, E. J. (1985). Global self-esteem: Unidimensional or multidimensional?
Psychological Reports, 57, 383-389.
O'Kelly-Collard, M. (1995). The Womens Belief Scale. Unpublished manuscript,
Department of Behavioural Medicine, Montash University, Melbourne,
Australia.
O'Kelly, M., Joyce, M. R., & Greaves, D. (1998). The primacy of the "shoulds": Where
is the evidence? Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy,
16, 223-234.
O'Donohue, W. & Vass, J. S. (1996). What is an irrational belief? Rational-emotive
therapy and accounts of rationality. In W. O'Donohue, & R. F. Kitchener, (Eds.),
The philosophy ofpsychology. London: Sage.
O'Gorman, J. G. & Baxter, E. (2002). Self-control as a personality measure. Personality
and Individual Differences, 32, 533-539.
Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2000). Academic procrastinators and perfectionistic tendencies
among graduate students. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 15, 103-
109.
Oppenheim, A. N. (1992). Questionnaire design, interviewing and attitude measurement.
London: Pinter.
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognitive structure of emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Otto, M. W., Pollack, M. H., Fava, M., Uccello, R., & Rosenbaum, J. F. (1995).
Elevated anxiety sensitivity index scores in patients with major depression:
Correlates and changes with antidepressant treatment. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 9, 117-123.
Owens, A. M. & Newbegin, I. (2000). Academic procrastination of adolescents in
English and mathematics: Gender and personality variations. Journal of Social
Behavior and Personality, 15, 111-124.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Passmore, J. (1970). The Perfectibility ofMan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons
Parker, J. D. A. & Bagby, R. M. (1997). Impulsivity in adults: a critical review of
measurement approaches. In Impulsivity: Theory, assessment and treatment. C.
D. Webster, & M. A. Jackson (Eds.), New York: Guilford Press.
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned reflex. London: Oxford University Press.
Pedhazur, E. J. & Schmelkin, L. P. (1991). Measurement, design, and analysis: An
integrated approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pojman, L. P. & McLeod, O. (1998). What do we deserve? A reader on justice and
desert. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Polivy, J., Heatherton, T. F., & Herman, C. P. (1988). Self-esteem, restraint, and eating
behaviour. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 354-356.
Power, M. J. (1990). A prime time for emotion: Cognitive vulnerability and the
emotional disorders. In K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie, and G.
Erdos (Eds.), Lines of Thinking (Vol. 2). Chichester: Wiley.
Power, M. J. (1991). Cognitive science and behavioural psychotherapy: Where
behaviour was, there shall cognition be? Behavioural Psychotherapy, 19, 20-41.-
Power, M. J. & Champion, L. A. (1986). Cognitive approaches to depression: A
theoretical critique. British Journal Clinical Psychology, 25,201-212.
Power, M. J. & Dalgleish, T. (1997). Cognition and emotion: From order to disorder.
Hove: Psychology Press.
Power, M. J., Katz, R., McGuffm, P., Duggan, C. F., Lam, D., & Beck, A. T. (1994).
The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS): A comparison of forms A and B and
proposals for a new sub-scaled version. Journal of Research in Personality, 28,
263-276.
Power, M. J., Duggan, C. F., Lee, A. S., & Murray, R. M. (1995). Dysfunctional
attitudes in depressed and recovered depressed patients and their first-degree
relatives. Psychological Medicine, 25, 87-93.
Pychyl, T. A., Lee, J. M., Thibodeau, R., & Blunt, A. (2000). Five days of emotion: An
experience sampling study of undergraduate student procrastination. Journal of
Social Behavior and Personality, 15, 239-254.
Quintana, S. M. & Maxwell, S. E. (1999). Implications of recent developments in
structural equation modeling for counseling psychology. The Counseling
Psychologist, 27, 485-527.
Rachlin, H. (1974). Self-control. Behaviorism, 2, 94-107.
Rachlin, H. (1995). Self-control: Beyond commitment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
18, 109-159.
443
Rachlin, H. & Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice, and self-control. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 17, 15-22.
Ramanaiah, N., Heerboth, J., & Schill, T. (1987). Measurement of irrational belief: A
critical review. Journal ofRational-Emotive Therapy, 5, 189-193.
Raskin, R., Novacek, J., & Hogan, R. (1991). Narcissistic self-esteem management.
Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 60, 911-918.
Reiss, S. & McNally, R. J. (1985). The expectancy model of fear. In S. Reiss & R. R.
Bootzin (Eds.), Theoretical issues in behavior therapy. New York: Academic
Press.
Rhodewalt, F., Madrian, J. C., & Cheney, S. (1998). Narcissism, self-knowledge
organization, and emotional reactivity: The effect of daily experiences on self-
esteem and affect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 75-87.
Rice, K. G. & Mirzadeh, S. A. (2000). Perfectionism, attachment and adjustment.
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 47, 238-250.
Riggs, D. S., Dancu, C. V., Gershuny, B. S., Greenberg, D., & Foa, E. B. (1992). Anger
and post-traumatic stress disorder in female crime victims. Journal of Traumatic
Stress, 5, 613-625.
Riley, G. (1992). How to stop smoking and stay stooped for good. London: Vermilion.
Robb, H. B. (1992). Why you don't have a "perfect right" to anything. Journal of
Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 4, 259-270.
Robb, H. B. & Warren, R. (1990). Irrational belief tests: new insights, new directions.
Journal ofCognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 4, 303-311.
Rodriguez, M. L., Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Wright, J (1989). Delay of gratification
and children's social behavior in natural settings. Paper presented at annual
meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Boston.
Rook, D. W. (1987). The buying impulse. Journal of Consumer Research, 14, 189-199.
Rorer, L. G. (1989). Rational-emotive theory II: Explication and evaluation. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 13, 531-548.
Rosenbaum, M. (1980). A schedule for assessing self-control behaviors: Preliminary
findings. Behavior Therapy, 11, 109-121.
444
Rosenbaum, M. (1990). The role of learned resourcefulness in the self-control of health
behaviour. In M. Rosenbaum (Ed.), Learned resourcefulness: On coping skill,
self-control, and adaptive behaviour. New York: Springer
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rosenzweig, S. (1938). Character and personality. Duke University Press.
Rothblum, E. D. (1990). Fear of failure: The psychodynamic, need achievement, fear of
failure, and procrastination models. In H. Leitenberg (Ed.), Elandbook of social
and evaluation anxiety. New York: Plenum.
Rothblum, E. D., Solomon, L. J., & Murakami, J. (1986). Affective, cognitive, and
behavioral differences between high and low procrastinators. Journal of
Counseling Psychology, 33, 387- 394.
Ruderman, A. J. (1986). Bulimia and irrational beliefs. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 24, 193-197.
Ryan, M. R. & Deci, E. L. (1999). Approaching and avoiding self-determination:
Comparing cybernetic and organismic paradigms of motivation. In R. S. Wyer,
Jr. (Ed.), Advances in social cognition. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Saboonchi, F. & Lundh, L. -G. (1997). Perfectionism, self-consciousness, and anxiety.
Personality and Individual differences, 22, 921-928.
Safran, J. D., Vallis, M. T., Segal, Z. V., & Shaw, B. F. (1986). Assessment of core
cognitive processes in cognitive therapy. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 5,
509-526.
Sayette, M. A. (1999). Does drinking reduce stress? Alcohol Research and Health, 23,
250-255.
Salzinger, K. (1995). A behavior-analytic view of anger and aggression. In H. Kassinove
(Ed.), Anger disorders: Definition, diagnosis, and treatment. Washington, DC:
Taylor and Francis.
Schmidt, N. B. & Cook, H. C. (1999). Effects of anxiety sensitivity on anxiety and pain
during a cold pressor challenge in patients with panic disorder. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 37, 313-323.
Schmidt, N. B., Joiner, Jr. T. E., Young, J. E., & Telch, M. J. (1995). The Schema
Questionnaire: Investigation of psychometric properties and the hierarchical
structure of a measure ofmaladaptive schemas. Cognitive Therapy and Research,
19, 295-321.
Schmitt, N. & Stults, D M. (1985). Factors defined by negatively keyed item: The result
of careless respondents? Applied Psychological Measurement, 9, 367-373.
Schmitt, N. (1996). Uses and abuses of coefficient alpha. Psychological Assessment, 8,
350-353.
Schmidt, N. B. & Telch, M. J. (1997). Nonpsychiatric medical comorbidity, health
perceptions, and treatment outcome in patients with panic disorder. Health
Psychology, 16, 114-122.
Schouwenburg, H. C. (1992). Procrastinators and fear of failure: An exploration of
reasons for procrastination. European Journal of Personality, 6, 225-236.
Schouwenburg, H. C. (1995). Academic procrastination: Theoretical notions,
measurement, and research. In J. R Ferrari, J. L. Johnson, & W. G. McCown,
(Eds.), Procrastination and task avoidance: Theory, research, and treatment. New
York: Plenum.
Schouwenburg, H. C. & Groenewoud, J. T. (2001). Study motivation under temptation:
Effects of trait procrastination. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 229-
240.
Schouwenburg, H. C. & Lay, C. H. (1995). Trait procrastination and the big-five factors
of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 18, 481-490.
Schriesheim, C. A. & Hill, K. D. (1981). Controlling acquiescence response bias by item
reversals: The effect on questionnaire validity. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 41, 1101-1114.
Schriesheim, C. A., Eisenbach, R. J., & Hill, K. D. (1991). The effects of negation and
negative polar opposite item reversals on questionnaire reliability and validity:
An experimental investigation. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 51,
67-78.
Schwarz, J. C. & Pollack, P. R. (1977). Affect and delay of gratification. Journal of
Research in Personality, 11, 147-164.
Scrull, T. K. & Wyer, R. S. (1986). The role of chronic and temporary goals in social
information processing. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook
ofmotivation. Chichester: Wiley.
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness. San Francisco: Freeman.
Seligman, M. E. P. & Maier, S. (1967). Failure to escape traumatic shock. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 74, 1-9.
Shafran, R., Cooper, Z., & Fairburn, C. G. (2002). Clinical perfectionism: A cognitive-
behavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 773-791.
Shaw. E. (1989). Psychometric properties of the General Attitude and Belief Scale.
Unpublished masters thesis, Institute of Education, University of Melbourne,
Australia.
Shaw. W. H. (1999). Contemporary ethics: Taking account of utilitarianism. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Sheasby, J. E., Barlow, J. H., Cullen, L. A., & Wright, C. C. (2000). Psychometric
properties of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale among people with arthritis.
Psychological Reports, 86, 1139-1146.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Peake, P. K. (1990). Predicting adolescent cognitive and
social competence from preschool delay of gratification: Identifying diagnostic
conditions. Developmental Psychology, 26, 978-986.
Shorkey, C. T. & Whiteman, V. (1977). Development of the Rational Behavior
Inventory: Initial validation and reliability. Educational and Psychological
Measurements, 37, 527-534.
Sharkey, P. W. & Malony, H. N. (1986). Religiosity and emotional disturbance: A test
of Ellis's thesis in his own counseling center. Psychotherapy, 23, 640-641.
Skarlicki, D. P. & Folger, R. (1997). Retaliation for perceived unfair treatment:
Examining the roles of procedural and interactional justice. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 82, 434-443.
Simeon, D., Stanley, B., Frances, A., Mann, J. J., Wincher, R., & Stanley, M. (1992).
Self-mutilation in personality disorders: Psychological and biological correlates.
American Journal ofPsychiatry, 149. 221-226.
Singer, E. (1981). Reference groups and social evaluations. In M. Rosenberg & H.
Turner (Eds.), Social Psychology: Sociological perspectives. New York: Basic
Books.
Sohlberg, S., Norring, C., Holmgren, S. & Rosmurk, S. (1989). Impulsivity and long-
term prognosis of psychiatric patients with anorexia nervosa/bulimia nervosa.
Journal ofNervous and Mental Disease, 177, 249-258.
Solomon, A., Haaga, D. A. F., Brody, C., Friedman, D G., & Kirk, L. (1998). Priming
irrational beliefs in recovered-depressed people. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 107,440-449.
Solomon, L. J. & Rothblum, E. D. (1984). Academic procrastination: frequency and
cognitive-behavioral correlates. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 31, 503-509.
Solomon, L. J. & Rothblum, E. D. (1988). Procrastination Assessment Scale-Students.
In M. Hersen, & A. S. Bellack (Eds.), Dictionary of behavioral assessment
techniques. New York: Pergamon Press.
Smith, T. W. (1982). Irrational beliefs in the cause and treatment of emotional distress:
A critical review of the rational-emotive model. Clinical Psychology Review, 2,
505-522.
Smith, T. W. (1989). Assessment in rational emotive therapy: Empirical access to the
ABCD model. In M. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.), Inside rational emotive-
therapy: A critical appraisal of the theory and therapy of Albert Ellis. San Diego:
Academic Press.
Smith, T. W. & Zurawski, R. M. (1983). Assessment of irrational beliefs: The question
of discriminative validity. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 976-979.
Spielberger, C. D., Jacobs, G., Russell, S., & Crane, R. (1983). Assessment of anger:
The State-Trait Anger Scale. In J. N. Butcher & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.),
Advances in personality assessment (Vol. 2). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stanford, M. S. & Barratt, E. S. (1992). Impulsivity and the multi-impulsive personality
disorder. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 831-834.
Stewart, S. H. & Phil, R. O. (1994). The effects of alcohol administration on
psychophysiological and subjective-emotional responses to aversive stimulation
in anxiety sensitive women. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 8, 29-42.
Still, A., & Dryden, W. (1999). The place of rationality in Stoicism and REBT. Journal
of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 143-164.
Stober, J. (1998). The Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale revisited: More
perfect with four (instead of six) dimensions. Personality and Individual
Differences, 24, 481-491.
Stumpf, H. & Parker, W. D. (2000). A Hierarchical structural analysis of perfectionism
and its relation to other personality characteristics. Personality and Individual
Differences, 28, 837-852.
Sutton-Simon, K. (1981). Assessing belief systems: Concepts and strategies. In P. C.
Kendall, & S. D. Hollon (Eds.), Assessment strategies for cognitive-behavioral
interventions. New York: Academic Press.
Sutton-Simon, K. & Goldfried, M. R. (1979). Faulty patterns of thinking in two types of
anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 3, 193-203.
Tabachnick, B. G. & Fidell, L. S. (2000). Using multivariate statistics. New York:
Harper and Row.
Tacq, J. (1997). Multivariate analysis techniques in social science research. London:
Sage.
Takahashi, M. & Fujihara, T. (1995). Self-control and choice in humans: Effects of type,
amount, and delay of reinforcers. Learning and Motivation, 26, 183-202.
Taylor, S., Koch, W. J., Woody, S., & McLean, P. (1996). Anxiety sensitivity and
depression: How are they related? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 474-
479.
Teasdale, J. D. (1991). Cognitive vulnerability to persistent depression. In P. Slade
(Ed.), The psychology of depression: Current issues in research and practice.
Sheffield: Sheffield University.
Telch, C. F., Agras, W. S., & Linehan, M. M. (2000). Group dialectical behavior therapy
for binge-eating disorder: A preliminary, uncontrolled trial. Behavior Therapy,
31, 569-582.
Terry-Short, L. A., Owens, G. R., Slade, P. D., & Dewey, M. E. (1995). Positive and
negative perfectionism. Personality and Individual Differences, 18, 663-668.
Thayer, R. E., Newman, J. R., & McClain, T. M. (1994). Self-regulation of mood:
Strategies for changing a bad mood, raising energy, and reducing tension.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 910-925.
The WHOQOL Group (1998). The World Health Organization quality of life assessment
(WHOQOL): Development and general psychometric properties. Social Science
and Medicine, 12, 1569-1585.
Thorpe, G. L. & Frey, R. B. (1996). A short form of the common beliefs survey III.
Journal ofRational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 14, 193-198.
Thurman, C. W. (1985). Effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral treatments in reducing
Type A behavior among university faculty. Journal of Counseling Psychology,
32, 74-83.
Tice, D. M. (1991). Esteem protection or enhancement? Self-handicapping motives and
attributions differ by trait self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 60,711-725.
Tice, D. M. & Baumeister, B. F. (1997). Longitudinal study of procrastination,
performance, stress, and health: The costs and benefits of dawdling.
Psychological Science, 8, 454-458.
Tice, D. M., Bratslavsky, E. & Baumeister, R. F. (2001). Emotional distress regulation
takes precedence over impulse control: If you feel bad, do it! Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 53-67.
Tosi, D. J., Forman. M. A., Rudy. D. R. & Murphy, M. A. (1986). Factor analysis of the
Common Beliefs Survey III: A replication study. Journal of Counseling and
Clinical Psychology, 54, 404-405.
450
Trull, T. J. (1992). DSM-III-R personality disorders and the five-factor model of
personality: An empirical comparison. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101,
553-560.
Trexler, L. D. (1976). Frustration is a fact, not a feeling. Rational Living, 11, 19-22.
Tucker, L. R. & Lewis, C. (1973). A reliability coefficient for maximum likelihood
factor analysis. Psychometrika, 38, 1-10.
Turvey, T., Humphreys, L., Smith, F., & Smeddle, M. (1998). Adult mental health
outcome survey 1998. Unpublished departmental report. Clinical Psychology
Department, Fife Healthcare NHS Trust.
Twenge, J. M. & Campbell, W. K. (2003). "Isn't it fun to get the respect that we're
going to deserve?" Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 261-272.
Tyler, T. R. (1994). Psychological models of the justice motive. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 67, 850-863.
Tyler, T. R. & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In M.
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25). New York:
Academic Press
Vertes, R. (1971). The Should: A critical analysis. Rational Living, 6, 22-25.
Walen, S. R., DiGiuseppe, R., & Wessler, R. L. (1980). Practitioner's guide to rational-
emotive therapy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walen, S. R., DiGiuseppe, R., & Dryden, W. (1992). Practitioner's guide to rational-
emotive therapy (revised edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walker, M. B. (1992). Irrational thinking among slot machine players. Journal of
Gambling Studies, 8, 245-261.
Wagner, A. R. (1966). Frustration and punishment. In R. N. Haber (Ed.), Current
research on motivation. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Warren, R. & Zgourides, G. (1989). Further validity and normative data for the Malouff
and Schutte Belief Scale. Journal of Rational Emotive & Cognitive Therapy, 7,
167-172.
451
Warren, R. & Zgourides, G., & Jones, A. (1989). Cognitive bias and irrational belief as
predictors of avoidance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 181-188.
Warren, R. & Zgourides, G. (1991). Anxiety disorders: A rational-emotive perspective.
New York: Pergamon.
Wason, P. C. (1961). Response to affirmative and negative binary statements. British
Journal ofPsychology, 52, 133-142.
Watkins, J. T. (1977). The rational-emotive dynamics of impulsive disorders. In A. Ellis
& R. Grieger (Eds.), Handbook of rational-emotive therapy (Vol. 1). New York:
Springer.
Watson, D. & Clark, L. A. (1984). Negative affectivity: The disposition to experience
aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 465-490.
Wegener, D. T. & Petty, R. E. (1996). Effects of mood on persuasion processes:
Enhancing, reducing, and biasing scrutiny of attitude-relevant information. In L.
L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), Striving and feeling: Interactions among goals,
affect, and self-regulation. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Weisberg, L. J., Norman, D. K., & Herzog, D. B. (1987). Personality functioning in
normal weight bulimia. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 7, 615-631.
Weishaar, M. E. (1993). Aaron Beck. London: Sage.
Weissman, A. & Beck, A. T. (1978). Development and validation of the Dysfunctional
Attitude Scale. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Association for
Advancement ofBehavior Therapy, Chicago.
Wells, A. (1994). Attention and the control of worry. In G. C. L. Davey and F. Tallis
(Eds.), Worry: Perspective on theory, assessment and treatment. Chichester:
Wiley and Sons.
Wessler, R. L. (1996). Idiosyncratic definitions and unsupported hypotheses: Rational
emotive behavior therapy as pseudoscience. Journal of Rational Emotive &
Cognitive Therapy, 14, 41-61.
Wessler, R. A. & Wessler, R. L. (1980). The principles and practice of rational-emotive
therapy. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
452
West, R. J., Hajek, P., & Belcher, M. (1989). Severity of withdrawal symptoms as a
predictor of outcome of an attempt to quit smoking. Psychological Medicine, 19,
981-985.
Wikman, A. & Warneryd, B. (1990). Measurement errors in survey questions:
Explaining response variability. Social Indicators Research, 22, 199-212.
Wilson, G. T. (1991). The addiction model of the eating disorders: A critical analysis.
Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 12, 27-72.
Wong, P. T. P. & Amsel, A. (1976). Prior fixed ratio training and durable persistence in
rats. Animal Learning and Behavior, 4, 461-466.
Yapp, R. & Dryden, W. (1995). The role of concurrent beliefs in emotional disturbance.
The Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapist, 3: 20-33. In W. Dryden (Ed.),
(1996). Inquiries in rational emotive therapy. London: Sage.
Yankura, J. & Dryden, W. (1994). Key figures in psychotherapy: Albert Ellis. London:
Sage.
Young, J. E. (1990). Cognitive therapy for the personality disorders: A schema focused
approach. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press.
Young, J. E. & Flanagan, C. (1997). Schema-focused therapy for narcissistic patients. In
E. F. Ronningstam (Ed.), Disorders of narcissism: Theoretical, empirical, and
clinical implications. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press.
Zigmond, A. S. & Snaith, R. P. (1985). The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale.
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67, 361-370.
Zuckerman, M. (1991). The psychobiology of personality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Zurawski, R. M. & Smith, T. W. (1987). Assessing irrational beliefs and emotional
distress: Evidence and implications of limited discriminative validity. Journal of
Counseling Psychology, 34, 224-227.
Zwemer, W. A. & Deffenbacher, J. (1984). Irrational beliefs, anger, and anxiety. Journal
of Counseling Psychology, 31, 391-393.
Zwick, W. R. & Velicer, W F. (1982). Factors influencing four rules for determining the





FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE (REVISED SCALE)
FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE (R)
NAME DATE
Listed below are a number of common thoughts and beliefs that people may have when
they are distressed or frustrated. Please read each statement and decide how well this
usually describes your own beliefs. Circle the number that best indicates the strength of
this belief.
RATING SCALE: absent =1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
1 I can't tolerate painful memories
12 3 4 5
2 I can't stand the stress of too many demands on my time
1 2 3 4 5
3 I can't stand having to wait for things I would like now
1 2 3 4 5
4 I can't stand having to wait when I want to get on with tasks
1 2 3 4 5
5 I absolutely must be free of disturbing feelings as quickly as possible; I can't bear if they continue
1 2 3 4 5
6 I can't stand doing tasks that I'm not interested in
1 2 3 4 5
7 I can't stand it if people act against my wishes
1 2 3 4 5
8 I can't stand life being so unfair when I have not deserved it
1 2 3 4 5
9 I can't stand the frustration of being disorganised
1 2 3 4 5
RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
10 I can't bear to feel that I am losing my mind
12 3 4 5
11 I can't tolerate being overlooked
12 3 4 5
12 I can't stand being prevented from achieving my full potential
12 3 4 5
13 I can't bear to have certain thoughts
1 2 3 4 5
14 I need the easiest way around a problem; I can't stand making a hard time of it
1 2 3 4 5
15 I can't bear it if other people stand in the way of what I want
1 2 3 4 5
16 I can't bear to have been treated unjustly
1 2 3 4 5
17 I can't bear the frustration of not achieving my goals
1 2 3 4 5
18 I can't stand situations where I might feel upset
1 2 3 4 5
19 I can't stand doing tasks that seem too difficult
1 2 3 4 5
20 I can't tolerate lowering my standards even when it would be useful to do so
1 2 3 4 5
21 I can't bear to experience extra problems
1 2 3 4 5
RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong - 5
22 1 can't stand doing tasks when I'm not in the mood
12 3 4
23 I can't stand being left in the dark with no explanations
12 3 4
24 I can't bear to move on from work I'm not fully satisfied with
12 3 4
25 I can't bear disturbing feelings
12 3 4
26 I can't stand having to push myself at tasks
12 3 4
27 I can't tolerate being taken for granted
12 3 4
28 I can't stand doing a job if I'm unable to do it well
12 3 4
29 I can't stand the hassle of having to do things right now
12 3 4
30 I can't tolerate being treated with a lack of consideration
12 3 4
31 I can't bear to make decisions about which I'm uncertain.
12 3 4
32 I can't stand the slightest hassle in my daily life
12 3 4














RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
34 I can't get on with my life, or be happy, if things don't change
1 2 3 4 5
35 I can't bear to feel that I'm not on top ofmy work
1 2 3 4 5
36 I can't stand giving up immediate pleasures for the sake of a distant goal
12 3 4 5
37 I can't tolerate being treated with disrespect
12 3 4 5
38 1 can't tolerate any lapse in my self-discipline
1 2 3 4 5
391 can't bear sad or morbid thoughts
1 2 3 4 5
40 I can't stand doing things that involve a lot of hassle
1 2 3 4 5
41 I can't stand having to change when others are at fault
1 2 3 4 5
42 I can't bear to 'waste' time
1 2 3 4 5
43 I can't stand to lose control ofmy feelings
1 2 3 4 5
44 I can't stand having to persist at unpleasant tasks
1 2 3 4 5
45 I can't tolerate criticism especially when I know I'm right
1 2 3 4 5
RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
46 I can't bear being deprived now of things I lacked in the past
1 2 3 4 5
47 I can't bear having my familiar routines disrupted
12 3 4 5
48 I can't tolerate other people's bad or stupid behaviour
12 3 4 5
49 I can't stand life being so difficult for me
1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX 2
FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE (PRELIMINARY SCALE)
FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
NAME DATE
This questionnaire lists a number of attitudes about situations that people often hold. You are asked
two questions about each situation.
Firstly, how strongly you believe that you couldn't stand or bear the situation.
Secondly, how strongly you would put yourself down or think badly about yourself as a person in this
situation. In other words, how much it would lower your self-esteem.
If a particular attitude does not apply to you, or you have no such thoughts about it, please circle 0 for
'absent'.
Please circle the number that indicates how strong your beliefs are on these two questions. Please
answer every question.
Example (A)
In this example, the person has a very strong belief that he could not tolerate the frustration of being
late. However, although frustrated, he would not put himselfdown for being late.
Example (B)
very
I absolutely must not be late.
Because I can't stand the frustration of being late.








I absolutely must not feel nervous.
I can't stand feeling nervous.




In this example, the person believes she could put up with feeling nervous. However, she would still
think badly about herself for feeling like that.
1. I absolutely must not risk upsetting other people.
Because I can't bear to upset others.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
2. I absolutely must not risk being rejected.
Because I can't bear to take such nsks.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
3. I absolutely must not have boring tasks to do.
Because I can't stand being bored.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
4. I absolutely must not lose strict control ofmy diet.
Because I can't stand the slightest lapse.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
5. I absolutely must not experience painful memories.
Because I can't tolerate such pain.
They totally lower my self-esteem.
6. I absolutely must not be at the mercy of events.
Because I can't stand being powerless to act.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
7. I absolutely must not make sacrifices for the sake of the future.
Because I can't stand losing out today.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
8.1 absolutely must not go too far from where I feel safe.
Because I can't stand feeling insecure.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
9. I absolutely must be certain about decisions.
Because I can't stand having doubts.
It totally lowers my self-esteem to have doubts.
10. I absolutely shouldn't have been treated so unfairly in the past.
Because I can't bear such injustice.
It continues to totally lower my self-esteem.
11.1 absolutely must not waste time.
Because I can't bear to waste time.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
12. I absolutely must not leave work unfinished.
Because I can't bear to leave work unfinished.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
13. I absolutely must not be involved in arguments and conflicts.
Because I can't stand such disagreements.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
14. My situation absolutely must not remain as it is.
Because I can't stand for it to continue.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
15.1 absolutely must not suffer loss.
Because It would be unbearable.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
16. I absolutely must not be overlooked.
Because I couldn't stand such unfairness.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
17. Other people absolutely must not restrict me.
Because I can't stand it if I am restricted.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
18. I absolutely shouldn't have to do things right now.
Because I can't stand the hassle.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
19.1 absolutely must not be deprived of the support I need.
Because I can't go on without support.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
20.1 absolutely don't deserve what has happened to me.
Because I can't stand life being so unfair.
It continues to totally lower my self-esteem.
21.1 absolutely must have the buzz I need.
Because I can't stand being deprived of this.
Not having this would totally lower my self-esteem.
22. I absolutely must be free of hassles.
Because I can't stand even the slightest hassle.
They totally lower my self-esteem.
23. 1 absolutely must not be opposed when I know I'm right.
Because I can't stand that happening.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
24. I absolutely must not be kept waiting.
Because I can't tolerate waiting.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
25. I absolutely must not experience mental difficulties.
Because I can't stand to feel I'm losing my mind
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
26. I absolutely must have an explanation.
Because I can't stand being in the dark.
It totally lowers my self-esteem not having one.
27. I absolutely must not experience extra problems.
Because I couldn't stand any more problems.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
28. I absolutely shouldn't have to work so hard at relationships.
Because I can't stand it being so difficult.
It totally lowers my self-esteem.
29.1 absolutely must not experience any signs of slipping back.
Because I couldn't bear to have such feelings.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
30. I absolutely must not be taken for granted.
Because I can't stand being unappreciated.
It totally lowers my self-esteem.
31. My parents absolutely shouldn't have neglected my emotional needs.
Because It is an unbearable gap.
It continues to totally lower my self-esteem.
32. I absolutely must not do things that could be upsetting.
Because I can't stand being upset.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
33. I absolutely must not be alone.
Because I can't stand being by myself.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
34. Those close to me absolutely must not be so difficult.
Because 1 can't stand it when they are difficult.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
35. Those close to me absolutely must not act against my wishes.
Because I can't stand it if they do.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
36. I absolutely must remain comfortable for as long as possible.
Because I can't stand having to shift.
Loss of comfort would totally lower my self-esteem.
37. I absolutely must not do things slowly.
Because I can't stand taking my time.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
38. I absolutely must not relax my self-discipline.
Because I can't bear the slightest lapse.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
39. I absolutely must not experience disturbing feelings.
Because I can't bear such feelings.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
40. Other people absolutely must understand me.
Because I can't bear it otherwise.
It totally lowers my self-esteem not having this.
41.1 absolutely must not lose control over how I feel.
Because I couldn't bear that to happen.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
42.1 absolutely must be confident of success before I start.
Because I can't stand uncertainty.
Otherwise, it would totally lower my self-esteem.
43. I absolutely must not be disturbed by noise.
Because I can't stand such disturbance.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
44. I absolutely must not be the centre of attention.
Because I can't bear to feel self-conscious.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
45. I absolutely must not suppress my feelings .
Because I can't stand bottling my feelings up.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
46. I absolutely must have an easier way around problems.
Because I can't stand facing problems.
It totally lowers my self-esteem to do so.
47. I absolutely must not be disorganised.
Because I can't bear disorganisation.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
48. I absolutely need excitement in my life.
Because I couldn't stand a lack of excitement.
Otherwise, it would totally lower my self-esteem.
49.1 absolutely must not have too many demands on my time.
Because I can't stand the stress involved.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
50. I absolutely must not have interference from other people.
Because I can't bear such hassles.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
51.1 absolutely must not change myself.
Because I can't stand the discomfort of change.


















52.1 absolutely must not be deprived now of the affection I needed in the past.
Because I can't bear to be deprived further. 0
It would totally lower my self-esteem. 0
53. I absolutely must not be let down by other people.
Because I can't stand being let down. 0
It would totally lower my self-esteem. 0
54.1 absolutely shouldn't have to make so much effort.
Because I can't stand having to push myself. 0
It totally lowers my self-esteem. 0
55.1 absolutely must not be blocked in getting things done.
Because I can't stand being obstructed. 0





































56. I absolutely must not have the personal flaws that I do.
Because 1 can't tolerate such shortcomings.
They totally lower my self-esteem.
57. 1 absolutely must not have certain thoughts.
Because I can't bear such thoughts.
They totally lower my self-esteem.
58. I absolutely shouldn't have to persist at unpleasant tasks.
Because I can't stand having to do so.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
59. I absolutely must not feel below par (e.g. due to lack of sleep or illness).
Because I can't stand feeling below par.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
60. Those I care for absolutely shouldn't have been treated so badly.
Because I can't bear that it happened.
It continues to totally lower my self-esteem.
61.1 absolutely shouldn't have to delay getting what I want.
Because I can't stand such delays.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
62. I absolutely must not give into other people's demands.
Because I can't stand having to do so.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
63. I absolutely must not have my familiar routines disrupted.
Because I can't bear the disturbance.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
64. I absolutely must be free of distressing feelings as quickly as I can.
Because I can't bear for them to continue.
It would totally lower my self-esteem if they continued.
65. If a job is worth doing, I absolutely must not fall short.
Because I cannot accept lower standards.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
66. Tasks that I attempt absolutely must not be too difficult.
Because Otherwise, I can't stand doing them.
They would totally lower my self-esteem.
67. Close relationships absolutely must not end.
Because 1 couldn't bear to start again.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
68. I absolutely must be in the mood before I tackle something.
Because Otherwise, I couldn't stand doing it.
Otherwise, it would totally lower my self-esteem.
69. I absolutely must not feel trapped.
Because I can't bear to feel trapped.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
70. I absolutely shouldn't have to change when others are at fault.
Because I can't tolerate doing so.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
71.1 absolutely must not have morbid thoughts.
Because I can't bear such thoughts.
They totally lower my self-esteem.
72. I absolutely need to indulge myself.
Because I can't stand being deprived of enjoyments.
Without this my self-esteem would be totally lowered.
73.1 absolutely must not be treated with disrespect.
Because I can't tolerate disrespect.
It would totally lower my self-esteem.
74. I absolutely must be interested in a task that I attempt.
Because Otherwise, I can't stand doing it.





NAME : DATE :
This questionnaire lists a number attitudes that people may hold.
Please read each statement and circle the number that indicates how strongly you
agree or disagree. Base your answer on your gut feeling rather than what you
think may be true.
Each statement has two questions :
Firstly, it asks how much you can tolerate or bear the situation described.
Secondly, it asks how much the situation would lower your self esteem.
For example: (A)
In this example the person has strongly agreed that he would be unable to stand the
frustration of being late, but that this would not make them feel bad about
themselves.
I absolutely must not be late.
I couldn't stand it I was.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
strongly strongly
disagree agree
Because: 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
(B)
Because:
I absolutely must not look nervous.
I couldn't stand it.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
In this example the person agrees that she could put up with looking nervous but
would put herself down for doing so.
My parents absolutely shouldn't have been so unaffectionate.
Because: I can't bear that they were.





2. I absolutely must not risk rejection.
Because: I couldn't stand it if I was.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
3. I absolutely must not be bored.
Because: I can't stand it.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
4. I absolutely must not fall short of other's expectations.
Because: I couldn't bear to do that.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
5. I absolutely must not experience painful feelings.
Because: I can't tolerate them.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
6. I absolutely must not be prevented from achieving my best.
Because: I can't stand to be frustrated in this.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
7. I absolutely shouldn't have to make sacrifices for the future.
Because: I can't stand losing out today.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
8. I absolutely must have a 'quick flx'when I feel unpleasant.
Because: I can't stand continuing to feel bad.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
9.1 absolutely must not be uncertain about decisions.
Because: I can't stand having doubts.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
10.1 absolutely shouldn't have been treated so unfairly in the past.
Because: I can't bear that I was.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
11.1 absolutely shouldn't have wasted so much time in the past.
Because: I can't bear to think I did.
































12. 1 absolutely must not waste opportunities. <
Because: I can't bear to do so.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
13. I absolutely must not be involved in arguments and conflicts.
Because: 1 can't stand such disagreement.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
14. I absolutely must not be at the mercy of events.
Because: I can't stand being powerless to act.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
15. I absolutely must not suffer loss.
Because: It would be unbearable.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
16.1 absolutely must not accept the past.
Because: I couldn't bear to do that.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
17.1 absolutely shouldn't have been so unappreciated.
Because: I can't stand to been treated so unfairly.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
18.1 absolutely shouldn't have to discipline myself.
Because: I can't stand giving myself a hard time.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
19. I absolutely shouldn't have been deprived of support.
Because: I can't bear that I was.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
20. Life shouldn't have been so difficult.
Because: I can't stand it being so unfair.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
21.1 absolutely must not have worries.
Because: I can't stand being disturbed by such thoughts.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
22.1 absolutely must not be uncertain about physical symptoms.
Because: I can't stand being unsure.












































34. People close to me absolutely shouldn't have been so difficult. disagree agree
Because: I couldn't stand it. 1 2 3 4 5
It totally lowered my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
35. My parents absolutely shouldn't have been so disapproving.
Because: I can't bear that they were. 1 2 3 4 5
It totally lowered my self esteem. 12 3 4 5
36. I absolutely must not risk making important mistakes.
Because: I couldn't tolerate that. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
37. I absolutely shouldn't have to do things slowly.
Because: I can't tolerate the frustration. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
38. I absolutely must not lose control ofmy weight.
Because: I couldn't bear doing that. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
39. I absolutely must not experience disturbing symptoms or emotions.
Because: I can't bear such feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
40. I absolutely must not be misunderstood.
Because: I can't bear when that occurs. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
41.1 absolutely shouldn't have the personal flaws that I do.
Because: I can't stand them. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
42. My parents absolutely shouldn't have been so belittling.
Because: I can't stand it. 1 2 3 4 5
It totally lowered my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
43.1 absolutely must not be disturbed by noise.
Because: I can't stand it. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
44. Those close to me absolutely must not be inattentive.
Because: I can't bear to be ignored. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
23.1 absolutely must not be opposed when 1 know I'm right.
Because: I can't stand that happening.





24. I absolutely must not be taken advantage of.
Because: I can't tolerate it.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
25. Absolutely must not come into contact with things that are unclean.
Because: I can't stand it.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
26. The past absolutely must not be left unexplained.
Because: I can't stand being in the dark.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
27. I absolutely shouldn't have to face problems.
Because: I can't stand having to do so.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
28. I absolutely must not feel uncared for.
Because: I couldn't bear to feel that way.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
29.1 absolutely must not slip back to how I felt in the past.
Because: I couldn't bear that to happen.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
30.1 absolutely shouldn't have been taken for granted.
Because: I can't stand that I was
It totally lowered my self esteem.
31. My parents absolutely shouldn't have neglected my emotional needs.
Because: It is an unbearable gap.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
32.1 absolutely must not have to do things I dislike.
Because: I can't bear the hassle.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
33.1 absolutely must not risk upsetting others.
Because: I couldn't stand it.












































45. My parents expect that I absolutely must not fail.
Because: I can't stand failing to meet such demands.





46. I absolutely must not have a hard time getting what I want.
Because: I can't stand such difficulties.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
47. I absolutely shouldn't have been so disorganized.
Because: I can't bear that I was.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
48.1 absolutely must not have too much routine.
Because: I can't stand it.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
49. There absolutely must not be too many demands on my time.
Because: I can't stand the frustrations involved.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
50. My parents absolutely shouldn't have been so restrictive.
Because: I can't bear that they were.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
51.1 must not change how I am.
Because: I couldn't bear to be'phoney'.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
52 I absolutely must not continue to be deprived of the affection I needed.
Because: I couldn't bear it.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
53.1 absolutely shouldn't have been let down by others.
Because: I can't stand it.
It totally lowered my self esteem.
54.1 absolutely shouldn't have to push myself.
Because: I can't stand too much effort.
It would totally lower my self esteem.
55.1 absolutely must not be blocked in getting things done.
Because: I can't stand such hassles.




























56. Other people absolutely must not cause me extra problems. disagree
Because: I can't bear it they do. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem 1 2
57. People close to me must not act against my wishes.
Because: I can't stand that they do. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
58. I absolutely shouldn't have to persist at tasks.
Because: I can't stand having to do so. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
59. I absolutely must not feel below par (e.g. due to lack of sleep or illness).
Because: I can't stand feeling like that. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
60. Those 1 care for absolutely shouldn't have been treated so badly.
Because: I can't bear that it happened. 1 2
It totally lowered my self esteem. 1 2
61.1 absolutely must not delay getting what I want.
Because: I can't stand waiting. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
62.1 absolutely shouldn't have to conform to the demands of others.
Because: I can't stand having to do so. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
63. I absolutely must not experience too much change.
Because: I can't tolerate it 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
64.1 absolutely shouldn't have failed to reach my potential.
Because: I can't stand having been frustrated in this. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
65. If a jobs worth doing I absolutely must not fall short.
Because: I can't stand second best. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
66. I absolutely shouldn't have to tackle tasks that are too difficult.
Because: I can't stand the hassle. 1 2
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2
strongly strongly
67. People close to me absolutely shouldn't have left me. disagree agree
Because: I can't bear that they did. 1 2 3 4 5
It totally lowered my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
68. I can't bear I absolutely must not lack confidence before doing something.
Because: I couldn't stand doing it. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
69. I absolutely must not feel trapped.
Because: I can't bear it. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
70. I absolutely must not be unfairly criticised.
Because: I can't stand it. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem 1 2 3 4 5
71. I absolutely must not have morbid thoughts.
Because: I can't bear such thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
72. I absolutely shouldn't have to go to bed or get up when I don't want to.
Because: I can't stand having to shift. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
73.1 absolutely must not be treated with disrespect.
Because: I can't tolerate such behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
74.1 absolutely shouldn't have to do things right away.
Because: I can't stand being hassled. 1 2 3 4 5
It would totally lower my self esteem. 1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX 4
FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE (REVISED SHORT SCALE)
SUPPLEMENTARY ITEMS FOR FIVE FACTOR SCALE
FRUSTRATION-DISCOMFORT SCALE
NAME DATE
Listed below are a number of common thoughts and beliefs that people may have when they are
distressed or frustrated. Please read each statement and decide how well this usually describes your
own beliefs. Circle the number that best indicates the strength of this belief.
RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
1 I need the easiest way around a problem; I can't stand making a hard time of it
1 2 3 4 5
2 I can't stand having to wait for things I would like now
1 2 3 4 5
3 I absolutely must be free of disturbing feelings as quickly as possible; I can't bear if they continue
12 3 4 5
4 I can't stand being prevented from achieving my full potential
12 3 4
5 I can't stand doing tasks that seem too difficult
12 3 4
6 I can't stand it if people act against my wishes
12 3 4
7 I can't bear to feel that I am losing my mind
12 3 4
8 I can't bear the frustration of not achieving my goals
12 3 4






RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
10 I can't bear it if other people stand in the way of what I want
12 3 4 5
11 1 can't bear to have certain thoughts
1 2 3 4 5
12 I can't tolerate lowering my standards even when it would be useful to do so
1 2 3 4 5
13 I can't stand having to push myself at tasks
1 2 3 4 5
14 I can't tolerate being taken for granted
1 2 3 4 5
15 I can't stand situations where I might feel upset
1 2 3 4 5
16 I can't bear to move on from work I'm not fully satisfied with
1 2 3 4 5
17 I can't stand the hassle of having to do things right now
1 2 3 4 5
18 I can't stand having to give into other people's demands
1 2 3 4 5
19 I can't bear disturbing feelings
1 2 3 4 5
20 I can't stand doing a job if I'm unable to do it well
1 2 3 4 5
21 I can't stand doing things that involve a lot of hassle
1 2 3 4 5
RATING SCALE: absent = 1 mild = 2 moderate = 3 strong = 4 very strong = 5
22 I can't stand having to change when others are at fault
12 3 4 5
23 I can't get on with my life, or be happy, if things don't change
1 2 3 4 5
24 I can't bear to feel that I'm not on top ofmy work
1 2 3 4 5
25 I can't stand having to persist at unpleasant tasks
1 2 3 4 5
26 I can't tolerate criticism especially when I know I'm right
1 2 3 4 5
27 I can't stand to lose control ofmy feelings
1 2 3 4 5
28 I can't tolerate any lapse in my self-discipline
1 2 3 4 5
SUPPLEMENTARY ITEMS FOR FIVE FACTOR EXTENDED VERSION
29 I can't tolerate being overlooked
12 3 4 5
30 I can't bear to have been treated unjustly
1 2 3 4 5
31 I can't stand being left in the dark with no explanations
1 2 3 4 5
32 I can't stand giving up immediate pleasures for the sake of a distant goal
1 2 3 4 5
33 I can't tolerate being treated with disrespect
1 2 3 4 5
34 I can't bear being deprived now of things I lacked in the past
1 2 3 4 5
35 I can't tolerate other people's bad or stupid behaviour
1 2 3 4 5
APPENDIX 5
PATIENT INFORMATION/ CONSENT FORM
Fife Primary Care
— NHS trust






Tel: (01334) 652611 Ext. 336
Fax: (01334) 655380
The enclosed questionnaires are part of a project involving the University of Edinburgh and Stratheden hospital
clinical psychology department. The aim of the study is to examine the nature and effect of different attitudes
on emotional problems. It is hoped that the results will help to improve the understanding and assessment of
psychological problems.
You may also be asked to complete further questionnaires at the beginning, and following therapy, to assess
your progress in treatment. No other requirements will be made of you. Any information collected will of
course be kept confidential and secure. Results will be reported in such a way that individual patients can not be
identified (e.g. scores from questionnaires will be reported as averages). If you do not wish to be involved in the
study this will not affect your treatment. You may stop participation at any time.
If you agree to participate please complete the consent form. Once you have completed the questionnaires
please return these as soon as possible in the stamped addressed envelope. If you do have any questions
regarding the project please contact me at the above address.
The results obtained will depend on the accuracy of your replies. It is important that you answer every
question and do not leave any blanks.





I have read the above information about this research project.
I understand that the information I provide will be kept securely and treated in confidence.
I understand that participation is entirely voluntary. If I do not wish to complete the questionnaires I can
withdraw from the study without prejudice to future treatment










1. I feel that I am a person ofworth, at least
on an equal plane with others.
2. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a
failure.
3. I feel that I have a number of good
qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other
people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude towards myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for
myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.





Described below are methods that people commonly use to cope with distress, discomfort,
or frustration. For each statement please indicate how well it would describe your way of
coping.
Not at Somewhat Moderately Very
all much so
1. I avoid difficult situations. 0 2 3
2. I withdraw from unpleasant situations. 0 2 3
3. 1 mentally shut off. 0 2 3
4. I restrict my eating by diet or exercise. 0 2 3
5. I seek reassurance. 0 2 3
6. I keep myself constantly'busy'. 0 2 3
7. I injure myself or overdose. 0 2 3
8. I am distracted from tasks by activities that are more pleasant. 0 2 3
9. I enlist the help of others. 0 2 3
10.1 put things off. 0 2 3
11.1 use alcohol for relief. 0 2 3
12.1 restrict myself to familiar routines (although I feel I'm in a rut). 0 2 3
13.1 use recreational drugs for relief. 0 2 3
14.1 become over involved in work or interests. 0 2 3
15.1 comfort eat. 0 2 3
16.1 restrict my eating by vomiting or laxatives. 0 2 3
17.1 overspend on unnecessary things. 0 2 3
18.1 go over and over worries in my mind. 0 2 3
19. I rely on medication to obtain symptom relief. 0 2 3
APPENDIX 8
SCHEMA QUESTIONNAIRE (IMPAIRED LIMITS SUB-SCALES)
ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE (SCHEMA)
INSTRUCTIONS: Listed below are statements that a person might use to
describe himself or herself. Please read each statement and decide how well it
describes you. When you are not sure, base your answer on what you emotionally
feel, NOT what you think true. Then choose the highest rating from 1 to 6 that
describes you, and circle the number next to the statement.
RATING SCALE:
Completely Untrue of Me = 1 Moderately True of Me = 4
Mostly Untrue of Me = 2 Mostly True of Me = 5
Slightly More True then Untrue = 3 Describes Me Perfectly = 6
1. I have a lot of trouble accepting "no" for an answer when I want something from
other people.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2. I often get angry or irritable if I can't get what I want.
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. I hate to be constrained or kept from doing what I want.
1 2 3 4 5 6
4. I get very irritated when people won't do what I ask of them.
1 2 3 4 5 6
5. I can't tolerate other people telling me what to do.
1 2 3 4 5 6
6. I have great difficult getting myself to stop drinking, smoking, overeating, or other
problem behaviors.
1 2 3 4 5 6
7. I can't seem to discipline myself to complete routine or boring tasks.
1 2 3 4 5 6
8. If I can't reach a goal, I become easily frustrated and give up.
1 2 3 4 5 6
9. I have a very difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve a long -
range goal.
1 2 3 4 5 6
10. It often happens that, once I start to feel angry, I just can't control it.
1 2 3 4 5 6
11. I tend to overdo things, even though I know they are bad for me.
1 2 3 4 5 6
12. I get bored very easily.
1 2 3 4 5 6
13. When tasks become difficult, I usually cannot persevere and complete them.
1 2 3 4 5 6
14.1 can't concentrate on anything for to long.
1 2 3 4 5 6
15.1 can't force myself to do thing I don't enjoy, even when I know it's for my own
good.
1 2 3 4 5 6
16.1 lose my temper at the slightest offense.
1 2 3 4 5 6
17.1 have rarely been able to stick to my resolutions.
1 2 3 4 5 6
18. I can almost never hold back from showing people how I really feel, no matter what
the cost may be.
1 2 3 4 5 6
19. I often do things impulsively that I later regret.
1 2 3 4 5 6
APPENDIX 9
DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE (DAS)
DAS QUESTIONNAIRE
(S-C SCALE)
This scale lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. Please read each statement
carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with what it says.
For each of the attitudes, please indicate your answer by placing a tick (V) under the column that best
describes how you think. Be sure to choose only one answer for each attitude. But please note that because
people are different, there is no right or wrong answer to these statements.
To decide whether a given answer is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you















1. I should be happy all the time.
2. I should always have
complete control over my
feelings.
3. I ought to be able to solve my
problems quickly and without a
great deal of effort.
4. A person should be able to
control what happens to him.
5. It is possible for a person to
be scolded and not get upset.
6. A person should do well at
everything he undertakes.
7. If I try hard enough, I should
be able to excel at anything I
attempt.
8. Whenever I take a chance or






A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Read
each statement and then circle the number which indicates how you generally feel.
Remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any
one statement but give the answer which seems to best describe how you generally feel.
1. I am quick tempered.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4
2. I have a fiery temper.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4
3. I am a hotheaded person.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4
4. I get angry when I'm slowed down by others' mistakes.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4









6. I fly off the handle.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4
7. When I get mad, I say nasty things.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4
8. It makes me furious when I am criticized in front of others.
almost never sometimes often almost always
1 2 3 4
9. When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone.
almost never sometimes often almost always
12 3 4
10.1 feel infuriated when I do a good job and get a poor evaluation.




HOSPITAL ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION SCALE (HAD)
HAD SCALE
This questionnaire is designed to help us to know how you feel. Read each item and place a firm tick in
the box opposite the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past week.
Don't take too long over your replies: your immediate reaction to each item will probably be more
accurate than a long thought-out response.
Tick Only One Box in Each Section
I Feel Tense or 'Wound Up' I Feel as if I am Slowed Down
Most of the time
A lot of the time
Time to time, occasionally
Not at all




I Still Enjoy the Things I Used
to Enjoy
Definitely as much
Not quite so much
Only a little
Hardly at all
I Get a Sort of Frightened
Feeling as if Something Awful is
About to Happen
Very definitely and quite badly
Yes, but not too badly
A little, but it doesn't worry me
Not at all
I Can Laugh and See the Funny
Side of Things
As much as I always could
Not quite so much now




A great deal of the time
A lot of the time






Most of the time






I Get a Sort of Frightened Feeling





I Have Lost Interest in my
Appearance
Definitely
1 don't take so much care as I should
1 may not take quite as much care
I take just as much care as ever






I Look Forward With Enjoyment To
Things
As much as ever I did
Rather less than I used to
Definitely less than I used to
Hardly at all














HOW INTENSELY HAVE YOl) EXPERIENCED THE FOLLOWING FEELINGS IN THE
PAST MONTH?
NOT AT SLIGHTLY MODERATELY VERY
ALL MUCH SO
ANXIETY 0 12 3
WORTHLESSNESS 0 12 3
DEPRESSED MOOD 0 12 3
JEALOUSY 0123
GUILT 0 12 3
ANGER 0123
HURT 0123
TENSION 0 12 3
EMBARRASSMENT 0 12 3
Please underline the main feeling that most clearly describes your current problem.
HOW LONG HAS THIS PROBLEM AFFECTED YOU?
LESS THAN 6 MONTHS □
6-12 MONTHS □
1-3 YEARS □
MORE THAN 3 YEARS □
AT PRESENT HOW MUCH DOES THIS PROBLEM AFFECT YOUR EVERYDAY LIFE?








HOW LONG HAVE YOU TAKEN MEDICATION FOR YOUR PROBLEM?
NONE □
LESS THAN A YEAR □
1-3 YEARS □
MORE THEN 3 YEARS □
APPENDIX 13
PROCRASTINATION ASSESSMENT SCALE-STUDENTS (PASS)
PASS SCALE
For each of the following activities, please rate the degree to which you delay or procrastinate. Rate each
item on an A to E scale according to how often you wait until the last minute to do the activity. Then,
indicate on an A to E scale the degree to which you feel procrastination on that task is a problem.
A. WRITING A TERM PAPER.
1 To what degree do you procrastinate on this task?
Never Almost Never Sometimes Nearly Always Always
Procrastinate Procrastinate
a b c d e
2 To what degree is procrastination on this task a problem for you?
Not at all
a problem
Almost Never Sometimes Nearly Always Always
a problem
B. STUDYING FOR EXAMS.
3 To what degree do you procrastinate on this task?
Never
Procrastinate
Almost Never Sometimes Nearly Always
a b c d
To what degree is procrastination on this task a problem for you?






C. KEEPING UP WITH WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS.
5 To what degree do you procrastinate on this task?
Never
Procrastinate
Almost Never Sometimes Nearly Always
a b c d
To what degree is procrastination on this task a problem for you?
Always
Procrastinate
Not at all Almost Never Sometimes Nearly Always Always
a problem a problem
REASONS FOR PROCRASTINATION
Think of the last time the following situation occurred: It's near the end of the semester. The term paper
you were assigned at the beginning of the semester is due very soon. You have not begun work on this
paper. There are reasons why you have been procrastinating on this task.
Rate each of the following reasons on a 5-point scale according to how much it reflects why you









1.You were concerned the lecturer
wouldn't like your work.
2. You had a hard time knowing
what to include and what not to
include in your paper.
3. You waited until a classmate did
his/hers, so that he/she could give
you some advice.
4. You had too many other things to do.
5. There's some information you needed a
to ask the lecturer, but you felt
uncomfortable approaching him/her.
6. You were worried you would get a
a bad grade.
7. You resented having to do things a
assigned by others.
8. You didn't think you knew enough to a
write the paper.
9. You really dislike writing term papers, a
10.You felt overwhelmed by the task. a
11 .You had difficulty requesting a








12.You looked forward to the
excitement of doing this task at the
last minute.
13.You couldn't choose among all
the topics.
14.You were concerned that if
you did well, your classmates would
resent you.
15.You didn't trust yourself to do
a good job.
16.You didn't have enough energy
to begin the task.
17.You felt it just takes too long to
write a term paper.
18.You liked the challenge of waiting
until the deadline.
19.You know that your classmates
hadn't started the paper either.
20.You resented people setting
deadlines for you.
21.You were concerned you wouldn't
meet your own expectations.
22.You were concerned that if you
got a good grade, people would have
higher expectations of you in the future.
23.You waited to see if the
lecturer would give you some more
information about the paper.
24.You set very high standards for
yourself and you worried that you
wouldn't be able to meet those standards.
25.You just felt too lazy to write a
term paper.
26.Your friends were pressuring you
to do other things.
APPENDIX 14
SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS ANALYSIS (PRELIMINARY SCALE)
468
Appendix 15 Item frequency distribution: Combined sample (Preliminary scale)
upset risk boring diet painful power¬
others rejection tasks control memory less sacrifices
% % % % % % %
absent 5.8% 12.9% 21.0% 51.7% 20.5% 7.4% 46.3%
mild 8.2% 19.6% 17.3% 20.4% 19.9% 16.6% 25.9%
moderate 32.8% 24.2% 21.6% 14.3% 24.2% 21.8% 17.1%
strong 32.8% 24.8% 22.5% 5.5% 19.3% 32.6% 7.0%
very strong 20.4% 18.4% 17.6% 8.2% 16.2% 21.5% 3.7%
safe past waste unfinish disagree¬ continue
situation doubts injustice time work ments situation
% % % % % % %
absent 23.2% 8.3% 19.3% 21.0% 11.2% 12.2% 21.3%
mild 19.5% 21.1% 19.3% 23.2% 20.7% 17.6% 13.1%
moderate 18.9% 22.9% 17.1% 20.1% 25.5% 22.5% 11.9%
strong 14.9% 27.5% 20.8% 22.3% 25.8% 23.7% 19.5%
very strong 23.5% 20.2% 23.5% 13.4% 16.7% 24.0% 34.1%
loss iqnored restriction
task
hassle support unfair life buzz
% % % % % % %
absent 19.0% 22.9% 12.2% 28.7% 19.5% 33.4% 41.3%
mild 20.5% 21.0% 18.6% 20.7% 21.9% 18.2% 14.4%
moderate 18.7% 26.5% 29.0% 24.4% 17.9% 15.2% 19.6%
strong 15.9% 22.0% 22.6% 16.5% 22.5% 13.1% 17.1%













% % % % % % %
absent 22.6% 19.5% 23.4% 14.7% 7.6% 11.9% 28.6%
mild 30.5% 24.7% 27.4% 11.3% 13.4% 18.8% 19.8%
moderate 20.1% 25.3% 22.8% 15.9% 25.6% 23.1% 20.7%
strong 15.2% 18.0% 15.8% 23.9% 29.0% 22.2% 16.1%

















% % % % % % %
absent 15.6% 9.4% 47.4% 17.0% 39.5% 21.6% 33.5%
mild 12.6% 14.9% 13.3% 23.1% 24.0% 26.5% 28.0%
moderate 20.2% 26.7% 9.9% 22.8% 14.9% 25.3% 23.8%
strong 23.3% 25.8% 10.2% 20.4% 12.2% 16.5% 10.7%
very strong 28.2% 23.1% 19.2% 16.7% 9.4% 10.1% 4.0%
lapse of being
comfort¬ taking self- disturbed under¬ emotional
able time discipline feelings stood control confident
% % % % % % %
absent 40.6% 41.2% 29.9% 14.0% 21.9% 7.6% 18.2%
mild 20.0% 20.7% 24.1% 18.5% 28.3% 19.0% 20.7%
moderate 19.4% 14.0% 16.5% 23.7% 24.6% 22.0% 24.9%
strong 14.2% 18.3% 16.2% 23.1% 18.2% 24.2% 21.9%














% % % % % % %
absent 35.0% 27.1% 24.6% 25.8% 14.6% 20.4% 15.2%
mild 23.1% 16.4% 20.1% 22.5% 18.2% 20.4% 17.9%
moderate 17.9% 21.6% 20.7% 22.5% 20.1% 27.1% 22.2%
strong 15.8% 14.9% 19.8% 18.2% 24.6% 19.1% 22.5%
very strong 8.2% 20.1% 14.9% 10.9% 22.5% 13.1% 22.2%
interfere emotional
from self deprive task personal
others change (now) let down effort obstruct flaws
% % % % % % %
absent 22.3% 52.0% 41.6% 8.5% 33.4% 14.1% 15.3%
mild 21.6% 19.0% 16.8% 20.7% 27.4% 19.0% 19.0%
moderate 23.8% 16.2% 14.4% 23.2% 19.8% 28.1% 22.6%
strong 20.4% 8.3% 12.5% 25.3% 11.6% 28.4% 24.2%
very strong 11.9% 4.6% 14.7% 22.3% 7.9% 10.4% 19.0%
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Appendix 15 (continued)









% % % % % % %
absent 25.2% 25.9% 8.8% 22.3% 37.3% 25.6% 29.6%
mild 13.1% 26.2% 14.0% 9.8% 25.1% 23.8% 27.1%
moderate 17.3% 23.5% 21.3% 17.4% 22.3% 25.0% 20.7%
strong 19.5% 17.7% 26.1% 22.0% 9.8% 15.9% 14.3%
very strong 24.9% 6.7% 29.8% 28.7% 5.5% 9.8% 8.2%
quick
emotional task difficult relation in the unfair
relief perfect tasks loss mood trapped chanqe
% % % % % % %
absent 11.9% 7.3% 40.7% 17.7% 8.2% 8.2% 13.5%
mild 14.3% 11.9% 23.7% 15.5% 19.5% 11.9% 16.0%
moderate 19.2% 22.2% 16.7% 19.8% 26.4% 21.3% 25.2%
strong 25.3% 30.4% 12.2% 21.3% 28.0% 23.8% 26.4%





% % % %
absent 24.8% 22.9% 9.8% 15.0%
mild 17.1% 19.8% 15.3% 19.6%
moderate 15.9% 28.7% 26.9% 26.9%
strong 19.6% 18.9% 31.5% 24.5%
very strong 22.6% 9.8% 16.5% 14.1%
Appendix 16 Four-factor component Matrix (Preliminary scale)3
471
Component
1 2 3 4
extra problems .705
disturbed feelings .691 -.338
easy solutions .687
upsetting tasks .679
interference from others .654
quick emotional relief .645 -.386




























in the mood .553 -.334





difficult tasks .514 -.338 .304
oppositional beliefs .513 .392
relationship work .513 -.302
unfair change .510 .339
disorganisation .510 .413 .371
craziness .507
continuing situation .496 -.338
safe situation .495
task interest .491 -.371
task hassle .490 -.407
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Appendix 16 Four-factor component Matrix (Preliminary scale)3
472
Component
1 2 3 4
lapse of self-discipline .488 .449
relationship loss .484














unfinished work .355 .501 .377
waste time .302 .499
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis,
a. 4 components extracted.
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Appendix 17 Four-factor rotated component matrix: Complete item
loadings (Preliminary scale)
Component
1 2 3 4
quick emotional relief .716 9.932E-02 .257 8.053E-02
disturbed feelings .709 .129 .265 .174
thoughts .680 4.304E-02 .208 8.620E-02
continuing situation .647 3.585E-02 6.396E-02 .146
extra problems .627 .156 .379 .154
slipping back .599 .219 4.801 E-02 .283
morbid thoughts .576 5.203E-02 .333 8.072E-02
unfair life .569 .321 .199 4.459E-02
painful memories .569 .178 .186 .112
craziness .562 .201 3.406E-03 .170
emotional control .547 .110 .199 .279
emotional deprivation
(now)
.544 .376 .116 4.195E-02
loss .534 .185 .245 9.468E-02
upsetting tasks .522 .150 .475 .138
easy solutions .516 .181 .480 .118
support .487 .253 .216 5.050E-02
emotional neglect
(parents)
.444 .310 -3.761 E-02 .191
safe situation .437 6.541 E-03 .361 .132
relationship loss .426 .265 .180 -8.604E-03
risk rejection .405 .162 .180 3.465E-02
neglect of others .392 .332 2.735E-02 .162
disagreements .391 -7.172E-02 .305 .192
trapped .389 .359 .194 .209
below par .366 .121 .299 .336
powerless .342 .227 -2.950E-03 .260
appreciation .199 .663 .113 .146
disrespect .123 .654 .170 .221
ignored .128 .619 5.691 E-02 3.623E-02
oppositional acts .161 .605 .213 .111
oppositional beliefs 8.534E-02 .596 .195 .170
gratification delay .149 .532 .335 .198
unfair change 4.286E-02 .530 .324 .151
task obstruction 6.671 E-02 .524 .201 .461
buzz .119 .522 1.953E-02 -3.084E-02
understanding .344 .518 8.638E-02 .230
restriction .156 .515 3.752E-02 .207
indulge 3.720E-02 .513 .323 -.142
submission 4.318E-02 .509 .332 .198
let down .345 .499 .222 .158
relationship difficulty .322 .483 .172 .119
waiting 7.709E-02 .454 .332 .328
being understood .365 .444 .149 .197
relationship work .406 .433 7.589E-02 9.644E-03
past injustice .382 .421 .135 8.845E-02
confidence .289 .377 .258 .364
difficult tasks .218 4.617E-02 .680 5.976E-02




1 2 3 4
persistence .156 .295 .623 1.161E-02
time pressure .340 .132 .610 .176
in the mood .219 .205 .607 3.946E-02
task interest 5.854E-02 .277 .594 5.601 E-02
effort .282 .203 .567 5.959E-03
self change .108 .112 .548 .160
task hassle .187 .270 .543 -9.382E-02
freedom from hassles .418 .148 .539 .115
disrupted routines .210 .163 .515 .390
comfortable .304 .283 .501 -6.644E-03
interference from others .227 .351 .441 .344
self conscious .351 -4.973E-02 .386 .260
sacrifices 6.717E-02 .314 .369 .125
unfinished work 5.416E-02 .109 2.652E-02 .745
disorganisation .183 .140 .173 .710
lapse of self-discipline .243 .153 7.772E-02 .655
waste time 9.469E-02 .101 -5.688E-02 .649
task perfectionism .165 .207 3.779E-02 .587
taking time .182 .117 .195 .465
doubts .312 .206 .282 .414
Appendix 18 Five-factor rotated component matrix (preliminary scale)3 475
Component
1 2 3 4 5
disturbed feelings .698
quick emotional relief .689
thoughts .644
continuing situation .640
extra problems .624 .374






morbid thoughts .532 .349 .330
upsetting tasks .529 .466


















gratification delay .537 .324
task obstruction .526 .453






let down .339 .498
relationship difficulty .350 .489
waiting .458 .328 .327
being understood .350 .442
relationship work .409 .433
past injustice .406 .426
confidence .301 .383 .371
difficult tasks .680
persistence .625
in the mood .624
task interest .613




freedom from hassles .444 .523
disrupted routines .508 .396
comfortable .334 .485
interference from others .354 .438 .345
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Appendix 18 Five-factor rotated component matrix (preliminary scale)3 476
Component
1 2 3 4 5









below par .308 .322 .322 .387
trapped .338 .348 .358
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 13 iterations.
Appendix 19 Six-factor rotated component matrix3 All
Component
















let down .433 .411
being understood .414
past injustice .402 .301
relationship work .385 .374
morbid thoughts .705
thoughts .690
quick emotional relief .690
disturbed feelings .661
craziness .615
painful memories .579 .326
continuing situation .550
extra problems .547 .348
below par .502 .318
emotional control .501
slipping back .476 .417
upsetting tasks .469 .417 .311
trapped .366 .442
unfair life .415 .373
difficult tasks .694
in the mood .645
time pressure .621
persistence .311 .615
task interest .312 .608
effort .598
self change .548
disrupted routines .493 .389
freedom from hassles .330 .474 .372
comfortable .471
task hassle .333 .464
easy solutions .383 .458
self conscious .430









confidence .326 .378 .354
powerless
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Appendix 19 Six-factor rotated component matrix3
Component










neglect of others .318 .365
disagreements .526
loss .413 .435
safe situation .317 .405
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations.
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% % % % % % %
1 8.7% 4.5% 12.3% 6.6% 7.6% 8.7% 9.6%
2 19.6% 15.1% 27.6% 16.6% 20.2% 28.0% 28.3%
3 31.6% 28.1% 25.5% 26.2% 17.5% 27.1% 35.2%
4 23.8% 34.7% 21.3% 31.9% 30.5% 20.2% 16.3%
5 16.3% 17.5% 13.2% 18.7% 24.2% 16.0% 10.5%
Unfair life
Disorgani
sation Crazy Ignored Potential Thoughts
Easy
solution
% % % % % % %
1 20.2% 7.2% 17.5% 14.5% 10.8% 10.8% 14.2%
2 22.0% 24.7% 14.8% 26.0% 13.6% 19.9% 28.2%
3 22.3% 20.5% 14.5% 25.4% 27.7% 13.6% 26.1%
4 17.5% 30.4% 25.7% 20.2% 26.5% 25.6% 19.7%















% % % % % % %
1 13.9% 5.1% 7.5% 7.2% 17.2% 13.3% 8.4%
2 29.1% 14.7% 16.5% 19.6% 34.9% 26.0% 24.4%
3 32.4% 18.2% 22.5% 24.7% 23.2% 27.8% 28.9%
4 14.8% 37.3% 36.3% 27.7% 16.0% 18.1% 21.4%
5 9.7% 24.7% 17.1% 20.8% 8.7% 14.8% 16.9%
In the Understa Task Disturbed Appreciat Task
mood nding satisfy feelings Effort ion perfect
% % % % % % %
1 4.5% 3.9% 14.6% 8.7% 23.9% 9.9% 8.4%
2 24.1% 13.9% 23.1% 14.5% 33.8% 21.1% 21.3%
3 32.2% 22.9% 28.0% 22.3% 24.8% 23.8% 27.9%
4 22.6% 32.2% 21.3% 25.3% 12.1% 26.2% 29.4%
5 16.6% 27.1% 13.1% 29.2% 5.4% 19.0% 12.9%
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Appendix 20 (continued) Frustration-Discomfort Revised scale: Frequency analysis
Freedom
Task Consider from Sub¬ Continue Work
Hassle ation Doubts hassles mission situation control
% % % % % % %
1 15.9% 3.3% 8.4% 21.5% 9.6% 20.2% 5.4%
2 28.8% 18.3% 20.1% 31.7% 31.3% 15.7% 15.4%
3 29.4% 27.0% 28.2% 21.1% 30.7% 16.3% 26.6%
4 14.1% 32.4% 24.9% 16.9% 21.1% 22.3% 35.3%
5 11.7% 18.9% 18.3% 8.8% 7.2% 25.6% 17.2%
Dis¬ Self- Morbid Task Unfair Waste
Indulge respect discipline thoughts hassle change time
% % % % % % %
1 24.5% 4.5% 14.2% 14.5% 12.1% 7.8% 15.5%
2 27.3% 12.4% 29.3% 21.7% 29.6% 18.1% 21.9%
3 28.5% 24.8% 26.3% 19.0% 30.2% 25.3% 30.4%
4 13.0% 34.4% 19.3% 21.7% 18.1% 28.3% 20.1%
5 6.7% 23.9% 10.9% 23.2% 10.0% 20.5% 12.2%
Emotion Past Disrupted Other's Difficult
control Persist Criticism Deprive routines behaviour life
% % % % % % %
1 7.9% 11.2% 4.8% 36.4% 20.2% 10.6% 21.5%
2 12.7% 24.3% 19.0% 24.7% 29.3% 23.0% 25.4%
3 19.6% 29.2% 25.7% 18.2% 23.9% 25.8% 18.4%
4 28.7% 24.0% 27.8% 10.2% 14.8% 25.8% 18.4%
5 31.1% 11.2% 22.7% 10.5% 11.8% 14.8% 16.3%
Appendix 21 Revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale: Full scale reliability analysis and
correlation with Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale
Corrected item-total Correlation
correlation with self-esteem
Qi Painful memories .49 -.36
Q2 Time pressure .46 -.33
Q3 Immediate gratification .50 -.20
Q4 Waiting .48 -.10
Q5 Emotional relief .58 -.33
Q6 Task interest .51 -.24
Q7 Oppositional acts .64 -.21
Q8 Unfair life .54 -.26
Q9 Disorganised .45 -.20
Q10 Craziness .55 -.41
Qll Ignored .56 -.25
Q12 Potential .48 -.14
Q13 Thoughts .66 -.50
Q14 Easy solutions .59 -.36
Q15 Task obstruction .62 -.13
Q16 Past injustice .47 -.09
Q17 Goal frustration .50 -.17
Q18 Upsetting situations .65 -.40
Q19 Difficult tasks .53 -.34
Q20 Personal standards .49 -.21
Q21 Extra problems .71 -.47
Q22 In the mood .55 -.30
Q23 Understanding .53 -.21
Q24 Unfinished tasks .51 -.24
Q25 Disturbed feelings .66 -.59
Q26 Effort .61 -.42
Q27 Appreciation .57 -.21
Q28 Task perfection .59 -.34
Q29 Time hassle .50 -.36
Q30 Consideration .54 -.16
Q31 Doubts .54 -.38
Q32 Freedom from hassle .66 -.39
Q33 Submission .62 -.25
Q34 Continuing situation .61 -.52
Q35 Work control .55 -.24
Q36 Indulgence .52 -.21
Q37 Disrespect .50 -.09
Q38 Self-discipline .60 -.26
Q39 Morbid thoughts .57 -.40
Q40 Task hassle .64 -.36
Q41 Unfair change .55 -.12
Q42 Waste time .44 -.07
Q43 Emotional control .58 -.34
Q44 Persistence .63 -.25
Q45 Criticism .53 -.12
Q46 Past deprivation .59 -.32
Q47 Disrupted routines .61 -.34
Q48 Other's behaviour .50 -.15
Q49 Difficult life .66 -.50
Alpha = .958
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Appendix 22 'MAP' analysis:








2 I can't stand the stress of too many demands on my time .572
6 I can't stand doing tasks that I'm not interested in .513
14 I need the easiest way around problems; .642
I can't stand making a hard time of it
19 I can't stand doing tasks that seem too difficult .669
21 I can't bear to experience extra problems .751
22 I can't stand doing tasks when I'm not in the mood .619
26 I can't stand having to push myself at tasks .715
29 I can't stand the hassle of having to do things right now .636
31 I can't bear to make decisions about which I'm uncertain .549
32 I can't stand the slightest hassle in my daily life .720
40 I can't stand doing things that involve a lot of hassle .771
44 I can't stand having to persist at unpleasant tasks .657



















Appendix 22 (continued) 'MAP' analysis:
Four-factor Revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale (r > 0.45)
483
ENTITLEMENT
3 I can't stand having to wait for things I would like now
4 I can't stand having to wait when I want to get on with tasks
7 I can't stand it if other people act against my wishes
8 I can't stand life being so unfair when I have not deserved it
11 I can't tolerate being overlooked
15 I can't bear it if other people stand in the way ofwhat I want
16 I can't bear to have been treated unjustly
23 I can't stand being left in the dark with no explanations
27 I can't tolerate being taken for granted
30 I can't tolerate being treated with a lack of consideration
33 I can't stand having to give into other people's demands
36 I can't stand giving up immediate pleasures for the sake of a distant goal
37 I can't tolerate being treated with disrespect
41 I can't stand having to change when others are at fault
45 I can't tolerate criticism especially when I know I'm right
46 I can't bear being deprived now of things I lacked in the past





































Appendix 22 (continued) 'MAP' analysis:







I II III IV
1 1 can't tolerate painful memories .572
5 I must be free of disturbing feelings as quickly as possible;
I can't bear if they continue
.648 .475
10 I can't bear to feel that I am losing my mind .612 .471 .456
13 I can't bear to have certain thoughts .753 .542 .500 .469
18 I can't stand situations where I might feel upset .627 .599 .520 .459
25 I can't bear disturbing feelings .770 .523 .500 .470
34 I can't get on with my life, or be happy, if things don't change .616 .486 .520 .456
39 I can't bear sad or morbid thoughts .705 .501
43 I can't stand to lose control ofmy feelings .590 .484 .456
49 I can't stand life being so difficult for me .645 .565 .548 .471
Alpha .901
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Appendix 22 (continued) 'MAP' analysis:








9 I can't stand the frustration of being disorganised .436
12 I can't stand being prevented from achieving my full potential .588 .473
17 I can't bear the frustration of not achieving my goals .588 .479
20 I can't tolerate lowering my standards even when it would be useful to do so .561
24 I can't bear to move on from work I'm not fully satisfied with .588
28 I can't stand doing a job if I'm unable to do it well .593 .488 .474 .473
35 I can't stand feeling that I'm not on top ofmy work .621 .455
38 I can't tolerate any lapse in my self-discipline .622 .455 .522 .509
42 I can't bear to 'waste' time .509
Alpha .849
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Appendix 23 'MAP' analysis:
Five-factor Revised Frustration-Discomfort Scale (r > 0.45)








3 I can't stand having to wait for things I would like now .605 .403
4 I can't stand having to wait when I want to get on with tasks .488 .434
7 I can't stand it if other people act against my wishes .627 .575
11 I can't tolerate being overlooked .598 .561
15 I can't bear it if other people stand in the way ofwhat I want .687 .570
33 I can't stand having to give into other people's demands .590 .554
36 I can't stand giving up immediate pleasures for the sake of a distant goal .515 .426









8 I can't stand life being so unfair when I have not deserved it .475 .452
16 I can't bear to have been treated unjustly .514 .442
23 I can't stand being left in the dark with no explanations .541 .468
27 I can't tolerate being taken for granted .686 .540
30 I can't tolerate being treated with a lack of consideration .673 .514
37 I can't tolerate being treated with disrespect .679 .515
41 I can't stand having to change when others are at fault .691 .599
45 I can't tolerate criticism especially when I know I'm right .529 .552





Appendix 24 Frustration-Discomfort Revised Scale.
Means and standard deviations by gender: Clinical group (N = 254)
Male (105) Female (149)
Frustration-Discomfort (four-factor) 88.8 (20.4) 92.2 (20.9)
Comfort 19.7 (6.1) 21.0 (6.6)
Entitlement 22.3 (6.4) 22.0 (6.1)
Emotional discomfort 24.4 (6.4) 26.5 (6.4)
Achievement 22.5 (5.7) 22.8 (6.4)
Frustration-Discomfort (five-factor) 111.2 (25.4) 114.6(25.3)
Fairness 24.6 (6.1) 24.6 (5.7)
Gratification 20.1 (6.6) 19.8 (6.7)
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Appendix 25 Frustration-Discomfort Revised Scale.
Normative statistics (four-factor): Clinical group (N = 254)
Comfort Entitlement Emotional Achievement Total
Discomfort
Mean 20.43 22.09 25.60 22.67 90.79
Std. Deviation 6.46 6.21 6.54 6.10 20.70
Skewness Z-value 0.93 -0.73 -4.26 -0.93 -1.07
Kurtosis Z-value -2.43 -2.07 -1.07 -1.47 -0.47
Percentiles 5 10 12 12 12 55
10 12 13 16 14 63
20 14 17 20 17 73
25 15 18 22 18 77
50 20 23 26 23 91
75 25 27 31 27 106
80 27 27 32 28 110
90 29 30 33 31 118
95 31 32 34 33 124
Appendix 26 Frustration-Discomfort Revised Scale.
Normative statistics (five-factor): Clinical group (N = 254)
Fairness Gratification Total
Mean 24.60 19.88 113.18
Std. Deviation 5.88 6.30 25.33
Skewness Z-value -1.50 1.37 -0.98
Kurtosis Z-value -1.90 -2.40 -1.58
Percentiles 5 14 10 69
10 17 11 78
20 19 14 91
25 20 15 96
50 25 20 113
75 29 25 132
80 29 26 137
90 33 29 147
95 34 30 154
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Appendix 27 Frustration-Discomfort Revised Scale.
Normative statistics (four-factor): Non-clinical group (N = 124)
Comfort Entitlement Emotional Achievement Total
Discomfort
Mean 17.63 19.52 18.49 20.70 76.35
Std. Deviation 4.65 4.41 5.09 5.03 15.30
Skewness Z-value 1.68 -0.68 0.09 -0.45 -1.34
Kurtosis Z-value 0.86 -0.70 -1.65 -1.44 -0.69
Percentiles 5 10 11 10 12 49
10 12 14 12 14 55
20 14 16 13 16 65
25 15 16 15 17 66
50 18 20 19 21 77
75 20 23 23 24 89
80 21 23 23 26 91
90 23 25 26 27 95
95 27 26 27 29 100
Appendix 28 Frustration-Discomfort Revised Scale.
Normative statistics (five-factor): Non-clinical group (N = 124)
Fairness Gratification Total
Mean 22.14 17.35 96.31
Std. Deviation 4.95 4.16 18.82
Skewness Z-value -1.68 0.14 -1.46
Kurtosis Z-value -0.79 -0.06 -0.49
Percentiles 5 14 10 62
10 16 12 71
20 18 14 81
25 19 15 85
50 22 17 99
75 26 20 111
80 27 21 112
90 28 23 120
95 29 24 124
